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Foreword
Climate change threatens to make the already difficult 
situation of food security in the world even worse. The 
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) – based on the evalu-
ation of many scientific studies – has made a critical 
assessment of the possible impacts of climate change 
on agriculture, livestock and fishing, particularly in the 
countries of the tropics and sub-tropics. The Food and 
Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) 
also warns about the negative consequences, in particu-
lar for smallholder subsistence farmers in what are in 
any case marginalized regions of Africa, Asia and Latin 
America. In view of the threat of more famine, the 
Human Rights Council of the United Nations has also 
started to examine the question of the responsibility of 
the international community of states in terms of hu-
man rights when it comes to dealing with the need to 
adapt to climate change. In particular, there is a need to 
provide support for vulnerable people in special need 
of protection, who are not able to cope with the conse-
quences of climate change on their own.
“Bread for the World”, the development organisation 
of the Protestant church in Germany, has always paid 
particular attention to fighting hunger and its structural 
causes. Climate change presents this work with a new 
challenge, as it threatens what has already been achieved 
in some areas and causes new problems in other areas of 
the world. Food security and climate change is therefore 
a strategic topic both in the international programme 
work and in respect of lobbying on development policy. 
“Germanwatch”, an environmental and development 
organisation, which has closely observed and followed 
the international negotiations on climate change since 
their inception, has placed great emphasis on food secu-
rity during climate change from an early stage, includ-
ing the aspect of climate policy. Here the significance of 
adaptation and the financing of adaptation has become 
increasingly important over recent years, because this 
issue is decisive for the poorest developing countries and 
island states.
“Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe”, the humanitarian aid 
organisation of the German Protestant Church, is striv-
ing to embed disaster-risk reduction and adaptation to 
climate change as crossing-cutting issues in both relief 
and rehabilitation. “Building back better” concerns not 
only houses but also livelihoods, therefore “Diakonie 
Katastrophenhilfe” closely cooperates with “Bread for 
the World” to strengthen the common approach to food 
security as well as to adaptation to climate change.
Together we want to document in this study important 
facts about the relationship between climate change 
and food security, evaluate these facts systematically 
and incorporate them in policy recommendations for 
the national and international level, focussing on the 
development of policies to adapt to climate change. 
Stuttgart, October 2008
Danuta Sacher  
Head of the Policy & Campaign Department 
Bread for the World
Klaus Milke 
Chairman 
Germanwatch
Volker Gerdesmeier 
Head of Department Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe
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Executive summary
1. This study has been written in order to get a good 
overview about the impacts of climate change on food 
security and the relevance of the right to adequate food. 
This study process was started with two specific motiva-
tions:
(1) While the number of publications and studies on 
climate change and its impact is rapidly growing, less in-
formation is available to understand the particular risks 
for those persons and groups who are malnourished or 
at the brink of becoming hungry. This study shall there-
fore sharpen the view of the problems these groups face 
and it shall systematize how the global mega trend of cli-
mate change might impact these marginalized groups. 
(2) The study shall secondly look into the political di-
mension of climate change. Policy decisions of the next 
decade will largely determine the dimension of the 
problem in this century. 
2. This study is based on the assumption that a two-di-
mensional response to climate change is needed: avoid-
ing the unmanageable (mitigation) and managing the 
unavoidable (adaptation). 
(1) Avoiding the unmanageable is directed to the need 
to prevent dangerous climate change. According to an 
emerging consensus among scientists, it is needed to 
limit global warming to a temperature increase below 
2°C as compared to pre-industrial levels. In order to stay 
below that limit, industrialized countries need to take 
the lead for a drastic cut in emissions. Globally, emis-
sions have to be reduced by 50 to 85 percent until 2050 
against 1990 levels. The global emissions should peak 
during the next decade. 
(2) Managing the unavoidable means that sound adapta-
tion policies are needed to deal with the consequences 
of climate change, which are already increasingly visible 
today. The special focus of the study is on the adapta-
tion needs particularly related to food security and the 
realization of the right to adequate food. But the au-
thors see that unmitigated climate change could easily 
overwhelm adaptation possibilities in many parts of the 
world. 
3. The impact of climate change on food security will be 
substantive. The increasing surface temperature influ-
ences factors very relevant for food security as precipita-
tion, water availability, weather extremes, and sea level 
rise. If certain tipping points are passed, entire conti-
nents can be heavily affected. Better regional and local 
assessments are needed to identify more specifically the 
risks of climate change, especially in developing coun-
tries. The debate so far is biased towards global food 
security concerns, i.e. the global balance of how much 
and where food can be produced. But the impact on 
hunger and malnutrition can only be well estimated, if 
the effects on the household level are taken into consid-
eration. Climate change will impact persons and groups 
that are already vulnerable to food insecurity. But there 
will also be new groups affected by climate change. 
4. Adaptation to the adverse impacts of climate change 
has long been neglected as a development issue, both 
by most governmental and nongovernmental organi-
sations. Until recently, adaptation was also not at the 
centre of UN-climate negotiations. By now it has be-
come clear that the additional benefits of adaptation 
to climate change will be huge and that early action 
is cheaper than a post-disaster response, even though 
there are still many uncertainties in existing adaptation 
cost estimates. 
5. Adaptation requires substantive investments in infra-
structure such as dams, flood-resistant storage facilities, 
and techniques for reducing water loss in distribution 
systems etc. It requires monitoring weather extremes 
and developing disaster preparation strategies. Higher 
prices for agricultural inputs, water, and food imports 
must be expected. Capacity building in communities 
particularly at risk, in national, regional, and local ad-
ministrations etc. is of utmost importance and will re-
quire resources. 
The direct and indirect consequences of climate change 
on food, water and health have the potential to influ-
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ence the realization of the MDGs. Additionally, climate 
impacts and adaptation needs will use resources that 
would have otherwise been available to realize the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
„How the world deals with climate change to-
day will have a direct bearing on the human 
development prospects of a large section of hu-
manity“ (UNDP 2007, 8). 
6. One clear recommendation of this study is that UN 
climate negotiations should create a reliable financial 
basis in order to manage the unavoidable. Substantial 
financial resources in addition to existing commitments 
of developing countries to provide 0.7 percent of their 
GNI are needed to cope with the expected adaptation 
needs for developing countries. However, more funding 
does not necessarily mean that the money reaches the 
most vulnerable groups. The rights-based framework 
should be considered by UNFCCC, as it has the poten-
tial to help measure progress, review government activi-
ties, and generate resources.
Climate change, food security and groups at risk
7. Key concept in the United Nations to measure the 
food and nutrition situation of people and groups is the 
term „food security“. The latest standard definition used 
in the FAO (2007b, 6) is 
„Food security exists when all people at all 
times have physical or economic access to suf-
ficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their 
dietary needs and food preferences for an ac-
tive and healthy life. To achieve food security, 
all four of its components must be adequate. 
These are: availability, stability, accessibility and 
utilization.“ 
Additionally, food security depends on a variety of un-
derlying determinants. Food must be nutritious and 
safe. The body must be in a condition to consume food 
without becoming ill. UNICEF and other nutritionists 
emphasize the fact that half of the children dying from 
hunger are not dying because of missing food supply, 
but because they cannot digest this food due to sick-
ness, e.g. diarrhea (Eide 2001). The study uses the 
three different levels of food security (global, national 
and household food security) to describe the effects of 
climate change. 
8. In order to deal adequately with the impact of cli-
mate change on food security, the work has to start with 
a good analysis of those groups which are particularly 
marginalized today. They will often be the most affected 
by climate change and they have very limited coping 
capacities. Given the crucial role of marginalization in 
the food security debate, it is clear that agricultural and 
food production problems cannot be tackled at the tech-
nical level. The situation of the rural poor has been ag-
gravated by the fact that rural areas were neglected in 
regional, national, and international policy making. 
9. A person or a family is a vulnerable person or family 
due to their livelihood situation and their factor endow-
ment. Often government response is decisive in wheth-
er the vulnerable situation translates into persistence of 
or additional hunger or malnutrition. A given (insuffi-
cient) factor endowment of families is already partially a 
result of government policy. Using the right to adequate 
food will therefore be very helpful in designing adapta-
tion policies. In regard to increasing the accountability 
of governments, it will help guide the implementation 
of effective adaptation policies. 
10. By now it is scientifically well established, that 
„the impacts of climate change will fall dispro-
portionately upon developing countries and the 
poor persons within all countries, and thereby 
exacerbate inequities in health status and ac-
cess to adequate food, clean water, and other 
resources“ (IPCC 2001, 12). 
The impact of climate change will be particularly sub-
stantial on smallholder and subsistence agriculture. 
Their livelihood systems, particularly in low latitudes, 
will be affected by major changes due to climate change. 
The farming system will be directly affected by chang-
ing weather patterns, sea level rise, and the increase 
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in frequency and intensity of extreme events. The pro-
ductivity of livestock and fisheries systems will also be 
affected, as well as potential income from collecting ac-
tivities in forests. 
11. The impact analyses of the study concludes that the 
specific family situation needs to be taken into account, 
because livelihood systems are typically complex and a 
number of factors interfere. Several crops and livestock 
species are involved (in intercropping systems etc.) and 
many smallholder livelihoods have a variety of income 
sources, such as the use of wild resources (from for-
ests), remittances, and other non agricultural income 
strategies. Government support can also play a role, but 
so far many of the smallholder farmers are faced with 
marginalization processes in national and international 
agricultural policies. Therefore, support is often unavail-
able or insufficient. Effective adaptation policies should 
start with supporting existing coping and adaptation 
strategies of poorer groups in rural as well as urban en-
vironments. 
Response capacities to climate change – national-
ly and internationally
12. Many developing countries will be most heavily af-
fected, but they have limited response capacities. These 
limitations contribute largely to their particular affected-
ness. They have limits in forecasting changing weather 
conditions, particularly extreme weather events, or to 
invest in infrastructure such as dams or other mecha-
nisms of flood control. 
Response capacities are also needed to enable changes 
in the use of agricultural crops and varieties and irriga-
tion and land use techniques to support affected families 
in order to cope with the need to migrate or to cover the 
cost of other forms of damage to the house or the land 
of the family. It is important to differentiate what part of 
adaptation can be done at the household level, locally, 
by national governments and where is international sup-
port needed.
13. While some priority action needs to be urgently im-
plemented in adapting to the short-term consequences 
of climate change, adaptation must be viewed as a long-
term challenge for societies. „Mainstreaming“, or inte-
gration of this challenge into sectoral and other policies 
and programs at different levels of decision making is 
necessary. 
One priority must be the reduction of vulnerability to 
climate change. At the same time, adaptation policies 
must address negative effects on the most vulnerable 
groups in order to avoid hardship for groups most af-
fected by climate change. Ecosystem management 
plans that allow for multi-sectoral response dealing with 
whole livelihood systems are needed in addition to sec-
toral responses. This study summarizes the instruments 
available for a response at different levels and in key 
vulnerable sectors. The study recommends that adapta-
tion policies need to be closely monitored in order to 
guarantee that the means are spent meaningfully.
14. A human rights-based assessment can help to best 
orient adaptation policies and the use of all instruments 
towards most vulnerable groups and to set priorities on 
who should get support first and what can be imple-
mented progressively. 
One of the strengths of this approach is that it helps to set 
up procedural guarantees for the affected communities 
and people for participation. This includes having access 
to relevant information (transparency) and the right to 
complain. A second strength is that a rights-based ap-
proach requests a specific outcome. Governments have 
to prove that they focus their policy and budget deci-
sions toward the most vulnerable groups and that no 
group is overlooked. Governments have to prove that 
their own adaptation policies do no harm i.e. deprive 
people from access to food or water. 
15. Development cooperation can play a crucial role in 
all stages of the adaptation policies. Different actors can 
play different parts. Bi- and multilateral aid can help in-
tegrating adaptation into policy development. Capacity 
must be built at all stages of the adaptation process in 
developing countries, from disaster preparedness and 
early warning to insurance schemes and policy design 
issues. Other stakeholders, such as the scientific com-
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munity and NGOs, should be included into adaptation 
planning. Aid organisations often have access to the 
most vulnerable groups and they can assist with their 
experiences in project management and implementa-
tion and also by mobilizing internationally available 
knowledge.
16. The financing of adaptation measures will need 
adequate international support. The study discusses 
the UNFCCC-supported National Action Plans for 
Adaptation (NAPAS) as well as the strenght and weak-
nesses of the newly introduced Adaptation Fund under 
the Kyoto Protocol. The UNFCCC process will likely 
take major decisions about the future adaptation process 
at the end of 2009. 
17. This study contains chapters that summarize the re-
gional effects of climate change on food security. This is 
followed by an identification of key affected, vulnerable 
groups and a discussion of the available response capac-
ity of governments and local actors in the regions. These 
regional chapters are summaries of the regional studies 
that have been written in parallel to the cover study. 
Climate change and human rights
18. National policies – regarding health, education, so-
cial services, taxation and subsidies, property rights and 
their legal protection etc. – often reflect the interests of 
powerful sectors and are seldom oriented towards the 
needs of vulnerable and marginalized groups. This is 
true for formal and informal political decision-making 
structures. 
Particularly, marginalized women and men in rural ar-
eas and in poor quarters of urban conglomerates don‘t 
benefit from them. They usually have no access to a 
functioning legal system, land-registration systems, jus-
tice and appeal mechanisms for checking discriminatory 
laws or their practices etc. Not only national govern-
ance, but also international policies can be determinants 
of poverty and exclusion. 
International trade policies often do have a direct im-
pact on the income of poor producers or consumers. 
Policies of multilateral institutions can and sometimes 
do limit states‘ capacities to act in favor of poorer seg-
ments of their societies.
A rights-based orientation for adaptation policies can 
help to overcome such forms of discrimination and 
exclusion. It will probably not be able to overcome all 
forms of institutionalized, historic marginalization, but 
they can at least avoid aggravating existing inequalities. 
Moreover, if adaptation policies are not well designed, 
they might not achieve their own objective – supporting 
those affected the most. Instead, the money is again di-
rected towards those more powerful within the society. 
A rights-based approach stimulates analysis and reflec-
tion on the causes of entitlement-failure and allows a 
more precise description of roles, obligations, and re-
sponsibilities of different actors in the development 
process. It is a way of reducing the accountability-gap 
works against the poor in many countries.
19. A rights-based approach not only asks for an end 
to violation of and for positive outcomes for the most 
vulnerable groups. They also set result-oriented stand-
ards for the political processes. They must be partici-
patory, transparent, and non-discriminatory. To sum 
it up, rights-based adaptation policies are a good tool 
to ensure that the money earmarked for adaptation is 
spend reasonably. It would be helpful if the Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, the FAO, and 
the UNFCCC would develop a rights-based adaptation 
policy checklist that could help governments design ad-
aptation policies accordingly. 
„The impact of climate change will fall dispro-
portionately on the world‘s poorest countries, 
many of them here in Africa. Poor people al-
ready live on the front lines of pollution, dis-
aster, and the degradation of resources and 
land. For them, adaptation is a matter of sheer 
survival“ (UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, ad-
dressing the 12th Conference of the Parties to 
the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, 15 November 2006, Nairobi, 
Kenya).
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Introduction
Bread for the World (BfdW) and Germanwatch have 
initiated this study process on the impact of climate 
change on food security in 2006. BfdW has a particular 
focus in its development work on people and groups 
who are hungry and malnourished or who are at the 
risk of becoming hungry. Germanwatch has a particular 
focus on „climate change and development“ and has 
been following the UN climate change negotiations for 
many years. This study process was started with the 
motivation to learn more about the potential impact of 
climate change on the food security of these most vul-
nerable groups. 
While the number of publications and studies on climate 
change and its impact is rapidly growing, much more in-
formation is still needed to understand the particular ef-
fects on those persons and groups who are malnourished 
or at the brink of becoming hungry. Hunger goes hand 
in hand with poverty. The study shall therefore sharpen 
the view of the problems that these groups face and it 
shall systematize how the global mega trend of climate 
change will impact on these marginalized groups. 
At the same time, it is clear that the size of the problems 
generated by climate change will depend on the politi-
cal decisions of today as well as on the implementation 
of these decisions. Part of climate change is already una-
voidable. However, the less emission reductions will be 
achieved and the higher the temperature increase will 
be in the future, the more severe the implications for 
food security will be, in particular in the low latitude 
areas (IPCC 2007b). Already, the unavoidable con-
sequences will severely challenge people around the 
globe. However, in order to avoid large-scale adverse 
impacts from global warming, global temperature in-
crease should be limited to well below 2°C compared 
to pre-industrial levels.
New scientific information points in an even more am-
bitious direction (Hansen et al 2008). This will require 
global emission reductions of at significantly more than 
50 percent by 2050 compared to 1990. This is a huge 
challenge, while at the same time the potential impact 
on food security for different mitigation scenarios has to 
be investigated. Some guiding questions for the debate 
are posed here: What are the variations in the impact of 
climate change in a continental and regional perspec-
tive? What type of impact will the different emission 
and temperature scenarios have? And what does this 
mean for adaptation policies at the local level?
Secondly, the study shall look into the political dimen-
sion of climate change. Climate change is already visible 
and measurable. The future impact is dependent on the 
effectiveness of climate change mitigation and adapta-
tion policies at the international and national level. The 
specific impact at the local level will, however, depend 
very much on the political adaptation decisions that are 
being taken at the national level and the support vulner-
able groups receive nationally as well as from the inter-
national community. These will determine the quality of 
adaptation policies. 
What do local or national climate change policies look 
like? What are the financial and regulatory capacities 
of relevant actors for the design and implementation of 
adaptation policies? What international conditionalities 
are influencing national level policy reaction? These are 
the questions of interest which need to be studied in 
order to understand what impacts climate change will 
have on hungry and marginalized people. 
Policy decisions at the national and international level 
and the quality of government response will be key for 
the capacity of people to cope with the adverse effects of 
climate change. They will define, to a large extent, the 
severity of its consequences. 
The study shall therefore look into the politics of adap-
tation and help to analyze which policy decisions are 
needed and how national and international policies 
should be designed in order to adequately respond to 
the challenges ahead. The analysis of policies done in 
the study is guided by an understanding of governments‘ 
roles which is derived from the right to food framework. 
More than 30 years ago most countries in the world had 
ratified the International Covenant for Economic, Social 
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and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and thus committed in a 
legally binding manner to protect basic rights, in par-
ticular the right to food.
The overview of research results shall be the basis 
for conclusions on the question: How to effectively 
strengthen the adaptive capacities of the vulnerable 
groups and how to minimize the expected damage of 
climate change on food security? The results shall guide 
on the one hand the future advocacy and project work 
of BfdW and its partners. On the other hand, it shall 
provide those involved in the climate change and food 
security debate to build on these results. 
This study was conducted by Germanwatch in coopera-
tion with Bread for the World and research partners in 
Africa1 and Asia2. The final product consists out of fol-
lowing elements:
(1) Cover study
The cover study will start (I) with an overview of the 
current status of climate change research and food in-
security. It is based on currently available literature, in 
particular the Fourth Assessment Report (FAR) of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
which was released throughout 2007. The International 
Panel on Climate Change is the most authorative re-
search body on climate issues. It brings together the 
peer-reviewed, relevant research results and models the 
potential impact of climate change in different scenari-
os. The third assessment report (TAR) was presented in 
2001 and the fourth one (FAR) was published between 
February 2007 and August 2007 (IPCC 2001 and IPCC 
2007a-d).
The study describes the major trends that climate change 
will have on food security by using all levels of food se-
curity. It gives also an overview of the latest research 
on hunger trends, including an analysis of those groups 
most affected by hunger and malnutrition. It further dis-
cusses what the potential impacts of climate change are 
on these groups. 
This first part is followed by a second part (II) looking 
into the response capacity in developing countries and 
at the international level. 
Part III of the study summarizes the key aspects of three 
regional studies that are being written. The assessment 
of climate change impacts at the regional level is based 
on the projections of current climate models for the dif-
ferent regions in the developing world, namely Africa, 
Asia, and Latin America. 
Each of the chapters will first look into the expected ef-
fects of climate change in the region and particularly on 
the most vulnerable groups, followed by a subchapter 
on the size and quality of adaptation policies needed in 
order to deal with these problems. It will finally look 
into the response capacity at the regional/national 
level. The study will end with a chapter discussing the 
way forward (Part IV), the conclusions and recommen-
dations.
(2) Regional studies3
The three regional studies will look, in more detail, into 
expected climatic changes and the consequences, par-
ticularly for the most vulnerable groups of the society. 
They shall give an overview of the available literature 
1  Stephen O. Anyango (Department of Environmental Science, Kenyatta University, Kenya) and Victor Orindi (International Development 
Research Centre, Kenya)
2 Ferdausur Rahman, Mizanur Rahman Bijoy, Nusrat Habib (all Network on Climate Change, Bangladesh) and Umme Kulsum (Climate 
Change Focal Point, Prodipan)
3 The regional studies that have contributed to this study have been prepared with financial support of the German Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (BMZ). The content expressed exclusively represents the opinions of the authors and the publishing 
organisations.
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and try to answer the question: Which consequences 
from climate change have to be expected on food secu-
rity at a regional or at a country level? 
They will not cover the whole region in detail, but give 
a comprehensive overview accompanied by more in-
depth research on specific countries. Still it is difficult to 
understand the consequences of climate change at the 
local level in detail. This makes these assessments and 
conclusions more difficult. Progress and more efforts in 
regional and national studies are needed in order to bet-
ter understand the specific needs for adaptation policies. 
But there is also a need for new policy models to adapt 
to a future, where weather patterns will be much more 
uncertain. 
Assessing the political response capacity in developing 
countries is particularly relevant to the impact of climate 
change on food security which is discussed both in the 
cover study and in the regional studies. Responding to 
the impacts of climate change will be a very challen ging 
task for many developing countries, as the country/re-
gional examples will show. This challenge comes on top 
of existing problems that are due to a variety of diffe-
rent reasons, both internal and external ones. Poverty is 
widespread in many countries. 
Quite a number of countries are involved in substantive 
internal conflicts or civil wars which are binding most 
of their capacities. Others are badly governed by non 
transparent and non accountable elites. Corruption can 
be a substantive element that hinders effective gover-
nance. 
External reasons that limit the governmental response 
capacity are as complex as the high debt burden (limiting 
the use of available national resources) or international 
policy conditionalities and international agreements 
that restrict the capacity of governments to choose the 
best policy alternatives. 
It is therefore very relevant to study how the current 
status of governance will impact countries‘ ability to 
adopt adequate adaptation policies. While such an anal-
ysis will require very good and detailed country studies 
in the long run, the present study will look into the 
matter, because it is often neglected when adaptation 
policies to climate change are discussed. The three re-
gional studies which are part of this study process shall 
have a particular focus on the political response capacity 
of governments in their region and shall highlight these 
capacity problems in a systematic way.
The political response capacity and willingness to act is 
of high relevance to judge the impact of climate change 
on groups and persons facing hunger and malnutrition 
today, and on other groups threatened to become hun-
gry or malnourished in the future. As we will see below, 
far too many of those groups facing hunger and malnu-
trition today are already faced with a non-responsive or 
not sufficiently responding government. When margin-
alization in national politics is already at the core of their 
problems it is very relevant to consider what happens to 
these groups when their problems might be aggravated 
through climate change. 
The challenge of the study will be to bring these different 
levels of analysis together: The factual impact of climate 
change on agriculture and water, the response capacity 
of political systems to the increasing problems and the 
particular situation of those already faced with hunger 
and malnutrition and those most likely to be threatened 
by hunger. Finally, implications and also potentials of 
the right to food debate for adaptation to climate change 
have to be examined.
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1 Climate change and food  
security – the development of the 
debate
1.1 General observations
The impact of climate change on food security will be 
huge and substantive. The latest forecast by the IPCC 
has been presented with a high degree of certainty. After 
an increase of 0.74°C during the last century, globally 
averaged surface temperature is projected to rise by be-
tween 1.1°C up to 6.4°C by the last decade of the 21st 
century (IPCC 2007a, 13). This temperature increase 
will change the timing and amount of precipitation, and 
the availability of water. It will alter weather trends such 
as wind patterns, and also the intensity and frequency of 
weather extremes, such as droughts, heat waves, floods 
or storms. All key elements of food security are affected 
by climate changed. Generally, there is little doubt that 
the higher the temperature increase the more severe the 
impacts on food security in developing countries will 
be. The latest research results will be presented below 
(chapter 3).
There is no doubt: Climate change is already happening. 
At a civil society meeting in the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) at the beginning of 2008, farmers‘ 
representatives from different regions of the world re-
ported the many changes they are already recognizing. 
Science tells the same story. 
„Observational evidence from all continents 
and most oceans shows that many natural 
systems are being affected by regional climate 
changes, particularly temperature increases“ 
(IPCC 2007b, 2). 
Eleven of the last twelve years (1995-2006) belong to 
the warmest years since the measurement of global 
surface temperature. The increase in global average 
temperature during the last 50 years has been twice 
as much as in the first half of the 20th century. The 
increase in temperature differs regionally. It is higher 
in the temperate climates of the northern and southern 
hemisphere. 
A part of climate change can no longer be avoided: 
Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions accumulate in 
the atmosphere and have a lifetime of several decades, 
thus today we feel the consequences of past emissions. 
This leads to the undeniable fact that even if all anthro-
pogenic emissions were to be stopped immediately, the 
temperature would continue to increase for some dec-
ades, by an estimated 0.6 °C, according to IPCC pro-
jections (IPCC 2007d, 7). However, the world is still 
far away from substantial reductions in greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
Global emissions have increased by more than 25 per-
cent since 1990, with a strong acceleration since the 
year 2000. The increase has three main reasons: In 
Eastern Europe emissions have grown again after a dec-
ade of strong decline, emissions in rapidly developing 
countries – first of all China – grow quickly, and high 
gas prices have caused a strong worldwide shift fom gas 
to coal. As a consequence, worldwide emissions per 
GDP unit increased the first time during the last hun-
dred years. 
The world now faces the challenge to avoid a level 
of climate change that leads to large-scale dangerous 
consequences, as spelled out in Article 2 of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), which was signed by 191 countries (includ-
ing the US) in 1992: 
Part I
Climate change and food insecurity
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„The ultimate objective of this Convention 
and any related legal instruments that the 
Conference of the Parties may adopt is to 
achieve, in accordance with the relevant provi-
sions of the Convention, stabilization of green-
house gas concentrations in the atmosphere at 
a level that would prevent dangerous anthropo-
genic interference with the climate system. Such 
a level should be achieved within a time frame 
sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally 
to climate change, to ensure that food produc-
tion is not threatened and to enable economic 
development to proceed in a sustainable man-
ner“ (United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change/UNFCCC 1992, 4).
Even that early it was recognized that climate change 
may have a negative impact on food production. 
Although this recognition is increasingly being under-
pinned by scientific findings, relatively few studies have 
looked into the matter of climate change and food secu-
rity in detail. 
The second working group, „Climate Change 2007: 
Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability“, of the IPCC‘s 
FAR addresses agricultural issues in several chapters, 
in particular in chapter 3 (Fresh water resources and 
their management, Kundzewicz et al. 2007), chapter 
4 (Ecosystems, their properties, goods and services, 
Fischlin et al. 2007) and chapter 5 (food fibre and for-
est products, Easterling et al. 2007). The fact that the 
Third Assessment Report (TAR) of the IPCC, published 
in 2001, did not contain a chapter on food and fibre 
shows the increasing attention that scientists now pay 
to this problem (IPCC 2001). 
1.2 The initial FAO debate: optimism 
on climate change and food security 
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the 
United Nations has also started to intensify its work 
on the impacts of climate change on food security. The 
High-Level FAO conference held in June 2008 in Rome 
was originally intended to focus on the issue of climate 
change, bio energy and food security, as an expression 
of this increasing attention. The soaring food crisis made 
the organisers change the focus.
The main FAO reports on climate change published 
in the last several years have investigated possible im-
pacts of future climate change on global food security. 
However, these reports reflected the still unresolved un-
certainties of the projections and scenarios available at 
that time (e.g. FAO 2002, 79).
 
The first major chapter 
on the issue of agriculture and climate change was in-
cluded in the 2002 outlook of the FAO: „World agricul-
ture: towards 2015/2030.”
The main reason for the fact that predictions and analy-
sis about costs of adapting to future impacts in the area 
of food production, food security and agriculture vary 
significantly is that the climate models available so far 
are still not best equipped to be precise in the forecast 
for micro or meso changes in the national and regional 
manifestations of climate change. This has different rea-
sons. It is due to limited availability of analyses and a 
larger natural climate variability at the regional scale 
(compared to the global scale). The chaotic nature of 
many of these processes will always limit the possibility 
to forecast them. 
Last not least, other factors (such as land-use change) 
are more influential on the local climatic conditions 
(IPCC 2007b). However, with the recent increase in 
disaggregation of the climate models and scenarios, and 
with more research being done on the regional and na-
tional outcomes, more reliable impact assessments can 
be elaborated on now. One consequence thereof is that 
the available literature on the tools, policies and costs 
for adaption policies is continuously growing. 
While the latest models have become more precise on 
the regional variation of the effects of climate change, it 
has to be noted that most potential feedbacks are not yet 
included. And small scale forecasts have many more un-
certainties than large scale forecasts. Also, particularly 
in developing countries, less and poorer quality data is 
all that is available. Thus, much caution has to be used 
making predictions at smaller scales. 
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„Difficulties remain in reliably simulating and 
attributing observed temperature changes at 
smaller scales. On these scales, natural climate 
variability is relatively larger making it harder 
to distinguish changes expected due to exter-
nal forcing. Uncertainties in local forcing and 
feedbacks also make it difficult to estimate the 
contribution of greenhouse gas increases to ob-
served small-scale temperature changes“ (IPCC 
2007a, 9). 
This also means that adaptation strategies have to be 
developed in a way that they are flexible and can cope 
with the scientific uncertainty as much as possible (see 
also chapter 4.1).
When FAO started some years ago to look into the po-
tential impact of climate change on food security the 
initial conclusions were quite optimistic for the global 
level. However, they took into account adverse effects 
for certain countries. The FAO concluded that in the 
next three decades, climate change is not expected to 
depress global food availability, but that it may increase 
the dependence of developing countries on food imports 
and accentuate food insecurity for vulnerable groups 
and countries (FAO 2003a, 361f). 
In that report, the organization highlighted both areas or 
regions with potential losses and areas or regions with 
potential gains. The FAO estimated that an increase in 
global carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere 
would cause plant stomata to narrow, so helping to re-
duce water losses and to improve the water efficiency 
in agriculture. 
Increasing atmospheric concentrations of carbon diox-
ide were supposed to have a fertilizing effect on many 
crops because they stimulate photosynthesis. Parallel to 
this overall potential positive outcome, it was estimated 
that an increase in surface temperature would create 
benefits for the agriculture in temperate latitudes. 
The FAO projected an increase of areas suitable for crop-
ping, an expansion of the length of the growing period 
and reduced cost for overwintering livestock. However, 
an overall comprehensive analysis of the impacts would 
also have to acknowledge that these gains, combined 
with predicted increasing yields (fertilizer effect of 
CO2), were calculated against losses from adverse im-
pacts, such as the loss or reduced productivity of fertile 
land caused by flooding (due to sea-level rise or extreme 
precipitation events), droughts and other relevant fac-
tors. 
In less well-watered areas, particularly in the tropics, 
the FAO estimated that the rise in temperature would 
increase evapotransporation and lower soil moisture 
levels. Both would lead to processes that render some 
cultivated areas unsuitable for cropping as well as the 
increasing aridity of tropical grassland. The reduction 
of the overall availability of water for irrigation would 
limit the possibility to extend irrigated areas for agri-
culture and would therefore constrain a fast increase in 
future yields. In addition to the water scarcity on arid 
lands, salinisation processes also adversely impact soil 
productivity. Most of the high-yielding varieties used in 
agriculture today require irrigation and optimal inputs 
in form of fertilizer and pesticides in order deliver the 
high yields. 
Another important reason for the optimistic conclusion 
was that the analysis of the impact of climate change on 
food security was still basically oriented towards the glo-
bal equation of food produced versus the world‘s popu-
lation, i.e. „food security“ as global food security. 
1.3 From optimism to acknowledging 
climate change risks
Today three processes are nurturing a change in this 
relative optimism: 
(1) First, the potential losses are becoming clearer, while 
the potential gains are being judged much more skep-
tically. The predictions presented above are only five 
years old but knowledge has increased fast. The evolu-
tion of our understanding will be summarized below in 
chapter 2 and for the regional level in the chapters 7 to 
9. In general the latest trend can be summarized thus: 
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Impacts will be more severe and adaptation costs  
will be higher than expected some years ago, while the 
potential gains in a warmer world are smaller, particu-
larly the gains for agriculture in temperate climates.
The fertilizer effect of CO  2 has been overestimated 
and parallel climate stress on crops is limiting its ef-
fects. 
And the effects of an increasing number and inten- 
sity of weather disasters is becoming clearer. 
(2) Second, the analysis is moving ahead and puts more 
emphasis on the assessment of the impact of climate 
change on particularly vulnerable groups, including the 
interplay of these impacts with factors that determine 
the peoples‘ vulnerability and adaptive capacities. 
(3) The third aspect is the recent development in world 
agricultural markets. The prices for many key agricul-
tural products have gone up to levels unseen in the last 
three decades, caused by factors such as: 
the increasing demand for meat and milk products in  
Asian developing economies such as China and India;
the demand for liquid agro fuels for transportation  
in industrialized countries and in some emerging econo-
mies;
and the high volatility in harvests at the global level  
(see chapter 2.4). 
The combination of these three factors has led to a situ-
ation where production no longer meets demand, and 
the reserves for major crops have been declining rapidly. 
The situation is further worsened by the annual loss of 
productive land. 
This new scenario has triggered alarm bells inside the 
FAO discussions on climate change. As long as a global 
surplus situation was a regular phenomenon, climate 
change was seen as one of many factors influencing 
production. But in a context of increasing problems 
in keeping pace with demand and with the increasing 
world population, the assessment of the severity of the 
impacts has been modified. 
The latest studies express increasing concern regarding 
the negative impact of climate change on food security. 
In order to better understand the impacts and associ-
ated costs of both damages and adaptation measures 
on policy-relevant levels, particularly with regard to the 
most vulnerable groups of society and countries, it is 
of utmost importance to have a second focus, next to 
global food security, on the level of household food se-
curity. The picture of threats clears when the hungry 
and malnourished of today and those currently living at 
the brink of hunger are placed directly in the focus of 
the analysis. 
Global food markets will provide those with purchas-
ing power with sufficient agricultural products and food 
supply. Those who lack an adequate income, those who 
cannot produce enough from their own resources, those 
who do not have enough labor capacity in their family 
or those affected by weather disasters or irregularities 
will have major problems in buying food. The negative 
impact of climate change on food production will have 
an important impact on food prices. The recent fast in-
crease in food price is very likely to trigger an increase 
in relative factor prices for land, water and other pro-
ductive assets.
1.4 A two-dimensional response is 
needed: avoiding dangerous climate 
change and adapting to the unavoidable
This study project is based on the assumption that a 
two-dimensional response to the challenge of climate 
change is needed: to avoid the unmanageable and to 
manage the unavoidable. 
Without increased efforts to limit global warming, adap-
tation to its adverse impacts is likely to become impossi-
ble for millions of people around the world. At the same 
time the unavoidable consequences of climate change 
require the urgent development of effective adaptation 
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strategies. Climate change threatens progress in poverty 
reduction in developing countries, but at the same time 
sustainable poverty reduction strategies generally have 
to be seen as a key element of policies to reduce the 
vulnerability of the poor and to increase their adaptive 
capacity.
1.4.1 Avoiding dangerous climate change:  
limit global warming to below 2°C
There is now little doubt that the higher the global tem-
perature increases the more severe will be the conse-
quences particularly in developing countries. The level 
of global warming depends on how much the world will 
be able to curb its greenhouse gas emissions in the next 
decades. Many of the investment decisions which are 
relevant for decades to come (e.g. coal power plants, 
airplanes) will be made in the next 15 years.
Figure 2 shows the projected sectoral impacts accord-
ing to different levels of temperature increase (above 
1980-1999 levels), and subsequently certain levels of 
greenhouse gas emissions.
These projections are based on the modeling of future 
development – one important pillar of climate change 
research. Such models have – especially on regional 
scale – major uncertainties. Most of the regular models 
look for linear trends that climate change might cause, 
such as the increase in temperature and its impact on 
water availability. Such linear scenarios help to calculate 
the size of change and to design adaptation measures. 
But quite a number of atmospheric or related processes 
are non linear. There, development can reach threshold 
levels where the whole development of the studied sys-
tem might dramatically change directions or speed up. 
Climate researchers are increasingly investigating these 
so-called tipping elements, which are in most cases tem-
perature thresholds where non-linear systems might be 
triggered, including several feedback loops.
When such a threshold – the tipping point – is reached, 
the system element might change in a relatively short 
time span; in other cases, it changes slowly but irrevers-
ibly. We have to expect tipping points at all levels, but 
usually this expression is only used if the scale of the af-
fected tipping element is at least sub-continental (Lenton 
et al. 2008). Many of the discussed tipping points could 
be reached during this century. These tipping elements 
have the potential to lead to unprecedented threats 
to humankind. During the last three years there has 
been major scientific progress in understanding them. 
Knowledge has dramatically increased, but there is still 
a lot of uncertainty in defining the exact threshold for 
Figure 1: A double response to climate change
Source: Germanwatch illustration
Avoid the unmanageable:
Limit global warming to below 2°C 
(compared to 1860), need for drastical 
reduction of emissions (global emission 
peak before 2020); industrialised countries 
taking the lead
Manage the unavoidable:
Adaptation to the unavoidable con-
sequences of climate change
Climate change threatens poverty reduction 
Sustainable poverty reduction as a key strategy to 
increase adaptive capacity

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 Vertical lines indicate likely impacts of the median warming expected to result from indicated emissions scenarios (per-
centage cuts are from 1990 levels); shaded columns show 5 to 95% uncertainty ranges for impacts of a 50 percent cut.
Source: Parry et al. 2008, 1
Figure 2: Selected global impacts from warming associated with various reductions in global green-
house gas emissions
Climate Change I Study
A
N
A
LY
SI
S 
02
30
these dramatic developments. (The risks associated with 
tipping elements in the climate system will be explained 
in much more detail in chapter 3.) 
Thus, limiting global warming to a degree which keeps 
the likelihood that tipping points are passed as low as 
possible is one crucial criterion to avoiding dangerous 
climate change. More and more climate researchers 
agree that based on this risk analysis global warming 
should be limited to well below 2°C above pre-indus-
trial levels, or about 1.3°C above present levels. This is 
indicated by the black line in Figure 2. 
In November 2006, the former chief economist of the 
World Bank, Nicholas Stern, released his report „The 
economics of climate change“. This „Stern Report“ 
highlights that tackling global warming will become 
economically much cheaper than dealing with the dam-
ages of a non-mitigation future (Stern 2006). This con-
clusion has been underlined by the findings of the IPCC 
(IPCC 2007c). 
The IPCC suggests that in a scenario where global green-
house gas emissions (GHG) would be reduced by 50 to 
85 percent until 2050 (compared to 2000), the tem-
perature increase could be limited to 2.0 to 2.4°C above 
pre-industrial levels, at an atmospheric concentration 
level of 445 to 490 ppm CO2 equivalent. Global GHG 
emissions would have to peak and then decline by no 
later than 2015 (IPCC 2007c, 22). However, the actual 
development in global emissions is the opposite: They 
have increased 24 percent since 1990 (IPCC 2007c, 2), 
with rapidly increasing growth rates in the past years 
compared to the 1990s. However, assessments under-
taken by Stern show that even this scenario would leave 
a 78 percent probability that global temperature increase 
would exceed the threshold of 2°C (Table 1). 
A recent paper released by a group of scientists associ-
ated with James Hansen from the NASA advocates for 
a stabilization target of 350 ppm CO2 equivalent. The 
result of the study is based on a more detailed analy-
sis of feedback effects in the earth system that are not 
sufficiently addressed in the IPCC scenarios (Hansen et 
al. 2008). This is significantly below present levels and 
would need more drastic emission reductions plus in-
creased efforts to take CO2 out of the atmosphere (e.g. 
by reforestation and changed agricultural techniques).
Achieving such targets will be quite challenging, be-
cause „climate change mitigation is about transforming 
the way that we produce and use energy“ (UNDP 2007, 
20). In addition, trends like tropical deforestation have 
to be reversed. 
The UN climate change negotiations are currently in the 
process of discussing long-term global emission reduc-
tion targets as a starting point for sustainable emission 
Stabilization level 
(in ppm CO2 eq)
2°C 3°C 4°C 5°C 6°C 7°C
450 78 18 3 1 0 0
500 96 44 11 3 1 0
550 99 69 24 7 2 1
650 100 94 58 24 9 4
750 100 99 82 47 22 9
Table 1: Likelihood of various CO2 equivalent concentrations exceeding various increases in global 
mean surface temperature in percent
Source: Stern 2008
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pathways, but also a new round of national reduction 
targets for industrialized countries for the period from 
2013 to 2020. 
The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol which 
was agreed in 1997 and which finally came into force 
in 2005, has already set such targets for industrialized 
countries, however at a scale far from being sufficient 
to prevent dangerous climate change. These targets are 
thought to result in a reduction of the industrialized 
countries emissions of 5.2 percent by 2012 (compared 
to 1990). But the USA, which had signed the Protocol 
under the Clinton administration, refused to ratify it. 
Only Europe has managed to significantly reduce its 
emissions during the last 18 years. However, much of 
these reductions were due to de-industrialization in East 
and Central Europe. The downward trend has been pri-
marily caused by emissions savings in Germany and the 
United Kingdom, due to different climate and energy 
policy measures (EEA 2008, 14).
The Kyoto Protocol has been an important first step, but 
is far from changing the emission pathways on the nec-
essary scale. In 1994 the UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), upon which the Kyoto 
Protocol is based, had already come into force (UNFCCC 
1992). It introduced the principle of common but dif-
ferentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities 
of industrialized and developing countries. This means 
that industrialized countries, which have historically 
contributed the most GHG emissions and have the most 
resources, must take the lead in international climate 
policy (IPCC 2007b). 
Emissions are still on the rise in most developed coun-
tries and emerging economies are increasingly playing a 
role as additional causers of climate change. China has 
now become the biggest emitting country and was re-
sponsible for two thirds of the emissions growth in 2006 
(MNP 2008). For the climate, this is an alarming trend. 
The same is – on a lower level – true for India. However, 
from an equity perspective it is important to note that 
developing countries in general still have a much lower 
output of emissions on a per capita basis. They claim 
their right to development and are not yet willing to 
accept ceilings for emissions based on an historic date – 
such as 1990 – because they fear that this might hinder 
their further economic development. China now is one 
of the few examples of developing countries where av-
erage per capita emissions have reached a level which is 
higher than the global average (MNP 2008). 
The different per capita emissions are one key reason 
why developed countries are expected to reduce their 
emissions much more drastically and rapidly than any 
of the developing countries, by at least 25 to 40 percent 
by 2020 and at least 80 percent to 95 percent by 2050 
(both compared to 1990 levels) (Gupta et al. 2007). 
Some projections even see steeper reduction efforts as 
necessary, given the uncertainties entailed in the cli-
mate system. Figure 3 shows the implications of a global 
reduction of 80 percent by 2050 (compared to 1990), 
developed countries’ (Annex I) reduction efforts of 90 
percent, and the implications for emissions in develop-
ing countries (non-Annex I).
This analysis reveals on the one hand that even if devel-
oped countries were to reduce their emissions to zero, 
it would not be sufficient to avoid dangerous climate 
change if present emissions trends continue in the de-
veloping world. On the other hand, it also shows that 
the less the developed countries reduce, the higher the 
reduction requirement for developing countries would 
be if the 2°C limit were to be taken seriously. At the 
same time, population growth is expected to continue 
until the middle of the century. 
The challenge now is to reconcile global emission re-
duction efforts with the legitimate developmental as-
pirations of developing countries. Achieving this is not 
a question of lacking technologies or scarce resources, 
but primarily of the political will to cooperate and to 
tackle one of the greatest challenges ever faced by man-
kind. Some of the most important instruments to reduce 
GHG emissions and to realize a low-carbon economy 
are carbon markets, carbon taxes, new and additional 
technology deployment instruments to the support of 
large scale energy efficiency, and renewable energy. 
Carbon capture and geological storage technologies 
(CCS) may also play a role, if they prove functioning. 
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A combination of many instruments and technologies 
will be needed to limit global warming to well below 
2°C, and simultaneously to satisfy the increasing energy 
demands of rapidly developing countries with growing 
populations. 
Agriculture itself is a significant source of greenhouse 
gas emissions. The GHG emissions from agriculture con-
tributed more than 13 percent of total anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas emissions in 2004 (Barker et al. 2007, 
5). Emissions from fossil energy use in the agricultural 
sector are not included here, since IPCC accounts them 
with the building or transport sector, but they are esti-
mated to be rather low compared to the CH4 and N2O 
emissions (Smith et al. 2007). Taken together with the 
forestry sector, where a large share of the emissions is 
caused by deforestation for agricultural purposes, this 
figure is estimated to be over 30 percent (Barker et al. 
2008, 5). 
The livestock sector accounts for more than half of the 
GHG emissions coming from agriculture. This amount 
is equivalent to more than two-thirds of the total emis-
sions attributable to deforestation and to more than one-
third of total agricultural release of methane (CH4) and 
nitrous oxide (N2O) (FAO 2007b, 10). There is a huge 
potential for reducing emissions of greenhouse gases 
through changes in production patterns in agriculture 
and also in forestry, where emissions often happen for 
agricultural purposes. 
1.4.2 Scenarios of different climate futures 
Our response to climate change will be decisive for our 
planet‘s future. Taking into account the growing public 
perception of climate change as a matter of increasing 
urgency, more and more heads of governments express 
the willingness to act – but so far it is not clear how far 
this moves beyond rhetoric. 
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Figure 3: Global emissions scenario with peak CO2 emissions in 2015, falling to 80 percent below 
1990 levels in 2050. Annex 1 emissions decline to 90 percent below 1990 levels in 2050
Source: based on Baer et al. 2008, 3
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In order to facilitate the assessment of different futures 
that would develop from different global climate policy 
approaches, Germanwatch developed a set of four sce-
narios (Figure 4). They provide a simple and intuitive 
overview of the variety of possible futures. The scenari-
os mainly differ in three aspects: First, in the magnitude 
of emission reductions envisaged, second in the degree 
of equity that is reflected in the implied application of 
opportunities and risks related to climate protection, 
adaptation and possible catastrophes, and finally in the 
legitimacy of the applied measures and the participation 
of most most-affected countries.
The first scenario (A) expects the continuation of the 
current trend. Global emission trends show that unmiti-
gated climate change will result in a large-scale uncon-
trolled experiment with mankind and nature. While 
some political speeches at climate negotiations such as 
in Bali in December 2007 may create the impression 
that the problem of climate change might be solved 
soon, the development of global emissions however tells 
so far a different story. The current emissions pathway 
is therefore at the upper end of the most energy intense 
IPCC scenario, which could easily lead to temperature 
increases beyond 5°C, i.e. most severe of the projected 
adverse impacts (Rahmstorf et al. 2007).
Scenario B, the so-called „climate apartheid“ scenario, 
can help explain why most developing countries remain 
unwilling to accept their own reduction commitments 
in the climate negotiations. The US has bound its own 
progress in emission reduction to comparable reduction 
efforts in rapidly developing country economies. These 
countries fear that industrialized countries will not take 
the lead in immediately reducing emissions but instead 
intend to deny the right of developing countries to end 
poverty and to develop through economic growth. 
Why should they consider commitments as long as the 
United States, whose per capita emissions are five times 
as high as in China and twenty times as high as in India, 
are not willing to reduce drastically? Since the Industrial 
Revolution, European and American progress has been 
built on fossil energy sources such as coal, oil, and gas. 
„And just when we – the Chinese and the 
Indians – are about to develop they say: You 
Figure 4: Four scenarios of the global climate future
Our Climate Future
Scenario A:   
Large-scale Experiment 
with Mankind and Nature  
Unmitigated climate change
Scenario C:   
Global Climate Partnership 
Combination of binding UN process, 
bi-/trilateral agreements, technologi-
cal innovations, self-financing process 
(auctioning emission trading etc.)
Scenario B:   
Climate Apartheid (with Elements  
of a Climate Dictatorship)  
Major concern of the industrialising and develop-
ing countries: serious climate protection limiting 
growth in developing countries
Scenario D:   
Planet Earth on the Heart-Lung machine 
(geo-engineering) 
Self-regulating mechanisms of the earth collapse. Large-
scale technical measures of permanent adjustments; 
significant sideeffects and potential for misuse.
Source: Germanwatch illustration
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cannot do that anymore,“ Armatya Sen points 
out, Indian Nobel Prize winner for economics 
(Germanwatch 2007). 
Although they promised in Kyoto in 1997, to take the 
lead in this regard, the developed world has as yet failed 
to show how a wealth model that combines prosper-
ity and development with the continuously decreasing 
burning of fossil fuels. 
Scenario C must be seen as the desirable result of inter-
national climate negotiations and complimentary bilat-
eral actions, leading to a global partnership of climate 
protection and energy security. This must be based on 
a substantial commitment by industrialized countries to 
take stronger domestic mitigation action (mainly energy 
efficiency and renewable energies) and to support miti-
gation and adaptation in developing countries. In addi-
tion complementary and fair contributions in the emerg-
ing economies following the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities 
are needed. Furthermore, the inclusion of missing sec-
tors like international aviation and maritime transport 
and a regime to curb emissions from deforestation needs 
to be agreed upon. Additional bilateral agreements with 
key actors, e.g. between the EU and China and India 
will also have to play an important role.
Scenario D is based on countries‘ and expert views that 
look to geo-engineering solutions for the rapidly grow-
ing global emissions. Often, they do not trust or believe 
in the slow political processes of climate negotiations. 
Proposals are made to use technical means of geo-en-
gineering to take control of the Earth‘s self-regulating 
systems, such as depositing iron in the oceans, spread-
ing reflective material in the atmosphere, or using other 
reflection systems. The latest IPCC report is very skepti-
cal about such promises: 
„Geo-engineering options, such as ocean fertili-
zation to remove CO2 directly from the atmos-
phere, or blocking sunlight by bringing material 
into the upper atmosphere, remain largely spec-
ulative and unproven, and with the risk of un-
known side-effects. Reliable cost estimates for 
these options have not been published“ (IPCC 
2007c, 20). 
These technological promises go hand in hand with the 
hope that technical solutions might be available soon 
and are less expensive than mitigation. Therefore, politi-
cians might begin to rely on them as an alternative to 
reducing emissions. Next to the risk of unknown side 
effects, geo-engineering solutions also carry the risk of 
military misuse. 
These four scenarios show the current variety of possible 
positions in international climate diplomacy. It becomes 
obvious that a meaningful path to emission reductions 
is only available with an international framework as the 
key pillar, where different actors contribute based on 
their responsibilities and capabilities. The task of nego-
tiating such an agreement among almost 200 govern-
ments with the goal of limiting temperature increase to 
well below 2°C is quite ambitious. So, additional negoti-
ations with key emitters and key affected countries can 
play a complementary role. Judging the effectiveness of 
domestic and international commitments will require 
a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the proposed 
instruments, and their consistency with the 2° limit are 
the crucial benchmark, as is the case for the recent EU 
climate policy discussions. Table 2 shows how differ-
ent choices for domestic mitigation in Annex I countries 
and mitigation achieved through offsetting emissions 
through carbon credits from developing countries might 
impact on global temperature increase. Only strong do-
mestic action in developed countries plus support for 
mitigation in developing countries allows a pathway to 
stay below 2°C above pre-industrial levels.
1.5 Adaptation to the unavoidable  
consequences
Along with the effort to limit increasing emissions, the 
second pillar of climate change policy is adaptation to 
changing climatic conditions. Adaptation measures were 
not at the centre of climate negotiations in the first few 
years. They were often seen as a road to distract atten-
tion from the most difficult and politically controversial 
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task of reducing emissions, particularly in countries that 
have contributed most to climate change. Since then, 
it has become clear that the additional benefits of ad-
aptation to climate change will be huge and that early 
action is cheaper than a post-disaster response, even 
though there are still many uncertainties in the existing 
adaptation cost estimates (see Table 3). A more detailed 
analysis of the economics of adaptation is provided in 
chapter 6. 
Adaptation requires substantive investment in infra-
structure such as dams, flood-resistant storage facilities, 
and techniques for reducing water loss in distribution 
systems etc. It requires monitoring weather extremes 
and developing disaster preparation and early warning 
strategies. Last but not least, capacity building in com-
munities particularly at risk, in national, regional and lo-
cal administrations etc, is of utmost importance and will 
require resources. Empowerment of local communities 
is often more effective than huge technical solutions.
Adaptation to the adverse impacts of climate change 
has long been neglected as a development issue, both 
by governmental and nongovernmental organisations, 
despite the fact that the developing countries in 2001 
CO2-eq concen-
tration (ppm)
Global mean tem-
perature increase 
above pre-indus-
trial levels
Annex I reduc-
tion by 2020
Non-Annex I 2020 EU post 2012 package pro-
posals extrapolated to other 
Annex I countries
445-490 2.0-2.4 -25 to -40% Substantial deviation 
from baseline in Latin 
America, Middle East, 
East Asia and centrally-
planned Asia
-30% domestic + 850 Mt CO2-eq 
support for GHG emissions limita-
tion in non Annex I
490-535 2.4-2.8 n.a. n.a. -30% + off-setting 
(meaning 22% domestic and 
around 450 Mt off-setting in non-
Annex I per annum)
535-590 2.8-3.2 -10% to 30% Deviation from base-
line in Latin America, 
Middle East, East Asia
-20% + off-setting 
(meaning 17% domestic and 
around 200 Mt off-setting in non-
Annex I per annum)
590-710 3.2-4.0 0 to -25% Baseline -20% + more flexibility than Euro-
pean Commission proposal 
(meaning less than 15% domestic)
Table 2: EU emission reduction proposals and its implications for global temperature increase
Source: CAN 2008, based on Smith et al. 2007, Annex I: developed countries (according to the Annex I to the 
UNFCCC), Non-Annex I: developing countries, Mt: Million tonnes (Megatonnes)
Table 3: Additional costs of adaptation in  
developing countries
Source Annual cost estimate
Oxfam 2007 At least 50 billion USD
UNDP 2007 86 billion USD by 2015
UNFCCC 2007a 28-67 billion USD by 2030
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– and even much earlier – were already identified as 
being the most affected by climate change:
„The impacts of climate change will fall dispro-
portionately upon developing countries and the 
poor persons within all countries, and thereby 
exacerbate inequities in health status and ac-
cess to adequate food, clean water, and other 
resources. Populations in developing countries 
are generally exposed to relatively high risks of 
adverse impacts from climate change. In ad-
dition, poverty and other factors create condi-
tions of low adaptive capacity in most develop-
ing countries“ (IPCC 2001, 12).
Changes in weather patterns are already happening 
and are affecting countries worldwide. Figure 5 below 
shows an analysis of relative impacts of extreme weath-
er events on countries grouped to their development 
status. Although the absolute damage costs of weather 
extremes are usually higher in developed countries, the 
picture changes significantly if relative impacts are taken 
into account. This is only one indicator among several 
which imply the particular affectedness of developing 
countries. 
Developing countries are particularly affected due to 
their geographic location and because the sectors which 
are among the most sensitive sectors to climate change 
like agriculture, forestry and fisheries, play a particularly 
important role in their economies. Nevertheless, effects 
of climate change vary from country to country and 
must be assessed nationally or regionally.
The definition of vulnerability used by the IPCC is fo-
cusing on the vulnerability of systems.
0
0,1
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0,5
0,6
High income
Upper middle income
Lower middle income
low income
Deaths per 100,000 
inhabitants
Losses per unit GDP 
in %
Source: Harmeling 2007, 17
Figure 5: Relative impacts of extreme weather events in 2006 according to World Bank country  
groupings
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„Vulnerability is the degree to which a system is 
susceptible to, or unable to cope with, adverse 
effects of climate change, including climate var-
iability and extremes. Vulnerability is a function 
of the character, magnitude, and rate of climate 
change and variation to which a system is ex-
posed, the sensitivity and adaptive capacity of 
that system” (Parry et al. 2007, 6). 
The term system is used in relation to ecosystems, but 
can also refer to production or societal systems. The 
overall vulnerability of agricultural production systems 
to external stressors, including climate change risks and 
their adaptive capacities, depend on different specific 
vulnerabilities (see Figure 6). 
Particularly in the food sector, the interdependence of 
these vulnerabilities has to be taken into account. E.g. 
globalization impacts may also help increasing the ca-
pacities to adapt to climate change. Climate change 
is now increasingly an additional factor which might 
prevent vulnerable people from securing their rights to 
livelihoods, food security, access to clean water, human 
security etc. and thus negatively impact on their adap-
tive capacities. 
In this sense and that is the focus of this study, vulner-
ability and adaptation to climate change entail a human 
rights dimension. Climate change is a process that will 
impact human beings and their livelihoods. They might 
lose water, food-producing resources or access to these 
sources. 
They might also lose access to or be hindered to achieve 
an income which secures their right to food or health. 
Thus, they will have to play an important role in re-
sponse strategies that governments design to react to 
the challenges arising from climate change (see chapter 
2). 
The design and proper implementation of adaptation 
measures will become an area of work central to cop-
ing with potential impacts of climate change. Numerous 
concrete adaptation options exist on different levels, in-
cluding the agricultural sector (chapter 4 to 6). Some 
options are of a more technological nature while others 
require more specific policy approaches. 
Adaptation will require assessment and monitoring 
work, research, and an adequate policy response. In 
most cases, the design must address the need for close 
Figure 6: Elements of vulnerability profiles
Source: based on TERI 2003
Adaptive capacity
Biophysical vulnerability
soil degradation 
groundwater availability 
Social vulnerability
agricultural workers and labourers 
literacy 
gender discrimination 
child mortality and fertility 
Technological vulnerability
irrigation 
infrastructure 
Climate sensitive (e.g. precipitation 
dependence and dryness)
Trade sensitive (e.g. port distance, 
import-sensitive crops)
Climate change  
vulnerability
Globalisation 
vulnerability
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integration with general development work in order to 
avoid stand-alone processes and to deliver adaptive de-
velopment. 
The FAO has developed a useful systematization of 
adaptation measures with respect to food security. In 
their contribution to the Bali Climate Conference in 
December 2007, the FAO differentiated five different 
areas of adaptation policies in the context of food secu-
rity (FAO 2007b, 4ff): 
1. Adaptation policies: Adaptation measures will first 
cover a broad range of actions, from policies oriented 
to manage risks posed by climate change to policies pro-
tecting people‘s lives and livelihoods.
2. Response to local circumstances: Second, they cover 
the response to local environmental circumstances and 
needs, based on different livelihood circumstances. It 
will be important that development strategies rely not 
only on national, but also on community-level responses 
to the risk exposure of different ecosystems. 
3. Secure food supplies: A third set of measures will be 
oriented to secure food supplies by helping avoid disrup-
tions or declines in global, national, or local food sup-
plies.
4. Adjust consumption to health needs: At the fourth 
level, measures will adjust consumption and orient it to 
protect health. 
5. Meet growing demands: Finally, adaptation policies 
need to give answers as to how the growing demand 
for energy can be met (in a climate-friendly way) as a 
prerequisite for growth and development.
The results from the Bali climate summit (2007) help 
to put adaptation work and policies on equal footing 
with the negotiations related to mitigation. The Bali 
Action Plan was adopted to establish a roadmap for 
the negotiations on a new international climate treaty, 
which is supposed to enter into force in succession to 
the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol in 
2012  (UNFCCC 2007b, Decision 1/CP.13). Adaptation 
work became the second building block of international 
climate negotiations for a post-2012 agreement in Bali. 
The two enabling building blocks (technology and fi-
nance) address adaptation as well as mitigation. 
Because many countries will have to cope with severe 
impacts of climate change in the future, developing 
countries demanded that industrialized countries offer 
massive support for adaptation measures in the most 
affected states and regions, while simultaneously in-
creasing their mitigation efforts to limit global warming. 
According to the Bali Action Plan, those countries iden-
tified as particularly vulnerable are the Least Developed 
Countries, Small Island Developing States, and coun-
tries in Africa affected by drought, desertification and 
floods (UNFCCC 2007b, 2). Under the current funding 
mechanisms, less than 1 percent of the estimated neces-
sary adaptation costs have been delivered:
Investments through integration of adaptation in  
Official Development Assistance: approx. USD 100 mil-
lion for five years (UNFCCC 2007a);
Funds under the Convention: approx. USD 73  
million (pledged: 90 million) for the Special Climate 
Change Fund (SCCF) and USD 92 million for the Least 
Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) (pledged: 172 mil-
lion) (Global Environment Facility GEF 2008);
Global Environment Facility (GEF) Strategic Priority  
for Adaptation: USD 50 million (UNDP 2007). 
After extensive debate in Bali and previous negotiations 
the conference decided about the governance structure 
of the Adaptation Fund (AF), which is supposed to be-
come a key funding instrument for action on adaptation. 
For the credibility of this instrument, it will be impor-
tant that the needs of particularly vulnerable groups 
and countries around the world will be adequately re-
flected.
Further negotiations on the Bali Action Plan will have 
to consider the need for international assistance to the 
most vulnerable countries in their adaptation efforts 
through „innovative means of funding“ (UNFCCC 
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2007b). Questions concerning access to „adequate, pre-
dictable and sustainable financial resources“ as well as 
the exploration of new and additional resources will be 
debated until the end of 2009 when the adoption of a 
new international climate treaty is being envisaged at 
the UN climate conference in Copenhagen.4 There is 
little doubt that significantly increased adaptation fund-
ing will play a key role in these negotiations. The Bonn 
negotiation session in June 2008 was the first incident 
that Parties are beginning to take these questions more 
seriously (Harmeling 2008). A number of interesting 
funding proposals were put on the table.
Substantial additional financial resources are needed to 
cope with the expected adaptation needs for developing 
countries. However, more money does not necessarily 
mean that more funds are reaching the most vulner-
able groups. This is one reason why the UNFCCC ne-
gotiations must discuss which frameworks can incen-
tivize adaptation, but also which frameworks measure 
progress, review activities, and generate resources.
Those groups which are already marginalized rarely re-
ceive adequate attention in national or regional policies. 
More attention and policy innovation must be devoted 
to these groups in order to ensure that marginalization 
is not reiterated or passed on in adaptation policies. 
Rights-based policy approaches offer good opportunities 
to make policies more poverty-oriented. National poli-
cies also need to set up the right incentive structure for 
community-based adaptation (CBA). 
1.6 Climate change and development
Climate change will have a substantial impact on the pace 
of development progress in many regions. Developing 
countries will need economic human development to 
overcome current shortages of basic goods and services. 
The Human Development Report 2007/2008 of the 
Development Program of the United Nations (UNDP), 
which analyses the connection between climate change 
and human development, comes to an alarming result: 
„In the long run climate change is a massive 
threat to human development and in some plac-
es it is already undermining the international 
community‘s efforts to reduce extreme poverty“ 
(UNDP 2007, v). 
The report highlights the fact that the world is a het-
erogeneous place, where people have unequal incomes 
and wealth, and that climate change will affect re-
gions very differently. Therefore, adaptation to climate 
change will be relatively easy in regions with lesser ef-
fects and sufficient resources, whereas poorer regions, 
with higher risks and vulnerability, will be disastrously 
affected. Existing income gaps might be increased and 
deepened. 
The Adaptation Fund under the Kyoto Protocol
The Adaptation Fund has many innovative features. 
For example, resources for the AF are being mobilized 
through a levy on emission reductions generated and 
traded under the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM). The CDM is the first international environ-
mental levy imposed on the trading of emission re-
ductions achieved in developing countries. The fund 
is other than some voluntary funds under the UN-
Framework Convention the first concrete step to con-
struct a reliable international finance structure needed 
to deal adequately with the consequences of climate 
change. Depending on how the CDM market will de-
velop, it is estimated that the resources generated will 
amount to some 150 to 900 million USD by 2012, 
and probably much more after 2012, depending on 
developed countries mitigation targets and the future 
of the CDM (UNDP 2007). In 2008, the Adaptation 
Fund Board, the newly appointed governing body, will 
have to agree on funding modalities including prioriti-
zation for the most vulnerable countries. 
4 For a discussion of the process leading to the Copenhagen climate summit (December 2009) and potential outcomes end of 2009 see Bals 
2008.
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Africa‘s variable climate is already contributing signifi-
cantly to its development problems (Hellmuth et al. 
2007, 8). Key factors for the development of agriculture, 
a very important sector in African economies, such as 
water, energy, transportation and health, are all particu-
larly sensitive to climate variability and the increase of 
weather-related disasters. Other sectors of the economy, 
like industry and tourism, are also put at high risk by cli-
mate change and water shortages. Vulnerability of econ-
omies to climate shocks is unequally distributed, and 
the risk increases dramatically as poverty increases. 
„Some 262 million people were affected by cli-
mate disasters annually from 2000 to 2004, over 
98 percent of them in the developing world“ 
(UNDP 2007, 16).
It will be poorer people who will suffer most. They will 
be confronted with substantive changes in their liveli-
hoods and many will be at the fringe of their coping ca-
pacities. They will have severe difficulties to dealing with 
weather extremes and other shocks. Poverty-stricken 
people who never contributed to climate change are 
most at risk to be heavily affected by climate change. 
Their right to development will be seriously threatened. 
The process of human development is increasingly go-
ing to be influenced or hindered by climate change. 
The fight against poverty and the fight against the ef-
fects of climate change must be seen as interrelated is-
sues. Figure 7 shows that climate change is expected to 
substantially impact the realization of most Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) in Africa. In addition, in-
vestments in adaptation will require financial resources, 
which in turn would bind resources needed to invest in 
poverty reduction. The additional challenge of climate 
change thus requires additional resources. The Human 
Development Report (HDR) 2007/2008 summarizes 
the challenge quite well: 
Figure 7: Climate change impacts and the Millennium Development Goals in Africa
The area suitable for agriculture, the length of growing seasons and yield 
potential, particularly along the margins of semi-arid and arid areas, are 
expected to decrease. This would further adversely affect food security 
and exacerbate malnutrition in the continent. 
In some countries, yields from rain-fed agriculture could be reduced by up 
to 50% by 2020. 
Local food supplies are projected to be negatively affected by decreasing 
fisheries resources in large lakes due to rising water temperatures, which 
may be exacerbated by continued over-fishing.
70% of the extreme poor are women (globally) and thus these are extraor-
dinarily affected by CC; resource scarcity triggered by CC (food, water, fire 
wood) increases burden for women.
 By 2020, between 75 and 250 million people are projected to be ex-
posed to an increase of water stress due to climate change.
 Projected sea-level rise will affect low-lying coastal areas with large 
populations. The cost of adaptation could amount to at least 5-10% of GDP. 
 Mangroves and coral reefs are projected to be further degraded, with 
additional consequences for fisheries and tourism.
The decrease or increase of the range and transmission potential of ma-
laria in Africa.
7. Ensure environmental 
sustainability.
4. Reduce child  
mortality; 
5. Improve maternal 
health; 
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, ma-
laria and other diseases
3. Promote 
gender equality 
and empower 
women
1. Eradicate extreme poverty 
and hunger
Millennium  
Development  
Goals
Source: Germanwatch illustration based on IPCC 2007b
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„How the world deals with climate change today 
will have a direct bearing on the human devel-
opment prospects of a large section of human-
ity. Failure will consign the poorest 40 percent 
of the world‘s population – some 2.6 billion 
people – to a future of diminished opportuni-
ties. It will exacerbate deep inequalities within 
countries. And it will undermine efforts to build 
a more including pattern of globalization, rein-
forcing the vast disparities between the ‚haves´ 
and the ‚have nots´“ (UNDP 2007, 8).
The recent rounds of climate negotiations after Bali – 
in March/April 2008 in Bangkok and in June 2008 in 
Bonn – have shown that the costs of adaptation and 
present underfunding by the perpetuators of climate 
change remain a key contentious issue. This is true de-
spite the goodwill of many developing countries to work 
jointly on developing a new climate regime. Most devel-
oping countries have hardly contributed to the emissions 
which cause climate change, and see domestic emis-
sions reduction as a hindrance to development. They 
see this as a justice issue. If such development rights 
are taken seriously, industrialized countries must invest 
in mitigation and reduce emissions more substantially. 
They will also have to finance and support deployment 
mechanisms for mitigation and adaptation technologies 
and make these technologies widely available.
At the same time, developing countries need to realize 
that climate change is a development issue, and thus 
the challenge has to be integrated into development 
policies and planning (chapter 4.4)
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2 Trends and developments in 
food insecurity and hunger
In order to properly assess the possible impact of climate 
change on food security, it is helpful to first start with 
an assessment of the worldwide situation concerning 
food security and hunger. Such an overview allows the 
analysis of if and how societies, which are facing hunger 
and malnutrition today, will be additionally affected by 
climate change. This overview will also explore the risk 
of additional groups becoming exposed to food insecu-
rity and hunger as a result of climate change. 
2.1 Three levels of food security  
definition: global, national, and 
household food security
The term food security has been revised many times 
since the phrase‘s inception in the late 1970s. For a long 
time, many definitions of the term were used in parallel. 
The most widely accepted and authoritative definition 
is the one agreed upon during the World Food Summit 
in 1996: 
„Food security exists when all people, at all 
times, have physical and economic access to 
safe and nutritious food which meets their di-
etary needs and food preferences for an active 
and healthy life“ (FAO 1996, 1). 
This is both the vision and definition of food security 
used in the World Food Summit Plan of Action and on 
which the FAO co-ordinate „Food insecurity and vulner-
ability information mapping systems (FIVIMS)“.5
However, food security is largely the definition of a goal, 
rather than a program with specific policy orientation. 
The implementation strategies required to achieve food 
security may need to change over time in order to ad-
dress new threats or barriers.
The term food security was first developed within the 
context of UN-specialized agencies dealing with food 
and nutrition (FAO 1983a). It was developed to discuss 
long term trends in food availability at the global level. 
The question of worldwide availability of surplus prod-
ucts and the storage of food reserves was at the core of 
the discussion. Therefore, global food security is based 
on the comparison between how much food can be pro-
duced globally and the expected demand. 
It soon became clear that measures at the national level 
are essential in order to secure enough food supplies. 
The Plan of Action of the FAO for World Food Security, 
which was adopted in 1979, therefore introduced the 
term „national food security“ (FAO 1979). This expres-
sion was used to describe ways of achieving a better 
national distribution of food. Within the framework of 
national food security, aspects such as grain reserves, 
import and export quotas, food aid, agricultural tech-
niques to increase production, and irrigation were dis-
cussed. These notions of food security were focused on 
the availability of sufficient food supplies in national 
markets and on population/food availability ratios. 
These notions strategically lead to the support for poli-
cies focusing on production increases. 
But food security deficits can not be overcome by na-
tional level increases in food production alone. Deficits 
in national food production can also be overcome by im-
ports. These imports need to be financed, which could 
be done through exporting other agricultural products. 
Hence, the World Bank developed recommendations 
for trade-based national food security strategies in the 
1980s (World Bank 1986). The advice was that devel-
oping countries should concentrate agricultural produc-
5 FAO 1996: The definition is included in paragraph 1 of PoA. FIVIMS is a tool developed in response to the World Food Summit results. 
A technical consultation on Food Insecurity and Vulnerability Information and Mapping Systems (FIVIMS) was held at the FAO in March 
1997. It recommended developing guidelines for the establishment of FIVIMS at the national level. The Guidelines were published in 
2000: IAGW-FIVIMS (2000). Guidelines for national FIVIMS. Background and principles, Rome. 
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tion on those goods for which the highest prices can be 
achieved on the market. Often these were cash crops 
and not food crops, because world market prices for 
most food products from temperate climates were very 
low during the last decades. This result can be attrib-
uted to high agricultural surpluses in the EU and the US 
as well as the regular use of export subsidies. 
Export subsidies amounted to close to 40 percent of 
the EU-agriculture budget in the 80s and beginning of 
the 90s. Due to the pressure from the agricultural ne-
gotiations at the WTO the EU started to reduce export 
subsidies. Today they are about 1,44 billion Euro only 
a fraction of their former size. Current price trends on 
the word markets are reversed, but there are a variety 
of reasons for that recent change in price trends (http://
www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/exportsubventionen2.
html).
Even in the early 1980s it was questioned whether pro-
duction-oriented policies alone would be helpful in alle-
viating hunger and malnutrition. Amartya Sen‘s seminal 
work on „Poverty and Famines“ brought considerable 
change to the debate by highlighting the entitlements 
of individuals and groups as important elements to un-
derstand whether or not they get access to food (Sen 
1981). 
The debate on food insecurity and hunger has changed 
gradually since then from an analysis merely looking 
at overall availability of food to an analysis based on 
an understanding of individual access (entitlement) to 
food. At the eighth Ministerial meeting of the World 
Food Council (WFC) in 1982 a decision was passed 
with the title „food security for people“ (World Food 
Council 1982). In 1983 the Council of the FAO and the 
WFC followed up with the recommendation for a new 
definition of food security including the access of the 
individual to food (WFC 1983). Since then, the concept 
of household and later individual food security has been 
developed, making the term food security increasingly 
comprehensive (Eide, Oshaug and Eide 1991). 
The definition in the middle of the 80s was “access by 
people at all times to enough food for an active and 
healthy life”, used by FAO and by the World Bank in 
1986 (quoted from: Eide et al. 1991).
In academic literature, the determinants of food secu-
rity are described very similarly to the definition of the 
right to food. Haddad and Gillespie collect the following 
determinants in their article: physical access at national 
level, physical access at local level, economic access, so-
cial access, food quality and safety, physiological access, 
risk of loss of access (Haddad and Gillespie 2001). 
The latest standard definition used in the FAO is quite 
similar: 
„Food security exists when all people at all 
times have physical or economic access to suf-
ficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their 
dietary needs and food preferences for an ac-
tive and healthy life. To achieve food security, all 
four of its components must be adequate. These 
are: availability, stability, accessibility and utili-
zation“ (FAO 2007b, 6; the second sentence is 
additional to the 1996 definition). 
To achieve food security, access to food must be physi-
cally available, e.g. food must be available in the region. 
But in order to guarantee that a family will have access 
to it, the food must be economically accessible, which 
is largely determined by family income. The food supply 
must also be stable, and shortfalls, e.g. in the months 
before the next harvest, avoided. 
Hunger in rural areas, particularly among producers, is 
often a seasonal phenomenon. Many poorer producers 
have to buy the seeds and other agricultural inputs be-
fore the plant. Therefore, the month before the next 
harvest is due is often the worst concerning the family 
food security situation. The leftover food from the last 
harvest has already been eaten and the familiy’s new 
income will only be secured after the new harvest. 
Additionally, food security depends on a variety of un-
derlying determinants: Food must be nutritious and 
safe. The body must be in a condition to consume food 
without becoming ill. UNICEF and other nutritionists 
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emphasize the fact that half of the children dying from 
hunger are not dying because of missing food supply, 
but because they cannot ingest due to sickness, e.g. di-
arrhea (Eide 2000). 
To analyze the impact of climate change on food secu-
rity, it is important to study all three levels of food se-
curity:
1. Food security on a global scale: It is important to ana-
lyze overall trends on a global scale and to understand 
which effects climate change might have on agricultural 
production, fishery production, and livestock produc-
tion at the global level. This is important because these 
trends will translate into agricultural prices and will in-
fluence decisions of producers worldwide. 
2. Food security on a national level: This level of analy-
sis is equally as important, because the national level is 
where most agricultural policy decisions are made. It 
will be decided here if food security concerns are cov-
ered by imports and how much financial resources are 
made available for national agricultural policies. Central 
elements of adaptation policies will be defined at the 
national level. 
3. Food security on a household level: Without a de-
tailed look at the impacts at the household level, the 
analysis would lack an understanding of the difficulties 
and specific necessities each person faces in regard to 
food security. This knowledge is crucial in designing 
adequate adaptation policies that support those groups, 
particularly marginal producers and vulnerable consum-
ers, which are most likely to become food insecure. All 
three levels of the food security definition will be taken 
into consideration in the following study. 
In this context, the most relevant level for explanation 
of the impact of climate change on food insecurity will 
be the household level. As long as there is no global 
food shortage, the income of the household is the key 
determinant for whether or not a family becomes food 
insecure. Production and consumption-related aspects 
are not the only important determinants of food secu-
rity. The whole food chain, including input factors, pro-
duction, storage and processing, distribution, exchange, 
preparation, and consumption, must be analyzed be-
cause of its influence on the development of income, 
prices, and the availability of food. 
„The food system is a set of dynamic interac-
tions between and within the bio-geophysical 
and human environments that influences both 
activities and outcomes all along the food chain“ 
(FAO 2007b, 6). 
Food security can therefore be seen as an outcome of 
the performance of the food system at the national level 
and the relevant international framework conditions 
(Figure 8). Bio-geophysical trends like those discussed 
in the climate change debate play an important role, but 
the human response and the political management of 
these trends are also decisive for the potential affects.
2.2 Who are the hungry today
Around 80 percent of the hungry live in rural areas; half 
of them are small-holder peasants, another 22 percent 
are landless laborers, and 8 percent are hunter-gather-
ers, fishers, and pastoralists. This situation is expected 
to persist. 
While the urban poor are the fastest increasing group 
of food insecure people, more than 50 percent of the 
hungry are projected to live in rural areas in 2050 (FAO 
2005). The majority of these groups live on extremely 
marginal conditions. They often live in remote geo-
graphical locations, in ecological vulnerable areas, or on 
slopes or drought prone areas/rainforest etc. They have 
difficulties accessing means of transport, such as roads, 
and thus to markets where they can sell their goods. 
Most have limited or no adequate access to extension 
services, credits or insurance mechanisms. 
Absence of land reform forces poor and marginal farm-
ing households to use land highly exposed to catastro-
phes like floods or droughts. Usually, they are also politi-
cally marginalized, without an important voice in local 
or national politics.
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According to FAO figures, more than 850 million peo-
ple are facing hunger and malnutrition. 815 million of 
them are living in economically developing countries – 
76 percent of whom live in rural areas (FAO 2006, 69). 
In this connection, a word of caution on the available 
data on hunger and malnutrition: All hunger figures are 
estimations with quite a degree of uncertainty, but the 
allow to identify trends and know the share of certain 
vulnerable groups.
All available data and studies show that the number of 
hungry and malnourished has not decreased in the last 
decade, even though enough food is produced globally 
to satisfy the needs of the world‘s population. Hunger 
and malnutrition today are not caused by food short-
ages or scarcity. Hunger is currently an issue of access to 
food, an adequate income, or productive resources that 
allow poor people either to produce or to buy enough 
food. Thus, the inequitable distribution of food, land, 
and other productive resources, as well as missing in-
come are decisive factors for hunger and malnutrition. 
It will be discussed later if food surplus is going to be a 
continuing state, or if the world will increasingly face 
absolute shortages (chapters 2.4 and 5.1). It will be one 
of the decisive factors to overcome this marginalization, 
in order to reduce the number of hungry people world-
wide. National and international agricultural policies 
have often forced marginalized populations to migrate 
to risk-prone areas. It would be irresponsible and im-
practical to focus more resources towards combating ca-
tastrophes instead of addressing underlying land access 
problems. A better approach would be to combat the 
marginalization of affected communities and people – 
this would also increase the resilience towards natural 
disasters. 
The World Food Summit (WFS) in 1996 committed 
to halving the number of hungry people by 2015. The 
persistence of the problem can be observed, when we 
see that at the World Food Summit in 1974 govern-
ment representatives declared that in ten more years 
“no child will have to go to bed hungry”. This goal was 
later integrated into the first Millennium Development 
Goal (MDG) set by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations in 2000, although it was modified at that oc-
casion. The MDG Goals demand the reduction of the 
Figure 8: Interaction of determinants for food security
Food system ACTIVITIES
Producing food: natural resources, inputs, techology ...
Processing and packaging food: raw materials, standards, storage life ...
Distributing and retailling food: transport, marketing, advertising ...
consuming food: acquisition, preparation, socializing ...
Food system OUTCOMES contributing to:
Social welfare:
 Income
 Employment
 Wealth
	Social and political capital
	Human capital
Food UTILIZATION
	Nutritional value
	Social value
	Food Safety
Food UTILIZATION
	Nutritional value
	Social value
	Food Safety
Food UTILIZATION
	Nutritional value
	Social value
	Food Safety
Environmental security/ 
natural capital
 Ecosystems stocks, 
flows
 Ecosystem services
 Access to natural 
 capital
Source: http://www.gecafs.org/glossary/index.html
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share of the hungry up to 2015 compared to 1990, 
while the WFS was demanding the reduction of the 
number of the hungry. Due to the fact that the world 
population is increasing, the MDG contains a softer re-
duction target, because of the number of hungry needs 
to be reducted to circa 600 Million people to achieve 
the goal, while the WFS goal demands a reduction to 
400 Million people. 
At the World Food Summit five years later in June 2002, 
it became clear that this goal would not be achieved 
unless substantial policy changes were to take place. 
Officially the FAO estimated before the WFS that the 
number of hungry people was reducted by six million 
a year between 1996 and 2002. It was already at the 
summit doubtfull if the figures were reliable, due to the 
fact that the numbers are based on a reduction of hungry 
people in China, while at the same time the number of 
hungry people has increased in many other countries. 
In between the FAO had to adjust the figures again to a 
number higher than 840 million. In October 2008 the 
FAO estimated that in 2007 the world had 923 million 
undernourished people. No process has been reached in 
reducing the total number since the WFS in 1996. FAO 
itself argued that the situation was caused by a lack of 
investment and a „lack of political will“ to implement 
policies that would reduce hunger. The financial means 
needed to close this implementation gap are estimated 
to be around USD 24 billion (FAO 2002, 3). 
A 2006 analysis by the FAO showed that the world is 
still not on track to meet neither the goals of the World 
Food Summit nor the weaker Millennium Development 
Goal (MDG) target (Figure 9).
A comprehensive review of the status of hunger and 
malnutrition has been provided in United Nations re-
ports presented by the Millennium Project. This group 
of experts was assembled by the Secretary General to 
give recommendations on how to implement the first 
MDG and halve the number of hungry and malnour-
ished people by 2015.6 Current estimates say that more 
than 75 percent of the world‘s poorest people live in 
rural areas and depend mainly or partially on agricul-
ture for their livelihoods. The report also highlights that 
Table 4: Typology of hunger
Food-producing households in higher-risk environments 
and remote areas
roughly 50% of the hungry
Non-farm rural households 22% of the hungry
Poor urban households 20% of the hungry
Herders, fishers and forest-dependent households 8% of the hungry
Vulnerable Individuals Vulnerable pregnant and nursing women and their  
infants, pre-school children, chronically ill or disabled
Affected people of extreme events ca. 60 million
HIV-related food insecurity Number of food-insecure households with adults or chil-
dren affected by HIV: ca. 150 million
Source: UN Millennium Project/UNDP 2003
6 The first report of the hunger task force of the Millennium Project developed a typologie of the hungry worldwide. It was published in 
New York, April 2003. See also the excellent overview in IFAD 2001.
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natural and man-made catastrophes, which often trig-
ger the need for food aid, are currently responsible for 
around 10 percent of all hungry and malnourished peo-
ple in the world. 90 percent of the hungry suffer from 
chronic malnutrition. 
Half of the world‘s hungry people are smallholder farm-
ers who live off a limited area of land and without ad-
equate access to productive resources. Two thirds of 
these people live on marginal lands in environmentally 
difficult conditions. Examples of such areas are hillsides 
or areas threatened by drought or other natural disasters 
like flooding or mud slides etc. Moreover, 22 percent of 
the hungry are landless families, who often subsist on 
income obtained under precarious working conditions 
as landless laborers. Additionally, 8 percent of hungry 
and malnourished people are found in fishing, hunting 
and herding communities. 
Secure access to productive resources – land, water, and 
agricultural inputs like seeds and livestock breeds etc. – 
is the key to improving the situations of these families. 
Such processes are exacerbated by the fact that the driv-
ing force of food and agricultural policies of many coun-
tries, in the industrialized North as well as the global 
South, has been industrial agriculture, livestock produc-
tion, and commercial fisheries. The need of smallholder 
farmers, pastoralists, and fisher folk to secure access to 
productive resources is often overlooked. 
Most undernourished people live in India and China. 
In India, more people suffer from malnutrition than in 
sub-Saharan Africa as a whole (Figure 10). In the early 
1990s, there was progress being made to reduce these 
numbers in Asia and the Pacific, but that trend seems 
to have reversed. 
However, since population growth in most regions is 
larger than the increase in the number of the under-
nourished, most regions see slight progress towards the 
Millennium Development Goal of halving the percent-
age of undernourished people. Still, this result occurs at 
too slow a pace to reach the 2015 goals (UN 2007).
There are a number of myths and assumptions why hun-
ger and malnutrition exist in a world of plenty. Many of 
these postulations refer to natural disasters and conflict. 
Environmental factors such as unreliable rain, storms 
and drought are often considered to be the main rea-
sons behind famine and hunger. Complex political situa-
Figure 9: Number of undernourished people in the developing world
Source: FAO 2006, 5
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tions, such as conflicts and civil war, are also thought to 
contribute.7 According to the UN Millennium Project, 
around 60 million people are affected by civil strife and 
insecure political conditions (UN Millennium Project 
2005). Even though these explanations are indeed in-
creasingly relevant, they address more the symptoms 
that occur in situations where people are poor and vul-
nerable rather than the underlying causes. The reason 
why poor people are the most affected by natural disas-
ters is due to their lack of reserves, power, and possibili-
ties, and thus their lack of control over resources. 
2.3 Marginalization of producers:  
a problem of development policies
Given the crucial role of marginalization in the food se-
curity debate, it is clear that agricultural and food pro-
duction problems cannot be tackled at the technical lev-
el. The situation of the rural poor has been aggravated 
by the fact that rural areas were neglected in regional, 
national and international policy making. For a long 
time, the policy focus was on investments in industry 
and urban infrastructure, causing budget allocations for 
rural areas to be reduced substantially – often by more 
than 50 percent (FAO 2003). The same happened with 
bi- and multilateral aid budgets. According to FAO fig-
ures, the average budget of rural development in devel-
oping countries was reduced by 50 percent between the 
mid ‚80s and mid ‚90s. The same happened to bi- and 
multilateral aid. The World Bank, for example, dropped 
its lending to these sectors from nearly USD 6 billion in 
1986 to USD 2.7 billion in 1996. Many reasons are giv-
en for this decline: the inherent complexity, relatively 
high transaction costs in agriculture and rural develop-
ment projects (particularly with poor producers), aver-
sions among bank staff and client to lend in those sec-
tors, and the low effectiveness of institutions working 
with these sectors in many countries (FAO 2001).
Support for rural development and agricultural produc-
tion were judged as outmoded. Only recently, interna-
tional organisations have begun to recognize that the 
policy shift away from rural development policies was 
at least too radical and the policies are now being re-
versed. A decade of official work on poverty reduction 
without major results has lead to the realization that 
policies aiming at effective poverty reduction have to 
Figure 10: Regional distribution of undernourished people
Source: FAO 2006, 8, 9 
7 See e.g. the Global Information and Early Warning System on food and agriculture (GIEWS) of the FAO and its determination of countries 
in food crisis
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address the needs of people in rural areas.8 The FAO is 
also arguing that the hope of the 1990s, that poverty 
reduction will automatically lead to a decrease in the 
number of hungry and malnourished, can no longer be 
justified. In fact, the opposite recognition – that hunger 
needs to be tackled first in order to address the prob-
lems of poverty – is gaining ground. The FAO and others 
have therefore promoted a twin-track approach which 
against the background of the recent food crisis aims 
„at (i) alleviating the impacts of high food and 
fuel prices on the weakest population groups 
through direct transfers and safety nets, while 
(ii) implementing policies and programs to pro-
mote agricultural and rural development both in 
the short and long run“ (FAO 2008a, 16).
In many developing countries agriculture is taxed, and 
support services are poorly equipped as described in the 
2008 World Development Report (World Bank 2008). 
Agricultural research is directed only towards commer-
cial crops. However, other negative framework condi-
tions such as insecure land titles, problems with access 
to credit or capital, insurance etc often prevail. The result 
is that even if smallholders do have access to some land, 
they must endure poor conditions, lacking support and 
adequate economic frameworks. Governments seldom 
pay enough attention to these sectors and do not im-
plement their human rights obligations to these groups. 
The recently published report of the „International 
Assessment of Agricultural Science and Technology for 
Development“ IAASTD, is highlighting the potential 
positive effects, when small holder farmers would get 
sufficient governmental support. The IAASTD has been 
established at the Johannesburg Summit in 2002 and is 
a network set up in a similar way as the IPCC of cur-
rently up to 400 researchers. The report of the IAASTD 
can be downloaded from their official web-site: www.
agessessment.org.
International policy conditions also have an important 
impact on marginal rural smallholder farmers‘ com-
munities and those of pastoralists and fisher folk. As 
international polices set binding conditions for national 
policies, it is the combination of national and interna-
tional policy frameworks, along with local situations, 
that together play a crucial role for the situation of these 
groups.
Structural adjustment policies, which have been imple-
mented in most developing countries since the middle 
of the 1980s, have influenced national agricultural poli-
cies to a large degree. These policies were built around 
what the World Bank referred to as a „trade-based food 
security“ policy package. Agricultural support was ori-
ented towards fostering agricultural production for ex-
ports in order to increase income in hard currencies, 
which should help to finance the import of staple foods. 
Such policy recommendations often support the nation-
al bias against small holder production. This approach 
leads to a concentration in means available for agricul-
ture and rural development concentrated in few sectors 
of export production. The later-developed instruments 
of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), 
were created with the aim to direct policy processes for 
highly indebted countries; however they seldom take 
agriculture and rural development properly on board 
(SLE 2002). International policy advice was therefore 
rarely supportive to small-holder agriculture and rural 
development. It was only recently that several bilateral 
and multilateral donors started a newly created „Global 
Donor Platform on Rural Development“ (GDPRD). The 
GDPRD held its second international conference in June 
2007 in Berlin. The group was also influential in the 
preparation of the World Development Report (WDR) 
2008 and it was established as a network for donor 
harmonization in the area of rural development. This 
is finally again focusing on agricultural issues including 
development (World Bank 2007).
At the same time international trade policy rules be-
came increasingly binding for many countries when the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) was created in 1995, 
8 The importance is reflected in the IFAD analyses for rural development in 2001
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particularly since they not only set the terms for tar-
iffs, but also are signed as agreements that set stringent 
conditions and regulations for national policies. From 
food safety regulations to geographical indications and 
intellectual property, from agricultural subsidies to price 
support for basic staple foods, the WTO regulations are 
still deeply affecting national policy frameworks. One 
of the bigger problems linked to the WTO Agreement 
on Agriculture (AoA) is the imbalance in the level of 
liberalization obligations for different groups of coun-
tries. While developing countries have opened up their 
markets during the last fifteen years, their smallholder 
farmers still have to compete with subsidized produc-
tion and subsidies exports from industrialized countries. 
Because poor countries are not able to pay subsidies to 
their farmers and are forced to remove trade barriers, 
hardly any agricultural policy instrument prevails in 
these countries (see FAO 2005, chap. 3). At the same 
time, industrialized countries are still paying subsidies 
to the farm sector, even though the bulk of it does not 
reach smallholder farmers, but rather goes to agribusi-
nesses and the grain trading companies. OECD figures 
estimate that still around 300 billion US-Dollers are 
payed as subsidies to agriculture producers in industrial-
ized countries. The export susidies went down during 
the last decade linked to the WTO-agricultural negotia-
tions (see Dewbre, Thompson and Dewbre 2007).
Furthermore, the industrialization of agriculture is 
contributing to the trend which leads to a consolida-
tion of agricultural land and assets in the hands of big 
landowners, agribusiness, and other large commercial 
entities. The most fertile and extensive areas of land re-
main in the hands of a decreasing number of producers, 
and in many countries smallholders are being excluded 
and forced onto unproductive or „low potential“ land 
(IAASTD 2008). Moreover, reduced resources and in-
creased poverty force smallholders in many places to 
cultivate the land more intensively and to abandon more 
environmentally sustainable agricultural methods. 
However, it would be wrong to conclude that it is small-
holders that constitute the main threat to the environ-
ment. Obviously smallholder farmers, pastoralists and 
fisher folk can be responsible for causing environmental 
problems such as soil erosion, over-exploitation of soil 
fertility, or deforestation. But at the same time, they have 
been the main custodians of the environment for millen-
nia. The diversity of sustainable uses of land, soil, water, 
forest, and genetic resources such as seeds and livestock 
breeds, represents the careful work and knowledge of 
many generations of rural and indigenous peoples. 
Important environmental threats in global agricultural 
production often come from the process of industriali-
zation of production patterns often in more favorable 
areas. The overuse of water resources, the loss of soil 
through erosion and salinisation, the loss of agricultural 
biodiversity through the destruction of agro-ecosystems, 
intensive animal production patterns, and over-fishing 
are all at least partly results of the open world market 
that does not internalize these externalities and has put 
enormous pressure on producing as cheaply as possible 
(see also IAASTD 2008). 
Large-scale industrial Trans-National Corporations 
(TNCs) are also exerting increased control over differ-
ent parts of the food system, its markets and worldwide 
food production. The input-sectors for food production 
are undergoing rapid concentration (see Hines 2003). 
Many traditional seed producing companies have been 
bought by agrochemical companies or oil-companies. 
Intellectual Property Rights systems (IPRs) are promoted 
that provide monopoly privileges over what was once 
common property and thus facilitate the control over 
genetic material/life forms such as seeds and livestock 
breeds. The IPR agreements are also an obstacle to the 
spread of knowledge and technology among smallhold-
er farmers and their access to seeds and livestock breeds 
(see Liebig 2005). They can hinder access to seeds farm-
ers will need to adapt to climate change. The WTO‘s 
Agreement on Trade Related aspects of Intellectual 
Property rights (TRIPs) requires all members of the 
WTO to implement plant variety protection legislation, 
through patents or other IPR systems, at the same level 
as the most developed countries. 
The process of concentration is also visible in other in-
put sectors for agriculture, such as the production of 
pesticides, as well as in the food trade and the food-
processing industry. All global transactions in cereals 
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and soybeans are controlled by a few companies. The 
same is true for other important international crops, 
such as tropical export crops like bananas, pineapples, 
coffee and cocoa etc. The strongest pressure on prices 
comes from international food processing industries (see 
e.g. UK Food Group 2003). It is not just at the input end 
of agriculture that corporate dominance prevails. Over 
the last two decades TNCs have increased their mar-
ket domination of the processing and retailing of food. 
Smallholder farmers able to produce enough to trade 
are now facing an ever-harder struggle to exert any in-
fluence over the farm inputs they need, the farm-gate 
price for their produce, and the terms and conditions 
of its trade. 
Local and national markets are currently becoming more 
dominated by retail chains even in poorer countries in 
Africa. The „supermarketization“ will make it more 
difficult for poor smallholder farmers to sell products. 
Local markets are changing fast to supermarkets and 
supermarkets buy – when they buy regional products 
at all – standardized products with a uniform quality. 
Smallholder farmers can seldom produce at such stand-
ards. A result of that process will be a separation among 
rural producers into those who have enough capital and 
skill to integrate into the global food market and the 
large majority of small holder units without sufficient 
resources to do so. New approaches to empower farm-
ers and re-localize food systems are needed. In Europe, 
where TNC dominance of food retailing has been an is-
sue for some time, there are already a number of farmer-
based initiatives including farmers‘ markets, Fair-trade, 
farm retail, box schemes that help to „localize“ food 
systems and empower smallholder farmers (e.g. Sustain 
2003).
Overall, it is recognized that rural development deserves 
much more attention than it did during the last decades. 
There are many signs that the issue will get more at-
tention in the future than in the past. The most visible 
sign at the international level is the World Development 
Report 2008, which is demanding a refocusing of de-
velopment aid to agriculture and the creation of the 
Global Donor Platform on rural development (World 
Bank 2007). The most important document at the re-
gional level is the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture 
Development Programmed (CAADP), a document de-
veloped by the New Partnership initiative of the African 
Union for African Development (NEPAD). The head 
of states committed themselves to invest at least ten 
percent of the national budgets for rural development 
(NEPAD 2002). 
There seems to be a common understanding and a re-
newed recognition among many actors, from civil so-
ciety up to the World Bank, of the importance of rural 
development in the combat against poverty. Yet there 
is no consensus on the specific policies that should get 
the most attention when fostering rural development 
and deciding how to spend the money. The title of the 
World Development Report already shows that conflict. 
The World Bank finally decided not to use „rural de-
velopment“ but instead „agricultural development“ as 
the title for the World Development Report, because it 
focuses its strategy more on those farmers who have 
the potential to be integrated into global markets and to 
use agricultural development perspectives. The report 
develops an understanding that the rural world can be 
distinguished into “three different worlds“ that needs 
different policy treatment (World Bank 2007). 
1. The first group covers those agricultural producers 
with products that have the potential and the assets to 
be integrated in the global markets. They can produce at 
competitive prices and internationally-accepted quality 
standards, and the products can be sold in supermar-
kets. The report argues that they should get all support 
possible to be successfully integrated into global mar-
kets. 
2. The second group are the subsistence farmers that 
have a certain security in access to productive resources 
and the necessary skills to use them. They should be sup-
ported in improving subsistence agriculture. Moreover, 
when needed their income should be lifted by cash 
transfers, in order to bring them out of poverty. 
3. The third group are marginal farmers with very lim-
ited assets. For these groups the Word Development 
Report recommends leaving the country side, migrating 
Climate Change I Study
A
N
A
LY
SI
S 
02
52
to the cities and sending back remittances from work in 
order to help the village to develop.
While the report makes a lot of proposals for how to im-
prove spending in rural areas, it gives up on larger groups 
among the marginalized rural producers. Unfortunately, 
the report does not explain which alternative jobs are 
available for them in cities and what consequences new 
trends on world agricultural markets and rising food 
prices would have for them (see chapter 2.4). It also 
does not look at the question of how this strategy might 
influence greenhouse gas development, as the emis-
sions of town citizens are usually much higher than 
rural smallholders. 
How can rural, disadvantaged smallholders be best sup-
ported? This question is in the center of the current 
debate about rural development. The World Bank‘s 
model is generally market-oriented, while NGO and 
CSO which met in June 2007 before the Conference of 
the Global Donor Platform argued that support to mar-
ginalized producers cannot be given up, because the 
alternative scenarios of getting an income or adequate 
livelihood security are not available on a short term ba-
sis. Necessary structural change will require a long pe-
riod of adaptation (see the positionpaper of NGOs “The 
Role of Agriculture and Rural Development in Poverty 
Reduction”). It was the World Bank director, Robert 
Zoellick, who recently and for the first time started to 
talk about the redirection of development aid to rural 
areas. In a press statement related to the fast increase 
of World Market Prices, he demanded that a new ap-
proach be needed, focusing less on supply and access to 
food and more on competing usage of food and issues 
such as the marginalization of female producers or oth-
er groups in rural livelihoods (World Bank 2008). This 
might only be the start of the necessary debate about 
necessary consequences of new trends in the markets 
for agricultural commodities. 
2.4 Trends on world agricultural  
markets and agricultural prices
Given the current fast trend of rising world market pric-
es for agricultural commodities, in particular for cereals, 
Figure 11: Monthly FAO price indices for basic food commodity groups (1998-2000=100)
Source: FAO 2008a, 3
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it becomes clear that the debate about the best approach 
to rural development – which Zoellick also addressed – 
must come back to the centre of the discussion. 
Many authors warn that the situation of relative over-
production of food, which was characterizing world 
markets for the last decades, has changed. Several econ-
omists warn in the light of the 2007 price increases that 
the mid-term trend for food prices will be upwards. 
The price index of the FAO showed an increase in pric-
es of about 40 percent in 2007 for major staple foods, 
compared to an increase of 5 percent in 2006. In April 
2008 the Asian Development Bank noted an increase in 
prices for rice from Thailand – one of the leading rice 
exporters worldwide has increased 30 percent in the 
first quarter of 2008 (Braun 2007). It is very important 
to note that many of countries with a high percentage 
of undernourished people are also highly dependent on 
Countries Petroleum  
% imported *
Major grains  
% imported **
% undernourishment ***
Eritrea 100 88 75
Burundi 100 12 66
Comoros 100 80 60
Tajikistan 99 43 56
Sierra Leone 100 53 51
Liberia 100 62 50
Zimbabwe 100 2 47
Ethiopia 100 22 46
Haiti 100 72 46
Zambia 100 4 46
Central African Republic 100 25 44
Mozambique 100 20 44
Tanzania 100 14 44
Guinea-Bissau 100 55 39
Madagascar 100 14 39
Malawi 100 7 35
Camboida 100 5 33
Korea, DPR 98 45 33
Rwanda 100 29 33
Botswana 100 76 32
Niger 100 82 32
Kenya 100 20 31
*     Source: Energy Information Administration: International Energy Anual 2005, Washington D.C., US. Covers crude and refined petroleum products
**   Source: FAOSTAT: Archives Commodity Balance Sheets. Average 2001-03 for wheat, rice and maize
*** Source: FAOSTAT: Food Security Statistics, Prevaleuce of undermourishment in total population (2002-2004 preliminary): 
      www.fao.org/es/ess/faostat/foodsecurity
Table 5: Net importers of petroleum products and major grains as a percent of domestic apparent 
consumption - ranked by prevalence of undernourishment
Source: FAO 2008a, 17
Climate Change I Study
A
N
A
LY
SI
S 
02
54
petroleum imports (Table 5). This leaves them with a 
double-fold increased bill: More money has to be spent 
on food, while the increased oil prices put further pres-
sure on national budgets, which often subsidize the 
price people have to pay for petroleum.
A recent paper presented at the FAO Summit 2008 
(FAO 2008) estimates how price increases in key com-
modities are expected to impact the import bills for 
food. It shows that the Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs) have to calculate expenditures increased by 25 
percent in 2007 as compared to 2006. The estimates 
for the Low-Income Food Deficit Countries result in an 
even higher increase of more than 30 percent. This se-
verely constrains governments‘ abilities to invest in the 
fight against poverty, malnutrition and other important 
developmental shortcomings.
Some researchers pinpoint the fact that the low price 
period of the last decades resulted in limited agricul-
tural investments in many regions of the world. The 
„High level Task Force on the Global Food Crisis“, 
which was established in April 2008 by a meeting of the 
heads of all UN-Agencies, is making that point strongly 
in its report to the General Assembly (HLTF 2008, 8). 
Increasing prices will therefore be an incentive and will 
encourage a market response with more investments 
in agriculture with increasing outputs. While precise 
and accurate forecasts are still difficult to formulate and 
must be made with caution, more studies show that the 
price for most agricultural resources will most likely stay 
higher than in the recent past. Studies from FAO, IFPRI, 
and the World Food Program all expect similar trends: 
The prices will probably not decrease to the same level 
they experienced during the last decades, even if higher 
prices will stimulate additional agricultural output in 
the coming years. The High Level Task Force of the UN 
concluded. 
„While food commodity prices now appear to 
be stabilizing, prices are expected to remain 
high over the medium or long term“ (HLTF 
2008, 10). 
Many studies refer to several long-term trends, that will 
influence future agricultural production, and which have 
already partially contributed to recent price increases. 
Five trends are of particular importance and will limit a 
broad and sustained market response in the near future. 
The first two trends are related to factors that influence 
global demand, while the fourth and fifth relate to the 
global production potential on the supply side:
1. The demand for food and agricultural products is 
expected to grow rapidly in coming decades: The in-
creased demand for food products is partially due to 
World Developing LDC * LIFDC **
2006 2007 2006 2007 2006 2007 2006 2007
Total food 630 135 812 743 190 975 253 526 13 822 17 699 88 577 119 207
Cereals 186 794 268 300 74 615 100 441 6 101 8 031 31 363 41 709
Vegetable Oils 70 822 114 077 34 831 55 658 1 948 3 188 22 919 38 330
Dairy 45 572 86 393 13 593 25 691 824 1 516 5 079 9 586
Meat 78 704 89 712 17 064 20 119 872 1 079 6 295 8 241
Sugar 33 024 22 993 13 892 11 904 1 755 1 320 7 598 4 782
*   Least developed countries
** Low-income food deficit countries
Table 6: Forecast import bills of total food and major food commodities (USD million)
Source: FAO 2008a, 18
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the increasing population – current estimates result in 
a population of 6.5 billion to 9 billion people in 2050 
(UN-ESA 2007). This growth will take place mostly in 
developing countries, but is also currently driven by the 
economic growth of several emerging economies. The 
increasing wealth (and images of modernity) in these 
countries leads to changes in diet towards more animal 
products and cereals. Meat consumption alone has dou-
bled worldwide during the last 25 years (Ehring 2008).
This is traditionally an issue documented by the former 
director of the World Watch Institute, Lester Brown 
(see Worldwatch Institute 2003). This trend has already 
contributed to the decline in food stocks. If global cereal 
consumption was comparable to the average European 
consumption level, two times more (6 billion tonnes) of 
cereals would be needed than are currently being pro-
duced.9
2. The demand for non-food use of agricultural resource 
is increasing along with oil prices: Agricultural products 
can be used as energy resources, such as agro fuels, 
and resources for other industrial production processes. 
Simultaneously, increasing oil prices will also impact the 
increase of agricultural prices by influencing the prices 
for agricultural input. The support for the use of agro 
fuel has been presented as partially, although not pri-
marily, motivated by the will to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions in the transport sector. But rising oil prices 
and energy security concerns might be more important 
drivers.
3. Global food markets will also be confronted with 
a shrinking surplus production in the US and the EU, 
partially because of WTO commitments to end export 
subsidies and partially because more agricultural pro-
duce will be used for bio energetic purposes in these 
countries.
4. Future environmental limitations for agricultural pro-
duction: There is a decreasing amount of land available 
for agriculture and grazing. Latest figures estimate that 
annually more than 0,5 percent of arable land is being 
lost (WBGU 2008). This is caused by a combination 
of factors: urbanization and expanded industrial infra-
structure, particularly around mega-cities in developing 
countries, soil erosion, desertification, salinisation, and 
contamination. Flooding as a consequence of expected 
increased extreme precipitation events can also contrib-
ute to soil degradation. Decreasing precipitation in some 
regions because of climate change in some regions, van-
ishing glaciers, and inundations from sea-level rise etc. 
are expected to reduce water availability and partially 
the available land for agriculture. Increasing demand 
for freshwater, inter alia through mega-city growth, also 
adversely impacts on the availability of this crucial re-
source.
5. Climate-related volatility on the supply side: Climate 
change will not only bring long term consequences. 
The expected increase in intensity and number of ex-
treme weather events may also bring about temporary 
shortfalls on the supply side. This can be one important 
factor for the increased volatility of food prices, espe-
cially in times of reduced storage capacities. In its recent 
analysis, the FAO explicitly mentions „weather-related 
production shortfalls“ as one of the factors that have 
contributed to the recent increase in food prices (FAO 
2008a). In recent years there has been a number of ex-
amples where extreme weather events have hit regions 
that supply large amounts of food commodities to the 
global market, both in developing and developed coun-
tries. For example, in Australia, which had been the 
second largest grain exporter after the US, a drought in 
2006 made grain yields drop from 25 million tonnes to 
less than 10 million tonnes (Bryant 2008). 
In June 2008, tornadoes caused severe flooding in the 
Midwest of the USA, with the water covering more 
than 40,000 hectares of farmland including large soy 
fields. As a result, soy prices experienced another in-
crease (dpa 2008). For methodological reasons, it is 
never possible to link one single extreme weather event 
to global climate change. But it can already be shown 
that anthropogenic greenhouse emissions have now 
9 Own calculation based on caloric consumption estamates.
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“loaded” the atmosphere. The likelihood of an increase 
in number and intensity of extreme weather events has 
grown (IPPC 2007a). In extreme cases, traditionally ex-
porting regions can become importers. 
What are the implications of these trends for those suf-
fering from food insecurity going to be?
Reflecting these structural drivers behind the price in-
crease, it is likely that prices will stay above the level 
we had during the last decade, even though there is a 
recent decline in commodity prices from the peak levels 
in early 2008 (see also CTA 2008). In addition to the 
mentioned factors, there is a continued rise in fertilizer 
prices and energy costs, which are major input factors 
for farmers. All indicators therefore support the assump-
tion that prices will stabilize at a higher niveau in the 
mid- and long term. A recession would certainly support 
a short term price reduction.
A recent OECD and FAO study highlighted that while 
prices should decline from their recent peak, they will 
remain above the average of the past decade (OECD/
FAO 2008). Comparing the 1998-2007 period to the 
projected price levels for 2008-2017 beef and pork pric-
es may be some 20 percent higher, raw and white sugar 
around 30 percent, wheat, maize and skimmed-milk 
powder 40 percent to 60 percent, butter and oilseeds 
more than 60 percent, and vegetable oil over 80 per-
cent.
The European Commission published an analysis of the 
recent food crises which supported the conclusion that 
the rising prices have affected net food importing coun-
tries in Africa most severely (see Table 6). According to 
the EC judgment the higher food prices have translated 
into greater poverty, malnutrition and increased vulner-
ability to further external shocks for the world‘s poorests 
(EC 2008). At the same time, the EC has the hope that 
higher prices in the medium or long term will present 
new income-generating opportunities for farmers also in 
developing countries, allowing them to better deal with 
the consequences of climate change. But the common 
OECD/FAO report is skeptical about that hope: High 
prices, the OECD is arguing, will benefit commercial 
producers but not necessarily the bulk of producers in 
developing countries where many farmers are not linked 
to markets (see OECD/FAO 2008). Prices are expected 
to become more volatile in the coming period, partly 
as the result of speculation, partly due to more intense 
weather extremes. 
The FAO sees two reasons why the urban poor are most 
exposed to the increase in world food prices. 
„First, urban populations are more likely to con-
sume staple foods derived from tradable com-
modities (wheat, rice), while rural populations 
(particularly in Africa and Latin America) tend to 
consume more traditional staples, such as roots 
and tubers. Second, urban populations are less 
likely to produce a significant share of their own 
food or produce for sale“ (FAO 2008a, 31). 
Price increases could have positive welfare effects for 
parts of society, including rural smallholders, which are 
net-sellers in respect to goods that experience price in-
crease. The amount of positive effect depends on the 
ratio between the price increase of the good sold and 
the production costs. In this regard, soaring oil prices 
have a detrimental effect on rural farmers, because en-
ergy use plays such an important role in the production 
and particularly transport of these products to markets. 
Even worse, in many countries most of the rural poor 
are not net-sellers. This means that they also face in-
creased expenditures for their food consumption (FAO 
2008a, 31f). In some cases, it may be possible to switch 
to consuming goods which have not faced such price 
increases. In the long term, price increases may lead 
to more political attention, increased support, and im-
proved productivity of rural agriculture, with opportu-
nities for higher incomes for the rural poor. However, 
currently it is more likely that a large number of people 
are negatively affected.
Price trends might be aggravated by the impact of cli-
mate change. It becomes therefore more and more ob-
vious that these particular groups are those most likely 
affected by rising prices, because the price increase will 
directly affect the percentage of their income which they 
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have to spend on food alone. Adequate policies such as 
social transfers and increased humanitarian help might 
improve the situation of poor consumers as well as poli-
cies to increase market access by remote small holder 
farmers. However, conclusions for strategic responses 
vary tremendously and are often partially contradictory. 
Against the background of these trends and including 
the impacts of global climate change on food security, 
conclusions with regard to agricultural development 
policies and rural development will be discussed in 
chapter 5. 
2.5  Food security compared with  
other concepts: food sovereignty,  
right to food
For the purpose of this study, it is important to clarify 
the relationship between the concept of food security 
and the human right to adequate food, as both con-
cepts are referred to regularly, and it is important to see 
both the similarities and differences. Food security has 
been described above. In essence, it is a concept to ana-
lyze and describe the nutritional status of people; they 
should have sufficient access to food and be healthy 
enough to avoid malnutrition. The four components of 
food security (availability, physical access, economic ac-
cess, utilization) seem comparable to the description of 
the right to adequate food, but the two concepts differ. 
Food Security is mainly an analytical tool, and not an 
agenda for policy action.
The right to adequate food is a human right. It is en-
shrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
adopted in 1948 by the UN General Assembly (UN 
1948). This document serves as a foundation for the 
legally binding International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which was adopt-
ed by the UN General Assembly in 1966 and entered 
into force in 1976. As of June 2008, it has been rati-
fied by 158 state Parties (as of June 2008, UN 1966, 
see Figure 12: Map of Parties to the ICESCR). It is 
well described by the General Comment No. 12 of the 
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (see High-Commissioner for Human 
Rights OHCHR). Moreover, it is politically reconfirmed 
Figure 12: Map of Parties to the ICESCR
Parties to the ICESCR: Parties in dark grey; states which have signed but not ratified in light grey, non-parties in white
Source: www.wikipedia.org, based on OHCHR
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and strongly supported by all member states of the 
Food and Agricultural organization in the adoption of 
the „Voluntary guidelines on the implementation of the 
right to adequate food in the context of national food 
security“ in November 2004 by the FAO-Council (FAO 
2004). It describes government obligations, and it is 
therefore an implementation-oriented tool that allows 
monitoring government action vis-à-vis groups which 
are particularly food insecure.
Other human rights particularly relevant for climate 
change effects are the rights to housing, to health, and 
to water and sanitation. The right to adequate food and 
housing are part of the right to an adequate standard of 
living in Art. 11 of the ICESCR. The right to achieve 
the highest attainable standards of health is recognized 
in Art. 12 of the same covenant. The right to water is 
not mentioned specifically in the ICESCR, but is derived 
from Art. 11, the right to adequate food and Art. 12 the 
right to health. The content and state obligations linked 
to the rights to food, housing and health has been de-
veloped in the course of the last 10 years, partially by 
the UN-Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (CESCR) in the form of general comments, or by 
the work of UN-special rapporteurs. 
Special rapporteurs are thematic experts nominated by 
the UN-Human Rights Council woh follow one issue 
for up to six years and publish two thematic and two 
country reports every year. The have helped develop a 
detail and precise understanding of the rights to food, 
housing, health and education (see Eide et al. 2007). 
General comments are interpretations or clarifications 
given by the UN-expert committee that is supervising 
the implementation of the Covenant. They are not le-
gally binding but interpretation guidelines for judges 
who use or apply the covenant in court rules related 
to ESC rights (see Eide et al. 2007). The detailed un-
derstanding of the right to water is still under discus-
sion and in 2008 the Human Rights Council selected 
an independent expert on the right to water and sanita-
tion, who has the mandate to help clarifying the related 
state obligations. An initial orientation for the use and 
interpretation of the right to water has given in 2002 by 
the UN-Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights with the General Comment No. 15 (see Sacher 
and Windfuhr 2008).
2.6 Content of the right to adequate 
food
In General Comment No. 12 (GC 12), the Committee 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights has given its 
interpretation of the right to adequate food. 
„The right to adequate food is realized when 
every man, women and child, alone or in com-
munity with others, have physical and econom-
ic access at all times to adequate food or means 
for its procurement“ (Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights 2002).
The right to adequate food implies the availability of 
food in quantity and quality which is sufficient to satisfy 
the dietary needs of individuals. The food has to be free 
from adverse substances and acceptable within a given 
culture. Furthermore, the food has to be accessible in 
ways which are sustainable, which implies that the ac-
cess and the availability needs to be given long term. 
Several components of this definition are of particular 
importance in properly understanding the content of 
the right to adequate food. Food must be physically 
available. Availability implies either a possibility to feed 
oneself from productive land or the existence of a well-
functioning food distribution system that guarantees 
food is always there. Availability in a region or a village 
alone does not mean that a person or a household has 
access to the food. The food needs to be accessible both 
physically and economically. Sometimes minorities are 
hindered in getting access to food. Sometimes they do 
not have the economic means to buy food. 
Accessibility of food is only sufficiently guaranteed 
when individuals or households do not have to sacrifice 
other essential basic needs in order to get food. Any 
form of food procurement is therefore only viable when 
other ESC-rights do not have to be breached. The term 
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`dietary needs´ refers to more than pure nutrients for 
physical needs. It refers to those dietary needs which 
are necessary for physical and mental growth and physi-
cal activity. 
Another important component is access to adequate 
health prevention and control of disease. Many children 
who die from malnutrition do have access to food, but 
cannot adequately utilize it, because diseases are hinder-
ing them.10 For children, particularly small children and 
babies, another component is decisive. Somebody must 
give adequate care so that children will be feed well and 
regularly. The General Comments defines this as core 
content of the right to adequate food and the freedom 
from hunger. This refers to the immediate obligations of 
governments to guarantee that nobody dies from acute 
hunger due to man made and natural catastrophes and 
emergencies. While the content of „freedom from hun-
ger“ has not been well elaborated so far, it reflects the 
intention of the drafters of the ESCR to make sure that 
nobody dies from immediate hunger. The full realization 
of the right to adequate food can only be achieved pro-
gressively and will take time, even when many govern-
ment obligations can be implemented immediately.
The implementation of the right to adequate food is 
guided by specific government obligations. Food secu-
rity describes a goal; the right to adequate food obliges 
governments make a qualitative response to the prob-
lem of hunger and malnutrition. A human rights-based 
monitoring has the specific focus to analyze whether 
governments are implementing their specific human 
rights obligations (see Immick 2004). Rights-based 
monitoring (RBM) starts by using available informa-
tion and data in a country as identified by food security 
indicators. Additionally, it tries to measure progress in 
the implementation of human rights obligations of the 
country. It measures to what extent government poli-
cies constitute an adequate answer to the duties of the 
government. It analyses whether governments use their 
respective resources adequately and most reasonably to 
guarantee the full enjoyment of this right. 
A third term gaining prominence within the debates 
of civil society organisations dealing with issues such 
as hunger, malnutrition, and rural development is food 
sovereignty. Food sovereignty is a political concept pri-
marily developed in the context of La Via Campesina, a 
global small farmers‘ movement. It is increasingly being 
used by other civil society organisations including the 
umbrella organization of civil society groups working 
at the FAO. 
The parallel civil society forum to the World Food 
Summit + 5 conference in June 2002 was held in the 
name of food sovereignty, providing evidence that this 
topic is becoming the most relevant civil society concept. 
In March 2007 Via Campesina coordinated with the 
umbrella organization of small farmers in West Africa, 
(Reseau des Organisations Paysannes et des Producteurs 
Agricoles de l’ Afrique de l’ Quest, ROPPA), and other 
civil society organisations at an international gathering 
of civil society in Mali. The outcome was a common 
statement that describes the ideas behind the concept 
of food sovereignty quite well (see Nyeleni Declaration 
2007). Food sovereignty has been developed as a con-
cept by social movements and farmers organisations to 
protest the neglect of rural areas and rural development 
in national and international policies. It highlights the 
political will of organisations of rural people to have the 
right to determine their own situation. 
Emphasis is placed on protecting the possibilities of  
smallholder farmers to continue producing and to earn 
a decent income from agricultural production.
Security in accessing productive resources is key for  
this concept. This includes a secure access to land, wa-
ter, as well as seeds and breeds. 
The current marginalization of rural communities  
shall be overcome and their right to food realized.
International trade shall be reduced to a minimum  
in order to let local and national markets blossom.
10 The standard definition of food security covers that aspect because adequate use and utilization of food is a precondition for food security.
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Traditional plant varieties shall be used, protected  
and supported. Patents on seeds and breeds should be 
forbidden.
Food sovereignty is not only used as concept for  
farmers, but also as a concept for the ambitions of fish-
ers, herders and indigenous communities.
Food sovereignty is promoted as a political concept 
countering the current dominant model of rural devel-
opment based on a free trade as central parameter. The 
current model is perceived by social movements as a 
model of „corporate driven“ agriculture that fosters a 
concentration of power and resources in the hand of a 
few multinational corporations and land owners. While 
the use of the term food sovereignty still varies and no 
standard definition is yet available, the Nyeleni state-
ment offers the first consolidated reference point. In the 
last chapter, this study will compare its own recommen-
dations with the central elements of the concept of food 
sovereignty (see chapter 11). 
2.7 Standards of governance under the 
right to food
The right to adequate food sets standards for govern-
ance at both national and international levels, accord-
ing to the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the aforementioned 
voluntary guidelines. 18 guideline recommendations 
describe how governments can guarantee the right to 
adequate food in national or local policies. Guideline 
19 refers to international obligations governments have 
in their own foreign policy, but also to obligations they 
have when acting in intergovernmental organisations. 
The right to food perspective in this study allows for 
discussing and challenging current forms of govern-
ance and to draw conclusions on how to better orient 
national and international policies to overcome hunger 
and malnutrition.
Human rights set standards for government policies. 
The state parties to the ICESCR have the obligation to 
respect, protect, and fulfill the right to adequate food, 
particularly for the most vulnerable groups. This results 
in a number of more specific obligations:
1. The state has to respect the rights of its people. When 
it comes to the right to food, the state must not take ac-
tions that endanger the means of livelihood or access to 
food for groups or individuals. Examples include forced 
evictions due to different kinds of projects (e.g. large de-
velopment or infrastructure projects, like construction 
of dams, lumbering or oil exploitation etc.). In cases 
where the possibilities for people to feed themselves 
are undermined by such activities, these groups must 
be offered compensation, rehabilitation, or an equal op-
portunity to feed themselves. The obligation to respect 
this target often requires states to omit action. The im-
plementation of that obligation is often affordable and 
can be immediately implemented by all states. At the 
same time, the obligation to respect requires that states 
respect equal rights of access to productive resources as 
well as to social transfer incomes. 
2. The state has to protect peoples‘ access to food against 
outside third parties. For example, transnational or na-
tional corporations or big land owners might threaten 
the livelihoods of people by engaging in activities with-
out taking into consideration the people living in the 
area. Such activities might be mining, oil exploitation, 
industrial fishing etc. Adequate protection means legis-
lation protecting vulnerable groups in society from be-
ing deprived of their resources or rights. Governments 
are obliged to implement existing laws in order to guar-
antee freedom from hunger through administrative and 
police measures. 
3. The obligation to fulfill requires that the state be-
comes active in identifying vulnerable groups and de-
signing policies and programs that improve their access 
to food-producing resources or income. The obligation 
to fulfill can only be implemented in a step by step man-
ner. Art. 2 of the ICESCR requires that state parties use 
the „maximum of the available resources“ (UN 1966). 
The non-identification of vulnerable groups or the miss-
ing start of progressive realization can be judged as vio-
lations of Covenant rights. Furthermore, the obligation 
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to fulfill states that parties should implement two differ-
ent types of policy measures:
First, they should enable as many people as possible to 
take care of themselves. Facilitating covers measures 
like creating access to productive resources like land, 
seed, water etc. or to receive other forms of income. 
For example, this obligation implies that governmen-
tal measures fulfill the right to food through agrarian 
reform, guaranteeing a minimum income, or securing 
minimum wage provisions. 
Second, the obligation to fulfill covers specific measures 
protecting affected groups who cannot make use of pro-
ductive opportunities. These populations are comprised 
of those who are too old, too young, HIV-Aids orphans 
etc. These groups need the provision of food or money 
in order to avoid hunger and malnutrition.
The implementation of economic, social, and cultural 
human rights does not demand impossible efforts from 
states, as is often suggested by skeptics, but involves 
feasible objectives. The obligation to respect and protect 
rights can usually be fulfilled without recourse to ex-
tensive financial means. The obligation to fulfill human 
rights requires the investment of resources. However, 
Art. 2 of the ICESCR sets realistic standards, which 
can be met even by poor countries. The article does 
not demand that all rights are to be immediately imple-
mented, but that the state has to implement the rights 
progressively and has to use the maximum amount of 
resources available. This obligation can also be fulfilled 
by poorer states, as the article only requires the invest-
ment of resources available. The use of these resources 
should, though, focus on and prioritize the poor and 
discriminated sections of the population. 
Other requirements have been described in the litera-
ture and are becoming standard interpretations of the 
application of the obligation to fulfill. Governments have 
to show that they have taken specific steps vis-à-vis all 
vulnerable groups. The realization of the rights should 
be progressive and should be fostered „as expeditiously 
as possible“. These qualifications were first developed in 
the Limburg principles from 1987. These principles are 
the result of a international lawyer conference which 
discussed the nature of the realisation of ESC-Rights. 
Published by the ICJ in 1987. 
The right to adequate food allows for holding govern-
ments accountable with regard to their adaptation poli-
cies to climate change. Governments must develop a 
national strategy for the implementation of the right to 
adequate food, which should encompass at least the fol-
lowing five elements (see Windfuhr 2001):
1. Governments must assess and identify the most vul-
nerable groups concerning the right to adequate food 
and food insecurity or those who are malnourished 
and hungry. Without proper assessment, governments 
cannot properly focus their policy attention to these 
groups.
2. Governments have to make sure that existing legisla-
tion addresses the concerns of these groups and that the 
legislation is not leading to de jure discrimination and 
violations. 
3. Governments have to make sure that their policy 
response and choice of instruments (de facto) is rea-
sonably focused towards the most vulnerable. Policies 
should respect and protect existing access to productive 
resources, income, and food. Governments must prove 
that they are doing the utmost to implement the right to 
adequate food and are helping people cope with risks.
4. Governments are obliged to monitor the outcome of 
their policies.
5. Governments must also allow for accountability 
mechanisms, including functioning complaint mecha-
nisms and access to recourse procedures. 
As described above, the World Food Summit in 1996 
established a new secretariat to improve the food inse-
curity measurement and the identification of vulnerable 
groups to food insecurity. Since then an interagency 
working group has developed a detailed methodology 
on how to identify vulnerable groups for food insecu-
rity. It developed a typology of 54 potentially vulnerable 
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groups, from both rural and urban livelihood contexts. 
This typology can be a helpful starting point for govern-
ment assessments on hunger and malnutrition (FIVIMS 
2002). 
Governments need to build the skills and methodol-
ogy to work with such a measurement system, which 
is so far only used by the UN-Agencies. However, the 
complexity of the system should not give the impres-
sion that it is too complex to monitor vulnerability for 
food security. In most countries, few groups are vulner-
able and need to be monitored in detail. The focus of 
the more detailed assessment of the specific vulnerable 
groups depends on the livelihood circumstances in that 
country. 
2.8 Climate change and vulnerabilities 
for food insecurity
Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries are all sensitive to 
climatic conditions. Climate change will have direct 
impacts on these three sectors, including their produc-
tivity. In turn, this will affect the income of vulnerable 
groups that depend on resources and products derived 
from these sectors. The scale of the direct adverse and 
positive effects varies with the specific geographical situ-
ation. Relatively easy general conclusions can be drawn 
on the global to regional scale, where it becomes obvi-
ous that particularly low-latitude regions will be affect-
ed negatively regarding their agricultural yields, water 
availability etc. Generally speaking, the greater the glo-
Figure 13: Analytical framework to assess climate-related risks and food security
Source: Zulu 2003
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bal temperature increase, the more severe the adverse 
effects (IPCC 2007b). 
However, these macro-level projections are not sufficient 
to identify the most vulnerable groups within regions 
or countries. This requires further efforts. Vulnerability 
assessments on the national level and the community 
level are crucial for developing adequate responses to 
food insecurity in face of climate change. The vulnera-
bility-specific information, which primarily looks at the 
internal constitution of a region or a community with 
regard to non-climate stressors, is the necessary next 
step, as was addressed above. It then must be connected 
to climate-related factors, for example the change in the 
likeliness of extreme weather events, and precipitation 
patterns etc. (see chapter 3). This may result in general 
assessments of vulnerability to climate change, but may 
also – and that would be appropriate in the context of 
this study – be translated into sector-specific climate 
change risk assessment, for example with regard to food 
security (Figure 13).
It is generally likely that those already suffering from 
undernourishment and hunger are also among those 
most at risk from climate change, although there might 
be exceptions. It then becomes important what vulner-
able groups are placed in regions where climate change 
will have adverse impacts. As in other fields also in the 
case of food security, certain non-climatic stressors may 
have a very important influence on adaptive capacity, 
as has been identified in the case of India (Parry et al. 
2007, 71). There is a large overlap between those dis-
tricts with a high vulnerability to climate change and 
those that rank highest in terms of import competition 
associated with economic globalization. Other studies 
have assessed specific rural vulnerabilities and relevant 
climate drivers, e.g. in Africa (Leary et al. 2007). Both 
external factors and internal factors were found to in-
crease the vulnerability of rural households. 
So far we see many regions – e.g. in Africa or in Asia 
– with more changes in the of weather patterns than 
changes in the average amount of rain fall (FAO 2003a, 
Table 7: Determinants of rural household vulnerabilities
External Internal
A high proportion of households engaged in subsistence 
or small scale farming or herding on marginal lands
Access to safe water and sanitation
Scarcity of water and other resources security of water rights
High poverty rates Land-tenure status
Rapidly growing population Farm size and soil quality
Poorly diversified income opportunities in the local 
economy
Number of animals owned
Inadequate health, education and other services Quantity and quality of household labor supply
Lack of social safety nets Ownership of farm equipment
Gender inequality Amount and diversity of household income
Declining local authority Financial savings
Governance failures Access to Credit
Violent conflict Food stores
Competition from market liberalization Health status of household members
Gender of household head
Source: Leary et al. 2007
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361ff). That means that even with insignificant changes 
of the average precipitation impacts on farmers and 
their harvests can already be severe. This provides a se-
rious challenge for the timing of sowing and harvesting. 
Additional problems are generated by a general trend 
towards more intense rain events, even if this does not 
effect the average rain fall. It is important to note, that – 
because of the non-linear and often chaotic behavior of 
weather – we will have considerable uncertainty in the 
future about how projected changes will impact the lo-
cal level. On the other hand, we can expect progress in 
assessing the likeliness of climatic long term changes for 
these regions. The possibility to predict the environmen-
tal and social impact will remain limited, but govern-
ments have to try to be as specific in their assessments 
as possible. 
The IPCC has concluded that the number and intensity 
of extreme weather events have likely increased (IPCC 
2007a). According to data from the reinsurance compa-
ny MunichRe, the increase in weather-related extreme 
events has been much more significant than that of non-
weather extremes (e.g. earthquakes) since 1980. This 
fact is another indicator for increased risks from climate 
change (Munich Re 2007). Additionally, it needs to be 
analyzed how changes in the frequency and intensity 
of extreme weather situations will increase the risk of 
these groups of being hit by an event with eventually 
disastrous consequences. Non-linear changes in climate 
change are difficult to estimate in a detailed assessment 
of changes. Nevertheless, their potential consequences 
help to indicate which the potential vulnerable groups 
are. 
In the UN-Human Rights context the term “vulnerable 
groups” is often used in an standardised form, to de-
scribe groups that are particulary hit by serveral forms of 
discrimination such as “women, children, indigenious 
etc.”. This study use the term in a broader form to de-
scribe all groups which are vulnerable to food depriva-
tion and undernutrition or which are under threat to 
become food insecure. This term is similarly used by an 
interagency working group on assessing food insecurity 
the Food Insecurity and Vulnerability Information and 
Mapping System (see FIVIMS/FAO 2003).
The risk arising from potential consequences of climate 
change for people will not only be determined by chang-
ing weather conditions but also to a large extend by 
the appropriateness of risk management and adaptation 
policies. It will therefore be decisive for potentially af-
fected persons how well their government and local 
community develop responses to adapt to already ex-
isting and potential future risks or uncertainties. Thus, 
climate change impacts have to be assessed in a double 
sense: 
(1) First, certain groups at the national or regional level 
are at risk to be affected by climate change in a simi-
lar way. Entire villages might have to expect impacts 
by changes in rainfall patterns. Governments need to 
identify the most likely changes (and also more uncer-
tain but high risk exposure) in livelihood situations and 
start designing an adequate policy response from that 
perspective. 
The number and geographic size of regions at risk is 
likely expanded, but in some cases it may also shift. 
New geographic areas, which had not been risk-prone 
to weather patterns or increasing sea levels, will be af-
fected by new risks in a climate-changed world. At the 
same time, new vulnerable groups regarding food inse-
curity are likely to emerge. While some agriculturally-
based livelihoods may – mainly in the beginning – ben-
efit from the effects of climate change, others will be 
undermined. Also, the livelihood status of agricultural 
workers will change as specific agricultural production 
patterns regionally shift. Vulnerability is also increasing 
for other groups such as low-income city dwellers who 
often face impacts of extreme weather events or vari-
able food prices. Those with few assets and those who 
lack adequate insurance coverage or access to safety net 
transfers are likely to become more vulnerable. 
(2) Second, from a human rights perspective, looking at 
the livelihood situation alone is not enough; even when 
persons belong to a certain livelihood setting and the 
climate change effects are similar for all households in a 
village or region, their individual coping capacities vary 
from household to household. Households have a differ-
ent factor endowment that takes into account aspects 
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such as land ownership, access to assets, or labor ca-
pacity. Governments might discriminate in their design 
of adaptation policies towards households headed by 
women, or families belonging to minorities or other dis-
criminated ethnic groups. In quite a number of regions, 
especially in Africa, HIV-affected families are particularly 
vulnerable. 
Any assessment of vulnerability must therefore be hu-
man rights-based. A rights-based assessment is a process 
in itself and has to build on human rights principles such 
as transparency, participation and non-discrimination. It 
has to be asked whether the people whose situation was 
assessed were informed about the assessment, if they 
could participate or contribute to the assessment, and 
if they can complain in case that their specific concerns 
and problems were not adequately reflected in the out-
come. The human rights based approach guiding the 
methodology of this study is further explained below 
(see chapter 2.5, 4 and 5). One value added is that it 
sharpens any assessment for the needs of particularly 
poor and marginal groups in society. 
The ability of people at risk to cope with the trends and 
effects of climate change will depend generally on the 
three following factors, and for each factor key analyti-
cal questions can be identified:
1. The coping capacity of each family and community 
in its given situation: How many assets does the family 
have? Which income sources are available? Where is 
the family living and what are the factors determining 
the livelihood situation etc.? 
2. The government response to the challenges: Does the 
government have the most affected groups identified? 
Has it started to introduce policies and programs that 
address their particular vulnerability etc.? 
3. The support for governments and local communities 
provided by the international community, e.g. by the 
UN climate policy process: Does the international com-
munity provide enough support for governments and 
local communities? Does the support provide incentives 
for the government and local communities to identify 
most vulnerable groups and limit their risk? Does the 
international support reach these groups?
 A person or a family is a vulnerable person or family not 
only due to changing weather conditions, but mainly 
due to their livelihood situation and their factor endow-
ment. The question whether the vulnerable situation 
translates into persistence of or to additional hunger or 
malnutrition is dependent on the form of the govern-
ment response. A given (insufficient) factor endowment 
of families is already partially a result of government pol-
icy. The challenge for governments to deal adequately 
with climate change will be therefore a double one: To 
adequately address vulnerability, as well as – identify 
the people at risk from additional climate change related 
threats – acute or long term ones. 
In many cases new groups will become vulnerable 
through sea-level rise, glacier melting, changing weather 
patterns or other climate related risk factors. Additionally, 
countries will see new vulnerable groups emerging that 
may face problems unknown so far to the country. 
Adaptation policies to climate change in principle must 
pass the same rights-based „test“ as normal policies:
Has the government identified the relevant vulner- 
able groups? 
Has a proper risk assessment been done?  
Are the policies reasonably focused on those vulner- 
able groups? 
Are the effects and the impact of policies moni- 
tored? 
Do people have the right to complain against poli- 
cies affecting them, do they have a legal recourse? 
Human rights not only ask for an end to violations and 
for positive outcomes for the most vulnerable groups, 
but they also set standards related to the political proc-
esses leading to results. These processes must be par-
ticipatory, transparent and non-discriminatory. A rights-
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based approach to adaptation policies will help make 
them better-targeted to those most affected by climate 
change.
While only states are parties to the Covenant and are 
thus ultimately accountable for compliance with it, all 
members of society – individuals, families, local com-
munities, non-governmental organizations, civil society 
organisations, as well as the private business sector – 
have responsibilities in the realization of the right to ad-
equate food. The state should provide an environment 
that facilitates the implementation of these responsibili-
ties. 
2.9 International obligations in  
the right to food debate and under the 
UNFCCC
The right to adequate food also sets standards for gov-
ernment interventions abroad and at the international 
level. The International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural rights mentioned the obligation to inter-
national cooperation and assistance in two articles. In 
Articel 2 (1) where the general obligations are described 
and in Artikel 11 (2) in relation to the realization of the 
right to adequate food. 
While it is a new step in international law to talk about 
such extraterritorial obligations, there is an increas-
ing body of literature that discusses the matter and 
describes the respective obligations (see Bread for the 
World, EED and FIAN (ed.); Gibney and Skogly 2007; 
Skogly 2006; Coonmans and Kaminga 2005). Three of 
the special rapporteurs on economic, social, and cul-
tural rights have also started to contribute to the clari-
fication of the extraterritorial obligations of states. Two 
reports on the extraterriorial obliagations related to the 
right to adequate food has been written by Jean Ziegler 
(2006 and 2007). The special rapporteur on the right to 
health, Paul Hunt, has written one report on the obli-
gation to interational cooperation and assistence in the 
year 2007. International obligations has been clarified 
by the special rapporteur on adequate housing, Miloon 
Kothari. 
The obligations can be described in parallel to the obli-
gations at the national level. Governments should make 
sure that their own policies and programs do not harm 
people abroad and do not contribute to violations (ob-
ligation to respect). They should regulate private actors 
in a way that their action in foreign countries does not 
lead to violations (obligation to protect). Concerning the 
obligation to fulfill, one cannot easily translate the obli-
gation from the national level to the international level, 
because at the national level it is an obligation to use the 
maximum of available resources. Thus, in the literature 
the term used is therefore „the obligation to support in 
fulfillment“. 
In this context it is also important to have a look at 
the obligations for governments arising from the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), which entered into force in 1994 and 
has been ratified by 192 Parties (for furhter informa-
tions see the website of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change UNFCC). In Article 4.1 
all Parties have committed to inter alia
Cooperate in preparing for adaptation to the impacts  
of climate change; develop and elaborate appropriate 
and integrated plans for coastal zone management, wa-
ter resources and agriculture, and for the protection and 
rehabilitation of areas, particularly in Africa, affected by 
drought and desertification, as well as floods;
Take climate change considerations into account, to  
the extent feasible, in their relevant social, economic 
and environmental policies and actions;
Promote and cooperate in scientific, technological,  
technical, socio-economic and other research;
Promote and cooperate in the full, open and prompt  
exchange of relevant scientific, technological, technical, 
socio-economic and legal information related to the cli-
mate system and climate change, and to the economic 
and social consequences of various response strategies;
Promote and cooperate in education, training and  
public awareness related to climate change and encour-
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age the widest participation in this process, including 
that of non-governmental organizations.
It is both remarkable and concerning that these com-
mitments, as well as the whole Convention, only in-
clude a recognition that low-lying and other small is-
land countries, countries with low-lying coastal, arid 
and semi-arid areas or areas liable to floods, countries 
experiencing drought and desertification, and develop-
ing countries with fragile mountainous ecosystems, are 
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate 
change. But it does not include any specific reference to 
vulnerable groups or parts of the society. Only in educa-
tion, training and public awareness are NGOs explicitly 
mentioned. The same holds true for the Bali Action Plan 
(UNFCCC 2007b). It is a process driven by Parties, and 
stakeholders below that level are rarely addressed in 
negotiating texts. At least the guidelines to the prepara-
tion of National Adaptation Programs of Action (NAPAs) 
explicitly state that it shall be guided by the objective of 
a „participatory process involving stakeholders, particu-
larly local communities“ (UNFCCC 2001).11
Where commitments under Art. 4.1 relevant to food 
security and the preservation of the right to food are 
implemented, the obligations and guidelines previously 
described with regard to the right to adequate food are 
applicable. The combination of these two delineates a 
clear legal foundation for applying these criteria to ad-
aptation policies and programs related to food security 
and other rights impacted by climate change, particu-
larly the right to water. According to the „obligation to 
support in fulfillment“, industrialized countries have 
committed themselves to additional obligations in the 
UNFCCC which are relevant to this debate:
Article 4.3 of the Framework Convention contains a 
two-fold financial obligation, to (a) „provide new and 
additional resources to meet the agreed full costs in-
curred by developing countries“ to prepare their initial 
national communications, and (b) to „meet the agreed 
full incremental costs of implementing measures“ as re-
ferred to under Art. 4.1. 
In addition, Article 4.4 states that industrialized coun-
tries 
„shall also assist the developing country Parties 
that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse 
effects of climate change in meeting costs of 
adaptation to those adverse effects“ (UNFCCC 
1992, 8). 
In essence, industrialized countries have agreed to the 
obligation to support developing countries in fulfilling 
their commitments under the Convention. However, 
Article 4.7 of the Convention must be read in close 
conjunction with this obligation, because it makes the 
support by developed countries a precondition for the 
activities undertaken by developing countries: 
„The extent to which developing country Parties 
will effectively implement their commitments 
under the Convention will depend on the effec-
tive implementation by developed country Parties 
of their commitments under the Convention re-
lated to financial resources and transfer of tech-
nology [...]“ (UNFCCC 1992, 8).
The recently (end of 2007) adopted Bali Action Plan 
has the objective to lead to an agreement which will 
enable 
„the full, effective and sustained implementa-
tion of the Convention through long-term co-
operative action, now, up to and beyond 2012“ 
(UNFCCC 2007b, 1). 
It is thus based on all principles and commitments that 
are enshrined in the Convention. While the Bali Action 
Plan is literally about considering certain elements in 
the negotiations on the way to a new climate change 
11 LDCs are assisted financially in preparing NAPAs which should identify the most urgent adaptation needs and identify priority projects; in 
June 2008, 33 LDCs had submitted their NAPAs to the UNFCCC.
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agreement, the elements contained imply certain reiter-
ated or new commitments for developed countries to 
support developing countries. Without these it is unlike-
ly that developing countries will agree to a (meaningful) 
post-2012 framework. 
New and additional resources shall be provided, includ-
ing innovative means of funding to assist particularly 
vulnerable Parties on adaptation, financial and technical 
support to assist developing countries in determining 
their financial adaptation needs, and means to incentiv-
ize adaptation action (UNFCCC 2007b). 
A number of activities are listed where increased in-
ternational cooperation shall be discussed, including 
vulnerability and financial needs assessments, risk man-
agement and risk sharing concepts (such as insurance) 
and ways to enable climate-resilient development and 
to reduce vulnerability (UNFCCC 2007b, 2).
The size and criteria for any additional resources devel-
oped countries will have to provide a key issue in the 
post-2012 negotiations. The Convention‘s key principle 
of „common but differentiated responsibilities and re-
spective capabilities“ serves as a starting point for de-
termining the „burden sharing“ in adaptation financing, 
but the concrete application is not trivial. Responsibility 
is usually related to greenhouse gas emissions, and ca-
pability mostly refers to an indicator of economic wealth 
or state of development. Table 8 shows one of the most 
recent and most sophisticated attempts to calculate the 
burden. 
Table 8: Global percentage shares of population, income, capacity, cumulative emissions,  
responsibility and RCI (combined Responsibility and Capability Index) for selected countries  
and groups of countries
Percentage share of
Global  
population
Global  
income
Global  
capacity
Cumulative emissions 
1990-2005
Global  
responsibility
Global 
RCI
United States 4.7 20.2 31.8 23.7 37.0 34.3
EU (27) 7.7 21.5 29.0 17.8 23.1 26.6
   United Kingdom 0.9 3.3 4.7 2.5 3.6 4.3
   Germany 1.3 4.0 5.6 3.8 5.2 5.5
Russia 2.2 2.5 1.5 7.4 4.3 2.3
Brazil 2.9 2.6 2.1 1.3 1.0 1.6
China 20.4 14.7 7.1 13.8 6.6 7.0
India 17.0 6.1 0.4 3.8 0.3 0.3
South Africa 0.7 0.9 0.8 1.6 1.5 1.1
LDCs 8.3 1.4 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0
All high income 15.6 53.9 78.8 52.7 76.9 78.5
All middle income 47.7 36.6 20.7 41.1 22.8 21.1
All low income 36.7 9.5 0.5 6.2 0.4 0.5
In this calculation, the US would have to bear 34.3 percent of the adaptation costs in developing countries, based on a combined analysis of capacity and 
responsibility. This analysis includes a „development threshold“, which excludes the number of people living below an annual income of USD 9,000 in power 
purchasing parities (see original source for more details).
Source: Baer et al. 2007, 12
Climate Change I Study
A
N
A
LY
SI
S 
02
69
While the negotiations on a post-2012 agreement are 
gaining pace, countries are expected to come forward 
with more concrete proposals describing how adapta-
tion could be fostered in the future. In the negotiations 
in Bonn in June 2008, some countries introduced ideas 
based on the Convention‘s principles. Three notable 
examples are proposals by Norway, Switzerland and 
Mexico. The first two presented their ideas explicitly 
as a means to generate financing for adaptation, while 
the Mexican proposal of a World Climate Change Fund 
focused on financing mitigation (see Harmeling and Bals 
2008b). In some of these concepts certain developing 
countries would also have to make limited financial con-
tributions, like in Table 8. While differentiation among 
developing countries is a touchy issue, the fact is that in 
more and more developing countries there is a growing 
consumer class with a growing carbon emission respon-
sibility – more than hundred of million people in China 
and India. It is interesting to see that, not only Mexico, 
but more and more developing countries start address-
ing this perspective more openly.
At the same time, developing countries are also expected 
to present on how they plan to effectively scale-up adap-
tation and deliver it to the most vulnerable communities 
in case they want to receive financial support. Neither 
the Bonn negotiations nor the submissions made in past 
months by developing country Parties have added sub-
stantially to this particular question (see Harmeling and 
Bals 2008b). Against this background, a more thorough 
analysis of how the voluntary FAO guidelines outlined 
above could serve as a guideline to develop such con-
cepts, e.g. in the context of the future development of 
„National Adaptation Plans“, will be reasonable.
Finally, a crucial issue with regard to developed coun-
tries‘ commitments has to be raised. Assuming the ad-
ditional resources needed for adaptation in developing 
countries is generated through a mechanism under a 
post-2012 framework, this resource flow would reach 
a significant magnitude in the order of tens of billions 
Euros. The actual delivery of ODA not only falls short 
of the developed countries‘ commitment made to pro-
vide 0.7 percent of their GNI, it also lags behind what 
is estimated to be necessary to reach the Millennium 
Development Goals. While there are many possible syn-
ergies between increasing people‘s adaptive capacity to 
climate change and poverty reduction strategies, adap-
tation requires additional investments. Those that are 
least able to cope with climate change are those that 
have contributed almost nothing to the problem. That is 
why many countries in the recent negotiations in Bonn 
and other occasions have rightfully called for a definition 
of additional finance (additional to ODA commitments). 
Thus, financing mechanisms that deliver resources that 
are not counted as ODA can be judged as more in line 
with the principles of the Convention (see Harmeling 
and Bals 2008b and for more details on adaptation mea-
sures see chapter 5).
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3 Relevant trends in climate  
change 
The following chapter is primarily based on the results 
of the IPCC‘s Fourth Assessment Report (FAR) which 
was released in the first half of 2007. Most informa-
tion is taken from the Working Group II of the IPCC 
on „Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability“ which was 
concerned with the relationship between observed cli-
mate change and the recently observed changes in the 
natural and human environment (IPCC 2007b; Parry et 
al. 2007). 
Working Group I, „The Physical Science Basis“, con-
sidered the information available on observed climate 
change and projections of future emission pathways and 
related consequences in terms of temperature increase, 
sea-level rise etc. (IPCC 2007a). Additional information 
has been added as new data has become available. 
The average global temperature has increased during 
the 20th century by 0,74°C. The first working group of 
the FAR concluded that most of the observed increase in 
globally averaged temperature since the mid of the 20th 
century is very likely due to the observed increase in 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations.
The FAR Working Group II summarized some major 
trends which show that many natural systems are being 
affected by climate change, particular processes related 
to temperature increase (IPCC 2007b):
In relation to changes in snow, ice and frozen  
ground, including permafrost, there is a high confidence 
that natural systems are affected on all continents. This 
conclusion includes the enlargement and increase of 
glacial lakes, the increasing ground instability in per-
mafrost regions, rock avalanches in mountain areas, 
as well as substantial changes in Arctic and Antarctic 
ecosystems. 
Concerning hydrological systems, there is high  
confidence that many glacier- and snow-fed rivers will 
experience increased run-off and earlier spring peak dis-
charge. A warming of lakes and rivers in many regions 
is projected.
There is also high confidence that recent warming  
is strongly affecting terrestrial biological systems, which 
includes effects such as earlier timing of spring events, 
leaf-unfolding, bird migration and egg-laying. Satellite 
data show already earlier greening of vegetation in 
the spring since the early 1980s, and that this trend is 
linked to longer thermal growing seasons due to recent 
warming. 
Rising water temperature will impact marine and  
freshwater biological systems as substantial new studies 
have shown. It will lead to range changes and earlier 
migrations of fish in rivers, and will contribute to shifts 
in ranges and changes in algal, plankton and fish abun-
dances in high-latitude oceans and high-altitude lakes. 
For some fundamental trends, recent studies indicate 
that the expected changes might even occur faster than 
recently anticipated. For example, the increase of the 
atmospheric CO2 concentration has been faster du ring 
the last years (2000-2006: 3,3%/year; 1990-1999: 1.3% 
year) (Raupach et al 2007). This development is partly 
seen as an implication of the fact that the ocean might 
already be absorbing less CO2 than expected (perhaps 
already as a result of global warming) (Canadell et al. 
2007). Loss of arctic sea ice seems to be accelerating 
compared to even the most advanced model projections 
(Stroeve et al. 2007). Observed temperature increase 
and sea level rise are at the highest range of IPCC ex-
pectations (Rahmstorf et al. 2007). 
The research on tipping elements and their thresholds 
and the impacts that these might have is increasing (see 
Lenton et al. 2008 for an overview). The severity of im-
pacts of such non-linear processes of climate change is 
potentially huge, also with regard to food security. Still 
there is a lot of uncertainty, particularly on the threshold 
levels for triggering these changes. 
Here, we choose a strategy to argue for a precautionary 
principle based mitigation strategy. It would prevent, 
with a high likelihood, the big tipping points. The tip-
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ping point which would irreversibly trigger the melting 
of the Greenland ice shield might already be triggered 
with a treshold of less than two degrees Celsius. It is un-
clear whether a meaningful adaptation strategy would 
be possible in a scenario where the threshold of most 
tipping points is passed this century. This is further elab-
orated in chapter 3.4. 
The different findings on the impact of climate change 
on food, fibre, fish and water as well as the necessary 
adaptation needs from the FAR are presented in chapter 
3.5. Obviously regional trends will vary quite substan-
tially because many different factors will interfere (cos-
tal regions, continental climate, land-use change etc.). 
They are described below in chapters 7 to 9 and are 
subject to continental studies that will accompany the 
main study. 
Besides chapter 3.5, we will summarize the major 
trends in climate change in chapter 3. These trends are 
of particular importance for the agricultural sector and 
for food security: (3.1) increase in variability of weather 
patterns, (3.2) rising importance of weather extremes, 
(3.3) moving of climate zones and (3.4) changes to be 
expected through non-linear changes in climate change 
(tipping elements). 
Phenomenon and  
direction of trend
Likelihood of future 
trends based on projec-
tions for 21st century 
using SRES scenarios
Agriculture, forestry and 
ecosystems
Water resources
Over most land areas, 
warmer and fewer cold 
days and nights, warmer 
and more frequent hot 
days and nights
Virtually certain Increased yields in colder 
environments; decreased 
yields in warmer environ-
ments; increased insect 
outbreaks
Effects on water resources 
relying on snow melt; effects 
on some water supply
Warm spells/ heat 
waves. Frequency in-
creases over most land 
areas
Very likely Reduced yields in warmer 
regions due to heat stress; 
wildfire danger increase
Increased water demand; water 
quality problems, e.g., algal 
blooms
Heavy precipitation-
events. Frequency 
increases over most 
areas
Very likely Damage to crops; soil ero-
sion, inability to cultivate 
land due to water logging 
of soils
Adverse effects on quality 
of surface and groundwater; 
contamination of water supply; 
water stress may be relieved
Area affected by 
drought
Likely Land degradation, lower 
yields/crop damage and 
failure; increased livestock 
deaths; increased risk of 
wildfire
More widespread water stress
Intense tropical cyclone 
activity increases
Likely Damage to crops; wind 
throw (uprooting) of trees; 
damage to coral reefs
Power outages cause disrup-
tion of public water supply
Increased incidence of 
extreme high sea-level 
(excludes tsunamis)
Likely Salinisation of irrigation  
water, estuaries and  
freshwater systems
Decreased freshwater  
availability due to salt-water 
intrusion
Table 9: Examples of major projected impacts of climate change
Source: Parry et al. 2007, 68
Climate Change I Study
A
N
A
LY
SI
S 
02
72
Table 9 summarizes projected climatic changes and 
their impact on the sectors most relevant for the food 
security debate.
3.1 Increasing variability
One of the major trends that will characterize the impact 
of climate change on food security will be the increase 
in the variability of weather patterns. Many factors that 
determine local weather conditions will change in the 
process of climate change and such changes in the pat-
terns of these weather factors have already become a 
major source for impact of climate change on agricul-
tural production and food security.
The IPCC predicts with high confidence a greater in-
stability of seasonal weather patterns for all parts of the 
world. The first indicator to change will be the start and 
the end of growing seasons. This trend is linked to in-
creasing evidence from observations of a wider range of 
species, that recent warming is strongly affecting strong-
ly terrestrial biological systems. It leads inter alia to an 
earlier timing of spring events, including earlier leaf-
unfolding, bird migration and egg-laying (Rosenzweig et 
al. 2007, 1.3). While this can be positive in temperate 
climates prolonging the growing season it will be nega-
tive in those areas where the start of the growing sea-
son was historically oriented towards sufficient rainfall. 
If the growing period is disconnected from the mayor 
rainfall events, it will become difficult to continue ag-
riculture with the same plants than were traditionally 
used in a certain region. 
Most land used for agriculture is still rain fed. Only 16 
percent of land used for agriculture is irrigated, and 
around 40 percent of the world‘s harvest is produced 
on this land. In Africa only seven percent of agricultural 
land is irrigated (FAO 2007). For all non-irrigated land, 
changes in precipitation patterns will have a huge impact 
on agricultural production. Rainfall will be influenced 
by the temperature increase, which will lead also to an 
increase in the evaporation almost worldwide. Because 
more water will be in the atmosphere, more precipi-
tation will fall as a result of climate change – but not 
everywhere. The IPCC concludes increasing precipita-
tion at high latitudes and in the tropics. The south-east 
monsoon region might benefit and the tropical pacific 
might get more rainfall (Kundzewicz et al. 2007, 3.3.1). 
A decrease in precipitation is expected in the sub-tropics 
such as southern Europe, Northern Africa and northern 
Sahara. 
While temperatures are expected to increase during 
all seasons of the year worldwide, precipitation may 
increase only in one season and decrease in another 
season. Precipitation variability are expected to increase 
in the future (Trenberth et al. 2003). Studies on ex-
pected changes in precipitation extremes in Europe can 
be summarized by the fact that the intensity of daily 
precipitation events will increase over the all areas in 
Europe, even on those where the average is likely to de-
crease (Christensen and Christensen 2003; Kundzewicz 
et al. 2006; Giorgi et al. 2004). This means that the 
number of wet days in Europe is projected to decrease, 
with longer dry periods in between excluding the win-
ters of western and central Europe. At the same time 
an increase in days with intense precipitation has been 
projected across most of Europe, except for the South. 
However, the IPCC highlights that the projections re-
lated to the change in precipitation and other hydrologi-
cal factors are less secure than the projections related to 
temperature increase (Kundzewicz et al. 2007, 3.3.1). 
Climate projections are still not easy to incorporate into 
hydrological impact studies (Allen and Ingram 2002).
The expected changes in precipitation will be of par-
ticular relevance for agricultural production. If the rain 
does not come at the right moment or on fewer days 
with more intensity, it might hinder the possibility of 
farmers in a certain region to produce the products they 
are used to. Alternative varieties or the shift to other 
products might help to deal with the situation, but this 
will require that the affected farm households have the 
necessary information on the expected changes and the 
necessary resources or support to shift production. 
Freshwater availability will also be affected by changes 
in the runoff of rivers. With the increasing humidity in 
the atmosphere it is projected that the annual average 
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river runoff and water availability will increase by mid 
century. The increase expected are 10-40 percent in 
high latitudes and in some wet tropical areas, however, 
decreases of 10-30 percent may occur in some dry re-
gions in mid-latitudes and in the dry tropics, some of 
which are already water stressed areas (Kundzewicz et 
al. 2007, 3.4.1). Since the TAR, over 100 studies have 
been published on climate change effects on river flows 
in scientific journals. Most of them are still focused on 
Europe, North America and Australia. While uncertain-
ties still exist relating to the downscaling from climate 
change models on catchment scale predictions, a very 
robust finding from hydrological impact studies is that 
warming leads to changes in the seasonality of river 
flows where much winter precipitation falls as snow 
(Barnett et al. 2005). The IPCC FAR refers to serval 
studies for all relevant regions, such as European Alps, 
the Himalayas, western Nothern America, central and 
eastern Northern America, the entire Russian territory, 
and Scandinavia and Baltic regions (Kudzewicz et al. 
2007, 3.4.1). Temperature increase causes less water 
to come down as snow, and therefore winter flows will 
increase and summer flows will decrease. In many cases 
the peak flow would occur at least a month earlier than 
today. 
Higher temperature will lead to increased glacier melt. 
The results from simulations lead to the conclusion that 
glaciers in the Northern Hemisphere will decrease in size 
up to 60 percent by 2050 (Schneeberger et al. 2003). 
Melting glaciers will lead to an increase in river flow in 
the short term, but the contribution of glacier melt will 
gradually decrease over the next decades. Less snowfall 
or earlier melting of snow will increase the seasonal-
ity of the river flow, creating higher flow in the peak 
flow seasons or either lower flows during the low flow 
season or extended dry periods. One sixth of mankind 
is living in areas with rivers nurtured by glaciers, par-
ticularly in the Himalayas (IPCC 2007b, 11). The melt-
ing of these glaciers in the coming decades will change 
the river flow pattern of all mayor rivers in South and 
East Asia. This will impact both the access to drinking 
water and water for personal consumption as well as 
to irrigation water. The large increase of productivity in 
agricultural production in Asia that has happened since 
the ‘80s was basically achieved through a combination 
of high yielding varieties with the increase of irrigation 
water and agricultural inputs. The expected changes of 
river flows in the region will be an important trend for 
the long term production potential of the region.
3.2 Extreme weather events 
Disaster losses from weather-related extreme events 
have grown much more rapidly than population and 
economic growth indicators (Kundzewicz et al. 2007, 
3.2; Mills 2005). There is now clear evidence for a cli-
mate change-related trend in floods during the last dec-
ade (Kundzewicz et al. 2007; Schiermeier 2006). What 
is visible is the observed increase in precipitation inten-
sity and other changes, such as the increase in westerly 
weather patterns during winter over Europe. This trend 
leads to very rainy low-pressure systems that often trig-
ger floods. These are the first indicators that climate 
change might have an impact on rain based floods. So 
far the number of great inland flood catastrophes has 
doubled during the years 1996-2005 compared to the 
‘50s up until the ‘80s. Economic losses have even in-
creased five fold (Kron and Bertz 2007). However, the 
dominant factor for the upward trends in economic 
flood losses are socioeconomic factors, such as increas-
ing population and the increase of settlement in vulner-
able areas etc. Floods are currently the most reported 
natural disaster across the globe. In this connection the 
World Development Report in 2003 abd 2004 reports 
about 140 million affected persons per year. In many 
countries they are the type of extreme weather events 
that cause the highest number of deaths (Figure 14).
Drought affected areas will likely increase in extent 
(IPCC 2007a). Several models predict that the pro-
portion of the land surface in extreme drought, will 
increase globally by the factor of 10 to 30, or from 
1-3 percent today to 30 percent by 2090 (Burke et al. 
2006). Droughts are first and foremost affecting rain-
fed agricultural production and the water supply for do-
mestic, industrial and agricultural purposes. However, it 
also impacts livestock (Table 10). It is already possible to 
show that some semi-arid and sub-humid regions of the 
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globe have suffered from more, more intense and multi-
annual droughts (e.g. Kundzewicz et al. 2007, 3.2). 
The term drought also refers to different factors. A me-
teorological drought refers to reduced precipitation, 
a hydrological drought to reduced river flows and re-
duced water levels in rivers, lakes and groundwater. 
Agricultural drought means lower soil moisture. With 
the expected increase in area affected by drought, it is 
likely that water stress in semi-arid and land in low lati-
tudes as well as in mid-latitude continental interiors in 
summer will be more widespread (IPCC 2007a).
Processes of land degradation will intensify the negative 
impact on crop yields up, livestock death and crop fail-
ure. Reduced water availability will also lead to water 
shortages for food and domestic consumption, which 
in turn will increase the risk of water and food-borne 
diseases. 
Precipitation intensity is projected to increase almost 
everywhere, but particularly at mid and high latitudes, 
causing more severe flash floods and urban flooding. An 
increase of events with heavy precipitation is very likely, 
and might damage crops and lead to soil erosion (IPCC 
2007a). It might increase the risk and/or inability to 
cultivate land (IPCC 2007b). Heavy precipitation events 
will simultaneously contribute at the same time to flood 
risks in the drought-prone areas. The amount and dis-
tribution of rainfalls will be important for food security. 
Only slight changes in the arrival or amount of water 
will influence certain crop yields dramatically. While 
the precipitation in the Sahel region has increased dur-
ing the last decade, there is uncertainty over the future 
Figure 14: Deaths attributed to different types of extreme weather events in 2006
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development (Lenton et al. 2008). Some models predict 
further increase. However, if this going to fall more in-
tensely and extreme precipitation events are going to 
occur, this may cause damages rather than benefits. It 
will be one of the regions where rain water harvest-
ing could become one of the most important adaptation 
techniques. Storm drainage systems need to be adopted 
to cope with increasing rainfall (Waters et al. 2003). 
A storm drain, storm sewer (U.S.), stormwater drain 
(Australia and New Zealand) or surface water system 
(UK) is designed to drain excess rain and ground water 
from paved streets, parkings lots, sidewalks, and roofs. 
Storm drains vary in design from small residential dry 
wells to large municipal systems.
While it is estimated that up to 20 percent of the world‘s 
populations live in river basins that are likely to be af-
fected by increased flood hazards by the 2080s as a re-
sult of global warming, river flows in many temperate 
regions during snow melt spring flood periods is likely to 
decrease (Kleinen and Petschel-Held 2007). River basins 
fed by snow-melt water in summer and autumn, when 
demand is highest, could become areas of temporal or 
seasonal droughts, particularly when, with rising tem-
perature, precipitation is falling as rain and not as snow 
(Barnett et al. 2005). Drought problems are projected 
for regions which depend heavily on glacial melt water 
for their main dry-season water supply. In the Andes 
region it will affect rivers fed by small glaciers in Bolivia, 
Ecuador, and Peru and will be relevant for tens of mil-
lions of people during the long dry season (Coudrain 
et al. 2005). In the Hindu Kush and Himalayas, areas 
are affected by reduced glacier melt in the long run, on 
which hundreds of millions of people in China and India 
live (Barnett et al. 2005). 
The projected increase in the frequency of droughts and 
floods is expected to negatively affect local crop produc-
tion, especially in subsistence sectors in low latitudes 
(Easterling et al. 2007, 5.4). More frequent extreme 
events may lower long-term yields by directly damag-
ing crops at specific developmental stages, such as tem-
perature thresholds during flowering, or by making the 
timing of field applications more difficult, thus reduc-
ing the efficiency of farm inputs (Porter and Semenov 
2005). The potential effects of extreme weather on food 
security and human beings have to be seen in regional 
or local perspectives. When marginalized farmers start 
to plant crops on steep hills, strong rains can easily de-
stroy their harvest. When people settle in areas often 
flooded by extreme weather conditions it will have an 
effect. Other examples could be given: These effects 
Table 10: Quantified impacts of selected African droughts on livestock, 1981 to 1999
Source: Easterling et al. 2007, 278
Date Location Mortality and Species
1981-84 Botswana 20% of national herd
1982-84 Niger 62% of national cattle herd
1983-84 Ethiopia (Borana Plateau) 45-90% of calves, 45% of cow, 22% of mature males
1991 Northern Kenya 28% of cattle, 18% of sheep and goats
1991-93 Ethiopia (Borana) 42% of cattle
1993 Namibia 22% of cattle, 41% of goats and sheep
1995-97 Greater Horn of Africa (average of nine pastoral 
areas)
20% of cattle, 20% of sheep and goats
1995-97 Southern Ethiopia 46% of cattle, 41% of sheep and goats
1998-99 Ethiopia (Borana) 62% of cattle
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from weather extremes have to be strongly judged in 
connection with land use patterns and settlement pat-
terns. Both (the climate change effects and the land use 
patterns) have changed rapidly during the last decade 
and this fact increases the risks.
Droughts will also have a huge impact on livestock kept 
on grassland and pastoralism, as it is summarized in 
Easterling et al. (2007). Warming up to 2°C is suggested 
to have positive impacts on pasture and livestock pro-
ductivity in humid temperate regions. Negative impacts 
are projected in arid and semiarid regions, even under 
this very positive scenario, while only a few studies ex-
ist on the impact for tropical grasslands and rangelands. 
Thermal stress will contribute to reducing productivity 
and is potentially life-threatening to livestock. Higher 
temperatures might put an end to the diary production 
of certain modern breeds (Friesians) in the tropics (King 
et al. 2005). As shown in the chapter above, many of 
the world‘s rangelands are affected by ENSO events, in-
creasing the risk of severe vegetation degeneration. 
Other weather extremes that are analyzed in the IPCC 
report are tropical cyclones and heat waves. It is likely 
that the intensity of tropical cyclones and the severity of 
their impacts will increase, which is also due to the rise 
in sea-level (see chapters 3.4 and 3.5). This will increase 
the risk of total failure of crops in a certain region. Trees 
may be uprooted, damaging the income families accrue 
from using the trees and reducing future protection of 
coastal areas. More intense tropical cyclones can also 
damage coral reefs, which are inter alia of very high im-
portance for the re-growing of fish stocks (IPCC 2007b). 
Latest findings also show that tropical cyclones might 
reach areas that were never before hit by cyclones, so 
that the risk areas for damages at coastal zones are in-
creasing. This was the case in 2004 when for the first 
time ever a hurricane formed off the Brazilian coast 
(Swiss Re 2004). More intense tropical cyclones would 
also cause severe economic consequences for the affect-
ed regions and households. For example, in 2004 hur-
ricanes hit the Cayman Islands and caused economic 
losses that amounted to more than double the Gross 
Domestic Product of that year (Anemüller et al. 2006). 
Beside the loss of property the likelihood of cyclones 
alone will change land prices and the possibility to se-
cure property with private insurances. 
It is also very likely that the frequency of heat waves 
will increase across most continents (IPCC 2007a). 
Heat waves can have a huge impact on the agricultural 
sector. The European heat wave in 2003 is a good ex-
ample that can prove this connection. In the summer of 
2003 Europe experienced a heat wave, with reaching 
6°C above the long term means and precipitation defi-
cits up to 300 mm (Trenberth et al. 2007). Maize yields 
in Italy dropped by 36 percent for the Po valley. For 
France, the corn grain crop was reduced by 30 percent 
compared to 2002 and the fruit harvest by 25 percent 
(Easterling et al. 2007, 5.2.2). Heat waves will contrib-
ute to reduced yields in warmer regions due to the heat 
stress for crops and can add to already existing water 
stress. The increase of the danger of forest fire and will 
directly affect the health of many people. The European 
heat wave in 2003 was a disastrous example of the pos-
sible health impacts, more than 30,000 people died 
across Europe, making this heat wave the most severe 
European natural catastrophe for centuries (Munich Re 
2007). However, it is likely that better preparation for 
heat waves in hospitals, nursing homes etc. will limit 
the impacts in the future. In terms of the connection 
to climate change, studies found out the anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas emissions already have substantially in-
creased the likelihood of such kind of extremes across 
central Europe. By 2050 such heat waves could become 
a usual phenomenon (Stott et al. 2004).
The increase in heat waves goes hand in hand with the 
trends of warmer and fewer cold days and nights and 
with warmer and more frequent hot days and nights. 
Together these tendencies will increase the heat stress 
for crops. While the second trend can be positive to 
yields in colder environments, yields will be reduced in 
warmer environments (IPCC 2007b).
In sum: The likelihood of weather extremes is increas-
ing both in frequency and intensity over all continents. 
Regional variation will be huge; different geographical 
conditions at specific locations will co-determine how 
disaster prone a certain area will be. One of the con-
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clusions of the FAR of the IPCC is that the projected 
changes in the 
„frequency and severity of extreme climate 
events will have more serious consequences for 
food and forestry products, and for food inse-
curity, than will changes in projected means of 
temperature and precipitation“ (Easterling et al. 
2007, 299). 
Modeling studies suggest that the increasing frequency 
of crop loss due to extreme weather events may elimi-
nate positive effects of moderate temperature increase 
(Easterling et al. 2007, 5.4.1). 
For all of the extreme events, there are quite a number 
of climatic and non-climatic drivers influencing the im-
pact, all of which have to be taken into account. The 
impact of different types of flooding (flash floods, river 
floods, urban floods etc.) is heavily influenced by non-
climatic drivers such as the human encroachment into 
flood plains or the lack of flood response plans. Drought 
impacts depend on factors such as changes in land use 
patterns or land cover and water demand and use. 
Excessive water withdrawals by urban cities or intensi-
fied agriculture are just two examples that might aggra-
vate the impact of a drought (Kundzewicz et al. 2007).
3.3 Moving of climate zones and other 
ecosystem impacts of climate change
The expected global increase in temperature will have 
an impact on many ecosystems and will require change 
and adaptation. Since healthy ecosystems are a key pro-
vider of services relevant to food security, this notion 
will impact food prospects. The IPCC FAR concludes 
that there is very high confidence that recent warming 
is already strongly affecting all terrestrial biological sys-
tems, which will include earlier timing of spring events, 
and pole ward and upward shift in ranges of plant and 
animal species (IPCC 2007b). In this subchapter we will 
summarize the main changes that are expected in eco-
systems and that are relevant for food security. Other 
changes might also indirectly impact food security in 
the long run but they are not discussed here in detail. 
This is particularly relevant for health related effects, 
such as changes in insects affecting human health and 
wiht that also individual food securtiy circumstances. 
Increasing temperature above 2.5°C, projections sug-
gest major changes in ecosystem structure and function, 
species´ ecological interactions and species´ geographic 
ranges, with predominantly negative consequences for 
biodiversity, and ecosystems goods and services (IPCC 
2007b). Plants and crops will need to adjust to the glo-
bal temperature increase. In chapter 3.5 we will look 
into the changes that can be expected for crop yields of 
major stable crops. Rice, wheat and maize have a limit 
in temperature increase, beyond which grain yields are 
damaged. In tropical regions the limit is 1.5 to 3° C, 
in temperate climate it is 4.5 to 5° C above. Further 
warming in either regions exceeds adaptive capacity 
(Easterling et al. 2007). In this chapter we will focus on 
the overall changes needed for plants, trees, and pluri-
annual crops. 
Non-anthropogenic climate change has also forced 
species to migrate in a palaoclimatic perspective. At 
the beginning of each cold period in the climate his-
tory many trees, crops, and other species had to move 
away from the poles or downwards into warmer valleys. 
Conversely, at the beginning of every warmer period 
plants and species started to move up towards the poles 
and uphill (Rosenzweig et al. 2007, 1.3; Confalonieri et 
al. 2007, 8.2; Field et al. 2007, 14.2). A similar process 
is expected to happen with current anthropogenic cli-
mate change. The IPCC estimates that already at a tem-
perature increase of 2°C above 1980-1999 levels will 
force around 20 percent of the world‘s eco-systems will 
have to move (IPCC 2007b). Due to the fact that entire 
systems can hardly migrate, the dominance of certain 
lead varieties will change. The current observed trend is 
about a 6 km per year move towards the poles (Fischlin 
et al. 2007). 
There is a limit to the speed with which crops can 
move over longer distances in order to grow there. 
Unmitigated anthropogenic climate change will be 
faster than all processes of warming or cooling during 
human history, and it will be too fast for many species 
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to move. Moreover, such moves were historically pos-
sible because nature had untapped space in which to 
migrate. It was not interrupted by cities or other major 
forms of land use, which now hinder such moves. In 
part climate change will lead to the use of crops which 
might not have been cropped in a certain country or 
region before. However most studies do not believe that 
this potential is substantial enough to offset other losses 
in food production through climate change. 
Ecosystems will react to external forcing in a non lin-
ear manner. Most initial changes in ecosystems seem 
to dampen the impact, but amplify it if thresholds in 
magnitude or rate of change are surpassed (Fischlin et 
al. 2007, 4.4.1). The temperature increase is projected 
to lead to a huge loss in the number of species present, 
and therefore the potential of biodiversity. 
Approximately 20 to 30 percent of plant and animal 
species assessed so far are likely to be at an increased 
risk of extinction if global average temperature exceeds 
a 2 to 3°C increase as compared to pre-industrial level 
(Fischlin et al. 2007, 4.4.10 and 4.4.11). This scenario 
requires very substantive mitigation efforts. Current 
conservation practices are poorly equipped to deal with 
the expected changes. An increase in temperature of 2 
to 3°C over pre-industrial levels will already put more 
terrestrial, maritime and freshwater species at the risk of 
extinction than in the recent geological past, inter alia 
because of the speed of the change.
Coral reefs are the habitat for about a quarter of all 
marine species. These reefs contribute to food security 
particularly in that they supply protein to subsistence 
fishers. They will be influenced by climate change by 
increasing surface water temperature and the acidifica-
tion of the oceans. These changes are projected to result 
in greater vulnerability to thermal stress, to which most 
species have a very low adaptive capacity. Increases in 
sea surface temperature of about 1 to 3 °C are projected 
Figure 15: Projected impacts of climate change on ecosystems
Source: Fischlin et al. 2007
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to result in more frequent coral bleaching events and 
widespread mortality (see also Figure 15).
In addition to the effects of temperature increase, ex-
treme weather events may also damage or even destroy 
important ecosystem components. The relevant IPCC 
chapter lists a number of examples of how extreme 
events can cause mortality of species, contribute to 
determining which species are present in ecosystems, 
and how droughts and heat waves have both short-term 
and long-term implications for vegetation (Fischlin et al. 
2007).
Climate change becomes a forceful external driver that 
will influence long-term food security at the global level. 
It will endanger sustainability of natural processes and 
their services to human beings in the long run. Beyond 
the threshold of 2 to 3°C temperature increase above 
pre-industrial levels, the IPCC projects 
„substantial changes in the structure and func-
tioning of terrestrial, marine and other aquatic 
ecosystems“ (Fischlin et al. 2007, 213). 
Ecosystems do have adaptive capacity but there seem 
to be thresholds which are likely to induce non-linear 
consequences and feedback processes. Also, the pace 
of change is particularly important. That is a key reason 
why, in addition to limiting global warming to below 
2°C above pre-industrial levels, the German Advisory 
Council for Global Environmental Change has also in-
troduced a climate guard rail of no more than 0.2°C 
increase per decade (WBGU 2003). 
However, it is important to underline that many eco-
systems are under immense stress from non-climatic 
human drivers, such as deforestation, urbanization and 
unsustainable use of resources etc. Climate change adds 
to these stresses. Thus, the IPCC concluded that 
„the resilience of many ecosystems is likely to 
be exceeded this century by an unprecedented 
combination of climate change, associated 
disturbances (e.g., flooding, drought, wildfire, 
insects, ocean acidification), and other global 
change drivers (e.g., land use change, pollution, 
over-exploitation of resources)“ (IPCC 2007b).
3.4 Tipping elements – large-scale  
risks in the earth system
Trespassing of certain threshold values regarding the 
rise of global temperature could cause abrupt and irre-
versible changes in the earth system. Not only is this a 
lesson learned from the earth‘s history, but it is increas-
ingly being investigated by climate change scientists. 
The relation between global climate and the earth sys-
tem is a complex one, particularly due to the fact that 
climate and non climate drivers interplay with one 
another. Additionally non-linear processes include sev-
eral feedback loops and these loops are very difficult to 
predict. The history of the earth shows that non-linear 
processes have happened quite often, particularly in 
the Holocene epoch. Ice shields have suddenly melted, 
ocean streams have frequently abruptly stalled and 
monsoons have unexpectedly collapsed. 
Often small disruptions are sufficient to entail funda-
mental changes. Simulations based on the knowledge 
of abrupt climate change in the past and the scientific 
school of analyzing highly complex processes which 
was established in the 1970s support the finding that 
our climate and the earth system might react to the in-
creasing temperature due to the anthropogenic climate 
change with changes of enormous magnitude. 
Avoiding dangerous climate change, in accordance with 
Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC see chapter 1), requires 
a better scientific understanding regarding the levels of 
temperature increase and atmospheric greenhouse gas 
concentrations at which large-scale dangerous impacts 
are projected to occur with a certain likeliness. Major 
progress has already been made in this regard (Lenton 
et al. 2008). 
Two approaches have been developed to define the 
challenge of „avoiding dangerous climate change“. One 
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is based on assessments from the bottom and includes 
the calculations of the impacts of climate change based 
on linear trends in ecosystems, agriculture etc. The oth-
er is a top-down approach that attempts to avoid more 
substantive changes than those during the still ongoing 
interglacial. 
One of the first approaches to calculate a threshold for 
avoiding dangerous climate change came in the early 90s 
from the United Nations Advisory Group on Greenhouse 
Gases (AGGG). The AGGG was the pre-IPCC scientific 
advisory group in the UN. They started to systematically 
screen scientific articles on climate change and studied 
historic processes of climate change.
The AGGG developed two central indicators. The first 
was a 1°C increase in temperature over pre-industrial 
levels; a higher increase was expected to lead to a fast, 
unpredictable, and non-linear reaction and damage to 
ecosystems. At the same time the 2°C limit was intro-
duced as a ceiling to avoid risks of severe impact on eco-
systems which could be aggravated by non-linear feed-
back loops. The 2°C limit was later confirmed by the 
Scientific Council of the German government on Global 
Environmental Change (WBGU). The WBGU also made 
a top-down assessment defining a ceiling above which 
the risk of dramatic changes in ecosystems was seen 
(WBGU 1995). In 2003, the WBGU confirmed that 
limit again in a bottom-up study, which concluded that 
Figure 16: Map of selected tipping elements and their consequences
Source: Germanwatch, based on Schellnhuber
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the expected losses of species and ecosystems would be 
unacceptably high if temperature should pass the ceiling 
of 2°C (WBGU 2003). In addition, the WBGU urged 
limiting global warming to less than 0.2°C per decade. 
The 2°C limit is now guideline for policies. In March 
2007 the EU decided to orient their climate and energy 
policies toward this limit (EU 2007). It has now become 
one of the key negotiation issues for a shared vision 
for long-term cooperative action under the UNFCCC. 
Norway, Iceland, Bangladesh, Chile, South Africa and 
the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) join the EU 
in explicitly supporting a 2°C (or even lower) limit. 
A key reason for this new political backing is the in-
creasing though still incomplete scientific understand-
ing of the so-called tipping elements in the climate sys-
tem (see Lenton et al. 2008). Connected to the tipping 
elements are tipping points, thresholds of temperature 
increase (or other changing factors) beyond which the 
likeliness of large-scale impacts is significantly increased 
through initiating non-linear and irreversible (at least in 
human dimensions) changes in the climate system. Or, 
how Lenton et al. (2008) explain this concept:
Tipping element: A component of the Earth system,  
at least sub-continental in scale (~1000 km), that can be 
switched – under certain circumstances – into a qualita-
tively different state by a small perturbation.
Tipping point: The corresponding critical point – in  
forcing and a feature of the system – at which the future 
state of the system is qualitatively altered.
John Schellnhuber from the Potsdam Institute for 
Climate Impact Research (PIK) developed the first map 
of possible tipping points, Germanwatch developed this 
map further (Figure 16). In some cases exceeding certain 
temperature thresholds could entail dangerous positive 
feedback effects (black), in other tipping elements there 
could be enormous direct consequences for human life 
– usually for many millions of people (grey). In other 
cases both reactions could occur in parallel (grey-black). 
For this analysis it is important to look at policy-relevant 
tipping points. Thus, Lenton et al. focus their report 
„on the consequences of decisions enacted 
within this century that trigger a qualitative 
change within this century, and we exclude 
tipping elements whose fate is decided after 
2100“.
Figure 17 shows the estimated temperature for selected 
tipping elements. All of these points lie within the range 
of the IPCC emission scenarios for this century and thus 
could be triggered if no substantial emission reductions 
are going to be achieved. It shows that even below a 
2°C temperature increase the Arctic Sea Ice is probably 
getting lost and that melting processes in Greenland 
may be irreversibly induced. 
Many aspects of these highly complex processes are not 
yet fully understood. The models that are used by cli-
mate scientists to analyze and project the tipping proc-
esses are not yet advanced enough to illustrate these 
dynamic processes with their multiple feedback loops. 
Additionally there is inherent uncertainty in these non 
linear processes. In some of these systems minimal fluc-
tuations at decisive points can induce very different out-
comes. Therefore, the anticipated developments are not 
deterministic predictions but rather well-justified scenar-
ios. On a scale of 0 to 100 Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, 
president of the Potsdam Institute of Climate Impact 
Research, estimates the reliability of the simulation re-
sults for many of the feedback processes ranges „maybe 
at 30 to 50, for other only at 10“ (Schellnhuber 2007).
Latest observations and new publications show that 
Greenland and the West-Antarctic already lose much 
more ice than expected in the IPCC FAR report 
(Germanwatch 2007; Lenton et al. 2008). This obser-
vation has particular relevance for global sea-level rise. 
These processes are also a good example of how impor-
tant it is to take a closer look at scientific development 
since the IPCC presented the FAR in 2007. In the Fourth 
Assessment Report, the IPCC estimated the future sea-
level rise to be between 18 and 59 cm compared to 
present levels (IPCC 2007a). The TAR report from 2001 
resulted in a projected increase of up to 88 cm. While 
this may create the impression that sea-level rise has lost 
pace, this change is due to a number of methodological 
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reasons (see Germanwatch 2007). The main reason is 
that certain processes have been excluded in the recent 
scenarios because the scientific assessment of these is 
still in its early stage. The Greenland melting process 
is partially being driven by the loss of Arctic Sea Ice, 
which in itself does not lead to higher sea-levels (be-
cause the ice is already swimming in the ocean), but 
leads to a faster temperature increase in the North 
Atlantic Ocean and in turn further accelerates melting 
processes. Due to these processes, sea-level rise is now 
expected to rise by between 0.5 and 1.4 meters by the 
end of the century (Rahmstorf 2007). Passing the tip-
ping point in Greenland would likely trigger a melting 
process which could take centuries (in Greenland) but 
would be irreversible with devastating consequences. 
The Greenland ice shield alone contains between 4 to 6 
meter of sea-level rise. This process could be triggered at 
a temperature increase of around 1 to 2°C above 1980 
to 1999 levels, which is equivalent to 1.5 to 2.5° C 
above pre-industrial levels. The Arctic sea ice loss tip-
ping point is estimated at 0.5 to 2°C above 1980 to 
1999 levels (Lenton et al. 2008). 
A recent paper by a group of scientists around James 
Hansen, which looked in more detail into some of the 
earth system‘s feedback, concluded that even at an in-
crease of 1.7°C above pre-industrial levels processes 
triggered could result in a dangerous or even catastro-
phic climate change, in particular because of the melt-
ing process in Greenland (Hansen et al. 2008). 
Figure 17: Selected tipping elements and its temperature thresholds (above 1980-1999 levels)
Shading indicates uncertain thresholds. For each threshold, the transition from white to light grey indicates a lower bound 
on its proximity, and the transition from grey to black signifies an upper bound. The degree of uncertainty is represented 
by the spread of the color transition. Dotted lines were added by the authors; the upper line indicates the 2°C limit (above 
pre-industrial levels), and the lower line shows the temperature increase that can no longer be avoided due to the inertia 
in the climate system, even if all emissions were stopped by now.
Source: based on Lenton and Schellnhuber 2007; IPCC 2007c
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Fast sea-level rises are nothing new, but a known phe-
nomenon from the past. About 20.000 years before today 
the temperature was 4 to 7°C lower than today and the 
sea-level was 120 meter lower at that time (Rahmsdorf 
2007, 193). Around 3 Million years ago, the tempera-
ture was 2 to 3°C higher and the sea-level was around 
25 to 35 meter higher than today. The examples show 
that substantive temperature related changes are pos-
sible. The historic oscillation of sea-level changes was 
influenced by a variety of factors and no simple equa-
tion between temperature increase and size of sea-level 
rise can be made, but the trends are clear. Around 20 
percent of the world population lives in coastal areas 
not more than 30 km from the coast line. A World Bank 
study in 2007 estimated that with a sea-level rise of 1 
meter about 56 million people in 84 investigated de-
veloping countries would be directly affected through 
permanent inundation (Dasgupta et al. 2007, 10). 
Some of the most fertile lands on earth are in low-lying 
coastal zones. Table 11 shows that even at a sea-level 
rise of 1 meter many countries would be severely af-
fected in different regards. The situation will be very 
difficult particularly for several of the small island states 
(Tuvalu, Kiribati etc.), which have not been included in 
the analysis shown in Table 11. 
It must also be mentioned that this analysis only looked 
at the impacts of the inundated area, but there are ad-
ditional impacts like increased storm surge, erosion and 
other coastal hazards, saltwater intrusion into rivers in 
delta areas etc. These will threaten vital infrastructure, 
settlements and facilities that support the livelihood 
people living along the coast. 
There are some tipping points which entail a bi- or 
multistability, that means there are different directions 
Table 11: Ten countries most affected by a 1 meter sea-level rise
Source: based on Dasgupta et al. 2007
Rank Population GDP Urban areas Wetlands
1
Vietnam 
 (10.79)
Vietnam  
(10.21)
Vietnam 
 (10.74)
Vietnam 
(28.67)
2
Egypt, Arab Rep. of 
 (9.28)
Mauritania 
 (9.35)
Guyana 
 (10.02)
Jamaica  
(28.16)
3
Mauritania  
(7.95)
Egypt, Arab Rep. of  
(6.44)
French Guiana  
(7.76)
Belize 
 (27.76)
4
Suriname  
(7.00)
Suriname 
 (6.35)
Mauritania 
 (7.50)
Qatar 
 (21.75)
5
Guyana  
(6.30)
Benin  
(5.64)
Egypt, Arab Rep. of 
 (5.52)
The Bahamas 
(17.75)
6
French Guiana 
(5.42)
The Bahamas 
(4.74)
LIbya 
 (5.39)
Libya  
(15.83)
7
Tunisia  
(4.89)
Guyana 
(4.64)
United Arab Emmirates 
(4.80)
Uruguay 
(15.14)
8
United Arab Emmirates 
(4.59)
French Guiana 
(3,02)
Tunisia 
(4.50)
Mexico 
(14,85)
9
The Bahamas 
(4.56)
Tunisia 
(2.93)
Suriname 
(4.20)
Benin 
(13.78)
10
Benin 
(3.93)
Ecuador 
(2.66)
The Bahamas 
(3.99)
Taiwan, China 
(11.70)
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in which the system can tip. This particular holds for the 
Indian and the West African monsoon or the El Niño 
phenomenon (see Lenton et al. 2008, for more details). 
If global warming is limited to below 2°C above pre-
industrial levels, then there is a relatively high probabil-
ity that most of these tipping points will not be passed. 
Hence, there is no reason for anyone to pretend that 
there is an exact forecast of the future with regard to 
these non-linear, extremely complex processes. „We are 
conducting a disastrous experiment whose outcome we 
are just about to see“, summarizes theoretical physicist 
David Gross, who won the Nobel Prize in 2004 for his 
contribution to quark research. 
„We do not have the appropriate instruments to 
anticipate the impacts of these drastic changes 
that we are talking about. The only serious cli-
mate experiment that we can conduct is the ex-
periment that is done by emitting greenhouse 
gases. Only when we actually experience these 
devastating non-linear effects we will truly 
know where this is leading“ (Germanwatch 
2007, 14).
The risk of extensive discontinuities is a category of 
particularly drastic dangers induced by the continuing 
increase of global temperature. However, as has been 
shown before, there are other important risk categories, 
and significant impacts from a rise in global mean tem-
perature by more than 1.5 to 2.5°C compared to pre-
industrial levels have to be expected, independent of 
the tipping elements.
3.5 Effects on food production,  
agriculture and water, forest and fishing 
resources
This chapter sums up research results related to the im-
pact of climate change on food production, agriculture, 
water, forestry and fishing resources. It is important to 
note that most of the scenarios referred to do not take 
into account the consequences of the potential non lin-
ear effects which were discussed in the previous chap-
ter. Where possible, impacts resulting from the tipping 
of the described large-scale risks on food security issues 
are indicated. The summary of these findings will allow 
us to better understand the impact of climate change on 
future food availability on a global and regional scale – if 
major disasters can be prevented. In general it is im-
portant to note that currently around 40 percent of the 
Earth‘s land surface is utilized as cropland and pasture 
(Fowley et al. 2005). Natural forests cover another 30 
percent of the land surface. Just 5 percent of the natu-
ral forest areas are provide 35 percent of global round 
wood. In developing countries, nearly 70 percent of 
people live in rural areas, where agriculture is the larg-
est supporter of livelihoods and income (FAO 2003b).
The Third Assessment Report (TAR) systematized 2001 
the ways on how climate change and variability might 
impact on food, fibre, and forest around the world. The 
elevated level of CO2 will have effects on plant growth 
and yield. Higher temperatures, altered precipitation, 
and transpiration regimes will be of high importance, as 
will be the increased frequency of extreme events, and 
modified weed, pest and pathogen pressure. These find-
ings are supported by most studies that were published 
since then.
3.5.1 Effects on food production  
and agriculture
Results from different models are summarized in the 
IPCC FAR. Figure 18 shows the impacts relevant to 
food production and agriculture in different sectors. In 
mid- to high latitude regions, moderate and medium lo-
cal increases in temperature (1 to 3°C)12, along with as-
sociated carbon dioxide increases and rainfall changes, 
can have certain beneficial impacts on crop yields. In 
low latitudes, however, even moderate temperature in-
creases (1 to 2°C) are likely to have negative yield im-
12 If not indicated otherwise, following figures refer to an increase above the 1980-1999 average; to compare with pre-industrial levels,  
0.5° C have to be added
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pacts for major cereals. If temperatures increase above 
these levels, the impact will be negative for crop yields 
in all regions (Easterling et al. 2007, 5.2). In summary, 
the FAR estimates that temperature increases from 1 to 
3°C will have a net positive impact on the potential for 
food production, but that this effect will become nega-
tive above this range of warming. 
The effects of elevated CO2 on plant growth and yields 
were reviewed extensively in the TAR. Plant response 
to elevated CO2 alone, without climate change, is posi-
tive. But recent studies also confirm that these effects 
depend on a variety of other influencing factors: spe-
cies, growth stage, management regime, and water 
and nitrogen application (Ainsworth and Long 2005). 
Nevertheless, on average, across several species, and 
under unstressed conditions, the effect of an increase 
of atmospheric CO2 concentrations at 550 ppm CO2 
would lead to an increase in crop yields between 10 
and 20 percent. The IPCC reports a common under-
standing between plant physiologists and modelers that 
the effects of elevated CO2, measured in experimental 
Figure 18: Sectoral impacts of climate change at different levels of temperature increase
Source: Parry et al. 2007, 66
The 19 footnotes refer to the 19 chapters of the IPCC Working Group II report from 2007. See Parry et al. 2007
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settings and implemented in models, may overestimate 
actual field- and farm-level responses. This fact is due to 
many limiting factors like pests, weeds, competition for 
resources, soil, water, and air quality, etc. (Easterling et 
al. 2007). IPCC judges that the interplay of these fac-
tors are neither well understood at large scales, nor well 
implemented in leading models. 
Many recent studies confirm that temperature and pre-
cipitation changes in future decades will modify, and 
often limit, the direct CO2 effects on plants. Higher 
temperatures during the flowering season may lower 
positive CO2 effects by reducing grain number, size, 
and quality. Increasing temperatures may also indirectly 
reduce CO2 effects by increasing water demand. Rain-
fed wheat shows increases in yields up to 0.8°C at 450 
ppm CO2, but declining yields with temperatures above 
1.5°C. It would be possible to counterbalance these 
negative effects with additional irrigation (Xiao et al. 
2005). This is an illustration for a trend described by 
IPCC. For most crops there will be a yield-damaging 
climate threshold. Below a certain increase, yields will 
increase, yet should the temperature climb beyond this 
threshold, the effect would be negative. 
At the same time, it is important to link changes in tem-
perature development to other vectors that will change 
due to climate change. The climate impact on crops 
may significantly depend on the precipitation scenario 
considered. Given the fact that more than 80 percent of 
total agricultural land and almost 100 percent of pasture 
land is rain-fed, the future of precipitation changes will 
be the most influential for the direction and magnitude 
of the overall impact of climate change. Ecosystem func-
tions are changed substantially by changes in precipita-
tion and in evaporation-precipitation ratios. 
This effect will be of extreme importance for smallhold-
er agriculture, which is very much dependent on rain-
fed agriculture. They often miss out on the resources 
needed for irrigation agriculture. 
Beyond the consequences from estimated changes in 
mean temperature or other mean variables alone, in-
creasing climate variability will additionally add to the 
negative impact of climate change. This is even more 
relevant for weather extremes. 
The IPCC concludes with high confidence that the pro-
jected changes in the frequency and severity of extreme 
climate events will have more serious consequences for 
food and forestry production, and for food security, than 
will changes in projected means of temperature and pre-
cipitation.13
 
This relates to the increased frequency of 
crop loss due to extreme events, such as droughts or 
heavy precipitation (Easterling et al. 2007, 5.8.1). 
More frequent extreme events may lower long-term 
yields by directly damaging crops at specific develop-
mental stages, such as temperature thresholds during 
flowering. Crops do have threshold responses to their 
climatic environment, which affect their growth, devel-
opment, and yield. It might be yield-damaging, if unu-
sual weather appears during short window of time for 
the formation of reproductive organs, such as seeds or 
fruits. Unpredictable weather extremes will also make 
it more difficult to time field application. Smallholder 
farmers living off of rain-fed agriculture with low adap-
tation capacities will be those most affected. 
Other important factors for food production and agricul-
ture are the impact of weed and insect pests, diseases 
on plants, and animal health. Results from the TAR have 
already shown that climate change will have an impact 
on weeds, insects, and diseases, and this concept has 
been reaffirmed since then. The expected increases in 
temperature and precipitation can change plant dam-
age from pests. For example, recent warming trends in 
the U.S. and Canada have led to earlier spring activi-
ties of insects and to the proliferation of some species, 
such as the mountain beetle (Crozier and Dwyer 2006). 
Additionally, an increase in weather extremes may pro-
mote plant disease and pest outbreak. 
13 IPCC notes that even the importance of climate variability is recognized, most studies contiunue to include only effects of changes in mean 
variables (Easterling et al. 2007, 5.4.1.3).
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Land available to agriculture will be affected through 
climate change. The reduction of precipitation in cer-
tain areas (see below) will have the consequence that 
larger areas are no longer suitable for agriculture. Many 
crops will be affected and will no longer be able to be 
planted in certain regions (e.g. coffee regions in Kenya 
and Uganda are supposed to shrink). No exact data can 
be added to this claim, because, as it was previously 
mentioned, many other non-climate drivers interfere as 
well.
Adaptation policies will also have an influential effect on 
the availability of water in certain regions in the future. 
If water-harvesting and irrigation systems are developed 
and become more efficient, the total net effect will be 
very different from the „no response“ scenario. 
Recent and future land use changes and associated land-
scape fragmentation are very likely to impede species‘ 
migration and impair their natural adaptation via geo-
graphical range shift (Fischlin et al. 2007, 4.1.2, 4.2.2, 
4.4.10). This might produce important income changes 
for affected families. It remains to be seen if national ad-
aptation policies will support affected families or if only 
bigger producers will be supported in order to maintain 
their level of irrigation. 
3.5.2 Effects on forests
Forests are ecosystems with a dense tree canopy, cover-
ing 30 percent of Earth‘s surface worldwide. In other 
words, forests amount to around 4 billion ha. They cov-
er 42 percent of the surface in the tropics, 25 percent 
in temperate areas, and 33 percent in the boreal zone 
(Sabine et al. 2004; Fischlin et al. 2007, 4.4.5). Forests 
require relatively favorable environmental conditions, 
and are among the most productive terrestrial ecosys-
tems. Therefore, they are attractive for both climate 
change mitigation, but also for agricultural usage. The 
current high rate of deforestation and degradation in 
tropical and subtropical regions is responsible for about 
17 percent of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions 
(Barker et al. 2007, 5). Forests are the biggest storage 
of terrestrial ecosystems carbon stocks. The most re-
cent estimate is that forests sequester an equivalent of 
220 percent of atmosphere carbon (Sabine et al. 2004, 
Figure 4.1).
The FAO estimates that 3.4 billion m3 of wood were 
removed in 2004, and around 60 percent of this wood 
was used as industrial round-wood (FAO 2005b). Only 
4 percent of forest areas are managed by intensive for-
est plantations (FAO 2005b); but these limited forest 
areas supply about 35 percent of global round-wood. 
Intensive forest plantations are increasing rapidly, and 
their share in global round-wood production is expected 
to increase to 44 percent by 2020 (FAO 2000). In addi-
tion to commercial timber goods, forests provide a huge 
number of non-timber forest products, most of which 
are important for subsistence livelihoods (Shvidenko et 
al. 2005). Forests also provide important environmental 
services as described by the IPCC (Fischlin et al. 2007, 
4.4.5). 
Modeling studies that examine the impact of climate 
change on forests estimate an increase in global tim-
ber production (Fischlin et al. 2007, 4.4.5). Forests 
will benefit from the fertilizing effect of increased CO2
 
concentrations in the atmosphere. Higher growth rates 
and location gains14 are predicted, particularly when the 
positive effects of elevated CO2 concentrations are taken 
into consideration. Although global timber productivity 
is likely to increase, regional production will face large 
variability, similar to the trends discussed for crops. In 
drought prone areas the effects will be different from bo-
real areas where productivity might be increasing due to 
higher temperatures and elevated CO2 concentration. 
Since the IPCC‘s Third Assessment Report, new stud-
ies have suggested that the CO2 fertilizer effect may 
be overestimated in models. It was shown that the fer-
tilizer effect is particularly strong in young trees, but 
that older trees hardly grow faster (Korner et al. 2005). 
Additionally, the fertilizer-enhanced growth period 
14 This covers the expected poleward shift of most productive species due to climate change (Fischlin et al. 2007, 4.4.5).
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might be limited by competition, disturbances, nutri-
ent limitations, or other factors (Fischlin et al. 2007, 
4.5.4.1). There are several other factors that are not 
or not properly included in existing models. Examples 
include fire, insects, and extreme events. Warmer tem-
peratures have already enhanced the opportunities for 
insects to spread across the landscape (Crozier and 
Dwyer 2006). There is evidence of both regional in-
crease and regional decrease of fire activities, with some 
reasons linked to climate change. Climate change might 
influence ignition sources, drought periods, and other 
risks in the forest industry. Pulp and paper production 
are particularly affected. For many forest types, pest and 
disease outbreaks are a major source of concern. 
The IPCC‘s Fourth Assessment Report has collected in-
formation on the effects of extreme climate events on 
commercial forestry. It is region-specific and includes 
reduced access to forestland, increased costs for road 
and facility maintenance, and direct damage to trees by 
wind, snow, frost, or ice. Among the indirect damages 
are wildfires, insect outbreaks, and recently, thaws on 
logging rates (Easterling et al. 2007, 5.4.5.2). 
Interaction between different disturbances is very im-
portant and can increase feedback loops. For example, 
severe drought increases mortality and is often seen 
in combination with insect and pathogen damage and 
wildfires. Such positive feedback between deforestation, 
forest fragmentation, wildfire, and increased frequency 
of droughts appears to exist in the Amazon basin, so 
that a warmer and dryer climate may trigger massive de-
forestation (Laurance et al. 2004; Nepstad et al. 2004). 
This drought can be influenced by more severe magni-
tudes of the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO). This 
phenomena causes higher temperatures in the Atlantic 
subtropics, e.g. in the Caribbean region, and leads to a 
decrease in precipitation over the Amazon. At the same 
time, the rate of deforestation in this area is increasing. 
The IPCC concludes that very few current models can 
simulate these effects (Easterling et al. 2007, 5.4.5.2). 
Land use change and the net global loss in forest cover 
had slowed since the TAR (FAO 2001; Easterling et al. 
2007, 4.4.5). However, deforestation rates are still high 
in some tropical and sub-tropical regions, particularly in 
Southeast Asia and the Amazon. And in recent months 
we have seen a dramatic change in the positive trend in 
the Amazon region. After falling for three consecutive 
years, deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon jumped 
during the final five months of 2007. While the Brazilian 
government had previously taken credit for the decline 
in deforestation, the recent rise in logging confirms sus-
picions that commodity prices – not policy measures 
– are the primary determinant of forest clearing. Grain 
and cattle prices have surged in recent months, boost-
ing development pressure on the Amazon – increasingly 
the agricultural heartland of Brazil (Butler 2008). 
Degradation rates are also increasing in some northern 
regions such as Siberia due to unsustainable logging 
practices (Lepers et al. 2005). While uncertainties about 
deforestation rates are considerably high, analyses show 
a continuous trend in pressure from deforestation and 
degradation on forests in critical areas for biodiversity 
(Duraiappah et al. 2005). Contrarily, in most industrial-
ized countries, forests are expected to increase. While 
general land use change will dominate impacts in certain 
regions, climate change will also exacerbate biodiversity 
risks, e.g. in tropical montane cloud forests (Fischlin et 
al. 2007, 4.4.7).
The socio-economic impact of climate change on forests 
will be dominated by the relocation of forest economic 
activities through a shift in production preferences (e.g. 
towards bio fuels). The most important socio-economic 
effects will be linked to income opportunities for forest-
based communities. Although these communities are 
likely to have a modest impact on global wood produc-
tion, they may be especially vulnerable because of their 
limited ability as rural, resource-dependent communi-
ties to respond to risk in a proactive manner (Davidson, 
et al. 2003; Lawrence 2003). 
Non-timber forest products (NTFP) are an equally im-
portant source of income for the livelihood of rural com-
munities (Easterling et al. 2007, 5.4.5.3). NTFP cover 
fuel, forest food, medical plants, and other collected 
goods. The FAO estimates that in many rural communi-
ties of sub-Saharan Africa, NTFP may supply over 50 
Climate Change I Study
A
N
A
LY
SI
S 
02
89
percent of farmers‘ cash incomes and provide for the 
health needs for over 80 percent of the population (FAO 
2004a). 
This is a similar result to concerns from the impact of 
food production and agriculture. While the net effect on 
global productivity might be modest – which itself is not 
a sufficient claim as models do not take into considera-
tion all effects of climate change and non climate drivers 
– it is obvious that poor rural communities are the most 
affected. They will lose income which is often gained 
without secure property rights. It will be very difficult 
to get any compensation for these types of income. Such 
communities and people will have the greatest difficul-
ties in getting attention in adaptation policies. 
3.5.3 Effects on fisheries
Fish, crustaceans, and mollusks can be either captured 
or grown in aquaculture. Although the capturing of fish 
has decreased every year by 1 percent since 1979, aqua-
culture production has increased by 59 percent. Still, 
capture production generates twice as much as aqua-
culture production. However, FAO data estimate that 
aquaculture production will reach the size of capture 
production by 2030. World fishing resources are already 
overused or depleted in many regions of the oceans, 
and aquaculture will become increasingly important. 
Around 2.6 billion people receive an important part of 
their protein supply from fish (FAO 2008). 
The IPCC compares aquaculture with animal husband-
ry because they share similar vulnerabilities and adapta-
tion needs to climate change. These similarities include 
ownership issues in access and use of land and water, 
the control of inputs, diseases, and predators (Easterling 
et al. 2007, 5.4). Aquaculture is also dependent on cap-
tured fish, because fish often needed as a food source for 
the aquacultures. 
The principle conclusions from the TAR concerning 
aquaculture and fisheries remain valid and are confirmed 
with the FAR. The negative impacts of climate change on 
aquaculture and freshwater fishing include stress from 
increased temperature, oxygen demand, and increasing 
acidity. Other factors mentioned are the uncertainty of 
future water supplies from river flows for fish farms, the 
increase in extreme weather events, the increased fre-
quency of diseases, the expected sea-level rise, and the 
conflict of interest with coastal defense needs. Positive 
impacts are seen in increased growth rates, an increased 
length of growing seasons due to increasing ocean tem-
perature, and range expansion for fish species and ac-
cess to new areas of the oceans due to the decrease in 
ice cover (Easterling et al. 2007, 5.4.6).
The current rate of overfishing is huge (www.overfish-
ing.org). Overfishing is an important non-climate driver 
that undermines the long-term availability of fishing 
resources, and thus negatively impacts food security. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to study the specific im-
pact climate change might have on fishing resources. 
The following impacts are likely to occur at an increase 
in temperature of more than 2 to 3°C above pre-indus-
trial levels (Fischlin et al. 2007, 4.4). 
One general trend resulting from an increase in CO2 
concentration in the atmosphere will be an increase in 
ocean acidification. This phenomenon will 
„impair a wide range of planktonic and shallow 
benthic marine organisms that use aragonite to 
make their shells or skeletons, such as corals 
and marine snails (pteropods), with significant 
impacts particularly in the Southern Ocean, 
where cold-water corals are likely to show large 
reductions in geographical range this century“ 
(Fischlin et al. 2007, 213). 
Ocean acidification can become a profound source of 
change in the long-term productivity of oceans. The 
acidification will hinder all species that require arago-
nite to build their body from shells as well as coral reefs 
(Fischlin et al. 2007, 213). The IPCC calculates that 
the pH-figures of the oceans are decreasing by 0.14 to 
0.35. It is possible that by 2065 few regions will be left 
where species that build their bodies with aragonite can 
live. Consequently, the whole system of food chains in 
the ocean will be affected, and fish production will be 
adversely impacted (WBGU 2006).
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Some studies estimate that fish growth can increase due 
to higher temperatures; however, other studies show 
that temperature increases in the wrong season could 
negatively affect fish populations and risks incurred on 
the upper end of these populations‘ thermal tolerance. 
A direct effect of temperature increase is the rapid pole 
ward shift of species in regions where the temperature 
change is rapid. Local extinctions are occurring at the 
edges of current ranges. Not only acidification, also cli-
matic change will affect the food chain for fish. Research 
in the Pacific and Atlantic suggests that nutrient sup-
ply for fisheries is declining due to reductions in the 
Meridional Overturning Circulation (Easterling et al. 
2007, 5.4.6.2). 
This has resulted in a reduction of primary production 
with regional variability (Lehodey et al. 2003).The IPCC 
concludes that the aggregate level the effects of changes 
in primary production due to climate change related im-
pact of the food chain are unknown, even when some 
regional sutdies are available. 
Another problem will be the pole ward spread of patho-
gens, particularly through temperature increases in win-
ter. Regional climate variability, such as the so-called El 
Niño events (ENSO) in the South Pacific, can have ma-
jor economic impacts on fishing communities in their 
respective regions. El Niño is a climatic anomaly fre-
quently ocurring in the south pacific between Southeast 
Asia and South America. 
Through complex ocean-atmosphere interlinkages, El 
Niño leads to the warming of the Humboldt stream off 
the South American East Coast which negatively im-
pacts on the fishing productivity, because the warmer 
water contains realtively less nutrients. El Niño usus-
ally leads to extreme precipitation events in that region 
and droughts in the West Pacific. Negative effects of 
higher temperatures are expected for inland lakes. The 
decline in fish catches in Lake Tanganyika since the late 
1970s has been related to climate-induced increases in 
the vertical stability of the water column, resulting in a 
reduced availability of nutrients (O´Reilly et al. 2004; 
Easterling et al. 2007, 5.4.6.2).
3.5.4 Effects on pasture and livestock 
production 
Grasslands and rangelands cover large areas all over 
the world, and more than 200 million people still make 
their living from pasture and livestock production (FAO 
2007). Grasslands are the dominant vegetation type of 
areas with low rainfall, such as steppes in Central Asia 
and prairies in Northern America, but they can also be 
found in regions with higher rainfall. Rangelands can be 
found on all continents, mainly in regions where tem-
perature and moisture restrictions limit other vegetation 
types. Pasture and livestock production systems range 
from extensive pastoral systems to intensive systems 
based on forage and grain animal feed, where animals 
are kept indoors. 
In general, studies expect climate change to positively 
impact pasture and livestock in humid temperate re-
gions. The elevation of CO2 will influence the combi-
nation of species growing on grassland and rangelands. 
The future development of grasslands will also depend 
on management factors such as grazing and non cli-
mate drivers like fertilizer supply. Experiments support 
the possibility of rapid changes in species composition 
and diversity due to climate change (Easterling 2007, 
5.4.3.1). The IPCC concludes that global extrapolations 
are still unclear. Experiments in the Mediterranean have 
shown that plant diversity decreases with elevated CO2 
and nitrogen desposition, and increases with elevated 
precipitation, but showed no significant effects from 
warming (Zavaleta et al. 2003). Changes in the forage 
quality are also quite likely, because elevated CO2 will 
lead to a possible reduction in crude protein. Thermal 
stress is likely to reduce productivity and conception 
rates. In some parts of the world, drier and hotter peri-
ods can potentially become life-threatening for livestock, 
as has it been the case in the past 20 years (see chapter 
3.2, Table 10). 
The most decisive factors for grasslands and rangelands 
will be the effects caused by weather extremes and 
changing weather variability. These impacts will be far 
greater than effects associated with the average changes 
in climatic conditions. This finding is very similar to the 
Climate Change I Study
A
N
A
LY
SI
S 
02
91
finding for the impact on agricultural production in gen-
eral (Easterling et al. 2007, 5.4.3.1). Non-preparedness 
to extreme weather events often results in losses of live-
stock. Many rangelands might be affected by potentially 
intensified ENSO conditions (see in chapter 3.1). 
In dry regions, reduced precipitation can lead to severe 
vegetation degeneration, which in turn contributes to 
desertification, soil erosion, and the possible loss of pas-
toral areas. Pastoralists, who live in Africa and Asia at 
the fringe of the big deserts and in the savannas and 
mountainous regions, are among the most vulnerable 
groups related to climate change. Droughts and de-
creased water availability can be directly life-threatening 
for the livestock and the pastoralists. Recent research 
shows declines in rainfall in some major grassland and 
rangeland areas, particularly in South America, South 
and North Africa, Western Asia, Australia, and Southern 
Europe (IPCC 2007b). Increased variability of rainfall 
may create more severe soil moisture limitation and will 
have an important impact on productivity (Luscher et 
al. 2005). 
The general impacts described here need to be analyzed 
in terms of their respective socio-economic consequenc-
es. The impact of climate change on livestock keepers 
and pastoralists will vary greatly from country to coun-
try, and therefore need to be studied in a decentralized 
manner. Livestock production between prairies in the 
U.S. and pastoralists in many arid and semiarid regions 
can hardly be compared. The most negative impacts will 
be seen for producers in arid and semiarid regions. 
3.5.5 Effects on water resources
Changes in the availability of water will be an essential 
factor influencing food security effects of climate change. 
But water is not only relevant for food production and 
processing; it itself is an important good, needed for sur-
vival and almost all human activities. Access to water 
for domestic consumption is regarded as a universal hu-
man right. At the end of 2002, the UN-Committee for 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) adopt-
ed the General Comment No. 15 to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Human 
Rights (ICESCR) concerning the right to water. The 
General Comment confirmed the fundamental human 
right to water and showed it interrelatedness for the 
realisation of any other human right (CESCR 2002). 
Improved water management is seen in many circum-
stances as an essential element for the long term avail-
ability of water to people. Unmanaged water systems 
are likely to be most vulnerable to climate change. 
The impact of climate change on freshwater will be 
huge.15 Climate change will change precipitation pat-
terns and increase the variability of precipitation. The 
risks of flooding and droughts will increase in many ar-
eas (Kundzewicz et al. 2007, 3.3.1). Climate change 
will also affect river flow in many regions of the world. 
„In a warmer world, less winter precipitation 
falls as snow and the melting of winter snow oc-
curs earlier in spring. Even without any changes 
in precipitation intensity, both of these effects 
lead to a shift in peak river runoff to winter and 
early spring, away from summer and autumn 
when demand is highest. Where storage capaci-
ties are not sufficient, much of the winter run-
off will immediately be lost to the oceans. With 
more than one-sixth of the Earth‘s population 
relying on glaciers and seasonal snow packs for 
their water supply, the consequences of these 
hydrological changes for future water availabili-
ty – predicted with high confidence and already 
diagnosed in some regions – are likely to be se-
vere“ (Kundzewicz et al. 2007, 3.3.1, quoting 
Barnett et al. 2005). 
The expected sea-level rise will extend the salinisation 
of groundwater and estuaries, resulting in a decrease 
of freshwater available for humans, agriculture, and 
ecosystems in coastal areas (Kundzewicz et al. 2007, 
3.4.2). 
15 The findings will be summarized here. Most trends have already been described in more detail in chapter 3.1 and 3.2.
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Semi-arid and arid regions are particularly exposed to the 
impact of climate change on freshwater. Efforts to offset 
declining surface water due to increases in variability 
will be hampered by the fact that groundwater recharge 
will also decrease in already water-stressed regions. The 
number of people living in water-stressed countries, 
defined as those using more than 20 percent of their 
available resources, is expected to increase substantially 
over the next decades – irrespective of climate change. 
Population increase, the sharp increase of water demand 
from growing mega-cities, and the overuse of water re-
sources for irrigation projects etc. are some of the driv-
ing forces for increased water demand (Neubert et al. 
2008). Particularly in the next few decades, population 
and other non-climate pressures are likely to be more 
important than the effects of climate change, although 
some regions may already be badly affected by climate 
change consequences during this period (Kundzewicz 
et al. 2007, 3.2). In the longer term, however, climate 
change becomes much more important. 
Adverse effects of climate change on freshwater systems 
might aggravate the impact of other water stress factors 
such as population growth, changing economic activ-
ity (both for irrigation agriculture but also for increasing 
industrialization), land use changes, and urbanization 
etc. Exacerbating factors such as the link between land 
degradation, climate change, and water availability are 
generally unaccounted for in the global assessments.
One landmark study on the risk of climate change was 
produced by Parry et al. (2001). This study estimated 
the additional millions at risk for different temperature 
levels and time horizons:
One of the major factors relevant for the future water 
situation in Asia is the increased water demand from 
mega-cities in India and China. It is not clear whether 
or to what extent additional water resource options will 
be available for these cities. This uncertainty may have 
broad implications for environmental flows of water in 
major rivers of China, India, and Tibet. It would change 
all water calculations for these regions if the mega-cities 
of India and China should seek large-scale diversion and 
impoundments of flows in the region.
Water management systems used currently are very 
likely to be inadequate to deal with the negative impacts 
from climate change on water supply reliability, flood 
risks, health etc. Water-related management has to be 
build around the fact that the increase in climate-related 
variability is respected. That will make adaptation to cli-
mate change easier. 
Drastic changes in the monsoon regime in both Asia and 
West-Africa are possible or even expected. Because of 
the bistability of these systems and a complex interplay 
of different drivers (mainly albedo change and climate 
change), it is highly probable that we will see non linear 
changes in these regimes, but it is not clear in which 
direction, – stronger, weaker, or even a total collapse of 
e.g. the Indian monsoon (Lenton et al. 2007). 
Changes in the amount and variability of rainfall, as well 
as melting glaciers will have major impacts on water 
availability, agriculture, and food security. Around 70 
percent of all water consumed worldwide is used in ag-
riculture. The increase in global productivity of agricul-
ture since the late 1970s was only possible because of 
the increase in irrigation areas. 
Besides this global perspective, it will be the regional or 
local changes that will determine the impact on particu-
larly poor people. Potential changes in the precipitation 
regime in rain-fed agricultural areas will require drastic 
adaptation measures. Changes in river runoff will have 
similar impacts on many forms of agriculture. 
3.5.6 Effects on health and nutrition
Only in recent years have there been more studies on 
possible health effects of global warming. Also IPCC has 
given health issues substantive scope and space. Climate 
change will induce many health-related effects; some 
examples include the health impacts that more intense 
heat waves and weather extremes will cause. 
As an example: In 2003, at least 30.000 people died 
during the summer heat wave in Europe (Munich Re 
2007b). Climate change also could increase the preva-
lence of certain diseases such as malaria, cholera, and 
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dysentery. The spread of diseases, such as malaria and 
diarrhea, will affect labor availability for agriculture as 
well as non-farm economic activities. 
Also, the aggravation of malnutrition and infectious 
diseases can move upwards into areas of higher alti-
tudes and higher geographical regions. For example, 
temperature increase is likely to shift the altitude limit 
for malaria upwards, spreading malaria risk to new ar-
eas, e.g. in the mountains of the East African highlands 
(IPCC 2007b). Access to clean water might be the big-
gest climate-related health risk. At the same time, the 
availability and quality of water is very influential in the 
prevalence of diarrhea and thus the utilization of food.
Climate-related health risks will be not being discussed 
here in detail, but they can be extremely important in 
determining or influencing the food situation. 
Figure 19: Climate change and food security
Source: based on Boko et al. 2007, 455
Climate Change 
& 
Food Security
FOOD AVAILABILITY FOOD ACCESS
NUTRIENT ACCESS
	Direct effect on coup yields 
(cereals, vegetables, fruits&edible 
oils). Rangelands and meat production, 
fisheries and wild food sources; trough 
alesvated CO2 levels, variations in tempera-
ture, and precipitation and length of growing 
seasons, increases in crop pests and diseases 
and altered soil fertility (e.g. trough desiccation 
and salination. (1)
	Indirect environmental feedbacks 
trough responses such as use of 
marginal lands increasing deg-
radation and influencing 
micro and macro-
climates. (2)
	Direct impact on agricultural zones 
effecting incomes and jobs, and the macro 
economy, which in turn shape livelihoods in a 
number of ways, e.g. forms of social protection
	Direct effect on human health and susceptibility 
to diseases such as malaria and HIV/AIDS which un-
dermine livelihoods capability and food security (4).
	Indirect alterations to socio-economic 
aspects of livelihoods, food systems and 
development processes through hu-
man responses, e.g. land-use and 
adaption responses (5)
	Direct effects on the nutrient content of foods, 
including protein contents, glutin content of grains, 
and toxin levels from pests and diseases (6).
	Direct effect on human health and thus ability 
to absorb nutrients trough increasing vulnerabili 
ty to disease (such as HIV/AIDS and malaria), 
affecting sanitation systems, drinking 
water (7).  
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3.5.7 Effects on food insecurity
All four dimensions of food security, namely food avail-
ability (production and trade), stability of food supplies, 
access to food, and food utilization (FAO 2003a) will 
likely be affected by climate change. Figure 19 sum-
marizes how the impacts of climate change previously 
described influence the state of three dimensions of 
food security. Other influencing factors are the social 
economic impacts and changes in trade flows, stocks, 
and food aid policy.
The impact concerning food availability will be mixed 
and vary regionally (FAO 2005b). A reduction in the 
production potential of tropical developing countries, 
many of which are already faced with poor land and wa-
ter resources and serious food insecurity, is quite likely. 
At a global level, the production potential is expected to 
increase if average temperature increase is limited to 1 
to 3°C. The higher the temperature increases, the more 
the production potential will decrease (IPCC 2007b). 
Food insecurity will be further affected by loss of culti-
vated land and nursery areas for fisheries (FAO 2003a). 
Access to food and stability of that supply will be hit 
by changes of increased frequency and intensity of ex-
treme weather events such as flooding and droughts. 
Food access might be impacted through economic prob-
lems and direct health-effects of climate change; health 
problems can be related to reduced access to clean wa-
ter, flooding, or inundation due to drought, sea-level 
rise, or increased precipitation. Increasing exposure to 
vector-borne (e.g. malaria) or water-borne (e.g. cholera) 
diseases (Easterling et al. 2007, 5.6.5). This might be 
one of the factors, which limits the capacities of affected 
people to utilize the food consumed. 
A number of studies have attempted to quantify the im-
pacts of climate change on food security at regional and 
global scales (e.g. Fischer et al. 2002, 2005; Parry et al. 
2004, 2005; Tubielo and Fischer 2006). These studies 
are based on complex modeling frameworks that inte-
grate outputs from General Circulation Models (GCM) 
with climate science, agro-ecological zone data, and/or 
dynamic crop models as well as socio-economic models. 
They are all – in the judgment of the IPCC FAR – still 
highly uncertain. One reason is that they focus mainly 
on food availability; they do not cover reactions by af-
fected communities in stabilizing food supplies, and they 
are based on a limited number of crop models. Given 
the complexity of factors analyzed and the dependence 
on reactions of affected communities, governments, and 
the international community, these studies are highly 
uncertain, but they help to understand the dimension 
of the problem and the complex net of influencing fac-
tors. 
Some findings on the overall development of climate 
change with regard to food security are summarized 
in the IPCC report (Easterling et al. 2007, 5.6.5, Table 
12). 
1. The number of people at an additional risk for hun-
ger primarily depends on the development of socio-
economic indicators, and poverty reduction progress is 
projected to lead to a decline in the number of people 
at risk by the 2080s. Climate change in most scenarios 
reduces the decline of people at risk. For this trend the 
IPCC FAR has found medium confidence, i. e. 5 from 10 
articles go into this direction. Parry et al. (2004, 2005) 
estimate reductions by more than 75 percent by 2080, 
which would be 560-700 million less hungry than the 
820 million in developing countries by FAO estimates 
today. By contrast, in an A2 scenario, the number of 
hungry will decrease slightly until 2080 because of the 
larger population projections as compared to other SRES 
scenarios.
2. The role of the CO2 fertilizer effect significantly in-
fluences the results of some scenarios. Excluding this 
uncertain effect leads to significantly higher numbers of 
people at risk in A2, with up to 100 percent more peo-
ple at risk compared to non-climate change scenario. 
However, this varies with the different scenarios. 
All projections show that the realization of the MDG 1 
(reducing the percentage of the hungry by half) will not 
be met until 2020 or 2030. 
At this time in the debate, it needs to be asked whether 
these assumptions are too optimistic. No reduction in 
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the number of hungry has been achieved since 1996 
despite significant economic growth (FAO 2007). In re-
ality, hunger today is much more persistent than was 
estimated in 1996. The IPCC estimations are particu-
larly optimistic given the fact that the IPCC report also 
concludes with high confidence that smallholder and 
subsistence farmers, pastoralists, and artisanal fisher 
folk will suffer from complex impacts of climate change. 
These groups, whose adaptive capacity is constrained, 
will experience negative effects on yields of low-latitude 
crops combined with a high vulnerability to extreme 
events. As shown above in chapter 2, these groups cur-
rently make up 80 percent of the hungry. If their situa-
tion changes and they become negatively affected, the 
Background to IPCC scenarios
The scenarios of future climate change are part of the 
IPCC reports. Working with different scenarios takes 
into account that we are not dealing with deterministic 
systems. Emission trends and climatic reactions can dif-
fer - we do not know the future. In order to develop 
a common and standardized method, the IPCC devel-
oped a Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES) in 
2000 in which different scenario-families are defined 
(IPCC 2000).  
The SRES scenarios are based on different assumptions 
of how the future will look and which trends are possi-
ble concerning population development, economic de-
velopment, consumption patterns, and political frame-
work conditions. All models developed by the IPCC 
describe possible trend descriptions/storylines without 
an explicit climate change policy. The models do not 
make a prediction or prognosis of the most likely devel-
opment to happen. They are model families/storylines 
whose function is to calculate different development 
scenarios and compare their impact. The four scenario 
families used in IPCC literature can briefly be summa-
rized in the following way:
The A family is more economically oriented. The A1 
family is oriented toward rapid economic growth com-
bined with a globalized setting in which regions cooper-
ate strongly toward cultural and social integration. The 
rate of world population is declining after the middle 
of the 21st century. Per capita income disparities are 
likely to be reduced. The A1 family has three different 
sub-scenarios, depending on the dominant technology 
framework used. A1f is based on the continuous use of 
fossil intensive technologies, A1T is built on non-fossil 
technologies, and A1B on a mix of fossil and non fossil 
technologies. The A2 family is also oriented towards 
economic growth but is less influenced by globalised 
factors. Regions keep their local identities, fertility is 
hardly declining, and world population is steadily 
growing. No dominant pattern for technology choices 
can be observed. 
The B family is more ecologically oriented. B1 is a 
scenario family based on a more globalized scenario 
with intense cooperation. The same development of 
the world population is assumed as in the A1 family. 
Under 1, there will be a fast move toward a service 
and information-oriented economy, which goes hand 
in hand with a decrease in material, energy intensity, 
and the introduction of clean and resource efficient 
technology. It is a path where global solutions for an 
economic, social, and environmentally sound develop-
ment are desired. 
Like A2, B2 is much more regionally-oriented. The 
world is searching for local solutions for the econom-
ic, social, and environmentally-sound development 
based on regional economic development trends. 
World population is increasing, but less strongly than 
in A2. Economic growth is reduced compared to B1, 
and less rapid and more diverse technological changes 
are assumed as compared to the B1 and A1 storylines. 
While all of the scenario techniques have methodologi-
cal limits as described above, they nevertheless help 
to identify trends and allow comparison of emissions 
from the different scenario paths. More details to the 
different scenarios of SRES can be found in the study 
IPCC 2000. The IPCC report is shortly introducing the 
Emission Scenarios in the Summary for Policymakers 
(IPCC 2007b). 
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estimations from most of the models are all extremely 
positive and unrealistic. In the longer term, there will be 
additional negative impacts from other climate-related 
processes. Such processes include snow-pack decrease 
(especially in the Indo-Gangetic Plain), sea-level rise, 
and the effects of the spread in prevalence of human 
diseases affecting agricultural labor (Easterling et al. 
2007, 5.4.7). 
Therefore, most models used above to calculate the out-
come of climate change on food security are extremely 
optimistic, because it will be the current groups of people 
affected by hunger that will be hurt most. Additionally, 
all of these models do not take into account non-linear 
climate effects and most of them not even the increased 
intensity and number of weather effects. The potential 
loss of the summer monsoon in central and south Asia 
would have major repercussions on hunger figures. 
Another robust trend is that sub-Saharan Africa is likely 
to surpass Asia as the most food-insecure region. In 
2080, sub-Saharan Africa may account for 40 to 50 
percent of all undernourished people compared to 24 
percent today (Easterling et al. 2007). 
Table 12: Impacts of climate change and socio-economic development paths on the number of people 
at risk for hunger in developing countries
2020 2050 2080
Millions at risk Millions at risk Millions at risk
Reference AEZ-BLS DS SAT-BLS AEZ-BLS DS SAT-BLS AEZ-BLS DS SAT-BLS
A1 663 663 208 208 108 108
A2 782 782 721 721 768 768
B1 749 749 239 240 91 90
B2 630 630 348 348 233 233
Climate change AEZ-BLS DS SAT-BLS AEZ-BLS DS SAT-BLS AEZ-BLS DS SAT-BLS
A1 666 667 219 210 136 136
A2 777 805 730 722 885 742
B1 739 771 242 242 99 102
B2 640 660 336 358 244 221
Climate change, 
no CO2 AEZ-BLS DS SAT-BLS AEZ-BLS DS SAT-BLS AEZ-BLS DS SAT-BLS
A1 NA 726 NA 308 NA 370
A2 794 845 788 933 950 1320
B1 NA 792 NA 275 NA 125
B2 652 685 356 415 257 384
Data from Parry et al. 2004 ; Tubiello et al. 2007: The first set of rows in the table depicts reference projections under SRES 
scenarios and no climate change. The second set (CC) includes climate change impacts, based on Hadley HadCM3 model 
output, including positive effects of elevated CO2 on crops. The third (CC, no CO2 ) includes climate change, but assumes no 
effects of elevated CO2. Projections from 2020 to 2080 are given for two crop-modeling systems: on the left, AEZ (Fischer 
et al. 2005); on the right, DSSAT (Parry et al. 2004), each coupled to the same economic and food trade model, BLS (Fischer 
et al. 2002 2005). The models are calibrated to give 824 million undernourished in 2000, according to FAO data.
Source: Easterling et al. 2007, 299
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Estimates of persons additionally affected by hunger and 
food insecurity should therefore be used with utmost 
care. The following figures from the IPCC and other 
relevant literature (Schellnhuber et al. 2006) refers to 
the potential additional number of people at the risk of 
hunger. The actual number of hungry people will de-
pend on how much hunger can be reduced in the com-
ing decades. A warming of around 1°C as compared 
to preindustrial times produces relatively small damage 
when measured from the point of increased risk of hun-
ger and/or undernourishment over the next century 
(around 10 million more at risk). In this temperature 
range, nearly all developed countries are projected to 
benefit, while many tropical developing countries are 
estimated to experience small but significant crop yield 
growth declines. A warming of 1°C to 2°C compared to 
preindustrial times could triple the number of people at 
risk for hunger by the 2080s, particularly hunger related 
to weather extremes and the increasing variability of 
climate patterns. 
The risk of damage begins to increase significantly with 
warming between 2 and 3°C above preindustrial times. 
While developed countries may still benefit within this 
temperature range, literature indicates that production 
in this range is finely balanced between the effects of 
increased temperature and changes in precipitation. 
‚Drier‘ models show losses in North America, Russia, 
and Eastern Europe, whereas ‚wetter‘ models show in-
creases. One study shows rapidly rising hunger risks as-
sociated with a 2.5°C warming. 45 to 55 million extra 
people are put at risk for hunger by the 2080s from this 
level of warming, and this number rises to 65 to 75 mil-
lion for a 3°C warming (Easterling et al. 2007). Another 
study shows that a very large number of people, 3.3 to 
5.5 billion, may be living in countries or regions expect-
ed to experience large losses in crop production poten-
tial at 3°C warming. For a 3 to 4°C warming, one study 
estimates the additional number at risk of hunger is in 
the range 80 to 125 million, depending on the climate 
model used. In Australia, a warming on the order of 4°C 
is likely to put entire regions out of production, with 
lesser levels of warming causing substantial declines in 
the west and the south (all figure studies mentioned in 
the para are taken from Easterling et al. 2007).
Countries and groups of countries are hit differently. 
Many studies indicate that developing countries as a 
whole are likely to lose in comparison to the developed 
nations. India, for example, is projected to experience 
significant losses with large areas of current cropland 
losing significant productivity. At all levels of warm-
ing, a large group of poor, highly vulnerable developing 
countries is expected to suffer increasing food deficits. 
It is anticipated that this will lead to higher levels of 
food insecurity and hunger in these countries. They will 
need support to cope with and finance the necessary 
adaptation measures. Developed countries will not be 
immune to large effects of climate change on their agri-
cultural sectors. 
3.6 Most affected: rural livelihoods –  
subsistence and smallholder agriculture
The impact of climate change will be particularly sub-
stantial to smallholder and subsistence agriculture. Their 
livelihood systems, particularly in low latitudes, will be 
greatly affected by climate change. The farming system 
will be affected by the previously described changes in 
temperature, elevation of CO2, and precipitation on 
yields of both food and cash crops. The productivity 
of livestock and fisheries systems will be affected, as 
well as the potential income from collecting activities 
in forests. All of these income sources will be affected 
by changes in the mean conditions and the increase in 
frequency and intensity of extreme events. 
Other physical impacts of climate change important to 
smallholder farmers are the decreasing water supply 
through the reduced flow of rivers which feed irrigation 
systems, the effects of sea-level rise on coastal areas, the 
increase of intensity of tropical storms, and changes in 
other environmental conditions (e.g. more forest fires).
The impact of climate change on subsistence and small-
holder agriculture, pastoralism, and artisanal fisheries 
was not discussed in the Third Assessment report of the 
IPCC; however, the FAR is taking up the issue. It is not 
mentioned systematically, but chapters 3 and particu-
larly chapter 5 also cover the impact on these groups 
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in short subchapters (Easterling et al. 2007, 5.4.7). 
The specific impact must be examined in the context 
of many different changes and impacts on many differ-
ent factors at regional and local levels. The FAR is also 
summarizing a number of new case studies which look 
more specifically into the impact of climate change on 
smallholder livelihood systems. Some studies look more 
into the effects of adaptation policies on smallholders 
(Thomas et al. 2005), while others study the impact 
of climate change on crops for smallholder agriculture 
(Adejuwon 2006) or on ecosystems for smallholders 
(Lasco and Boer 2006).
The coping capacity of smallholder farmers depends 
on a variety of factors. One important factor is their 
geographical situation. Some regions will be hit harder 
than others. That fact might even change from region 
to region in a smaller scale. The farming system will be 
influenced, because some crops might lose a lot, and 
others might do fine with certain changes in the region. 
Another important factor is the available family assets 
that can be used to react to the situation. Some exam-
ples include the skills and labor capacity of a family and 
other income sources such as remittances. 
In general, it is not easy to show direct causal links 
between climate change and specific family situations, 
because livelihood systems are typically complex and 
include a number of interfering factors. For example, 
many smallholder livelihoods are comprised of a variety 
of income sources like the use of wild resources from 
forests, remittances, and other non agricultural income 
strategies. These livelihoods can also involve systems re-
quiring several crop and livestock species. Government 
support can also play a role, but as of now, many small-
holder farmers are marginalized in national and interna-
tional agricultural policies. Therefore, support is often 
unavailable or insufficient. 
Effective adaptation policies should start here and sup-
port coping and adaptation strategies for poorer groups 
in rural and urban environments. Coping strategies are 
characterized by changes in the relative importance 
between different income opportunities and will vary 
with factors influencing the income situation of families. 
Adaptation can be better managed if good government 
support and response is developed and implemented.
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4 Response capacity in 
developing countries
Responding to climate change is already and will con-
tinue to be a challenge for all countries worldwide. The 
size of the impact will vary from country to country 
and particularly depend on each area‘s specific adaptive 
capacities. For some countries, the changes will be ex-
tremely difficult to manage, and for others it looks like 
it will be easier to cope with the expected scale of the 
problem. 
Industrialized countries will have many more resources 
to deal adequately with the challenge of adaptation. 
They have research institutions that can study the ex-
pected changes on micro- and meso-levels, which is 
a precondition for the design of effective adaptation 
policies. They have well functioning administrative 
structures in all parts of their countries, and they have 
the financial resources which allow the development 
of complex and potentially costly adaptation policies. 
While these resources are available in principle, the re-
ality will look much more complex and difficult. Often 
exact information on the local effects of climate change 
is missing or is not available in enough detail. Some 
solutions might lead to conflict, for example if people 
need to be resettled in order to improve adaptation in-
frastructure such as dams etc. One can expect many 
debates on questions of: Who is responsible to finance 
and implement what type of adaptation policies, what 
is the responsibility of the government, what needs to 
be financed by affected cities or families themselves etc. 
Depending on emission scenarios, the magnitude of the 
impacts from climate change might be so substantial 
that adaptation will require deep and profound changes 
in the way certain policies have been implemented dur-
ing the last decades. Communal water supply might be-
come a major problem in southern Europe when water 
becomes more scare. Melting permafrost might destroy 
access to certain parts of northern Europe for months 
during the year because certain routes will no longer be 
available for transport. 
The situation in many developing countries looks very 
different. On one hand most developing countries have 
capacity limitations making adaptation more difficult. On 
the other hand there are some oil exporting countries, 
or countries like Singapore and China, where financial 
resources are not the problem. Limitations include both 
human capacity and financial resources. In most coun-
tries, there is a lack of scientists and university institutes 
which can generate reliable scenarios for the expected 
impact of climate change. Financial resources will be ex-
tremely tight in many developing countries, in contrast 
to the expected size of the problem. Non-functioning in-
frastructure, insufficient administrative capacities, and 
missing political will are factors that will influence the 
development of adaptation policies in many countries. 
The mobilization of financial support is increasingly be-
coming an international issue both at the level of UN 
climate negotiations and in development organisations 
and banks. 
Financial support will be needed because the expected 
costs for adaptation measures in developing countries 
will be substantial. There is the obligation, both in legal 
and ethical terms, of the countries who have contrib-
uted most to the problem to assist those that are most 
affected.
Adaptation to climate change will require simultane-
ous changes in several policy areas. Therefore, success 
will depend on both coordinated action between differ-
Part II
Response capacity to climate change – nationally and 
internationally
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ent ministries and also coordination between different 
governance levels (national, regional, and local). The 
UNFCCC summarizes the output from several work-
shops and meetings carried out under the Nairobi Work 
Program on Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability as 
follows:16 The most effective adaptation approaches for 
developing countries are those addressing a range of 
environmental stresses and factors (UNFCCC 2007c, 
29). Strategies and programs need to be linked with co-
ordinated efforts aimed at poverty alleviation, enhanc-
ing food security and water availability, combating land 
degradation, and reducing the loss of biological diversity 
and ecosystems services. 
Many developing countries face difficulties integrating 
climate change concerns into national policies. Key bar-
riers include issues around information, institutions, 
inclusion, incentives and international finance (IDS 
2007). This is aggravated by the fact that those coun-
tries which will be hit hardest and that are required 
to radically change policies are often particularly poor 
countries. Adequate adaptation policies will entail ad-
justments and changes at all policy levels – from the 
household and community level to the national and 
international levels. Communities must build their resil-
ience, including adopting appropriate technologies and 
using traditional knowledge. They need to adapt and 
diversify their livelihood strategies to cope with current 
and future climate stress. The selection of required ad-
aptation measures will depend on the local and national 
circumstances. Local coping strategies need to be used 
and encouraged together with governmental responses 
at all levels. 
Developing countries will be additionally confronted 
with the problem that not only governments, but also 
most affected households or communities will have 
very limited coping capacities and resources to adapt 
to the changing circumstances. This fact means that the 
government‘s role in adaptation might be bigger than in 
industrialized countries. 
Chapter 4 will summarize the dimension of the adapta-
tion problem for developing countries. It will study and 
analyze the response capacity and limitations different 
actors have at the national level. It will look first into the 
overall dimension of the problem, and then will address 
the climate information available at national levels. The 
following sub-chapter will discuss the response capac-
ity at the national level, regional level, and household 
level. After that, the relevance of insurance mechanisms 
as a means to support and incentivize adaptation will 
be addressed. Chapters 5 and 6 will study the response 
capacities available at the international level and look 
into the currently available instruments for financing 
adaptation measures and the potential needs. They will 
also discuss how adaptation to climate change in the 
agricultural sector can be linked with policy choices to 
mitigate the climate impact of agriculture. 
4.1 Dimensions of the problem
4.1.1 Adaptation
The dimension of the problems linked to adaptation to 
climate change will be huge for developing countries. 
The IPCC report shows that poorer countries will be rel-
atively more affected by the impact of climate change. 
Their limited capacities to react are one important rea-
son for this particular affectedness. Adaptation policies 
cover a variety of interventions17 from the ability to esti-
mate changing weather conditions, particularly extreme 
weather events, and establish early warning systems, to 
16 The Conference of the Parties in 2004 (COP10) requested the UNFCCC secretariat organize three regional workshops in Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America, as well as one expert meeting for small island developing states (SIDS) to discuss adaptation priorities. The seminars 
took place in 2006 and 2007 and a synthesis report summarizes the identified adaptation needs and concerns, particularly those across all 
regions (UNFCCC 2007c).
17 A detailed overview of adaptation measures for key vulnerable sectors are shown below in Chapter 4.3.
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infrastructural investments in methods and techniques 
of disaster management like dams or other mechanisms 
of flood control. They cover the change in the use of 
agricultural crops, varieties, irrigation, and land use 
techniques to support affected families in order to cope 
with various needs. These needs could cover the cost 
of other forms of damage to the house or land of the 
family, or even the necessity to migrate. According to 
the IPCC, 
„adaptation practices refer to actual adjust-
ments, or changes in decision environments, 
which might ultimately enhance resilience or 
reduce vulnerability to observed or expected 
changes in climate” (Adger et al. 2007, 720). 
A large number of planned and unplanned adaptation 
options exist, which can be differentiated along several 
dimensions (see Adger et al. 2007, 720):
by spatial scale: local, regional, national, 
by sector: water resources, agriculture, tourism,  
public health, etc;
by type of action: physical, technological, invest- 
ment, regulatory, market;
by actor: national or local government, international  
donor, private sector, non-governmental organization 
(NGOs), local communities, and individuals;
by climate zone: dry land; floodplains, mountains,  
Arctic, etc.;
by baseline income/development level of the sys- 
tems in which they are implemented: Least Developed 
Countries, middle income countries, and developed 
countries;
Response Proactive Reactive Inaction
International Guidelines for national adaptation 
strategies
Development of new crops
Measures of food aid No actions to initiate changes 
are being taken
National Grain storage
Agricultural policy to alter crops and 
farming practices
Changes in taxes and 
dispenses to increase food 
imports and emergency aid
Small infrastructure invest-
ments which only would profit 
local population are not under-
taken
Local Investments in rainwater harvest-
ing, irrigation and protection from 
flooding
Implementation of seed banks
Local coordination
Mutual support Migration as a response option 
is ignored
Individual Diversification of income sources
Investments in education
Changes in agricultural practices
Migration Accepting individual increased 
vulnerability and reduced well-
being
Table 13: A typology of adaptive responses: examples from food production and food security
Source: based on Adger et al. 2006 
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by an identification of most vulnerable groups: small  
holder farmers, fisher folk etc;
or by a combination of these and other categories. 
Another approach is to differentiate between proactive, 
reactive, and inactive responses as Table 13 shows.
Analytically, the IPCC further differentiates between 
two categories of adaptations: 
„autonomous adaptation, which is the ongoing 
implementation of existing knowledge and tech-
nology in response to the changes in climate 
experienced, and planned adaptation, which is 
the increase in adaptive capacity by mobilizing 
institutions and policies to establish or strength-
en conditions favorable for effective adaptation 
and investment in new technologies and infra-
structure“ (Easterling et al. 2007, 294). 
The IPCC uses this differentiation of adaptation meas-
ures in Chapter 5 on „Food, fibre and forest products“, 
because in agricultural context farmers were always 
adapting to changing weather conditions. There is a cer-
tain amount of autonomous adaptation capacities among 
local communities and within ecosystems. The advan-
tages of this IPCC differentiation are that it looks into 
the coping strategies and capacities which are available 
locally to adjust to the changing circumstances without 
any government interference. This perspective helps to 
identify, on the other hand, the need for planned inter-
ventions, because the available coping capacities might 
be very limited. The issue of coping capacities will be 
taken up in chapter 4. 
One way of grouping adaptation options is to identify 
whether they are sectoral, cross-sectoral, or multi-secto-
ral (UNFCCC 2008). This differentiation is particularly 
helpful for identifying responsibilities within govern-
ments. The standard form for the design of adaptation 
measures will be sectoral. Sectoral adaptation measures 
look at actions of individual sectors affected by climate 
change, such as agriculture, coastal zones, or for fresh 
water-related effects. Adaptation policies in one sector 
will be built around existing sector policies, empha-
sizing the importance of including long term climate 
change consideration into the sectoral planning. 
Multi-sectoral adaptation options relate to the manage-
ments of livelihood systems or natural resources which 
span sectors, for example, the integrated management 
of water or river basins. Multi-sectoral adaptation poli-
cies will be essential for national adaptation strategies, 
but will require a much higher institutional capacity to 
deal with the necessary complexities. Cross-sectoral 
measures are measures that need parallel and coordi-
nated development in several sectors. Examples could 
include the development of systematic observations and 
monitoring systems for the effect of climate change or 
the development of an effective science and research 
network at the national level dealing with problems 
such as forecasting and early warning. 
In conclusion, while some priority actions need to be 
implemented urgently to adapt to the short-term conse-
quences of climate change, adaptation must be viewed 
as a long-term challenge for societies. „Mainstreaming“, 
or the integration of adaptation into sectoral and other 
policies and programs at different levels of decision mak-
ing, will be necessary. It requires a prominent role for 
the reduction of vulnerability to climate change. 
In addition to sectoral responses, ecosystem manage-
ment plans that allow multi-sectoral approaches that 
deal with whole livelihood systems are also needed. At 
the same time, adaptation policies must address nega-
tive effects for the most vulnerable groups in order to 
avoid hardship for these groups most affected by climate 
change. Tompkins and Hultman (2007) argue that 
„the best approach to reducing vulnerability 
must be at the heart of any adaptation strategy 
and adaptation policy“. 
The identification of vulnerable groups has to be 
achieved in a rights-based form, by identifying which 
groups within a society will be threatened by the main 
consequences from climate change. In their opinion ad-
aptation must also include 
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Goal Impacts of climate varia-
bility
Role of climate interventions Outcomes: climate sensitive 
development planning
Goal 1: 
Eradicate ex-
treme poverty 
and hunger
Extreme climatic events 
trigger acute hunger from 
loss of agricultural produc-
tion, cause loss of infra-
structure.
Climatic uncertainty is a 
disincentive to investment, 
intensification, technology 
adoption, fertilizer use, 
and high value agricultural 
enterprises.
The poor are trapped in a 
downward, vicious cycle 
of increasing poverty and 
asset loss, because they 
never recover from climate 
shocks.
Short-term risk reduction
Climate-based food insecurity 
early warning increases lead-
time, aids targeting of relief 
efforts
Risk reduction in longer term 
planning
Climate information (monitor-
ing and prediction) empowers 
poor farmers to better manage 
risk, and to exploit opportunity 
in favorable years.
Climate information pro-
vides opportunity to spread 
risk through social insurance 
schemes that provide a safety 
net for the poor during climatic 
shocks.
Prediction of hydro-climatic ex-
tremes helps societies prepare 
and mitigate disasters, reduc-
ing losses in infrastructure and 
productive activities
Short-term risk reduction
Local capacity built to respond 
rapidly to disaster, crisis and 
pre-crisis conditions.
Fewer public resources spent 
on disaster rehabilitation and 
relief and on reconstruction; 
more public resources avail-
able for positive development 
progress.
Risk reduction in longer term 
planning
Small-holder agricultural 
practice is resilient to climate 
variability.
Stronger economic growth due 
to resilient irrigation, land use, 
cropping and trade policies. 
Generates macroeconomic 
and investment strategies that 
minimize recessive impacts.
Goal 4: 
Reduce child  
mortality
Poor sanitation from both 
water shortages and flood-
ing contribute to morbid-
ity and mortality from 
diarrheal diseases.
Malaria (whose endemic-
ity and epidemicity are 
impacted by climate) during 
pregnancy is associated 
with lower birth weight, 
increased infant mortality.
Climate monitoring and fore-
casts help identify high risk 
areas prone to water contami-
nation based on water short-
ages or flooding.
Climate forecasts can prompt 
malaria early warning, increas-
ing lead-time for mobilization 
and distribution of resources to 
remote areas.
Plan for water storage and de-
livery implementation, invest-
ment, design and maintenance.
Develop national and regional 
capacities to plan for, anticipate 
and react to epidemics.
Understand long term impli-
cations of climate change on 
disease distribution and socio-
economic vulnerability.
Table 14: Synergies between the MDGs and climate interventions
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Goal Impacts of climate varia-
bility
Role of climate interventions Outcomes: climate sensitive 
development planning
Goal 5: 
Improve maternal 
health
Climate variability impacts 
on food production and 
nutrition; affects pregnant 
women and the develop-
ment of embryo and fetus.
Pregnant women are more 
likely to contract and die of 
malaria.
Climate-based food insecurity 
early warning increases lead-
time for organizing interven-
tions.
Climate prediction provides 
advance information for activat-
ing relevant aid and raising 
awareness on the ground (e.g., 
maternal education programs).
Develop resilience in food pro-
duction, storage, and markets 
by taking into account com-
prehensive climate sensitive 
socioeconomic data.
Develop understanding of 
dynamic health distribution, 
socioeconomic impacts, capac-
ity and resource needs in the 
face of changing climate condi-
tions. Develop understanding 
of climate impacts on health 
distribution.
Goal 6: 
Combat HIV/Aids, 
malaria and other 
diseases
Climate variability influ-
ences endemicity and 
epidemicity of malaria and 
other infectious diseases 
transmitted by insects.
Climate variability impacts 
on food production and 
nutrition; affects suscepti-
bility to HIV/AIDS, malaria, 
and other diseases.
Climate monitoring supports 
targeting high-risk areas.
Climate-based early warning 
increases lead-time of epidemic 
detection, prevention, and con-
trol of climate sensitive diseas-
es, e.g., malaria early warning 
can facilitate activation of funds 
for preventive measures and 
medicines and their distribution 
to remote areas.
Combined understanding of 
climate history, climate impacts 
and affected socioeconomic 
factors to be used in prioritiz-
ing, designing, implementing 
and maintaining health care 
investments.
Develop and maintain commu-
nication and response networks 
that use the best applied 
climate information.
Goal 7:
Ensure  
environmental 
sustainability
Climate variability con-
straints both quality and 
quantity of water supply.
Resource management 
regimes fail because they 
ignore the impact of 
climate variability, e.g. for 
water or pastures.
Resource degradation is 
blamed on people who 
are actually responding to 
climatic variations.
Water reservoirs can be man-
aged more effectively for 
multiple purposes under both 
scarcity and surplus, using reli-
able climate forecasts.
Managing rangelands based 
on understanding of climate 
human-livestock interactions 
enhances sustained produc-
tivity.
Long term sustainability and/
or impact mitigation through 
adaptation to climate change 
policies, designs and applica-
tions.
Biodiversity conservation to 
take into account climate vari-
ability and change.
Improved designs of water 
infrastructure systems, using 
climate information, mitigate 
adverse environmental conse-
quences of extreme climatic 
events.
Source: Germanwatch based on Columbia University 2006
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„correcting maladaptations – for instance, by no 
longer providing flood insurance in ways that 
encourage risky development in flood zones.“
4.1.2 Response capacity
The first problem in designing adequate adaptation poli-
cies is that response strategies are needed – often in par-
allel – in all of these areas. The responses, particularly 
the overall integration of adaptation, have to involve 
many different governmental institutions at the central, 
regional, and local level. Government decisions about 
new housing areas, financing crop research, and infra-
structural investments in flood control or water storage 
have to consider the potential impacts of climate change. 
Dealing with the long term perspective and with the 
necessary multi-sectoral or cross-sectoral complexities 
requires sufficient institutional capacities in the differ-
ent institutions involved, from research institutions to 
line ministries to city or district administrations.
Moreover, many of the decisions require priority setting. 
What are the measures that need to be financed first? 
What types of investments in infrastructure are given 
priority? Because many issues are of high relevance for 
affected people, priority setting will be difficult. The 
National Adaptation Programs of Action (NAPA) have 
been useful in initiating priority identification and creat-
ing methodologies (see e.g. Harmeling, Burck, and Bals 
2007). But there is a high risk that setting priorities in 
the management of climate change impacts will over-
look or marginalize those groups who have not been 
in the centre of national policies. They might be mar-
ginalized again if their situation is not prioritized in the 
allocation of resources. Poor groups in society who are 
already marginalized might get the least attention in the 
formulation of national adaptation strategies. 
Countries will be confronted with conflicts over the use 
of financial and other resources available to deal with 
the consequences of climate change. Discussions on 
how to best use these resources will occur. Will the re-
sources be spent in rural areas or cities? Which sector 
will get more attention in national adaptation policies? 
Are specific groups able to obtain a larger share of the re-
sources available? What role will powerful groups with 
vested interest play in the national policy setting? These 
questions need to be answered. They are just some ex-
amples of the potential conflict that could be caused 
in the context of resource allocation. A human rights-
based approach will help to identify the first priorities 
by giving criteria for the setting of priorities, as we will 
see later in chapter 4.6 and chapter 10. 
The formulation of adaptation policies require many 
administrative skills and long term planning processes 
based on scientific evidence and advice. One problem 
which is particularly important in developing countries 
is that disaggregated research on the impact of climate 
change at the local level is still only rudimentarily avail-
able. Such knowledge gaps in climate data go hand in 
hand with poor or, at times, non-existent social data on 
land ownership, land cadastres, and population census-
es etc. This can lead to a situation where certain groups 
are not properly registered and will be overlooked in the 
design of adaptation policies.
It will not be an easy task to mobilize the necessary 
political will for these types of necessary substantive 
changes. Adaptation policies might require supporting 
certain groups that have not been in the focus of nation-
al policies or which have been marginalized in national 
policies until now. They might change the flow and dis-
tribution of public resources in countries, between dif-
ferent regions or ethnic groups etc. 
Moreover, adaptation policies need to have a long term 
focus, which might be missing in national policies based 
on four or five year election cycles. Many developing 
countries, particularly those involved in resources ex-
traction, are more oriented towards short term gains 
and policy goals. Shifting policy towards long term sus-
tainable management of resources will be a challenge. 
Poverty might also be a reason why affected communi-
ties or households will not be able to finance the neces-
sary long term adjustments needed. 
However, relying on short or medium term solutions 
might even aggravate the effects of climate change. 
When farmers are without the money and the skills to 
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Other forms of weak governance relate to countries 
with wide-spread corruption and inefficient government 
institutions. Such situations will make it very difficult to 
develop a long term response towards a realistic adap-
tation policy to climate change. Again, these are situa-
tions where it must be examined how the international 
community can effectively support affected groups and 
persons to respond to the situation. 
4.2 Climate information and  
climate science
Adaptation policies will need to start with good know-
ledge about the impact of climate change on different 
sectors, actors, and regions in a country. Without suf-
ficient information and services to collect or to use avail-
able data, it will be difficult to design an adequate policy 
response. 
While research on impacts at national or even sub-na-
tional levels has started in many countries, data cover-
age in other regions is still very low. The situation is well 
summarized by a study from the Earth Policy Institute 
at Colombia University: 
„Over relatively long timescales (i.e. 30 years or 
more) and larger spatial scales (i.e. hemispher-
ic or global), today‘s climate change models 
broadly agree, both with each other and with 
physical theory about what is likely to happen 
in aggregate, at least with regards to anthropo-
genic climate change. At shorter timescales and 
on local and regional scales, there is consider-
able disagreement among the models, making 
it difficult to reach conclusion“ (Hellmuth et al. 
2007, 8). 
This sentiment is particularly true for poorer countries 
where adequate models to calculate the regional impact 
are least developed. Regarding the already observed 
changes, 
„there is, however, a notable lack of geographi-
cal balance in data and literature on observed 
change agricultural techniques toward reduced water 
consumption, they might start overusing the still exist-
ing water reserves even faster than before. That is an-
other reason why the development of adaptive respons-
es has to be linked with actual development priorities 
as much as possible. Adaptation means safeguarding 
developmental work rather than just dealing with an 
environmental challenge. In that sense, it is very im-
portant that as many climate-related interventions as 
possible contribute to development goals, such as the 
MDGs (Table 14).
Problems will also occur because many decisions on 
adaptation policies need to be taken in a situation of 
uncertainty. Still, much data is missing in most parts of 
the world on the local impact of climate change. But 
even with the best available data, uncertainty will be 
part of the picture. The variability of the weather is 
likely to increase. The chaotic behavior and feedbacks 
of many parts of the weather and earth system prevent 
exact regional forecasts. And the insecurity surround-
ing emission trends, international support activities, and 
regional economic developments all add to the overall 
uncertainty. Countries can react to this uncertainty by 
increasing their scientific and risk management capaci-
ties. Exchange of experiences with other governments 
and institutions will be a key challenge in order to use 
scarce resources as effectively as possible. 
A number of countries that will be affected by climate 
change are currently in difficult governance situations. 
There are countries involved in ongoing civil wars, such 
as Sudan or Chad. Some of these struggles are particu-
larly protracted because they are loaded with ethnic 
or religious conflicts. Some countries are in a situation 
where several armed groups operate; these various 
groups include private armed groups, such as war lords, 
private security groups protecting extractive industries, 
or paramilitary groups. Adaptation policies are difficult 
to design and implement in these types of situations, 
because no rule of law and no ordinary administrative 
capacities are available. But even these countries are 
not totally neglecting the issue. Chad and Sudan both 
have developed National Adaptation Programs of Action 
(NAPAs).
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changes, with marked scarcity in developing 
countries“ (IPCC 2007b). 
This statement is important even though progress has 
been made since the Third Assessment Report (see also 
Figure 20). 
The gap in climate information and climate science is 
still huge. They lack national research capacities as well 
as computing capacity in order to do the necessary cal-
culations. Many developing countries, particularly the 
poorer ones, lack data on all relevant levels, including 
historical meteorological data, and well-functioning 
meteorological monitoring systems specifically for the 
analysis of particular weather events like heavy rainfalls 
leading to floods, or drought periods. 
The missing data basis and limited research capacities 
are leading to a situation where all forms of climate-
related forecasts are limited. This starts with predictions 
of atmospheric conditions, which makes even the nor-
mal weather forecast more difficult. Data on sea tem-
perature could help to scale up climate information to 
seasonal forecasts. Seasonal forecasts are the most use-
ful planning data for agricultural activities. 
For longer term strategic planning in rural development 
policies pre-estimations over a time span of 10 to 30 
years (decadal variability) are relevant. Getting better 
data for seasonal and decadal variability, and making 
these applicable to farmers‘ daily lives, will be of utmost 
importance for the adequate design of adaptation poli-
cies. 
Fortunately, the situation is slowly improving in several 
developing countries, because of more international 
data becoming locally available, satellite data supple-
menting ground observations, and an increasing cli-
Figure 20: Africa‘s climate information gap
Source: based on UNDP 2007, 173
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mate modeling capacity (Hellmuth et al. 2007, 5). But 
there is still concern that not all internationally available 
data – including that from stakeholders such as global 
reinsurers – is regionally accessible. 
For countries to better understand their local climate 
and thus be able to predict local implications of climate 
change, they must have adequate operational national 
systematic observing networks, and they must invest 
into these networks. The networks should have access 
to data available from other global and regional net-
works, be it in the hands of the United Nations such 
as the data from the World Meterological Organization 
(WMO) or data collected by private companies such as 
Munich Re and Swiss Re, the biggest reinsurance com-
panies in the world. For example, the WMO has initi-
ated Regional Climate Outlook inter alia in the Greater 
Horn of Africa, Southern and West Africa, Asia, and 
Southern and Central America.
Still, many developing countries do not have access to 
such information and scientific services. Access to such 
data will allow inputs for local climate models and a spe-
cific adaptation plan to be provided. Monitoring trends 
of sea surface temperature and sea-level are essential 
to assessing their impacts on the increased intensity of 
tropical cyclones and storm surge. Monitoring weather 
data will help to predict extreme events which are in-
fluencing precipitation in different regions and leading 
to floods and droughts, such as the phenomenon of El 
Niño. 
In addition to the access to data, it is important that 
countries have sufficient human resources to use the 
weather and climate information available and to help 
maintain a minimum recommended density of weather 
stations. These services need to be financed nationally, 
but developing countries must also have the opportuni-
ty to finance information flow and an adequate scientific 
infrastructure with financial flows from international ad-
aptation funds. 
Article 5 of the UNFCCC obligates the international 
community to support and further develop climate re-
search and systematic observation systems (UNFCCC 
1992). The workshops organized by UNFCCC on ad-
aptation needs of developing countries highlighted the 
need for international support in collecting necessary 
information and having access to existing data sources 
(UNFCCC 2008e).
The UNFCCC workshops also concluded that climate 
data is not the only thing needed to effectively assess the 
vulnerability and adaptation needs to climate change in 
developing countries. 
„Equally important, and very much lacking at 
present, is the need for accurate socio-econom-
ic data“ (UNFCCC 2008e, 5). 
Without a poverty sensitive assessment, it will be impos-
sible to get an adequate overview about the vulnerabil-
ity of households and communities in a given region or 
country. Countries therefore need to develop sufficient 
assessment capacities in order to do a proper risk and 
vulnerability assessment. While international support is 
useful, countries will need to urgently build up such as-
sessment capacities domestically in order to guarantee 
an adequate policy response.
Secondly, it is important for governments to guarantee 
that climate information available at national or region-
al levels is distributed to those groups in civil society 
which support or represent vulnerable groups. Still to-
day, many farming communities and rural areas do not 
have access to existing agricultural extension services 
or to the meteorological data available in the country 
(UNFCCC 2008e). 
Many decisions taken in the „autonomous adaptation“ 
by farmers, fisher folk, or pastoralists will be of better 
quality when they have access to such information in 
an applicable manner. This will influence decisions such 
as when to start planting, and what type of seed varie-
ties are to be used etc. Even for existing early warning 
systems, the last mile – from a development perspec-
tive, this is the last mile –, which cannot be bridged 
with technologies, is the biggest hurdle. It is important 
to find out how disaster assistance can be further opti-
mized in this regard. 
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4.3 Climate-related insurance 
approaches18
Insurance instruments that provide financial security 
against droughts, floods, typhoons, and other weather 
extremes have emerged as an opportunity for develop-
ing countries to reduce poverty and adapt to climate 
change. This issue has increasingly gained importance in 
the UNFCCC negotiations, e.g. in the Bali Action Plan. 
This opportunity is due to a number of recent innova-
tions: Greatly increased computer capacity is making it 
possible to model and price low-probability risks; index-
based insurance contracts are providing a low-cost al-
ternative to traditional indemnity-based insurance; and 
novel mechanisms for transferring catastrophe risks to 
the global financial markets are opening new windows 
for reinsurance arrangements. Emerging financial risk 
management opportunities for the developing world, 
although not at all the only solution for adapting to in-
creasing climate risks, can play a critical role in reducing 
economic and human losses from weather extremes, 
and in providing necessary security for investments nec-
essary to escape poverty. 
While insurance can be valuable in reducing the long-
term effects of climate disasters on poverty and develop-
ment, it is important to recognize that insurance instru-
ments, particularly if not supported by donors, cannot 
be a panacea for adapting to climate change. There are 
many reasons for this, including:
Insurance is generally not appropriate for very slow- 
onset climate impacts, such as sea-level rise and deser-
tification, which are considered uninsurable. Other in-
struments are needed in this case. 
Without government or donor support, private in- 
surance is not easily affordable by governments, house-
holds, and firms in highly exposed and vulnerable coun-
tries. Here the opportunity costs of private risk-financing 
instruments can be prohibitively high in terms of meet-
ing other human needs. 
Many developing countries lack an insurance tradi- 
tion and market, which will take time to develop. 
Perhaps most importantly, insurance must be consid- 
ered within an overall risk-management and adaptation 
strategy. The two top priorities are avoiding dangerous 
climate change and preventing human and economic 
losses. 
The benefits of insurance must be viewed together with 
the costs, keeping in mind the urgent need for other 
types of adaptation and also poverty reduction measures. 
Insurance benefits those in the risk pool by spreading 
their losses temporally and geographically, and assures 
timely liquidity for the recovery and reconstruction 
process (which can, itself, save lives and livelihoods). 
There are also significant transaction and other costs 
to providing insurance, and over the long run insured 
clients can often expect to pay more than their antici-
pated losses. This is especially the case for insuring ca-
tastrophes. Unlike other types of insurance (e.g., life or 
health), catastrophes affect whole regions or countries 
at the same time (co-variant risk). The insurer‘s cost of 
backup capital, diversification, or reinsurance to cover 
co-variant claims can raise the premium far above the 
„actuarial fair price“ or the client‘s expected losses. 
So what is the rationale for governments, households, 
and farms to insure? The textbook rationale for insur-
ance is based on the concept of „risk aversion“, which 
simply means that risk-averse persons prefer less con-
sumption, if it is steady, to higher consumption, if it is 
highly irregular or even subject to catastrophic short-
falls. Even risk-averse agents, however, should not 
purchase insurance if they have lower-cost alternatives 
for providing post-disaster security. These may include 
accumulated assets/savings, post-disaster borrowing, 
kinship arrangements, and government/donor support. 
These alternatives appear to work reasonably well for 
low-loss events, but are often unreliable and inadequate 
for catastrophic events (Cohen and Sebstad 2003), in 
18 This chapter builds on Linneroth-Bayer, Mechler and Bals 2008 (forthcoming)
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which case households may be forced to sell produc-
tive assets at very low prices; post-disaster inflation may 
greatly reduce the value of savings; money lenders may 
exploit their clients; entire families, even if geographi-
cally diverse, may be affected by large disasters; and 
donor assistance rarely covers more than a small per-
centage of losses (Mechler et al. 2006). In other words, 
insurance can have significant advantages over informal 
security arrangements, especially for the very high con-
sequence events.
Likewise, if governments do not have the necessary 
infusion of capital after a disaster to rebuild critical in-
frastructure and assist households and businesses with 
their recovery, the indirect costs can greatly exceed the 
direct losses from the disaster. Such delays can lead to 
secondary economic and social effects, such as deterio-
ration in trade, budget imbalances, and increased inci-
dence of poverty.
An often overlooked but highly significant rationale for 
investing in insurance is the security it provides for tak-
ing on productive but risky investments. Due to high 
uninsured risk exposure, households and farmers may 
adopt low-risk, low-return strategies (e.g., placing rela-
tives in low-paid but secure employment or adopting 
low-yield drought-resistant seeds). This reduces the like-
lihood that they can accumulate the assets needed to 
escape poverty through savings and investment. 
Banks in developing countries are often reluctant to of-
fer credit to clients at high risk of default due to natural 
disasters. By making clients more creditworthy, insur-
ance can enable investments that increase their produc-
tivity (sometimes more than the cost of the insurance). 
Thus, agents do not need to be risk averse to receive net 
benefits from insurance. 
The same can be said for the case of governments of 
highly exposed countries. If governments insure their 
public infrastructure, this may lead to greater foreign 
investment in their country. Some observers claim that 
the security offered by insurance has enabled industrial-
ized countries to take risks, and thus increase productiv-
ity, far above the costs of insurance. 
In sum, insurance is not appropriate in all contexts and 
will generally increase, not decrease, the expected fi-
nancial cost of disasters to the clients. In cases where 
agents (households, farms and governments) have 
lower cost alternatives to providing post-disaster liquid-
ity after disasters, insurance may not be advisable. In 
many contexts, however, these alternatives are ineffec-
tive (especially for large catastrophes), in which case 
agents should weigh the benefits of insurance with the 
costs. These benefits include, first and foremost, secu-
rity against the wholesale loss of assets, livelihoods and 
even lives in the post-disaster period. Insurance not only 
provides the liquidity to smooth disaster shocks, but by 
enabling productive investments has the added benefit 
of helping high-risk agents escape disaster-induced pov-
erty traps. 
Novel and imaginative programs are demonstrating their 
potential to pool economic losses and smooth incomes 
of the poor facing weather variability and climate ex-
tremes, as well as transfer risks to the global capital mar-
kets. These schemes provide insurance to (1) farmers, 
property owners and small businesses (micro scale), (2) 
to donor agencies charged with providing disaster relief 
(mesa scale), as well as to (3) governments by trans-
ferring their risks to the global capital markets (macro 
scale). A few examples serve to illustrate: 
In Malawi, smallholder farmers can purchase af- 
fordable index-based drought insurance, where, unlike 
traditional claims-based insurance, indemnity is on an 
index of rainfall measured at a local weather station. 
By making farmers more creditworthy, this pilot loan/
insurance scheme enables farmers to purchase hybrid 
seeds, and thus greatly increase their productivity 
(Suarez, Linnerooth-Bayer and Mechler 2007).
Similarly, herders in Mongolia can purchase an  
index-based insurance policy to protect them against 
livestock loss due to extreme winter weather or dzuds. 
A recent pilot program combines self-insurance, market-
based insurance, and social insurance. Herders retain 
small losses that do not affect the viability of their busi-
ness (self-insurance), while larger losses are transferred 
to the private insurance industry (market-based insur-
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ance) and only the final layer of catastrophic losses is 
borne by the government with backing from the World 
Bank (social insurance) (Skees, Barnett and Murphy 
2008, 151ff.).
The World Bank has also absorbed layers of Turkey‘s  
earthquake risk to enable an affordable nation-wide in-
surance program. This is the first time that the interna-
tional development community has provided pro-active 
risk-financing support to a developing country (Gurenko, 
Lester and Mahul 2006).
Similarly, at the mesa scale:
The World Food Program issued a novel parametric  
weather derivative or catastrophe bond to assure suf-
ficient funds to the Ethiopian government to protect the 
livelihoods of Ethiopia‘s vulnerable populations, who 
are at risk to severe and catastrophic drought (investors 
purchase a bond that pays an above-market interest rate 
if rainfall exceeds a specified level, but which pays part 
of the principal to the Ethiopian government if rainfall is 
below this level). This insurance instrument holds large 
promise for supporting institutions that have tradition-
ally provided humanitarian assistance (Hess 2006). 
And at the macro level:
The Mexican government is the first to issue a ca- 
tastrophe bond to partly insure its catastrophe fund and 
thus reduce its risk of large fiscal deficits following dis-
asters. This bond makes it possible to transfer sovereign 
risk directly to the world‘s capital markets (Cardenas, 
Hochrainer, Mechler, Pflug, Linnerooth-Bayer 2007, 
40ff.). 
The Caribbean island states have recently formed  
the world‘s first multi-country catastrophe insurance 
pool to provide governments with immediate liquidity 
in the aftermath of hurricanes or earthquakes. There is a 
largely untapped potential for pooling uncorrelated risks 
of country governments ill prepared to respond to disas-
ters with their own means (Ghesquiere, Mahul, Forni, 
Gartley 2006). 
At a recent expert workshop on Insurance Instruments 
for Adaptation to Climate Risks19 in Laxenburg, Austria, 
these risk-pooling and risk-transfer programs were ex-
amined by those most familiar with them. Participants 
agreed that, for the most part, they directly or indirectly 
target the most vulnerable, and while first experience 
is promising, it is too early to assess their sustainability. 
Importantly, without exception these (mainly) public-
private systems have received technical and/or finan-
cial support from international development and donor 
organizations, making them a viable alternative to post-
event aid. 
As experts discussed in Laxenburg, experience is too 
short to determine if internationally backed public/pri-
vate systems are viable in the long haul, but as pioneer-
ing „test balloons“ (and some are beyond the testing 
phase) they may radically change the way development 
organizations provide disaster aid and support adapta-
tion to climate change: Binding contracts instead of 
aid, criteria-based instead of camera-based – it is often 
critisised that aid goes primarily to regions where TV 
cameras are present – payments, and obligations to 
compensate instead of engaging in goodwill activities 
are three such examples. Despite the promise of these 
new initiatives, insurance still reaches only a small frac-
tion of vulnerable communities and governments; for 
instance, over 40 percent of farmers in the developing 
world face weather-related threats to their livelihood 
(World Bank 2005), and yet those benefiting directly 
from micro-insurance systems number in the thou-
sands. Weather risk destabilizes households and coun-
tries and creates food insecurity. In the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), as a case in point, 
floods, cyclones, and droughts have been a major cause 
19 An expert workshop, Insurance Instruments for Adaptation to Climate Risks, organized jointly by the International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis (IIASA), Munich Re, the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and the World Bank, and as part of the activi-
ties of the Munich Climate Insurance Initiative (MCII), took place at IIASA in Laxenburg, Austria, on Sept. 24-25 2007.
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of hunger affecting more than 30 million persons since 
2000. Governments and donors react to these shocks 
rather than pro-actively managing the risks. These 
emergency reactions have been criticized for being ad 
hoc, sometimes untimely and destabilizing local food 
markets (Hess and Syroka 2005a).
Similarly, many highly exposed developing country gov-
ernments do not have the means to finance the recovery 
costs of catastrophic disasters and could greatly benefit 
from transactions, like those in Ethiopia and Mexico. 
Least-developed countries can hardly afford the techni-
cal analyses and other start-up costs for insurance sys-
tems. Scaling up will prove costly, especially since disas-
ter risks, unlike health or accident, affect whole regions 
at the same time and thus require spatial diversification, 
reinsurance and/or large capital reserves. Thus, it is very 
important that risk management mechanisms including 
insurance will play a role in the UNFCCC negotiations. 
As part of the Bali Action Plan, one workshop will be 
held during the COP 2008 in Poznan. Switzerland only 
recently proposed a global carbon tax to generate financ-
ing for adaptation, with insurance being identified as 
one of the key purposes to be supported (Germanwatch 
2008). It will also be important to highlight the role of 
the most vulnerable in this specific debate.
4.4 Response capacity at the national 
level 
The first actor responsible in dealing with the impact 
of climate change is the government. Given the IPCC 
differentiation of adaptation introduced above, the gov-
ernment has a key role to play to identify where and 
which planned adaptation interventions are necessary 
to increase climate resilience. Often multi- and cross-
sectoral approaches will be the most promising to im-
prove the adaptive capacity of the agricultural system or 
to help to adjust to specific adaptation needs. 
Planned adaptation consists, therefore, of deliberate ac-
tions undertaken to reduce the adverse consequences 
of climate change. While a broad range of adaptation 
measures exists, the role of the governments is essen-
tial for these deliberate actions. The first reason is that 
governments are duty bound by international human 
rights standards to respect, protect, and fulfill all human 
rights. The right to adequate food, the right to housing, 
the right to health, to water etc. are all recognized rights 
in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights (see chapter 2). Governments are 
obliged to guarantee that no violations are happening 
and that the government is using the maximum amount 
of available resources to implement theses rights. The 
second reason is that most of the measures required for 
successful adaptation are measures that need to be im-
plemented with the support of national governments, 
including the creation of regulatory frameworks that in-
centivize adaptation in the private sector. International 
help and support cannot replace governments – it is the 
opposite. Without a functioning government, adapta-
tion policies will not work and cannot be implemented 
properly, at least not on a longer time scale and with 
wider geographic coverage. Governments cannot be 
circumvented by international resources. The better a 
government response to climate change, the more likely 
it is that the adaptation options chosen are well selected 
and strategically chosen. 
4.4.1 Financial resources needed
Many studies estimate that autonomous adaptation 
would be a comparably low cost implementation strate-
gy because it can lead to high benefit-cost ratios. Studies 
conclude, for example, that adjustments in land use 
techniques at the farm level, which are assumed to cost 
very little, can generate significant benefits in terms of 
offsetting damages (OECD 2008a; Adger et al. 2007). 
The same is estimated for other behavioral adaptations, 
such as enhanced water use efficiency. While the ex-
amples pinpoint some low cost adjustments, they al-
ready show how difficult such assessments are, because 
their starting point is that farmers have the skills and 
opportunities to change certain patterns of production 
easily, including sufficient information on climate data. 
Extremely marginalized smallholder farmers might need 
much more support to apply such „low cost“ adaptation. 
This scenario is often the case when these farmers are 
extremely poor or part of women-headed households 
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with less then one hectare, which is not rare in Africa 
and Asia.
As it has been mentioned before, the FAO and the IPCC 
highlight that particular care has to be given to the situ-
ation of smallholder and subsistence agriculture, and 
on related livelihoods such as pastoralism and artisanal 
fishing, because they have the least coping capacities. 
When they are negatively hit by the impact of climate 
change, the number of hungry people will increase. The 
FAO is demanding a conceptual framework to harness 
the growing understanding of the biological processes 
involved with climate change impacts on crops and live-
stock production as they relate to the specific features of 
these livelihoods (FAO 2008b). According to the IPCC, 
such a framework should recognize the complexity and 
high location specificity of these problems, incorporate 
„non-climate stressors“ in rural livelihoods and their 
contribution to vulnerability, and recognize that climate 
change impact on smallholder livelihoods is manifold 
and scale dependent (Easterling et al. 2007).
Nevertheless, while many low-cost strategies for adapta-
tion exist, it becomes more and more clear that adap-
tation is an economic challenge, particularly for those 
countries that are highly vulnerable and economically 
weak. Adapting to climate change requires investing in 
sustainable natural resources and ecosystem manage-
ment (e.g. integrated river basin management for the 
provision of freshwater or the conservation of wetlands 
for flood protection) as well as significant extra invest-
ments such as building new dikes to protect coasts from 
sea-level rise, supporting local communities to prepare 
for weather-related disasters, or setting up seed banks 
to ensure food production after disasters have occurred. 
This extra challenge emerges at a time where the 
commitments of developed countries to increase their 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) are far from be-
ing met. 
The spending of adaptation finance should focus not 
only on supporting national governments to make nec-
essary infrastructural investments, but as mentioned 
earlier, on building poor people‘s resilience to climate 
change. However, there is a risk of fungibility with exist-
ing Official Development Assistance (ODA) and, while 
mainstreaming climate change in ODA is important, in 
general, adaptation financing should be additional and 
should pay for additional measurably initiatives, due to 
its compensatory nature.
Although there is still a lot of uncertainty about the fu-
ture costs both in developed and developing countries, 
the scale of financing needed is not inconsiderable. 
Recent studies undertaken by the UNFCCC secretari-
at, UNDP, or Oxfam suggest that adaptation costs will 
amount to several tens of billion of dollars per annum 
(see box page 114). No doubt that adaptation is in most 
cases cost-effective in the longer term, since it seeks 
to minimize the damages from climate change in the 
future. However, initially large investments have to be 
made. According to the UNFCCC, private sources of 
funding can be expected to cover a portion of the adap-
tation costs in developing countries. However, 
„public resources will be needed to implement 
policies or regulations to encourage the invest-
ment of private resources in adaptation meas-
ures especially in developing countries. Public 
domestic resources will also be needed to cover 
adaptation costs related to climate change 
impacts on public infrastructure“ (UNFCCC 
2007a, 17). 
It also becomes clear that support measures from ad-
aptation funds, e.g. on the UNFCCC level, should also 
cover the option to support human and institutional 
capacity development. If that money is not taken from 
adaptation funds themselves, it could at least become 
one of the key tasks for bi- and multilateral develop-
ment aid to help building up the necessary government 
capacities to act.
The share of public responsibilities will probably be 
much higher where generally investments in the pri-
vate sector are limited, such in many Least Developed 
Countries. Also, where Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) provides a significant share of national budgets, 
this instrument may become a key channel to progress 
towards mainstreaming adaptation.
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These figures give an initial idea of the expected costs 
for adaptation but have already received some criticism. 
In a recent study on the economic aspects of adaptation, 
the OECD rejects the findings of the few existing stud-
ies with cost estimations. 
„While potentially relevant for the internation-
al discussion on adaptation and its financing, 
existing global multi-sectoral estimates face 
serious limitations. The quality of data and the 
assumption are not reliable enough“ (OECD 
2008a, 12). 
The discussion shows that adaptation will be a huge 
challenge for poorer countries. It is still open as to how 
many low cost alternatives exist, and it becomes clearer 
that smallholder livelihoods also need particular govern-
ment attention. While it might still be low cost, it will 
require good human and institutional capacities to do it 
properly, which in turn also requires investments.
4.4.2 Assessment of adaptation policies
The IPCC looked also into existing experiences with ad-
aptation policies, practices, and constraints (Adger et al. 
2007). Many societies have a long record in adapting to 
the impact of weather and climate through a range of 
practices such as crop diversification, irrigation, water 
management, disaster risk management, insurances etc. 
The IPCC highlights that, while much can be learned 
from historic experiences, 
„climate change novel risks often outside the 
range of experiences, such as impacts related to 
drought, heat waves, accelerated glacier retreat 
and hurricane intensity” (Adger et al. 2007, 
17.2.1). 
Many observers do have hope that adaptation to climate 
change is „nothing new under the sun“ (GTZ 2007, 5), 
because in a historical perspective, changing climate 
conditions are not new phenomena. 
Obviously many activities considered as adaptation to 
climate change are not new, such as risk management, 
coastal management, and spatial planning. Some ob-
servers, therefore, conclude that what is needed to cope 
with the impact of climate change is an exchange of 
experiences. 
„In some regions, the repercussions of climate 
change will be unknown phenomena to these 
regions, while the same events may be well 
known in other regions. These latter regions 
will have developed experiences and traditions 
to cope with these conditions. It is essential 
that we learn from such regions and their his-
toric experience – this is an important part of 
Different adaptation „cost factors“
a) What are the adaptation costs in international devel-
opment co-operation (in ODA)?
b) What are the costs for „climate-proofing“ of other 
(non-ODA) existing infrastructure?
c) How many new investments are necessary because 
of climate change (e.g. dams, dykes etc.)? 
d) What are the adaptation costs on community level 
(community based adaptation, capacity building by 
NGOs etc.)?
e) What are the incremental costs to adapt poverty 
reduction strategies to climate change?
Estimates of annual adaptation costs and the factors 
included in developing countries: 
Oxfam 2007: at least 50 billion USD (cost factors  
a-d)
UNDP 2007: 86 billion USD by 2015 (a, b, e) 
UNFCCC 2007: 28-67 billion USD by 2030 (a-c)  
World Bank 2006: 9 to 40 billion USD (a). 
Taken from Harmeling and Bals 2008: differentiation by the 
authors, deduced from the different cost estimates.
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adaptation and does not need to be invented: Ii 
is already there and ‚just‘ needs to be applied“ 
(GTZ 2007, 5). 
While it is true that many technical solutions are avail-
able and better practices might be found in other parts 
of the world, it is the size, speed, and dimension of the 
problem that will make the search for the best adapta-
tion policy so difficult. How do we set priorities? Who 
should we support first? These will be decisive ques-
tions. Moreover, adaptation measures and policies are 
not only technical by nature; they might lead to changes 
in entire livelihoods, thus altering the living conditions 
of bigger parts of the population. One example is that 
coffee can no longer be grown in Uganda at certain tem-
perature increases, because coffee needs to be grown in 
higher (unavailable) altitudes (Simonett 1989). 
A large portion of smallholder farmers would lose an 
important part of their income. Additionally, when ad-
aptation policies are integrated into national politics, the 
institutional capacity of the government and its political 
will to help those most who are most affected will mat-
ter. In many countries this will require to overcome his-
toric forms of marginalization and discrimination faced 
by those who are already hungry and malnourished. 
The IPCC notes that adaptation policies are seldom 
undertaken in response to climate change alone. Many 
measures that might help to tackle the impact of climate 
change are taken in order to deal with current climate 
variability, in particular extreme weather events. Often, 
planned adaptation measures are not undertaken as 
stand alone measures, but embedded within broader sec-
toral initiatives such as water resource planning, coastal 
defense and disaster management planning (Adger et al. 
2007, 17.2.2). The adaptation perspective needs there-
fore to be mainstreamed in all relevant national policies, 
for agricultural development, water management and 
housing, just to mention some. 
The IPCC is also concerned with the fact that adaptive 
capacities are unevenly distributed across and within 
societies. There are individuals and groups within all 
societies that have insufficient capacities to adapt to cli-
mate change and that are disproportionally hit. Women-
headed households in subsistence farming are one such 
group (Adger et al. 2007, 17.3.2 and 17.3.3). The ca-
pacity to adapt is a dynamic one; it will be influenced 
by a variety of factors such as economic development, 
natural resources, social networks, and security of enti-
tlements that poorer segments of the society have. The 
availability of sufficient institutional capacities and gov-
ernance as well as human resources and technologies 
are also important. 
„Multiple stresses related to HIV/AIDS, land 
degradation, trends in economic globalization, 
and violent conflict affect exposure to climate 
risks and the capacity to adapt. For example, 
farming communities in India are exposed to 
impacts of import competition and lower prices 
in addition to climate risks; marine ecosystems 
overexploited by globalized fisheries have been 
shown to be less resilient to climate variability 
and change“ (Adger et al. 2007, 719).
Adaptation is not and will not be an easy task. The IPCC 
has very high confidence that there are significant bar-
riers to implementing adaptation measures (Adger et 
al. 2007, 17.4.2). These include both the inability of 
natural systems to adapt at the rate and magnitude of 
climate change, as well as technological, financial, be-
havioral, social, and cultural constraints within socie-
ties. Additionally, there are still significant knowledge 
gaps on the one hand as well as valuable experiences 
on the other hand. Good organization is necessary so 
that available knowledge will reach those most affected 
by climate change. Even in countries that have a huge 
capacity to finance and implement adequate adaptation 
policies, it does not mean that adaptive policies auto-
matically will reduce vulnerability. The IPCC uses the 
heat wave in Europe to illustrate the point: 
„(...) despite a high capacity to adapt to heat 
stress through relatively inexpensive adapta-
tions, residents in urban areas in some part of 
the world, including European cities, continue 
to experience high levels of mortality“ (Adger et 
al. 2007, 719).
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To conclude: While technical expertise might be avail-
able – and, to a large extent, it is an issue of knowl-
edge management to know what answers can be sup-
plied to a given problem – the politics of adaptation and 
the management of necessary changes will be the real 
challenges in the development of adaptation policies. 
Increasing the accountability of government institutions 
and policymakers towards those affected by climate 
change will therefore be a decisive step for the proc-
esses of development of national adaptation policies. 
The authors of the study propose a human rights-based 
strategy for adaption policies as a key tool to increase ac-
countability towards the most vulnerable groups. More 
details to a human right based strategy will be given in 
chapter 10.
4.4.3 Adaptation measures
Key to effective adaptation policies will be a functioning 
national setting in which different actors cooperate and 
try to work together in order to achieve better outcomes 
through cooperation. Adaptation policies will entail ad-
justments and changes at all levels – from the community 
level to national and international levels. Communities 
can increase their resilience, including searching for and 
developing the most appropriate technologies. They can 
partially draw on their own „traditional“ knowledge, 
but they can also learn from the experience of com-
munities in other places who have acted successfully 
in similar situations. They might diversify their liveli-
hood strategies in order to cope with the expected fu-
ture climate stress and the expected extreme weather 
events. Or they might insure themselves. Local coping 
strategies will only be successful if they are developed in 
synergy with government action at the local and inter-
national level. At all levels, ministries, governments, as 
well as institutions and non-governmental organisation 
have to work together and integrate the climate change 
perspective in their planning and budget work. If only 
some of the actors mentioned are aware and willing to 
act according to the adaptation needs identified, but the 
others opt out, the result will probably be sub-optimal.
There are many adaptation measures that can be ap-
plied, and literature is increasing in presenting many op-
tions available to deal with one problem. The IPCC has 
in each chapter of the report from Working Group 2 a 
subchapter discussing the opportunities and techniques 
for adaptation in that sector: in chapter 5 „Food, fibre 
and forest products“, in chapter 3 „Freshwater resources 
and their management“ and in chapter 4 „Ecosystems, 
their properties, goods and services“. Most of the recom-
mendations for the systematization of adaptation meas-
ures use a sectoral approach. The following overview 
(Table 15) from the UNFCCC lists adaptation measures 
for different vulnerable sectors. It differentiates between 
reactive and anticipatory adaptation measures. 
The typology used by the FAO follows an ecosystemic 
structure. The FAO framework study on climate change 
and food security from 2008 uses, based on this struc-
ture, three steps: 
analysis of the nature of risks in each ecosystem  
(Nature of risk),
definition of vulnerable groups affected by these  
risks (Livelihood groups at risk),
possible adaptation approaches for each of the vul- 
nerable groups (Adaptation responses).
Since this appears to be a very useful and practical ap-
proach, the full tables for 10 ecosystems are displayed 
here.
Independent from the typology used to systematize the 
available instruments and technologies used to adapt to 
climate change, it is important to recall from above that 
adaptation is not only a technical issue. Adaptation poli-
cies need to be integrated into a national strategy that 
focuses on particular vulnerable groups and that tries to 
involve all actors significantly affected.
Adaptation to climate change must also occur through 
the prevention and removal of mal-adaptive practices –  
e.g. incentives to live in risk-prone areas –, as has been 
outlined before. A policy test is needed to make sure 
that they do not contradict adaptation needs. Examples 
include badly managed irrigation systems, the removal 
Climate Change I Study
A
N
A
LY
SI
S 
02
117
Vulnerable sectors Reactive adaptation Anticipatory adaptation
Water resources Protection of groundwater resources
Improved management and maintenance of 
existing water supply systems
Protection of water catchment areas
Improved water supply
Groundwater and rainwater harvesting and 
desalination
Better use of recycled water
Conservation of water catchment areas
Improved system of water management
Water policy reform including pricing and ir-
rigation policies
Development of flood controls and drought 
monitoring
Agriculture and 
food security
Erosion control
Dam construction for irrigation
Changes in fertilizer use and application
Introduction of new crops
Soil fertility maintenance
Changes in planting and harvesting times
Switch to different cultivars
Educational and outreach programs on con-
servation and management of soil and water
Development of tolerant/ resistant crops (to 
drought,salt, insect/pests)
Research and development
Soil-water management
Diversification and intensification of food and 
plantation crops
Policy measures, tax incentives/ subsidies, free 
market
Development of early warning systems
Human health Public health management reform
Improved housing and living conditions
Improved emergency response
Development of early warning system
Better and/or improved disease/vector surveil-
lance and monitoring
Improvement of environmental quality
Changes in urban and housing design
Terrestrial ecosys-
tems
Improvement of management systems 
including control of deforestation, reforesta-
tion and afforestation
Promoting agro forestry to improve forest 
goods and services
Development/improvement of national for-
est fire management plans
Improvement of carbon storage in forests
Creation of parks/reserves, protected areas 
and biodiversity corridors
Identification/development of species resist-
ant to climate change
Better assessment of the vulnerability of 
ecosystems
Monitoring of species
Development and maintenance of seed banks
Including socioeconomic factors in manage-
ment policy
Table 15: Adaptation measures in key vulnerable sectors highlighted in national communications of 
developing countries
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Vulnerable sectors Reactive adaptation Anticipatory adaptation
Coastal zones and 
marine ecosystems
Protection of economic infrastructure
Public awareness to enhance protection of 
coastal and marine ecosystems
Building sea walls and beach reinforcement-
Improvement of carbon storage in forests
Protection and conservation of coral reefs, 
mangroves, sea grass and littoral vegetation
Integrated coastal zone management
Better coastal planning and zoning
Development of legislation for coastal protec-
tion
Research and monitoring of coasts and coastal 
ecosystems
Source: based on UNFCCC 2008a, 31
of laws that protect particular vulnerable groups and 
their access to productive resources for the building of 
infrastructure, and practices that lead to the destruction 
of mangroves etc. 
The key focus of all adaptation policies should be im-
proving the situation of particularly vulnerable groups. 
The following set of principles and criteria should be 
applied for all adaptation policies:
they should be based on human rights standards and  
principles (e.g. transparency and non-discrimination); 
they should focus on vulnerable groups and people  
and show that they are using the maximum amount of 
available resources to improve their situation;
they should guarantee existing access to productive  
resources and avoid mal-adaptation;
they should be build around meaningful participa- 
tion of all affected groups;
they should include the right to complain, including  
complaint and recourse procedures and
they should be „customer-oriented“, meaning that  
appropriate climate services should be developed for the 
groups affected by climate change. That must include 
effective communication between stakeholder groups, 
user friendly support tools, full stakeholder participation 
in all steps of adaptation policies, capacity building at all 
levels of government, and integrated climate research 
whose results are communicated to all stakeholders. 
Community-based adaptation strategies often show the 
best results. Political will is a central precondition for 
designing adaptation policies in a result-oriented man-
ner. Political will is best fostered by freedom of expres-
sion and a proactive role of media and the guarantee of 
freedom of association for civil society groups.
4.5 Response capacity to problems at 
the local and household level 
Developing countries have very different national cir-
cumstances. The specific impact of climate change on 
a country depends on climatic conditions as well as its 
geographical, social, cultural, economic, and political 
situation. As a result, countries require a diversity of ad-
aptation measures very much depending on these spe-
cific circumstances. However, there are cross-cutting is-
sues which apply to multiple countries and regions. The 
same sectors are affected by climate change, albeit to 
differing degrees, such as agriculture, water resources, 
human health, terrestrial ecosystems, biodiversity, cos-
tal zones etc. The capacity of governments to act locally 
and to correctly assess who is going to be affected and 
in what ways also differs.
Adaptation policy will only work if it functions locally, 
because otherwise it is very likely that the instruments 
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Nature of risk Livelihood groups at risk Adaptation responses
Dry land ecosystem
EXTREME
Drought
Flood
GRADUAL
Changes in rainfall patterns
Low-income groups in 
drought- and flood-prone 
areas with poor distribution in-
frastructure and limited access 
to emergency response
Producers of crops that may 
not be sustainable under 
changing temperature and 
rainfall regimes
Poor livestock keepers where 
changes in rainfall patterns will 
affect forage availability and 
quality
Improved crop, grassland and livestock 
management
Promotion of cropping systems increasing 
soil organic matter and water infiltration 
capacity (no-tillage systems)Research and 
dissemination of crop varieties and breeds 
adapted to changing climatic conditions
Community grain storage for food distribu-
tion
Weather-related insurance
Coastal and island ecosystem
EXTREME
Heavy rains,high winds, storm surges, 
floods
GRADUAL
Saltwater intrusions, sea-level rise
Fishing communities that 
depend heavily on coral reefs 
for protection from natural 
disasters and flood
Fishers whose infrastructure 
essential for fishing activities, 
e.g. port and landing facilities, 
storage facilities, fish ponds 
and processing areas, become 
submerged or damaged
Farmers whose land becomes 
submerged or damaged by the 
rise in sea-level or saltwater 
intrusions
Coastal defenses:
Hard-groynes, revetments, embankments
Soft-mangroves, coral reefs, wetland con-
servation
Emergency shelters on high ground, with 
stocks of food, water and medicine
Relocation of settlements, roads and other 
infrastructure
Integrated coastal zone management
Desalination plants
Weather-related insurance
Relocation where a rise of sea-level is inevi-
table
EXTREME
Flood
Landslide
People indirectly dependent on 
mountain ecosystem services
Producers of crops that may 
not be sustainable under 
changing temperature and 
rainfall regimes
Integrated watershed management ap-
proaches
Adjusted silvicultural practices
Research and dissemination of crop varieties 
and breeds adapted to changing climatic 
conditions
EXTREME
Heat and cold waves, high winds, 
storm surges, floods
GRADUAL
Sea-level rise
Elderly people and others 
susceptible to temperature 
extremes
Low-to-medium-income 
groups who may lose homes, 
stored food, personal posses-
sions and means of obtaining 
livelihoods
Emergency shelters
Adaptive infrastructure investments
Innovative insurance instruments
Table 16: Examples of adaptation responses according to different ecosystems
Climate Change I Study
A
N
A
LY
SI
S 
02
120
Nature of risk Livelihood groups at risk Adaptation responses
EXTREME
More anomalies, in both failures and 
bonanzas, among multiple species
Drastic shift in the areas where small, 
migrating fish are found
GRADUAL
Changes in ocean currents, rise in 
average sea temperatureSharpen-
ing of various gradient structures, 
Increased discharge of freshwater 
into oceansRatchet-like Eutrophica-
tion (increase in chemicalnutrients 
and loss of oxygen in ocean waters), 
severe reductions in water quality and 
in fish and other animal populations.
Fishers/aqua farmers who suf-
ferdiminishing catches from 
shifts in fishdistribution and 
aquatic ecosystem productivity
Shift from dynamic to static fishingtech-
nologies that are less wasteful ofremaining 
fish stocks
Occupational training to facilitate searchfor 
new livelihood opportunities
Inland water and floodplain system
EXTREME
High winds, heavy rains, floods
GRADUAL
Changing water levels
Low-income groups in 
drought- and flood-prone 
areas with poor food distribu-
tion infrastructure and limited 
access to emergency response
Changes to dam and infrastructure specifi-
cations
Storm- and flood-resilient building codes
Improved river defenses
Watershed management, including zero-
tillage farming systems
Restricting development in high-risk (floods, 
mudslides) zones
Weather-related insurance
Forest ecosystem
EXTREME
Heavy rains, high winds, floods, 
droughts, wildfires 
GRADUAL
Sea-level rise, forest dieback, pests 
and disease
Low-income, forest-dependent 
people
People indirectly dependent on 
forest
ecosystem services
Integrated forest pest managementsystems
Integrated forest fire managementsystems
Integrated watershed managementap-
proaches
Adjusted silvicultural practices
Forest conservation
Promotion of small-scale forest-based en-
terprises for local income diversification
Cultivated ecosystem
EXTREME
High winds, floods, droughts
GRADUAL
Changing temperature and rainfall 
regimes
Producers of tree crops that 
aresusceptible to wind damage
Producers of crops that may 
not be sustainable under 
changing temperatureand 
rainfall regimes
Introduction of cropping systems that do-
not move and expose soil
Introduction of integrated agro forestrysys-
tems
Research and dissemination of cropvarieties 
and breeds adapted tochanging climatic 
conditions
Source: FAO 2008b, 56 
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fected by HIV/AIDS or who are headed by marginalized 
women. Younger and better skilled people might find 
it easier to adapt to changing circumstances because 
historically they are more open to planting other crops. 
Often, younger people have better educations which 
might provide them with additional useful capacities.
In most cases, the effects of climate change will vary 
within regions and even among households, although 
there may be generalized trends on the national level. 
This fact leaves households with different coping capaci-
ties. Therefore, developing a vulnerability mapping of 
households potentially affected by climate change is an 
indispensable starting point for each country. This ac-
tion allows countries to develop adaptation strategies 
that target the most vulnerable. 
Overall, there is little doubt that poverty is a key factor 
limiting the adaptive capacities of people and why poor 
people often constitute the most vulnerable groups. 
will not be precise enough to reach out to those who 
are locally affected. In all countries, a detailed analysis 
of the impact of climate change is a pre-condition to 
deal adequately with it. Assessing the impacts of and 
vulnerability to climate change and subsequently work-
ing out participative adaptation strategies reflecting the 
needs of the affected people require good quality infor-
mation. This information has to include local climate 
data as much as possible, such as temperature, rainfall, 
and the frequency of extreme events. 
The risk of households hit by the effects of cli-
mate change will depend on several circumstances. 
Vulnerable groups need to be distinguished by the 
different livelihood risks they face. Additionally, the 
coping capacities of each family need to be taken into 
consideration. It will vary from family to family; those 
families with savings, or where enough labor capacity is 
available might have a better chance of autonomously 
coping with climate risks than those who are heavily af-
Table 17: Examples of adaptation options by poverty category
Source: IDS 2007, 4
Chronic Poor Transient Poor
Always Poor Usually Poor Cyclical Poor Occassionally Poor
Autonomous  
adaption
• Conflict, crime, sex 
work
• Selling of last assets
• Intra-community 
transfer/charity
• Sending children 
to work
• Seasonal migration
• Working multiple 
jobs, longer hours
• Diversify livelihoods
• Investment in social 
capital/assets
Market-based  
adaption
• Promote micro-
finance, micro-
insurance
• Cattle insurance
• Weather-indexed 
insurance
• Promote mirco-
finance, micro-
insurance
• Promote mirco- 
finance, micro-insur-
ance
• Selling assets
Public policy driven 
adaption
• Assisted migration
• Cash tranfers
• Community re-
stocking schemes
• Subsidised seed 
banks
• Ecosystem rehabili-
tation
• Improved climate 
information (sea-
sonal forecasting)
• Social insurance pro-
grammes (health, crop, 
employment)
• Irrigation schemes/ur-
ban service provision
Type of 
Adaption
Poverty  
Category
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When thinking about solutions, addressing the differ-
ent faces seems to be useful in identifying adaptation 
options which address the specific needs of the target 
groups (Table 17).
One important precondition for local adaptation policies 
is that there is a functioning local administration to de-
velop good strategies. Local administrations need to be 
supported by national institutions, both in the supply 
of climate information and knowledge for adaptation 
measures as well as in the delivery of financial resources 
and legal tools (when needed). The correct application 
of such knowledge and the transfer resources to the lo-
cal level need to done by the local administration. It is 
at that level where administration is often very weak in 
developing countries. Often, local administration lacks 
the power to make the necessary decisions because 
the central government controls all of the steps. On 
the other hand, local governments are often the agents 
responsible for the marginalization and discrimination 
of certain weaker groups in society. Decentralization is 
urgently needed and must start with strengthening local 
governments and their accountability.
The literature on local and community-based adapta-
tion policies is increasing, and several studies are avail-
able which provide a good overview of policy options 
for adaptation at the local level. One example is a case 
study which was carried out in Bangladesh. It devel-
oped a useful typology to describe the different policy 
measures and policy areas that need to be involved in 
local adaptation measures to cope with climate change 
(FAO and ADPC 2006, 66f.). The authors of the study 
show that successful local adaptation to climate vari-
ability and change is not an easy task, and it requires 
multiple pathways with well-planned, interrelated short 
and long term measures. The task ahead for the design 
of meaningful adaptation policies at local levels is to find 
the right combination of these factors, which will give 
answers to the expected changes in the „geo-physical 
settings“ as well as the necessary adjustments in the 
„livelihood systems“. 
Table 18: Policy options for the design of local adaptation policies 
Source: FAO and ADPC 2006
Type of measures Examples
Adopting physical adaptive measures Excavation, re-excavation of canals, miniponds, irrigation, 
storage facilities for retaining rain water
Adjusting existing agricultural practices Adjustment of cropping patterns, selection of drought-
tolerant crop varieties; better storage of seeds and food; 
dry seedbeds, or adopting alternative, cash crops such as 
mango and jujube
Adjusting socio-economic activities Livelihood diversification, market facilitation, small-scale 
cottage industries, integration of traditional knowledge
Strengthening local institutions Self-help programs, capacity building and awareness rais-
ing for local institutions
Strengthening formal institutional structures Local disaster management committees and financing 
institutions; formulating policy to catalyze enhancement 
of adaptive livelihood opportunities
Creating awareness and advocacy
Supporting better research Farm links to new or improved crops including drought 
tolerant varieties, and other conducive and adaptive 
technologies
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4.6 Human rights set standards for 
adequate government responses
Adaptation measures will only reach particularly margin-
alized groups if a good assessment has been done. This 
assessment must analyze the vulnerabilities of different 
groups living under similar livelihood circumstances 
and, ideally, the vulnerability of each household. 
The analyses shall be measured in how far adaptation 
policies applied will contribute to the implementation of 
the right to adequate food and other economic, social, 
and cultural rights of the affected households. Other 
examples are the rights to health, housing and water. 
The human rights perspective has been chosen here as 
the relevant point of departure, because human rights 
describe what can be expected from governments based 
on their own commitments.
Key aspects of the right to adequate food debate have 
been summarized before. What are the applications 
for the adaptation debate and for designing appropriate 
policies?
The complexity of the choice of specific policy options 
seems to stretch the limits and coordination capacity 
of current local institutions to find the right adaptive 
responses, including research and technology develop-
ment. However, a rights-based approach will be helpful 
for the design of adaptation policies. Those groups and 
persons who are already marginalized and who have 
compromised coping capacities, will be most affected.
In chapter 1 and 2 it was described that most of the 
hungry today are marginalized producers or consumers 
who have never received government support to help 
them in the given circumstances. Pre-existing discrimi-
nations are likely to be aggravated and already vulner-
able groups will be particularly affected. The human 
right to adequate food, as well as the rights to water 
and health, comes into play in the design and analysis 
of governmental response to climate change. According 
to the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights, governments have to first focus their 
policy response on the most vulnerable groups and take 
into consideration the already existing discriminations 
and marginalization. 
Human rights set standards for government behavior 
on the issues enshrined in these specific rights. Since 
climate change and adaptation to its consequences will 
influence the fulfillment of these rights, principles for an 
adequate design of adaptation policies can be reasonably 
deducted from the human rights debate. Governments 
have the obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill human 
rights – particularly for the most vulnerable groups. They 
have to make sure that government policies respect 
these rights, e.g. do not deprive people from access to 
food-producing resources, from obtaining an adequate 
income, or from the access to food itself. 
Continuing with the example of the right to food, gov-
ernments have to make sure that third parties do not vi-
olate the right to food (obligation to protect). Moreover, 
governments have to prove that they fulfill the right to 
adequate food by using the maximum amount of its 
available resources as expeditiously as possible. This 
cover measures the prevention of disasters and prepar-
edness to shocks.
Human rights are also an important category, because 
they set standards in how far governments act in a way 
that is sufficiently participatory to the most affected 
stakeholders. The persons affected by drought, flood-
ing, weather anomalies etc. are often experienced ad-
aptation „experts“. They should be informed and their 
opinions heard before adaptation decisions are made. 
Moreover, they should have opportunities to complain, 
be it to a national ombudsman system, or to the national 
human rights institution. 
If these people are negatively affected by the chosen 
adaptation policies or if they feel that their claims have 
been overseen, there should be a route for citizens in 
which they can object to unfair policies. In the context 
of UN climate policies, even a complaint mechanism on 
the international level is imaginable.
Human rights allow holding governments accountable 
– as well as when designing adaptation policies to cli-
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mate change. Governments are requested to develop a 
national strategy for the implementation of each right, 
which shall encompass the aforementioned five crucial 
elements:20
Adaptation policies to climate change must pass the 
same rights-based test. Did the government identify the 
relevant vulnerable groups? Has a proper risk assess-
ment been done? Are the policies reasonably focused 
on the vulnerable groups? Are the effects and the im-
pact of policies being monitored? Do people have the 
right to complain against the policies affecting them? Do 
they have a legal recourse? Human rights not only ask 
for ending violations and for positive outcomes for the 
most vulnerable groups; they also set standards for the 
form of political processes. They must be participatory, 
transparent, and non-discriminatory. 
It is important to recognize that there are no specific 
„rights-based policies“ valid under all circumstances – 
but the selection of adaptation policies should be done 
in a rights-based manner. First of all, it is a procedural 
obligation. This means that good adaptation policies also 
need to address the historic discrimination of marginal-
ized groups in order to allow them to cope with the 
upcoming problems. The policies have to address this 
marginalization, although one cannot expect to solve all 
problems of marginalization from adaptation policies. 
Measures to achieve this in the agricultural sector in-
clude:
Ending insecurities in access to productive resour- 
ces;
Helping to get access to research results, the dis- 
semination of crop varieties and breeds adapted to new 
circumstances, and using different varieties at the same 
time;
Promoting agro-forestry, integrated farming, organic  
farming techniques (soil moisture, biodiversity, stress 
resistance of local agricultural systems), particularly ori-
ented to subsistence and smallholder farmers;
Improved infrastructure for small-scale water cap- 
ture, storage, and use;
Improved soil management practices;  
Minimizing post harvest losses; 
Helping to adapt farming systems and livelihood  
strategies to changing agro-ecological conditions. 
There are many other instruments which could poten-
tially play a role in adaptation in the agricultural sec-
tor. The procedural aspects of the rights-based approach 
need to be applied to those adaptation strategies being 
chosen. These aspects must also be seen in a wider 
context as there is a need for an adequate and compre-
hensive government response to a non agricultural food 
supply system. It must be ensured that no food insecure, 
vulnerable groups are excluded from supply systems. A 
combination of e.g. the following measures should be 
pursued:
Safety net systems (e.g. cash transfer, micro-insur- 
ance etc.);
20 (1) Governments must assess and identify what are the most vulnerable groups concerning the rights to adequate food, to housing, to 
water etc. Without proper assessment, governments cannot properly focus their policy attention to these groups.  
(2) They have to make sure that existing legislation addresses the concerns of these groups and that the legislation is not leading to “de 
jure” discrimination and violations.  
(3) The governments have to make sure that their policy response and their choice of instruments (“de facto”) is reasonable and focused 
on those most vulnerable under this right. Policies shall respect and protect existing access to resources and other means necessary to 
realize these respective rights. They must also help people cope with risks. 
(4) Governments are obliged to monitor the outcome of their policies. 
(5) Governments must allow for accountability mechanisms including functioning complaint mechanisms and access to recourse proce-
dures. 
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School feeding and other targeted food related in- 
terventions;
Price support for vulnerable groups or similar mea- 
sures (public subsidized distribution systems);
Support for HIV/AIDS-affected families (orphans  
etc.) and
Employment guarantee schemes. 
To sum it up: Adaptation policies need to be embed-
ded appropriately in the local context and should be 
oriented towards the most vulnerable groups. One of 
the strengths of this approach is that it helps set up pro-
cedural guarantees of participation for affected commu-
nities and people, including having access to relevant 
information (transparency) and the right to complain. 
The second strength is that rights-based approaches re-
quest a specific outcome. Governments have to prove 
that they focus their policy and budget decisions toward 
the most vulnerable groups and that no group is over-
looked. Governments have to prove that their own ad-
aptation policies do no harm, i.e. deprive people from 
access to food or water. It is, therefore, a very sensitive 
and meaningful approach to target adaptation policies 
for those who need it the most, as many studies demand 
(FAO and ADPC 2006, 95).
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5 Impacts on global food 
security and response capacity at 
the international level
5.1 Impacts on global food security
Climate change will have effects on all four dimensions 
of the food security definition (see chapter 1). It is useful 
to apply the four dimensions to the potential impact of 
climate change. Some of the dimensions can basically 
be addressed at the local or national level, while oth-
ers are most relevant to the global response. Although 
there will be some positive impacts, the following list 
illustrates that climate change will have mostly negative 
effects on the food security dimensions: 
(1) Availability of food: It is likely that food availability 
will be reduced by a drop in food production caused by 
extreme events, changes in the suitability or availability 
of arable land and water, and the unavailability or lack 
of access to crops, crop varieties and animal breeds that 
can be productive in conditions resulting from changes 
in pests and diseases. 
The production side of availability has global implica-
tions. The amount of sufficient food available guaranteed 
during emergencies is one such implication. Questions 
also arise as to who is going to keep certain stocks etc.
(2) Access to food: The situation might be worsened due 
to the fact that extreme weather events and their likely 
intensification resulting from climate change might lead 
to damages in infrastructure. Losses of livelihood assets 
and loss of income and employment opportunities are 
even more important. Access to food is an issue that 
first and foremost needs to be tackled at the national 
and household level.
(3) Stability of food supply: It is important to note that 
this will be influenced by food price fluctuations and a 
higher dependency on imports and food aid. Adequate 
regulation for this dimension needs to be found at the 
national and global levels. 
(4) Utilization of food: It can be affected indirectly by 
food safety hazards associated with pests and animal 
diseases, as well as by the increased presence of human 
diseases like malaria and diarrhea. Again, these prob-
lems need to be solved first and foremost at the national 
and household levels. 
In chapter 4, the potential to deal with adaptation prob-
lems at the national, local and household level was de-
scribed. Chapter 5 will discuss the elements for which 
the international dimension will be most relevant. It 
will look into the response capacity of the international 
system in order to adequately deal with coming adap-
tation problems. It will discuss the role development 
aid can and should play as well as the response capac-
ity of intergovernmental organisations working in the 
field. However, predictions on the overall availability of 
food supply are difficult to make due to the many in-
tertwined factors. One line of argument in the debate 
is the Malthusian argument, that limited resources of 
fertile soil and irrigation water cannot feed the long 
term demand of the overall, growing population with a 
changing live style. Other groups are hopeful that the po-
tential to increase yields and production is still far from 
being fully realized and that a second or third „green 
revolution“ will be necessary and possible. Chapter 2.4 
analyzed agricultural market trends more in detail. The 
five key trends identified were the following: 
The demand for food and agricultural products is  
expected to grow rapidly, due to factors such as the 
population growth, increasing wealth etc.;
The demand for non-food use of agricultural re- 
source is increasing along with oil prices, in particular 
for energy purposes;
Global food markets will be confronted with a  
shrinking surplus production in the US and the EU 
through reduced export subsidies and more domestic 
use for energy purposes etc.;
Future environmental limitations for agricultural  
production including land degradation, urbanization, 
reduced fresh water availability etc.;
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Climate change is likely to increase volatility on the  
supply side, particularly due to more intense extreme 
weather events, inter alia in today‘s surplus countries. 
All of these factors contribute to a scenario of increas-
ing demand and limitations on the supply side. Food 
producing resources are limited, particularly soils and 
water. While this scenario does not necessarily lead to 
scarcity of food in the coming years, it is an indication 
that prices for agricultural produce will not likely de-
crease to levels that prevailed during the last decades. 
5.2 Options to increase production
The standard answers given concerning these challenges 
are normally technical. Suggested solutions are often to 
increase productivity and the yield per hectare through 
the use of modern plant varieties. The general model of 
the last decades has been to continuously innovate, re-
duce farm gate prices and externalize costs. This model 
drove the phenomenal achievements of Agricultural 
Knowledge, Science and Technology (AKST) in indus-
trial countries after World War II and the spread of the 
Green Revolution beginning in the 1960s. Agricultural 
research has contributed to an average increase of yields 
for decades at a rate above the increase of the world 
population. 
The increase in productivity was due to better seeds 
or breeds, but also to the intensification of agricultural 
production through the increasing use of fertilizer, pes-
ticides, and a remarkable mechanization of agriculture. 
At the same time, the size of land being irrigated was in-
creased, particularly in Asia. Only recently the increase 
in productivity has slowed down. 
It is within this context that UN-Agencies and private 
philanthropic organisations are currently promoting a 
second green revolution for Africa. The hope is that a 
good supply of agricultural inputs will help African farm-
ers increase production. An increase in irrigated land 
will help increase yields at a different pace in Africa 
than in the past decades.21 While it is correct to look at 
all options to improve productivity per area of land, it 
is becoming increasingly recognized that marginalized 
communities, rather than the already intensively culti-
vated agricultural land, need more attention. Moreover, 
further intensification in favorable agricultural areas is 
reaching its limits. These results are, for example, due 
to increasing water shortages and therefore reduced ir-
rigation possibilities, as well as through increasing en-
vironmental problems, like salinisation, that current 
intensive industrialized production is already causing. 
Recently the International Assessment of Agricultural 
Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development 
(IAASTD), which was published in Paris, gave the most 
encompassing documentation of the possibilities, which 
small holder agriculture has. 
„Given the new challenges we confront today, 
there is increasing recognition within formal 
S&T organizations that the current Agricultural 
Knowledge, Science and Technology (AKST) 
model requires revision. Business as usual is no 
longer an option. This leads to rethinking the 
role of AKST in achieving development and sus-
tainability goals; one that seeks more intensive 
engagement across diverse worldviews and pos-
sibly contradictory approaches in ways that can 
inform and suggest strategies for actions ena-
bling to the multiple functions of agriculture“ 
(IAASTD 2008, 4).
The report, which had been kicked off in Johannesburg 
during the Earth Summit in 2002, lines out 
„various policy options to meet the challenges 
ahead, perhaps best characterized as the need 
for food and livelihood security under increas-
ingly constrained environmental conditions 
from within and outside the realm of agriculture 
21 See the documents of AGRA “Alliance for a new green revolution in Africa” at www.agra.org. The ideas are supported by the FAO which 
highlights the potential to increase yields and production in Africa.
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and globalized economic systems“ (IAASTD 
2008, 3).
The setting of the World Agricultural Council is similar 
to the IPCC. It comprises 400 scientists from all over 
the world. They screened the available literature and 
published their report on that basis (IAASTD 2008). 
The report focuses on the question, how Agricultural 
Knowledge, Science and Technology (AKST) can be 
used to reduce hunger and poverty, to improve rural 
livelihoods and to facilitate equitable environmentally, 
socially and economically sustainable development. It 
shows how much potential exists to increase sustainable 
agricultural production, when small holder farmers get 
an adequate support in national agricultural policies: 
„The main challenge of AKST is to increase the 
productivity of agriculture in a sustainable man-
ner. AKST must address the needs of small-scale 
farms in diverse ecosystems and create realistic 
opportunities for their development where the 
potential for improved area productivity is low 
and where climate change may have its most 
adverse consequences. The main challenges for 
AKST posed by multifunctional agricultural sys-
tems include: 
 How to improve social welfare and personal 
livelihoods in the rural sector and enhance mul-
tiplier effects of agriculture? 
 How to empower marginalized stakeholders 
to sustain the diversity of agriculture and food 
systems, including their cultural dimensions? 
 How to provide safe water, maintain biodi-
versity, sustain the natural resource base and 
minimize the adverse impacts of agricultural 
activities on people and the environment? 
 How to maintain and enhance environmental 
and cultural services while increasing sustain-
able productivity and diversity of food, fiber and 
bio fuel production?
 How to manage effectively the collaborative 
generation of knowledge among increasingly 
heterogeneous contributors and the flow of 
information among diverse public and private 
AKST organizational arrangements? 
 How to link the outputs from marginalized, 
rain fed lands into local, national and global 
markets?“ (IAASTD 2008, 4f.). 
It is not only this report which recognizes that those 
marginalized smallholder farmers, who have never re-
ceived adequate attention or research support, could 
easily increase their yields – often three- or fourfold – in 
a different policy environment.22 This potential for in-
creasing yields depends on different factors, such as the 
type of agricultural system (organic or non-organic), en-
vironmental conditions for agriculture, and the respec-
tive ecosystems. After years of neglect, smallholders are 
now being taken much more seriously in the debate. 
A good indicator of this are the documents of the Global 
Donor Platform for Rural Development. It is a platform 
of bi- and multilateral donors which tries to learn from 
the best practices and make proposals for how to foster 
rural development policies inside of the official devel-
opment assistance. Long term solutions for achieving 
higher yields, which can be secured sustainably, are 
most important. They will require agro-ecological solu-
tions that will increase productivity on marginal soils, 
and convert damaging industrial production systems 
into more sustainable systems. Miguel Altieri noted: 
„Throughout the developing world, resource-
poor farmers (about 1.4 billion people) located 
22 For details: The UN Millennium Project describes in detail how to marginal many farming areas are today. Marginal both in terms of rural 
remoteness and distance to streets, infrastructure, and markets, and marginal in terms of policy ranking at national and international 
agendas (UN Millennium Project 2005).
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in risk-prone, marginal environments, remain 
untouched by modern agricultural technology.“ 
Altieri states that a new approach to natural resource 
management must be developed so that new systems 
can be tailored and adapted in a site-specific way to 
highly variable and diverse farm conditions typical of 
resource-poor farmers. Agro ecology provides the sci-
entific basis to address the production by a biodiverse 
agro ecosystem able to sponsor its own functioning. 
The latest advances in agro ecological research need to 
promote natural resource management compatible with 
the needs and aspirations of smallholder farmers. 
„Obviously, a relevant research agenda setting 
should involve the full participation of farm-
ers with other institutions serving a facilitating 
role. The implementation of the agenda will 
imply major institutional and political changes“ 
(Altieri 2002).
Such agriculture can, under certain conditions, have a 
higher resilience against climate change impacts. 
But the problems cannot be tackled only at the techni-
cal level. The situation of the rural poor has been aggra-
vated by the fact that rural areas were neglected in na-
tional and international policy making. For a long time, 
the policy focus was on investments in industry and 
urban infrastructure, and budget allocations for rural 
areas were reduced substantially, as has been previously 
described (chapter 2.3). Support for rural development 
and agricultural production were judged as outmoded 
and reduced by more than half since the beginning of 
the 1990s. A radical and intelligent shift towards poli-
cies that pay greater attention to the needs of the poor 
and hungry is needed, and governments must imple-
ment their human rights obligations to these groups. 
This includes addressing other negative framework con-
ditions such as insecure land titles and problems with 
access to credit or capital etc. 
Therefore, we can conclude that the availability of food 
is not an indicator per se to explain why people are hun-
gry. The overall availability of food is dependent on many 
factors, including agricultural research and productiv-
ity. This chapter has shown that it is important to look 
further than the high potential areas of production, be-
cause their relative advantage might suffer with climate 
change (less water, flooded fertile coastal zones affected 
by salt water intrusion etc.). Productivity gains will be 
best achieved when smallholder farmers get more sup-
port and incentives to produce. That support must be di-
rected to them, in order to make sure that they can use 
it (linked with micro-credits and training etc). If the sup-
port is simultaneously directed to help them to adapt to 
climate change or to cope with the consequences, then 
adaptation policies are becoming more oriented towards 
an integrated approach including poverty concerns. At 
the same time, smallholder farmers are the biggest sin-
gle group of the hungry worldwide. If their income can 
be raised, the hunger situation will become better.
5.3 Agriculture – increasing 
productivity or global warming?
If strategies to increase the productivity of agriculture 
are considered, it should be taken into account,
to what extent this fits with adaptation strategies to  
climate change,
to what extent this is coherent with a mitigation  
strategy based on the two degrees limit and 
what synergies between increased productivity, ad- 
aptation and mitigation can be implemented? 
As outlined before, according to IPCC data, greenhouse 
gas emissions from the food, forestry, and agriculture 
sectors contribute over 30 percent of current annual to-
tal anthropogenic emissions. 13.5 percent of emissions 
come from agriculture and 17.4 percent come from de-
forestation (Barker et al. 2007, 5). It is therefore impor-
tant to address these emissions and try to reduce them 
substantively. The main source of these emissions is the 
livestock sector, which accounts for about 18 percent of 
global emissions. Interestingly, two thirds of those 18 
percent come from deforestation caused by livestock 
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production. This means that the numbers used here for 
deforestation and livestock emissions cannot be added, 
as this would be double-counting of emissions by defor-
estation due to livestock extension. The other third is a 
result of the release of methane and nitrous oxide (FAO 
2007). Addressing land use change for livestock pro-
duction and reducing deforestation rates are two very 
important objectives for reducing agricultural-related 
emissions. 
The design of adaptation policies in countries could be 
a useful opportunity to kill two birds with one stone: 
(1) identifying the most vulnerable populations and try-
ing to minimize the impact of climate change on them, 
partly by increasing the productivity of their land, while 
(2) at the same time trying to change harmful develop-
ments by way of production in order to reduce agricul-
ture‘s contribution to climate change. Many technology 
options proposed for adaptation can also help to miti-
gate the impact of these sectors. 
The FAO has put together a list of proposals for how 
agriculture could systematically apply new technolo-
gies to help reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Such a 
list cannot be applied in all countries, but it provides 
options for which the most relevant techniques in differ-
ent situations can be chosen. The design of national or 
local adaptation strategies has the potential to become 
an important occasion where such techniques could be 
used. 
The FAO particularly highlights the potential of conser-
vation agriculture to mitigate agricultural emissions, but 
the same would apply for organic agriculture. Zero-till 
techniques of conservation agriculture could help se-
quester up to 3 billions of tons of carbon per year for 
Source: FAO 2007, 18
Table 19: Best practices of climate change mitigation in agriculture
Reducing emissions of carbon dioxide through:
• reduction in the rate of deforestation and forest degradation,
• better control of wildfires, 
• avoiding the practice of burning crop residues after harvest, 
• avoiding pasture degradation,
• reduction of emissions in arable farming by adoption of no-till systems,
• reduction of emissions from commercial fishing operations and,
• more efficient energy use by commercial agriculture and agro-industries.
Reducing emissions of methane and nitrous oxide through:
• improving nutrition for ruminant livestock, 
• more efficient management of livestock waste, 
• more efficient management of irrigation water on rice paddies,
• more efficient management of applications of nitrogen fertilizer and manure on cultivated fields, 
• reclamation of treated municipal wastewater for aquifer recharge and irrigation.
Sequestering carbon through:
• afforestation, reforestation, and improved forest management practices,
• introduction of integrated agro-forestry systems that combine crops, grazing lands, and trees in ecologically sus-
tainable ways, 
• use of degraded lands for productive planted forests or other cellulose biomass for bio fuels,
• improved management of pastures and grazing practices on natural grasslands, including by optimizing stock num-
bers and rotational grazing, 
• use of techniques such as conservation agriculture to improve soil organic matter management with permanent 
organic soil cover, minimum mechanical soil disturbance and crop rotation.
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about 30 years (FAO 2007, 18). Conservation will also 
use much less fossil energy in the production of agricul-
tural goods. 
There can also be negative trade-offs between adapta-
tion and mitigation. Adaptation measures in one sector 
can negatively affect livelihoods in other sectors. For 
example, river fisheries can be negatively affected from 
adaptations in other livelihood sectors upstream. In 
particular, additional irrigation water needs, such as in 
the Ganges region, can reduce flows and affect seasonal 
spawning and fish productivity.
Negative trade-offs could also evolve in the other direc-
tion. Mitigation measures, such as reducing emissions 
from deforestation by financing the non use of certain 
forest areas, can threaten the land rights, traditional-us-
er rights, and livelihood forms of rural people. This proc-
ess could even undermine efforts to improve food secu-
rity and sustainable development for these groups. It is 
possible to reduce trade-off risks by sensitively applying 
a rights-based approach to analyze and avoid possible 
adverse effects of policies on other groups. However, 
in many cases, adaptation, mitigation, food security en-
hancement, and rural development can go hand in hand 
if well planned.
Furthermore, there can be positive feedback loops. 
„Agriculture and forestry strategies can simul-
taneously increase adaptive capacity and miti-
gate climate change. For example, increasing 
soil organic matter in cropping systems, agro 
forestry and mixed-species forestry can improve 
soil fertility and soil moisture holding capacity, 
reduce impact of droughts or floods, reduce vul-
nerability and sequester carbon. There is need 
to explore and promote the synergy between 
adaptation and mitigation in the agriculture and 
forestry sectors (IPCC)“ (FAO 2008, 8c).
Although the most vulnerable countries should focus on 
food security and adaptation they also should try to real-
ize benefits of synergies with mitigation whenever pos-
Figure 21: Annual official flows and shares potentially affected by climate change
Source: OECD 2005
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sible. Adaptation (including increase of the productivity 
of land) and mitigation and their respective synergies 
and antagonisms are often location specific, although 
some patterns are based on elements such as climate, 
soil type, farming system, and level of development. 
5.4 Response capacity in development 
cooperation
Climate change is becoming a central issue for develop-
ment cooperation. Bi- and multilateral donors, as well as 
private non governmental agencies, have embarked on 
programs and policy advice related to both mitigation and 
adaptation policies. Climate change will become a ma-
jor trend influencing all endeavors to reduce or combat 
poverty and in reaching the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs). Development cooperation must there-
fore take climate change seriously and develop adequate 
solutions. A second motivation for taking up this issue is 
the demand from the donor governments. 
Development cooperation agencies have started to 
develop tools to „mainstream“ adaptation into their 
project portfolio by attempting to climate-proof projects 
that they carry out. Analyses have shown that, in some 
cases, up to 40 percent of ODA investments are climate 
sensitive (Figure 21). While increasing experience is 
gathered on a project level, mainstreaming has moved 
more towards the higher level of policies, rather than 
the operational level. A limited number of donors have 
systematically started to integrate adaptation into their 
work. Those who have are still in the early stages (OECD 
2007; Harmeling, Burck and Bals 2007). However, by 
mid-2008, OECD countries themselves had identified 
progress, but also further challenges in a number of 
fields (Table 20). 
An issue of increasing relevance is the addition of fi-
nancing for adaptation and mitigation. Almost all of the 
donor countries, with the exception of a few, primarily 
Scandinavian countries, have never met their 30-year-
old commitment of spending 0.7 percent of their GNI 
into Official Development Assistance.23 Only recently, 
the Bali Action Plan reaffirmed the commitment for 
additional resources, however, this term is not exactly 
defined. It could be additional to existing ODA spent 
on adaptation, to overall existing ODA, to the ODA 
commitment of spending 0.7 percent of GNI. Many 
developing countries and NGOs call for the latter ap-
proach, given the large gap in actual ODA compared to 
the needs (see e.g. Oxfam 2007; Klima-Allianz 2007). 
They fear that ODA is being diverted from its original 
purpose. 
Secondly, the money that is likely to come out of the 
UNFCCC process has the objective to support coping 
with situations or consequences of climate change; a 
challenge, which to a large extent, has been caused 
by developed countries. Financial flows to mitigate cli-
mate change and particularly flows to cope with the 
impact of climate change are, by nature, compensatory. 
Development Assistance was often demanded from de-
veloping countries as compensation for historic harm 
done by former colonial powers, but the ODA is not for-
mally paid because of that reason. Developed countries 
have refused to accept such a compensatory function of 
ODA. The United Nations working group on the Right 
to Development has been “poisoned” for years inter alia 
with this debate (see Eide, Krause and Rosas 2004). In 
the context of the UNFCCC commitments, the case is 
different.
Development actors are well prepared to engage in the 
financing and implementation of adaptation policies. 
They have the methods and tools (from policy advice to 
budgets support) to develop practically, and they have 
approved ways to channel the money. One of the big-
gest risks of using the same actors for the delivery of 
funds is that development aid has also produced many 
23 In 1970, the UN proclaimed the goal that developed countries should spent 0.7 percent of the Gross National Income (GNI) as develop-
ment aid. The OECD Development Assistance Committee is monitoring the implementation of that goal and is publishing a regular report 
about trends in development aid (OECD-DAC 2007).
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Progress  Challenges
Many development co-operation agencies and Multilateral 
Development Banks have taken formal commitments to 
integrate climate change concerns as part of their opera-
tions.
Donors should play a more active role in bringing climate 
change related risks and possible opportunities to the 
attention of developing country policy-makers and seek 
entry points for climate change-related dialogue.
Donor agencies and International Financial Institutions 
have made considerable progress in raising awareness 
among their staff of the risks posed by climate change 
and the importance of integrating climate change into 
development activities. Several donor agencies have also 
made special efforts to discuss these issues with their 
partners in the context of policy dialogues at various 
levels.
Donors must work towards harmonized approaches for 
assessing and integrating climate risks in the projects and 
programs which they support.
Many donor agencies and International Financial Institu-
tions have begun to systematically assess the climate 
vulnerability of the various activities which they support, 
with a view to building in corrective precautionary meas-
ures as needed.
Donors and partners need to move from identifying the 
risks posed by climate change to ongoing projects to 
reducing those risks in a pro-active and strategic manner, 
starting from the early stages of policy and program for-
mulation. Current trends towards providing development 
co-operation support at the level of policies, programs 
and plans open up new opportunities in this regard, as 
well as avenues for enhanced policy dialogue on policies 
and strategies which can support “climate-resilient” long-
term development.
Some donors have begun working with vulnerable com-
munities to build resilience into development projects 
and encourage integration of National Adaptation Plans of 
Actions (NAPAs) with Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSPs).
Donors also need to recognize that traditional knowledge 
may offer experience and insights to building resilience, 
which may help develop and implement locally-appropri-
ate and situation-specific approaches.
Detailed assessments of climate change-related vul-
nerabilities have been conducted in many developing 
countries.
Donors should support methodologies for assessing 
climate risks that are based on scientific data, including 
observed climate data and climate model projections, 
as well as provide tools to enable developing countries 
to access information to inform their own development 
decisions, e.g. through regional earth observation and 
climate projection tools.
Donor agencies have developed tools and methodologies 
to assess climate vulnerabilities and to identify adaptation 
options in development policies, plans, programs and 
projects. These tools, which build on existing approaches 
such as Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) and 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), should be shared 
to reduce redundant efforts.
Table 20: Progress and challenges ahead in mainstreaming adaptation, as identified by the 
Development Assistance Committee of the OECD
Source: based on OECD 2008b
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of mistakes and mal-development. The design of adapta-
tion policies should therefore try as hard as possible to 
avoid repeating old mistakes. Only a few percent of de-
velopment aid is directed to poverty alleviation. A larger 
portion of aid is still being given to foreign policy and 
economic interests.24 Rural development, as an issue of 
development aid, lost attention, and the overall size of it 
in aid budget was halved between 1995 and 2005. 
Most of the policy advice given in past decades was ori-
ented towards freeing market forces. The international 
financial institutions recommended to opening up mar-
kets, privatizing infrastructure, and reducing subsidies 
to non-competitive sectors. As a result, poor people in 
many developing countries lost most support institutions 
that had been available in rural areas some decades ago. 
Some examples include government-run veterinary serv-
ices, government marketing boards, input support for 
farmers and price support for consumers etc.. A general 
slowdown of public investment in rural infrastructure, 
the breakdown of extension services, and the depletion 
of natural resources without protection measures are all 
factors that contributed to the uneven growth in many 
countries worldwide (GDPRD 2005). The strategy was 
based on macroeconomic assumptions rather than on 
a sound needs assessment of the particularly poor seg-
ments of the society. Growth rates were soaring in sev-
eral developing countries, but poverty remained high, 
and the relative inequality increased in many countries 
– one of the reasons why so much literature has been 
published on how to foster pro-poor growth (see e.g. Ali 
and Son 2007a; Ali and Zhuang 2007).
Strategies in development policy should be oriented to-
wards the needs of the most vulnerable groups. A posi-
tive trend is that rural development has started to come 
back on the agenda as an important issue in national 
and international aid. The process of reviving this issue 
started at the beginning of this century. In light of the 
current world food crisis, it is now gaining momentum. 
The African Head of States committed to aim for using 
10 percent of their budgets for agriculture and rural de-
velopment in Maputo in 2003 during an African Union 
conference. They developed the Comprehensive African 
Development Policy (CAADP) in the realm of NEPAD 
in 2004, a plan that guides the revival of different sec-
tors. Several bi- and multilateral donors have created 
the „Global Donor Platform for Rural Development“ 
which tries to revitalize and harmonize the aid going 
into the agricultural sectors and into rural develop-
ment. The World Bank chose the issue of „Agriculture 
for Development“ for its World Development Report 
2007/08. These are all indicators of growing interest 
in rural development after decades of neglect. However, 
the World Bank‘s approach to differentiate three agri-
cultural worlds and to suggest specific policies (chap-
ter 2.3) by inter alia recommending migration to the 
particular poor producers and less laborers, might be 
economically rational, but it forces too many people to 
migrate to cities without any security that they might 
receive a sufficient, or even any, income there. A rights-
based approach requires the government to first focus 
the resources available on the most vulnerable people.
Climate change, in combination with an increased com-
petition of different land uses (food – fodder – fuel), 
will probably be the most important driver for rural de-
velopment policies in the coming decades. It is there-
fore important that adaptation policies are developed in 
favor of the most vulnerable and marginalized groups. 
Adaptation funds and adaptation-related policy advice 
should focus on them. A human rights-based assess-
ment can help to best orient the policies and the use of 
all instruments towards those most in need and to set 
priorities of who should get support first and what can 
be implemented progressively. 
Development cooperation can play a crucial tool in all 
stages of adaptation policies. Different aid actors can 
play different roles in development aid. Bi- and multilat-
eral aid can help integrate adaptation into policy devel-
opment. Capacity must be built at all stages of the ad-
24 Eurostep, a European network of developing organisations, regularly publishes a DAC–shadow report, which documents the spending 
priorities of development assistance.
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aptation process in developing countries, from disaster 
preparedness and early warning to insurance schemes 
and policy design issues. Other stakeholders, such the 
scientific community and NGOs, should be integrated 
into adaptation planning. Each of these institutions can 
help to best design adaptation policies. Aid organisations 
can help with their experiences in project management 
and implementation and also by mobilizing internation-
ally available knowledge.
5.5 Response capacity in 
intergovernmental organisations
To deal adequately with the consequences of climate 
change, good and harmonized institutional architecture 
is required. Effective cooperation will be a key compo-
nent for a successful international response, with the 
prime objective to strengthen national government in-
stitutions involved in adaptation. National governments 
have been identified as those having the obligation and 
responsibility to guarantee that the impact of climate 
change is assessed and that national policies are set up 
to use the available resources best in order to imple-
ment sound adaptation policies. They have to organize 
the scaling-up of lessons learned and design the policies 
needed. Adaptation needs to be integrated into various 
sector policies. 
National governments can and should be supported in 
their endeavour to implement adaptation policies by 
intergovernmental organisations which have started to 
work on the issue of adaptation. The following over-
view shall highlight existing commitments and proce-
dural regulations inside the climate regime. It will also 
discuss the roles of other intergovernmental organisa-
tions who could contribute to a functioning adaptation 
infrastructure.
For the first years, adaptation to climate change was 
only of marginal importance within climate negotia-
tions and inside the international climate change com-
munity. It was perceived as a distraction from tackling 
the root causes of climate change and mitigating global 
emissions. This perception has changed. The affects of 
climate change are already visible, and the scientific evi-
dence that global warming is causing adverse impacts 
is overwhelming. Because of this, adaptation to climate 
change has become a key element in international cli-
mate change negotiations. 
Article 4.1 of the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) states that parties shall 
„(...) formulate, implement, publish and regularly up-
date national and, where appropriate, regional programs 
containing measures to (...) facilitate adequate adapta-
tion to climate change, (...)“ and „(...) cooperate in pre-
paring for adaptation to the impact of climate change.“ 
Article 4.4 states that developed countries shall „assist 
the developing country parties that are particularly 
vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in 
meeting the costs of adaptation to those adverse effects“ 
(UNFCCC 1992).
The negotiations under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol are increasingly paying attention to adaptation 
issues. The Convention addressed the issue of funding 
for adaptation in 1992 for the first time, and then in 
1997 the Kyoto Protocol became more concrete regard-
ing the obligations to support adaptation in developing 
countries. However, it was not until the adoption of the 
Marrakesh Accords in 2001 that adaptation became a 
prominent area for action. Since then, the pressure from 
affected developing countries has become stronger and 
stronger. 
In 2004, the Parties to the Convention concluded a far 
reaching agreement with the Buenos Aires Program of 
Work for Adaptation and Response Measures to adverse 
impacts of mitigation policies. The agreement sets up a 
two-track approach for adaptation work; track 1 is the 
development of a five-year program of work on the sci-
entific, technical, and socio-economic aspects of vulner-
ability and adaptation to climate change, and track 2, 
with the improvement of information and methodolo-
gies, implements concrete adaptation activities, technol-
ogy transfer, and capacity building. In November 2006, 
during the meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP 
12) and the 2nd Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol convened in Nairobi, adaptation was finally 
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becoming a key issue of the negotiations. Governments 
renamed the five year program, calling it the „Nairobi 
Work Program on Impacts, Vulnerability and Adaptation 
to Climate Change (NWP) (see Harmeling 2008). The 
NWP carries out activities, basically workshops and 
technical papers, to improve countries‘ understanding 
and assessment of impacts, vulnerability and adaptation, 
and „to make informed decisions on practical adapta-
tion actions and measures to respond to climate change 
on a sound scientific, technical, and socio-economic 
basis, taking into account both current and future cli-
mate change and variability“, in the following areas 
(UNFCCC 2008c):
1. Methods and tools 
2. Data and observations 
3. Climate modeling, scenarios and downscaling 
4. Climate related risks and extreme events 
5. Socio-economic information 
6. Adaptation planning and practices 
7. Research 
8. Technologies for adaptation 
9. Economic diversification
For the financing of adaptation to climate change, a 
number of funds have been established in the UN cli-
mate change process. As part of its general tasks, inside 
the GEF (Global Environment Facility‘s Trust Fund) 
the SPA (Strategic Priority on Adaptation) has been set 
up. With the Marrakesh Accords, the Least Developed 
Countries Fund (LDCF) and the Special Climate Change 
Fund (SCCF) were established under the COP, but op-
erated by the GEF. Finally, the Adaptation Fund under 
the Kyoto Protocol started work at the beginning of this 
year (UNFCC). This is a breakthrough as it is the first of 
these funds which is not based on voluntary contribu-
tions but on a levy of project-based emission trading in 
developing countries (Clean Development Mechanism, 
CDM). 
While the SPA, the LDCF, and the SCCF are already 
fully operational, the governing Board of the Adaptation 
Fund is now in the process of developing and agreeing 
upon guidance for its work, including criteria of how to 
use the funding (see www.adaption-fund.org). Without 
any doubt, there has been some progress during the last 
years. But so far the financing for the funds is not on the 
right order by far. 
In that context, it becomes clear that the UNFCCC is 
the key negotiation platform for adaptation policies. The 
advantage of the UNFCCC as a host for the Adaptation 
Fund is that the UNFCCC is a Convention under the 
United Nations allowing all members to participate with 
equal voting rights. Funds managed only by the World 
Bank or by the GEF would follow the decision-making 
structure of the World Bank with weighted votes ac-
cording to the financial engagement. The World Bank 
and the GEF aim at playing a stronger role in the debate, 
in order not to be sidelined in the adaptation debate, 
which might receive a lot of funding in the future. The 
GEF is administering the SPA and is currently providing 
secretariat services on an interim basis to the Adaptation 
Fund. But the fund is working on a UNFCCC-based gov-
ernance structure. 
With regard to adaptation related to food security, a very 
important set of intergovernmental organisations are the 
Rome-based agencies working in the area of food secu-
rity, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development IFAD, 
and the World Food Program (WFP). The strength of 
the FAO in adaptation policies could be to coordinate 
early warning assessments and to coordinate the disas-
ter preparedness of the UN-system for agriculture and 
rural areas with the WFP. 
Another role for the FAO could be to specialize with 
IFAD in policy advice on how to set up adaptation poli-
cies that are oriented toward rural poor and the most 
vulnerable. The FAO should build that policy advice 
around the Voluntary Guidelines on the progressive 
implementation of the right to adequate food, which 
was adopted by the FAO-Council in November 2004. 
The role of WFP would be to help countries identify 
the most vulnerable groups with sound needs assess-
ments. Together with IFAD and FAO, the WFP should 
develop a policy proposal for safety nets in rural areas as 
tools in adaptation policies. IFAD is a financing mecha-
nism specializing in the support of rural poor. It is the 
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one organization from the Rome-based agencies which 
is most oriented towards particularly poor and vulner-
able groups. It should be discussed in which form the 
emerging UNFCCC finance structure could cooperate 
with IFAD. 
Unfortunately the current food security architecture 
of the United Nations is quite weak and needs reform. 
There is much overlap between the three Rome-based 
agencies; however, all were recently evaluated, and are 
in the process of restructuring. The FAO process shall 
come to an end in November 2008. These reorganiza-
tion processes should also be used to develop a good 
division of labor concerning their future work related 
to climate change. Other organisations involved in 
this process are the UN-OCHA, the UN-office for the 
coordination of humanitarian affairs, and the Food Aid 
Convention, which also needs to be re-negotiated up to 
June 2009. 
The coordination among these institutions needs to find 
a division of labor with respect to the following tasks: 
Which organisations shall be involved in work re- 
lated to food security, disaster preparedness and early 
warning? 
Who is involved in using the available climate data  
and applying them to agriculture, fisheries, and forestry? 
Who can help developing countries receiving up to date 
information?
Which are involved in humanitarian assistance and  
emergency aid?
How can it be guaranteed that humanitarian assist- 
ance and emergency aid get the long term food security 
of the affected and vulnerable population in the focus?
Who is primarily responsible for policy advice for  
adaptation policies at the national and local level?
Who is going to organize a global minimum reserve  
of food in order to cope with several weather catastro-
phes in one year?
Who will support countries in implementation  
projects and programs? 
Other institutions with relevance to this issue are those 
where important macroeconomic rules are being set. 
The World Trade Organization, regional or bilateral 
trade, and investment agreements are examples of these 
institutions. They need to make sure that rules and regu-
lations promoted by them do not hinder governments to 
adapt to changing circumstances. Emergencies, for ex-
ample, the increase in extreme weather events, might 
force countries to stop exporting agricultural goods in 
order to supply its own population. Some countries have 
approved export bans during the current world food cri-
sis. Even if institutions, such as IFPRI, speak out against 
such a step, because it takes away the incentives to local 
farmers to increase production, there will be situations 
in the future that will require governments to act. Trade 
rules should also have all the necessary flexibility to re-
act to the potential impact of climate change. 
To conclude, several intergovernmental organisations 
(IGOs) have embarked with work related to adaptation 
to climate change. This is often related to their particu-
lar mandates such as food or health, which will be af-
fected by climate change. On the other hand, all IGOs 
are interested in getting a share of the financial flows 
that are to be expected for adaptation policies in devel-
oping countries. So far, the financial flows are not high, 
but this might change soon, particularly with financing 
mechanisms such as the Adaptation Fund, which will 
be funded from carbon market instruments. 
Details of the financing mechanisms will be presented 
in chapter 6.3. The number of organisations involved is 
already quite high, and it is therefore an individual task 
to coordinate the work of the different IGOs in order 
to avoid duplication of work and to best support coun-
tries in developing a national adaptation strategy. The 
final coordination will be an ongoing task for the climate 
negotiations, but also for the coordination among UN-
agencies. 
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6 Climate change and poverty – 
economics of adaptation
The impact of climate change is already visible today. 
Climate change will hit poorer countries and their peo-
ple particularly hard. It will change their development 
perspective, and might destroy their opportunities. It 
puts development at risk – but it also creates new op-
portunities. 
This chapter will discuss the connection between cli-
mate change and development, or more precisely be-
tween climate change and the prevalence of poverty. 
Moreover, it will discuss the estimated cost of adapta-
tion policies and present key economic aspects of adap-
tation to climate change.
6.1 Climate change, the MDGs and  
development prospects
UN Millennium Development Goals provide the most 
precise definition of what should be achieved when the 
UN talks about development. Climate change will affect 
the realization of all MDGs as has already been shown 
above. „Forget about making poverty history. Climate 
change will make poverty permanent“ is a slogan of the 
British non-governmental organisation Practical Action. 
The relevant impact of climate change on development 
will be on the income opportunities people might loose 
or be reduced as a result of climate change. The loss of 
productive land through salt water intrusion or through 
desertification can destroy the livelihood of a family. 
Climate change will alter economic opportunities of 
larger segments of the population. Adaptation policies 
need to cope with these socio-economic changes if ad-
equate answers are to be found as to the problem of 
these affected groups. 
Climate change will also have an impact on the econo-
my as a whole. The cost of importing food, in the case 
of low income food deficit countries, might increase 
drastically. Larger scale losses of fertile land will lead to 
substantive changes in the national economic structure. 
It will also influence the income situation of the govern-
ment, which will be one of the important sources to 
finance adaptation policies. 
Public budgets will not only face a decrease of income, 
but also potentially an increase in public expenditure, 
for example, for food and water supplies. Public budg-
ets will be potentially affected largely by the costs for 
financing infrastructure to cope with climate change, 
such as the dam constructions etc. The spread of ad-
ditional diseases will create extra costs. As a result, less 
money will be available for the regular implementation 
of the MDGs. 
Climate change will lead to additional risks for develop-
ment perspectives, particularly in those countries which 
will be substantially hit. But climate change will also 
require a lot of investment in adaptation and mitigation 
measures. However, these measures might – if they are 
not done in an intelligent way, – compete with invest-
ment into poverty reduction and sustainable economic 
growth. 
However, as shown before, if done in the right manner, 
adaptation can bring about direct benefits for poverty 
reduction. Where there are limited prospects for suc-
cessful adaptation, for example in low-lying communi-
ties because of the threat of sea-level rise, it might even 
be necessary to use financial resources to compensate 
people for their losses instead of investing into adapta-
tion.
The increasing environmental scarcity in some regions 
might be one important factor to trigger conflicts. Darfur 
is one example showing that the ongoing depletion and 
overuse of livelihoods can become one of the reasons 
for conflict. Such processes, both environmentally-
induced conflicts and situations where the impact of 
climate change might aggravate existing conflicts, will 
increase the number of refugees and cause migration. 
Migrants and internally displaced persons (IDP) are be-
coming two of the most vulnerable groups that might be 
affected by climate change. And they are without many 
coping capacities to deal with this new situation.
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6.2 Financial aspects of adaptation 
to climate change: assessing costs and 
benefits
Financing adaptation will be a key issue in the coming 
decades. 
„The poor have mechanisms to cope with cli-
mate variability since generations, but many 
of these will be overwhelmed by the extent of 
changes or other pressures on their livelihood“ 
(DfID 2006). 
The economic costs of more extreme weather events 
will reduce financial possibilities to finance develop-
ment, but also to finance adaptation measures. Several 
current government functions (financing water services, 
financing import bills for food in LIFDC) will become 
more expensive. Losses in agricultural income are, for 
many countries, equivalent to general losses in growth 
and GDP. For many poor people, climate change will 
destroy their livelihoods and make them even more vul-
nerable to food insecurity.
Calculating the costs of adaptation and climate change 
is not an easy task. But it is necessary as a precondition 
to receive financial support for climate change-related 
activities. Costs assessment approaches should be ex-
emplified for the agricultural, forestry, and fisheries sec-
tors according to an UNFCCC study. Adaptation costs 
in the year 2030 are estimated, which means that they 
are relatively independent of mitigation activities in the 
next years, due to the inertia in the climate system and 
the delayed warming effects.
In any case, a baseline scenario is needed, on top of 
which additional adaptation costs will be estimated. 
Based on scenarios of population and economic growth, 
it is expected that the level of resources spent on re-
search in this sector will continue to grow by about 2 
percent per year. Resources spent on extension are as-
sumed to rise by 20 percent in developing countries due 
to their current and emerging food issues. 
Thirdly, certain levels of investment in physical assets 
are estimated based on scenarios of the OECD and the 
International Energy Agency. As additional adaptation 
costs, the following is assumed:
an additional increase of 10 percent is assumed for  
research and extension expenditures,
an additional 2 percent for new capital is needed to  
inter alia irrigate areas, adopt new practices etc. This 
relatively low percentage is due to the assumption that 
„most agricultural and fisheries capital have a short life 
Table 21: Estimated additional investment and financial flows needed for adaptation in 2030  
(billions of USD)
Source: based on UNFCCC 2007a
Sector Global Developing countries (Non Annex I Parties)
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries 14 7
Water supply 11 9
Human health 5 5
Coastal zones 11 5
Infrastructure 8 to 130 2 to 41
Total 49 to 171 28 to 67
Climate Change I Study
A
N
A
LY
SI
S 
02
140
(10 to 20 years) and would be replaced and adapted as 
climate change proceeds“ (UNFCCC 2007a, 102). For 
the latter one, research is important.
This analysis, which is based on estimated investments 
and financial flows of USD 305 billion in 2030 in this 
sector in developing countries, results in additional ad-
aptation costs of USD 7.2 billion, which is about 2.3 
percent (UNFCCC 2007a). In research, the additional 
costs are estimated to be about 10 percent of the in-
vestments of USD 13 billion. In capital formation, it is 
about 2 percent. The UNFCCC made similar analyses 
for other sectors (water supply, human health, natural 
ecosystems, coastal zones, and infrastructure) and end-
ed up with estimates of additional adaptation costs (see 
Table 21).
It is important that this, and other analyses, only ad-
dress parts of the costs that will be necessary to cover, 
and it also lacks a human face. One key challenge will 
be to prepare people, in particular agricultural farmers, 
to the risks that changing climate brings. Capacity build-
ing for communities on a large scale is one task that is a 
blind spot of many cost estimates (Oxfam 2007). UNDP, 
for example, includes estimates specifically for strength-
ening poverty reduction programs in ways that build 
resilience and reduce vulnerability. It assumes an ex-
tra investment of 0.1 percent of OECD countries‘ GDP, 
which results in USD 40 billion in 2015, plus USD 2 bil-
lion to strengthen disaster response, and USD 44 billion 
for „climate-proofing“ those investments that are tak-
ing place as part of the Official Development Assistance 
(UNDP 2007,194).
The recent study of the OECD on economic aspects 
of adaptation concluded that global studies of adapta-
tion costs are available, but face very serious limitations 
(OECD 2008a). Some sectoral adaptation cost studies 
are very good, but there are no studies for all relevant 
sectors. Such an overview would be needed in order to 
set priorities correctly. In general, there are a number 
of difficulties in assessing the costs. According to the 
UNFCCC, key limitations for estimating adaptation 
costs can be grouped in four areas (UNFCCC 2007a, 
96):
(1) differences in adaptive capacity: different economic 
resources, countries will not develop in the same ways 
with regard to the economy, population etc;
(2) most adaptations will not be solely for the purpose 
of adapting to climate change: Most useful adaptation 
actions will have benefits even without climate change, 
and addressing adaptation in an integrated manner is 
desirable; however, some actions are needed specifically 
due to climate change (e.g. coastal protection infrastruc-
ture) (see also OECD 2008a);
(3) the uncertainties associated with any readily availa-
ble method to estimate adaptation costs: These me thods 
will be further explained below; and
(4) the existence of an adaptation deficit: Existing pro-
perty and activities are insufficiently adapted to current 
climate, including its variability and extremes. They are 
not climate-proof, and they do not even take climate 
change into account. 
Under 3, UNFCCC distinguishes four methods:
(1) A complete bottom-up approach: Cost estimates re-
fer to projects and programs being identified as neces-
sary, like in the NAPAs.
(2) Extrapolation of the bottom-up method, as Oxfam 
has done. Based on the cost estimates of existing 
NAPAs, these were scaled up to all 49 LDCs based 
on factors such as population, income, and land area 
(Oxfam 2007).
(3) The UNFCCC used current global expenditures in 
sectors and applied a rule of thumb to estimate addi-
tional costs for meeting development needs and climate 
change adaptation. This method can at least give an or-
der of magnitude, but results can vary depending on the 
assumptions being made.
(4) Top-down quantified analysis, in which the UNFCCC 
uses the water and coastal resources and a human health 
analysis in this study. Models and uniform cost rules can 
be applied to estimate costs. The advantage is that „dif-
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ferences across countries can reflect different conditions 
and needs“ (UNFCCC 2007a, 98).
A general lesson is that the choice of method depends 
on the purpose of the estimate. Even at a national policy 
levels, different methods will have to be applied in order 
to assess the overall risk for a country, but also to iden-
tify resources that are needed to support those groups 
that have been identified as the most vulnerable. More 
global estimates will help to identify the „bill“ that has 
to be covered by governments according to their „dif-
ferentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities“. 
Again, it has to be recalled that non linear developments 
are usually not taken into account in these estimates. 
But adaptation necessities in regardto these develop-
ments might easily outweigh all other costs.
The NAPAs, as outlined before, also include cost assess-
ments of the projects identified as priorities in a more 
bottom-up approach. Figure 22 analyses how the costs 
of priority projects are distributed across different sec-
tors. In most countries, agriculture and water combined 
to make up more than 50 percent of the costs, which 
underlines the importance of these sectors.
As more and more examples of community-based adap-
tation emerge, it is also interesting to look at their costs. 
Oxfam gives three interesting examples (Oxfam 2007):
Coastal exposure: In Vietnam, the Red Cross has  
worked with its local branches and communities to 
plant 22,000 hectares of mangroves, providing 100 km 
of protection for sea and river dykes. The project ben-
Figure 22: Distribution of adaptation costs by sector for each country
Source: OECD 2008a, 66
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efited 1.2 million people – successfully protecting many 
communities from the impact of Hurricane Damrey in 
2005 – and cost USD 5 million over nine years.
Flood risk: In India, Oxfam‘s local partners piloted  
a scheme to raise the foundations of 600 flood-prone 
mud houses, costing around USD 70 per house. In 
Bangladesh, CARE worked with sixteen local NGOs to 
support communities in adopting more flood-resilient 
livelihood strategies, stockpiling food in flood-proof stor-
age, harvesting rainwater, and creating floating vegeta-
ble gardens in waterlogged areas. The project benefited 
7,500 households, at a cost of USD 2.5 million over 
three years.
Water shortage: In Peru, where farmers face increas- 
ingly heavy rain, but dry winters, Practical Action‘s lo-
cal partners have supported rural communities (cover-
ing 3,600 people) to understand the risks they face, 
diversify their livelihoods, and cultivate native crops – 
costing USD 200,000 over two years. In Zambia, where 
farmers face reduced and more erratic rainfall, Tearfund 
has supported local NGOs in spreading the practice of 
minimum tillage farming, to retain soil moisture, aiming 
to benefit 12,500 households, as part of a project cost-
ing USD 528,000 over five years. In Nicaragua, where 
farmers face both droughts and floods, Oxfam‘s local 
partners have supported communities with conserva-
tion agriculture, tree planting, and water.
These examples show that even with a limited amount 
of money, many people can benefit if investments ad-
dress the right priorities and needs.
Given the large amount of damage costs that, for ex-
ample extreme weather events can bring about (Table 
22), there is little doubt that investments in adaptation 
measures, in this case in disaster preparedness, pay off 
in principal. It is estimated that one dollar invested into 
disaster preparedness saves between 2.5 and 13 dollars 
of disaster aid (DfID 2005). 
Thus, a full analysis of the costs of adaptation would 
have to include the benefits of adaptation. In this re-
gard, it is interesting that 
„adaptation costs are usually expressed in mon-
etary terms, while benefits are typically quanti-
fied in terms of avoided climate impacts, and 
expressed in monetary as well as non-monetary 
Rank Country Total losses in million 
US-Dollar in PPP 2006
Average 
1987-2006
Rank Country Losses in % 
of GDP
Average 
1987-2006
1 India 31,144  9196 1 Vietnam 2.39 1.34
2 China 24,515  39,356 2 Korea (DR) 1.67 -
3 USA 18,765  26,306 3 Philippines 0.96 0.32
4 Vietnam 6,841  2,015 4 India 0.74 0.46
5 Philippines 4,459  854 5 Malaysia 0.46 0.09
6 Indonesia 2,588  1,968 6 Indonesia 0.27 0.31
7 Japan 2,575  2,107 7 China 0.24 0.89
8 Germany 1,970  1,698 8 Australia 0.22 0.18
9 Russia 1,783  1,896 9 Afghanistan 0.22 -
10 Australia 1,563  776 10 Austria 0.22 0.14
Table 22: Ten countries most affected by absolute and relative economic losses from extreme weather 
events in 2006
Source: Harmeling 2007, 19
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terms (e.g. changes in yield, welfare, population 
exposed to risk)“ (Adger et al. 2007, 724). 
Benefits of adaptation can often not be distinguished 
from non-climate related benefits, given the fact that, 
for example, reducing vulnerability to climate change 
often reduces vulnerability to other stressors, which 
makes it more complex.
Thus, the development of pragmatic approaches is im-
portant to handle costs and benefits. But even if there 
are net benefits, initial investments have to take place, 
sometimes large ones, and in countries where on the 
one hand public resources are already too scarce to ful-
fill non-adaptation development, and which on the oth-
er hand have not contributed significantly to the cause 
of climate change, external financial resources have to 
be generated to support adaptation. 
A key element under the UNFCCC to advance the un-
derstanding and practical approaches to assess adapta-
tion costs and benefits, is the Nairobi Work Program 
on Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability (NWP). The 
NWP has the main objective of helping all countries 
improve their understanding of the impacts of climate 
change and to make informed decisions on practical 
adaptation actions and measures. Thus, it is a good ex-
ample for cooperative action and sharing of experience 
among Annex-I and Non-Annex-I Parties. 
Key components for governments for making informed 
decisions are cost assessments. Many governments have 
stressed the need that further work of the NWP should 
contribute to the considerations under the Bali Action 
Plan. Improved cost assessments will also be important 
for the work of the Adaptation Fund Board.
In June 2008, at the climate negotiations in Bonn, ac-
tivities for the second part of the NWP‘s five year work 
program were agreed upon (UNFCCC 2008a). Inter alia, 
the UNFCCC secretariat will prepare a technical paper 
on literature on the costs of adaptation before Poznan. 
Also, parties have been invited to submit their views 
on efforts undertaken to assess the costs and benefits 
of adaptation options, as well as their views on lessons 
learned, good practices, gaps, and needs in September 
2009. A workshop is supposed to follow in June 2010. 
It is unfortunate that this work is not being undertaken 
before the important UN-climate summit in Copenhagen 
in December 2009, because such information will be 
absolutely relevant for considerations of and decisions 
on the scale of adaptation funding in post-2012 and 
mechanisms to generate the funding. Developed coun-
tries, in particular the US, also prevented more work 
being undertaken on the question of what future costs 
of adaptation will arise depending on different mitiga-
tion scenarios, it as has been discussed in a previous 
decision draft. 
There is no doubt that further research and capacity 
building on all levels is needed on adaptation costs and 
the methodologies to assess them. On the international 
level, different mitigation levels also have to be linked 
to estimates of the adaptation costs, in order to clarify 
the implications of different long-term reduction goals 
being discussed.
6.3 Current financing for adaptation 
A number of funding instruments exist under 
the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, and Official 
Development Assistance (ODA). The overall resources 
available lag far behind the cost estimates: 
Investments through integration of adaptation in  
Official Development Assistance: approx. USD 100 mil-
lion for five years (UNFCCC 2007a);
Funds under the Convention: approx. USD 73  
million (pledged: 90 million) for the Special Climate 
Change Fund (SCCF) and USD 92 million for the Least 
Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) (pledged 172 mil-
lion) (GEF 2008);
Global Environment Facility (GEF) Strategic Priority  
for Adaptation: USD 50 million (UNDP 2007). 
At the same time developed countries start to invest 
heavily into domestic adaptation (see Figure 23).
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As part of the efforts to implement adaptation with re-
gard the Convention, Parties agreed to support the Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs), which are particularly 
vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change, 
in formulating National Adaptation Programs of Action 
(NAPAs). The key objective of the NAPAs is to identify, 
in a participatory national process, 
„immediate needs – those for which further 
delay could increase vulnerability or lead to in-
creased costs at a later stage“ (www.unfccc.int/ 
adaption/ napas/items/2679.php).
By May 2008, 33 Least Developed Countries had sub-
mitted their NAPAs to the UNFCCC, which are posted 
on the website. In most cases, the NAPA process has 
been useful in better understanding the challenge of cli-
mate change, analyzing key sectors impacted, and iden-
tifying priority projects. Following the progress from 
this process, other countries have called for expanding 
the use of this instrument to other non-LDC vulnerable 
countries, e.g. the Small Island Development States. 
Many developed countries could benefit from the NAPA 
guidelines and the lessons learned in designing their 
own adaptation strategies, including active participation 
of vulnerable groups. 
However, there are a number of limitations to the NAPAs, 
like the inadequate funding for preparation, which is 
USD 200,000 for each LDC no matter which size they 
are, the project-bias, and, according to UNDP, weak 
links to human development (UNDP 2007). However, 
the NAPA process must be seen as a first step – not 
more but not less – which creates useful experience 
on the way to designing comprehensive and integrated 
national adaptation strategies. In a recent meeting, the 
Least Developed Countries Expert Group 
„noted with satisfaction the degree of integra-
tion of NAPAs and NAPA priorities in national 
development plans and activities“ (UNFCCC 
2008c, 4). 
Figure 23: Developed country investments into adaptation and their contributions to UNFCCC Funds
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Nevertheless, implementation of the NAPAs has experi-
enced little progress so far, and the prospects are quite 
bleak. The key instrument for funding the NAPAs is 
the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) under the 
Convention. It constitutes of voluntary financial con-
tributions by Annex I countries. By March 2008, USD 
172 million were being pledged to the LDCF, but only 
USD 92 million were actually paid. The project volume 
financed so far is significantly less than that (ca. USD 12 
million) (GEF 2008, 3). 
At the moment, 16 NAPA projects from different coun-
tries are under consideration within the GEF (UNFCCC 
2008c, 5). While some Annex I countries have made 
significant contributions to the Fund, others, including 
the USA, Belgium, and Greece, have not even pledged 
to contribute. Comparing these resources with the fi-
nancial demand of all 49 NAPAs, reveals the financing 
gap; it has been estimated to be somewhere between 
USD 1 and 2 billion (Oxfam 2007, 21). Developing 
countries have often complained about the complex 
and lengthy procedure for proposals addressed to the 
Global Environment Facility (GEF), which manages 
the LDCF. This is a key reason why until now, only a 
few number of projects have been approved. The im-
plementation of NAPAs, including accessing the funds, 
will play an important role in the 29th session of the 
SBI in Poznan, based on submissions submitted by 19th 
September 2008.
The Adaptation Fund is one of the most innovative 
funding instruments, because it is not fed by voluntary 
contributions but rather by a levy on project based emis-
sion reductions issued under the Clean Development 
Mechanism. The present forecast of the resources that 
will flow into the AF from the levy on the CDM will 
probably be larger than the voluntary contributions into 
the Convention Funds, but still insufficient to cover the 
needs. At current prices of around EUR 20 per tonne, the 
available resources are estimated to be between about 
EUR 500 million to 1 billion (UNFCCC).25 After Parties 
agreed on the governance structure of the Adaptation 
Fund, with a non-Annex-I majority on the Adaptation 
Fund Board, it now has its work to do to fully operation-
alize the Adaptation Fund. It is important to note that 
the AF can not only finance projects, but also programs 
and activities. It is not principally tied to mere projects, 
which many Annex-I countries fear, since integrating 
adaptation into national development plans and activi-
ties is more promising in a longer-term perspective.
The Adaptation Fund has the potential to success-
fully demonstrate that effective international financing 
mechanisms with direct access for developing countries 
and independent from the conventional donor-recipient 
structures are possible. The better the AF will serve the 
goal of advancing adaptation in developing countries, 
the better it is suited to play a key role in future ad-
aptation financing beyond 2012. When developing its 
guidelines, it should address the questions of how to 
monitor project and program implementation in order 
to ensure effective disbursement of the resources, and, 
more importantly, how to ensure that particularly vul-
nerable communities are prioritized as target groups. 
In Poznan, the Fourth Review of the financial mecha-
nism of the Convention (LDCF, SCCF etc.) will also 
have to deal with the obvious inadequacy of resources 
provided thus far by Annex-I countries to the Funds 
and other activities relevant to adaptation under the 
Convention. This process has political implications for 
the post-2012 discussion, as the EU remarks: 
„This review should be seen as an integral part 
of future efforts with respect to a post-2012 
climate agreement. It is therefore important 
to take fully into account the Bali Roadmap as 
it has a bearing on the review of the financial 
mechanism“ (UNFCCC 2008b, 21). 
The EU also underlines that the 
„financial and investment flows will have to be 
considerably scaled up and redirected towards 
25 Own calculation based on www.cdm.unfccc.int/statistics/index.html
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low-carbon sustainable development, if we are 
to credibly address the challenge before us“ 
(UNFCCC 2008b, 21). 
Here, the inadequacy of the financial resources available 
under the Convention‘s financial mechanisms has been 
described. Increasing the financial flows is urgently 
needed. It is also a matter of building trust from devel-
oped to developing countries, and that they are will-
ing to better meet their commitments manifested in the 
Convention to support the developing countries.
The G8 summit in Hokkaido launched two new cli-
mate-related funds under the World Bank: the Climate 
Technology Fund and the Strategic Climate Fund. The 
latter, through the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience 
(PPCR), is supposed to support a number of develop-
ing countries in the integration of climate resilience into 
their development activities. The size of this fund is ex-
pected to be around USD 300-500 million. There has 
been considerable irritation for the UNFCCC process 
emerging from this initiative. Japan, the US, and UK are 
the key drivers behind these new funds, but other G8 
members might also make contributions. 
While the key objective of this Fund is for good reason 
– advancing the understanding and experience with ap-
proaches to integrate adaptation into national planning 
processes – a number of issues raise serious concerns. 
Providing loans for adaptation is inappropriate given the 
compensatory nature of adaptation, and concessional 
loans are mentioned as one potential instrument. Any 
adaptation financing has to be in full cost grants, in ad-
dition to the ODA commitments. It has to be seen how 
the governance structure balances in reality between 
developing and developed countries, which are now – 
after many protests – supposed to have an equal number 
of votes. And finally, it was seen as very strange that only 
a couple of months after an agreement was reached on 
the governance structure of the Adaptation Fund under 
the Kyoto Protocol – in lengthy and very contentious 
discussions – that the World Bank came up with anoth-
er Fund which – by the World Bank‘s nature – had to 
be less fair and appropriate than the Adaptation Fund‘s 
structure.26 The international pressure on the proposed 
funds has resulted in some improvements. Of particular 
importance is the sunset clause, which states that the 
PPCR will not finance activities beyond the year 2012 
when the entry into force of a new international climate 
agreement is expected (World Bank 2008). This reiter-
ates that the UNFCCC is the primary actor on climate-
related purposes. 
However, at a time when the negotiations on a new 
post-2012 climate change agreement are gaining speed, 
it was highly insensitive to have funding opportunities 
outside the UNFCCC process emerge, especially funds 
with a probably much larger financial volume, while the 
UNFCCC instruments still remain largely underfunded. 
In the first place, the existing UN Funds, including the 
Adaptation Fund, should be supported. And setting up 
a new fund with the objective to build on the experi-
ence of the NAPAs seems strange if the fund intended 
to finance the NAPA implementation was suffering from 
scarcity of finances.
Even more important is the question of the different 
roles different institutions will have to play. While there 
are great expectations that a post-2012 framework will 
deliver large-scale financing for adaptation in the devel-
oping world, it remains clear that even if that will hap-
pen, other instruments will continue to exist or even 
emerge. One such example is the regional adaptation 
cooperation funds linked to ongoing policy processes, 
like the Joint Africa-EU strategy. The World Bank will 
probably continue to exist. For an overall financing 
framework, and also for the credibility of those who give 
money and those who receive it, it will be important to 
develop a minimum standard of key principles, in order 
to avoid sidelining the UNFCCC process and disturbing 
26 The governance structure of the adaptation fund forsees sixteen members, each representing country groups. Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) have different seats. Each of these heavily-affected groups has one vote to adopt deci-
sions, independent of their power or financial contributions to the Fund.
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this debate by disrespecting certain principles. It could 
be considered that the UNFCCC process also sets the 
criteria for regional funds. Key principles for adaptation 
financing will be outlined in the following subchapter.
6.4 Principles for adaptation financing 
and future instruments
The new and developing world of funding and financing 
for climate change adaptation poses many challenges: 
morally, politically and economically. However, it is 
necessary to consider a range of fundamental principles 
based on an equity approach for steering the discussion 
and design of the policy and institutional architecture. 
The following principles are based on the Framework 
Convention (UNFCCC) as well as the Bali Action Plan 
(see Harmeling and Vaughan 2008):
Financing adaptation by developed countries should  
be seen as an obligation originating in harmful actions 
being taken, namely fostering global warming by green-
house gas emissions. Thus, it is of compensatory nature, 
and any adaptation financing has to flow in grants and 
not loans; 
Timely and predictable delivery, which overcomes  
the failure of relying on voluntary contributions;
New and additional resources, which basically  
means that resources delivered by developed countries 
for adaptation have to be additional to the existing and 
mostly unfulfilled commitments to spend 0.7 percent of 
their Gross Domestic Product into Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) (it at least should be additional to the 
agreed upon steps to reach the 0.7 percent target);
The principles of equity and of common but dif- 
ferentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities 
should be the underlying principles for allocating these 
funding obligations. Responsibility is closely linked to 
the „polluter pays“ principle;
Adaptation funds should respond to needs identified  
at the national and regional level; 
Governance structures have to reflect the „one  
country, one vote“ principle and must result in a vot-
ing majority of those countries most affected by climate 
change – the small island states, states with low-lying 
coasts, as well as least developed countries;
Expenditures for adaptation should have a focus on  
increasing the adaptive capacity of those people who are 
most vulnerable to climate change. Developing coun-
try governments are expected to prioritize vulnerability 
reduction as much as possible for the most vulnerable 
people. This is part of their obligation to secure the hu-
man rights of its people whose fulfillment is threatened 
by climate change. Examples include people‘s right to 
food security, the right to health, and access to sufficient 
fresh water etc.;
Transaction costs should be kept to a minimum  
and coordination between funding mechanisms maxi-
mized;
Transparency of criteria, disbursement, and moni- 
toring is needed.
Delivering on these principles will be one of the key 
challenges for a post-2012 agreement as well as for ad-
aptation work in other forums. The negotiations under 
the UNFCCC have to quickly become quickly more 
concrete if an effective and comprehensive outcome in 
Copenhagen 2009 is to be agreed on. This deal cannot 
be a gradual improvement of the Kyoto Protocol, but 
must result in a quantum leap forward on mitigation as 
well as adaptation for developing countries. The June 
negotiations in Bonn have shown that some Parties are 
becoming more concrete and have put specific proposals 
on the table, including ideas on how to generate large 
amounts of resources needed for adaptation and other 
purposes. Müller in a recent paper prepared a very use-
ful overview of the different instruments for generating 
resources being discussed. 
Some countries have proposed instruments that would 
end up in a formula for sharing contributions to a fund, 
similar (but perhaps less sophisticated) to Table 8 in 
chapter 2.8 (UNFCCC 2008d):
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The „Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)“ pro- 
posed that an adaptation fund under the Convention 
should be established, based on indicators of responsi-
bility for greenhouse gas emissions and capability;
Mexico put forward a proposal for a world climate  
change fund to support mitigation, adaptation, and tech-
nology cooperation through financial contributions from 
developed and developing countries based on criteria 
such as emissions, population, and gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP);
China proposed scaling up funding from developed  
countries through a percentage of GDP (0.5 percent) 
in addition to existing official development assistance 
to support an adaptation fund and a multilateral tech-
nology acquisition fund. Developing countries would 
have to contribute nothing to this fund, independently 
of their responsibilities for greenhouse gas emissions or 
economic capability.
In addition, Switzerland proposed a global carbon tax 
with an exemption for countries whose annual per 
capita emissions are less than 1.5 tonnes of carbon di-
oxide. The resources generated would flow into a mul-
tilateral fund for adaptation and insurance along with 
national climate change funds in all countries. Also this 
idea would indirectly take into account the capabilities, 
since developing countries would receive a much larger 
share of the revenues for adaptation, and also because 
the 1.5 t carbon dioxide threshold can be interpreted in 
relation to the level of economic capability. 
These proposals would, in theory, provide relatively sus-
tainable, predictable resources, and could also generate 
the adequate scale (tens of billions of USD) of necessary 
finances. However, the contributions from most of the 
developed countries would probably not be additional 
to the 0.7 percent ODA commitment, since most coun-
tries would strive to fill up their ODA quota with these 
resources. But even more important is what Müller 
called the domestic revenue problem. When resources 
for international purposes come from national budgets – 
even if they were generated through mechanisms other 
than taxes – there is the perception that it is tax pay-
ers´ money. At a stage where resources provided would 
reach the scale of billions, it is likely – and that shows 
past experience – that countries would step back from 
their commitments (Müller 2008). Given this, realisti-
cally, the aforementioned proposals are unlikely to pro-
vide resources in a predictable and sustainable manner.
There are other proposals which have a better perform-
ance in such principle-based analysis. Norway proposed 
that adaptation should be financed through auctioning 
a share of assigned amount units (AAUs), the emission 
allowances granted to developed countries which have 
ratified the Kyoto Protocol. In that case, it would be, for 
example, private companies who have emission obliga-
tions under national/regional emission trading systems. 
They would have to auction part of their obligations, 
or Parties might miss filling emission reduction targets 
domestically. These payments would truly generate re-
sources in addition to ODA flows.
Norway also proposed to use revenues from auction-
ing in the maritime sector to fund adaptation activities 
in developing countries, e.g. through the Adaptation 
Fund. Other possible approaches were mentioned in 
Parties´ presentations, including a levy on international 
air travel, extension of the share of proceeds that cur-
rently exists under the CDM to other mechanisms, and 
a levy on bunker fuels (UNFCCC 2008d). 
These proposals would address private companies and 
individuals and would be more or less compatible with 
the „polluter pays“ principle. For example, an aviation 
levy (per ticket or in percentage of price), even if also 
imposed in developing countries, would only target 
those who book flights, particularly intercontinental 
flights. These produce relatively large „CO2 footprints“ 
for individuals, and those who can afford these flights 
are not the poor.
Since each instrument has its strengths and weaknesses, 
a combination of some of the latter possibilities seems to 
be the most promising approach, and it would still be in 
line with the leading principle of common but differenti-
ated responsibilities and capabilities. The auctioning of 
AAUs would only apply to countries and sectors which 
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have emission obligations under an emission trading 
scheme (Annex I and maybe some rapidly developing 
countries with sectoral agreements), and instruments 
like the aviation levy would address those individuals 
who have a bigger „CO2 footprint“ and are capable of 
paying flights. In all instruments, the amount of resourc-
es generated – the adequacy – depends on a number of 
assumptions and influencing factors, some of which will 
solely depend on the political decisions and others on 
the market price of emissions.
Once a large scale of resources is generated, if this does 
occur, it remains to be decided if one operating entity 
will strategically manage these funds or if they will be 
disbursed to different sub-entities who have particular 
expertise in certain fields or to regional entities etc. 
Part of this strategic management must be to assist the 
implementation of incentivizing frameworks for adap-
tation within countries, for both actions undertaken 
by the public and private sectors. Public and private 
adaptation investments are needed. In many develop-
ing countries, the share of public investments and the 
share of adaptation costs – especially when addressing 
the most vulnerable communities – may be higher than 
in developed countries. Nevertheless, many actions rel-
evant for adaptation are being undertaken by different 
private actors (OECD 2008a). It is argued that 
„in theory, such actions should be autonomous. 
Self-interest should be a sufficient incentive for 
such actors to undertake measures that reduce 
their vulnerability to climate risks or to ex-
ploit potential business opportunities“ (OECD 
2008a, 26). 
But in practice, governments will have a role to play to 
create enabling environments through different kinds of 
measures to incentivize adaptation in the private sector 
and to support those who can not afford private sector 
solutions. 
Eventually, any mechanism and the actors involved, in-
cluding governments in developing countries, will have 
to prove that they are able to deliver adaptation and 
climate resilience to the most vulnerable.
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7 Research results for Africa27
Most forms of agriculture and food production activities 
in Africa are sensitive to change in the climatic system. 
Change in climate (moisture, heat or wind) can affect 
food production directly, while climate shocks (such 
drought or floods) may wipe out crops, push up food 
prices, and destroy properties, thereby confronting peo-
ple with stark choices. However, it is important to recog-
nize that agricultural production is based on three types 
of resources which include, but go beyond climate: 
natural resources (climate, soil, topography, genetic  
endowments), 
capital resources (e.g. fertilizers, energy and other  
inputs), and 
human resources (labor, management practices,  
market conditions). 
For Africa, limited capital resources required purchasing 
farm inputs, like fertilizers, and climate and soil condi-
tions play an important role in the level of agricultural 
production.
7.1 Effects of climate change on food 
production, agriculture and water availability 
7.1.1 Changes in climatic conditions
The global scientific community views climate change 
as the most significant environmental threat of the 21st 
century – endangering the sustainability of the world‘s 
environment, its agriculture, and consequently the 
health of its people (IPCC 2001). 
It is anticipated that African countries in particular will 
endure some of the worst effects of climate change, 
mainly because of the heavy reliance on rain-fed agri-
culture. These countries are already limited by social 
(the region has the highest proportion of people living 
in extreme poverty (UN 2006)), technical, and envi-
ronmental factors including widespread poverty, fragile 
ecosystems, weak institutions, conflicts and ineffective 
governance. The latest IPCC report confirmed that be-
cause of Africa‘s high dependence on natural resources 
and other climate sensitive sectors, such as agricultural 
systems heavily dependent on rainfall, climate change is 
likely to exacerbate the threats to the livelihoods of the 
many people in Africa.
Climate data for Africa for the last 30-40 years show 
that the continent has been warming, which is contrib-
uting to more erratic but intense rains. In other words, 
warming is causing more droughts but also more floods 
(Nyong 2005). Climate change threatens both crop and 
livestock production in a number of ways. Crop yields 
are expected to fall in regions predicted to become hot-
ter and drier; this may make some areas too dry for ag-
riculture and food production, especially the arid and 
semi arid areas.
Rainfall exhibits notable spatial and temporal variabil-
ity. But in general, a decline in annual rainfall has been 
observed from several studies. Studies also observed a 
decline in the amount of precipitation but an increase in 
intensity, which at times results into floods; this obser-
Part III
Regional studies on climate change impacts,  
food security and response capacity
27 Based on a contribution by Stephen O. Anyango (Department of Environmental Science, Kenyatta University, Kenya) and Victor Orindi 
(International Development Research Centre, Kenya).
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vation is consistent with some of the projections from 
regional circulation models (Table 23). 
Large parts of Africa already experience climate variabil-
ity, which is experienced in terms of changes in rain-
fall distribution, frequency, and intensity of dry spells 
(Reason et al. 2005). Droughts have long contributed 
to human migration, cultural separation, population 
dislocation, and the collapse of prehistoric and early 
historic societies (Pandey et al. 2003). About one third 
of the people in Africa lives in drought-prone areas 
and is vulnerable to the impacts of droughts. Droughts 
have mainly affected the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, and 
southern Africa, particularly since the end of the 1960s 
(Richard et al. 2001; L‘Hôte et al. 2002; Brooks 2004). 
This may worsen with long-term climate change. 
Observational records show that Africa has been warm-
ing throughout the 20th century at the rate of about 
0.05° C per decade, with slightly larger warming in the 
June-November seasons than in December-May (Hulme 
et al. 2001). Since the mid-1970s, precipitation has de-
clined by about 2.4± 1.3 percent per decade in tropi-
cal rainforest Africa. This rate is stronger in West Africa 
(-4.2± 1.2 percent per decade) and in northern Congo 
(-3.2± 2.2 percent per decade) (Nicholson et al. 2001; 
Nyong 2005). 
Only limited experiments have been conducted in Africa 
on regional climate change scenarios using climate mod-
els or empirical downscaling are mainly due to restrict-
ed computational facilities and problems of insufficient 
climate data in the region (Swart et al. 2002; Jenkins et 
al. 2002). But the results show serious concerns about 
agriculture and food insecurity situation in Africa due to 
current climate variability and soil degradation associ-
ated with climate change. 
If current trends continue, it is predicted that by 2060, 
sub-Saharan Africa will be warmer by 2.9°C, and it will 
have 4 percent less rainfall in the interior. Water loss 
will be further exacerbated by higher evaporation rates 
(UNDP 2007; Nyong 2005). Indeed, the latest IPCC 
report projects that warming will likely be above the 
global average throughout the sub-Saharan Africa.
7.1.2 The state of food insecurity in Africa
According to Hellmuth et al., 
„Africa‘s variable climate is already contributing 
significantly to its development problems. The 
key development sectors of agriculture, water, 
energy, transport, and health are all particularly 
sensitive to climate variability.” 
Table 23: Observed changes in precipitation in parts of Africa
Region/Country Observed Changes
West Africa (4°-20°N; 20°W- 19 40°E A decline in annual rainfall has been observed since the end of the 1960s, 
with a decrease of 20 to 40% noted between the period of 1931 and 1960 
and the period of 1968 to 1990
The tropical rainforest zone A decline in mean annual precipitation of around 4% in West Africa, 3% in 
North Congo and 2% in South Congo for the period 1960-1998
Southern Africa Increased interannual variability in the post-1970 period, with higher rainfall 
anomalies and more intense and widespread droughts noted
Angola, Namibia, Mozambique A significant increase in heavy rainfall events
Guinean coast A 10% increase in annual rainfall for the last 30 years
Source: Nicholson et al. 2001; Fauchereau et al. 2003; Chappell and Agnew 2004; Dai et al. 2004; New et al. 
2006
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world population and 25 percent of the undernour-
ished people in the developing world (FAO 2006). In 
the period 2001-03, 33 percent of the SSA population 
was undernourished compared to 17 percent in the 
developing countries as whole (see Table 24). But the 
proportion rises to 55 percent in central Africa (Oxfam 
2006). Other worse off regions in Africa – with more 
than a third of their population undernourished – in-
clude southern and eastern Africa. In both regions, the 
number of food insecure people has increased since the 
last world food summit held in Rome in 1996, despite a 
general reduction in the prevalence of global hunger. It 
should, however, be noted that regional or continental 
figures often hide lower level differences. 
Some of the hunger hotspots in SSA include Niger, Sudan 
(specifically the Darfur region), Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Mali, and Southern Africa as a region. While 
many factors may be responsible for the state of food in-
security in these places, wars and conflicts are largely re-
sponsible for the food insecurity situation in the Central 
African Republic and in the Darfur region of Sudan. 
It has been noted that an increase in the numbers of 
hungry people in SSA since the year 1990-92 (WFS 
Baseline) was driven mainly by five war-torn countries 
including Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Eritrea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. These countries com-
bined account for 29 million out of the regions increase 
of 37 million hungry people (FAO 2006). Particularly 
worrying is the Democratic Republic of Congo, where 
Models show that the effects of climate change are 
likely to be very different across the continent, since 
the initial climate conditions are quite different with 
precipitation varying greatly across sub-regions (Ngaira 
2007). However, overall the impacts of climate change 
on Africa are expected to worsen the situation Hellmuth 
describes.
Currently a significant proportion of the food in Africa is 
grown as rain-fed annual crops, which means that even 
small changes in the climate can have big impacts on 
productivity. Countries that produce only a few princi-
pal commodities are generally thought to be more eco-
nomically sensitive to climate impacts, simply because 
of the greater chance that a significant portion of their 
production will be affected by the same meteorological 
event or climate fluctuation. For water scarce regions, 
climate change is likely to result in further reduction 
in available water through increased evaporation and 
changes in patterns of rainfall and runoff (UNDP 2007). 
An integrated approach including both socio-economic 
and environmental aspects is necessary in the elimina-
tion of hunger and malnutrition. According to Jones and 
Thornton (2003), food production has to double in the 
next 35 years if the world is to meet future needs. 
To date, Africa has the highest rate of food insecurity 
with sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) being the most food 
insecure region against a rapidly increasingly human 
population. The region accounts for 13 percent of the 
Table 24: Hunger in Africa and the developing world
Region Total Population Total undernourished Undernoursihed as %  
of total population
North Africa  144,400,000  6,1000,000  4%
West Africa  230,300,000  36,400,000  15%
Southern Africa  90,100,000  35,700,000  39%
East Africa  226,500,000  92,400,000  40%
Central Africa  82,000,000  45,200,000  55%
Developing world  4,712 200,000  797,900,000  16%
Source: FAO 2005
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the number of undernourished people tripled from 12 
to 36 million with prevalence rising from 31 to 72 per-
cent of the population (FAO 2006). Conflicts therefore 
play an important role in the food insecurity situation 
in these countries, and may be exacerbated by climate 
variability and change. In eastern Africa, the situation in 
Eritrea is of particular concern, because successive years 
of inadequate rains have seriously undermined crop 
and livestock production (FAO 2005). The expected 
demographic growth and socio-economic development 
in many African countries would result in substantial 
increases in food requirements exacerbating the nega-
tive effects of climate change (Gregory et al. 2005). It 
was predicted that by 2005, one third of the African 
population was at risk from widespread hunger and mal-
nutrition, a situation likely to get worse with long-term 
climate change (Royal Society 2005).
7.1.3 Effects on food production, agriculture, 
water, forests, fish and livestock
Extreme climatic events such as droughts and floods 
often affect food production negatively, and result in se-
vere food shortages. In Malawi, for example, the 2002 
drought left approximately 5 million people in need of 
emergency food aid. This aid took a long time to arrive 
just like in Niger, where in 2004/2005, around 2.5 mil-
lion people, or one fifth of the population, required such 
assistance (UNDP 2007, 84). The cycles of drought 
experienced in many of the poor sub-Saharan African 
countries create poverty traps for many households. 
These events constantly thwart efforts to build up as-
sets and increase income. For pastoral and agro-pastoral 
groups, vulnerable households often find it difficult to 
sell under-nourished animals for income to buy cereals, 
and the drop in prices adversely affects their food secu-
rity and terms of trade during drought. 
Climate change impacts on agriculture and food securi-
ty could push additional 600 million people worldwide 
at risk of hunger by 2080, in addition to projected rev-
enue losses of 26 percent by 2060 for dry land areas 
in sub-Saharan Africa. These figures are calculated at 
a threshold of 2°C (UNDP 2007, 90). In this case it 
is important to note, with a high likelihood, tempera-
ture will only stay under this threshold in this century, 
if worldwide a very harsh mitigation policy is realized. 
Agricultural production in SSA could fall by up to 9 per-
cent. In Kordofan in northern Sudan, climate models 
indicate that temperatures could rise by 1.5°C between 
2030 and 2060. This would mean decline in rainfall 
of 5 percent, which could result in a 70 percent drop 
in sorghum yields. Cash crop production will not be 
spared either. In Uganda, an increase of 2°C in average 
temperatures could significantly reduce the land avail-
able for growing coffee, which is an important source 
of income to farmers and foreign exchange earner to 
the country. While it may be possible to maintain tea 
production in Kenya, production will have to move to 
higher slopes currently occupied by forests, suggesting 
that this can only be achieved with some extent of en-
vironmental damage. 
For North Africa, which is already dry, even modest 
temperature increases could significantly reduce water 
availability. An increase of 1°C could reduce water run-
off in one of the watersheds in Morocco by 10 percent 
by the year 2020. Reduction in water availability will 
seriously affect irrigated agriculture currently practiced 
in many dry areas. It is also worth noting that compared 
to other regions, SSA has lowest amount of land under 
irrigation. 
Floods are also critical and impact food production. 
Recurrent floods in some countries are linked to neg-
ative economic and human losses as a result (e.g. in 
Mozambique, Obasi 2005). Even countries located in 
dry areas (Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, and Somalia) have not 
been flood-safe (Kabat et al. 2002). A rise in temperature 
in excess of the agreed 2°C threshold would accelerate 
the rise in flooding, and cause widespread displacement 
of people in such countries, especially in the low lying 
coastal areas. If the predicted temperatures increase by 
the year 2030, then climatic zones would likely change 
and support very limited agriculture, as most of the land 
will be too marginal for farming, and probably only some 
form of nomadic pastoralism may be viable. 
Among the cereals, wheat production potential in the 
sub-tropics is expected to be worst affected, with signifi-
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Figure 24: Overview of expected consequences of climate change in Africa
Source: Boko et al. 2007, 451
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cant declines anticipated in Africa just like in South Asia 
and Latin America. In addition to the yield, changes in 
climate are anticipated to affect crop quality. For exam-
ple, decreases in protein content in some grains have 
been associated with climate variability, which could 
have major impacts on food quality. Other effects on 
crop quality include pests and diseases, such as danger-
ous levels of mycotoxins in groundnuts (Royal Society 
2005). 
The low-lying coastal zones of Africa are also likely to 
be affected with a rise in sea-levels. In Lower Egypt for 
example, possible displacement of 6 million people and 
flooding of 4500 km2 of farmland is likely with a 1-metre 
rise in sea-level. This would drive many people into des-
titution, considering that 17 percent of the population 
in the area live below poverty line (UNDP 2007, 100).
Not all expected changes in climate will be negative. 
Growing seasons in certain areas may lengthen (as in 
the case of Ethiopian Highlands mentioned above), and 
parts of dry areas may experience increased rainfall with 
climate change. As a result of a reduction in frost on the 
alpine zones of Mt. Kenya and Mt. Kilimanjaro, for ex-
ample, it may be possible to grow more temperate crops, 
e.g. apples, pears, barley, wheat, etc., on the adjoining 
elevations (Parry et al. 2004). Mild climate scenarios 
predict further benefits across African cropland for irri-
gated and especially dry land farms. However, it is noted 
that even in these favorable scenarios, regions in the 
Mediterranean, central, western and southern Africa 
that currently produce such crops stand to be adversely 
affected (Kurukulasuriya and Mendelsohn 2006). 
Summarizing the Africa-related conclusions of the FAR, 
it becomes obvious that climate change compromises 
the ability of many African societies to achieve the dif-
ferent Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and to 
improve food security. The SPM of Working Group II of 
the IPCC expects that the area suitable for agriculture, 
the length of growing seasons, and yield potential, par-
ticularly along the margins of semi-arid and arid areas, 
will decrease. The yields from rain-fed agriculture are 
expected to decrease by up to 50 percent in some coun-
tries until 2020 (IPCC 2007b, 13). Also, the number 
of people under increased water stress will significantly 
increase in the next 15 years, from 75 to 250 million 
people (with a further increase until 2050). This will 
primarily take place in Northern and Southern Africa. 
In addition, local food supplies are projected to be nega-
tively affected by decreasing fisheries resources in large 
lakes due to rising water temperatures, which may be 
exacerbated by continued over-fishing. Lake Victoria 
for example represents an important food source for 30 
million people in danger.
However, Boko et al. (2007, 457) also note that 
„the contribution of climate to food insecu-
rity in Africa is still not fully understood, par-
ticularly the role of other multiple stresses that 
enhance impacts of droughts and floods and 
possible future climate change. While drought 
may affect production in some years, climate 
variability alone does not explain the limits of 
food production in Africa. Better models and 
methods to improve understanding of multiple 
stresses, particularly at a range of scales, e.g., 
global, regional and local, and including the 
role of climate change and variability, are there-
fore required.“ 
In addition to the direct impacts of climate change on 
food security and the MDGs, recent research pays in-
creasing attention on the role of water scarcity or re-
duced food availability in the emergence of conflicts, 
and through an increased competition concerning 
scarce resources. These may further aggravate the live-
lihoods of people. Climate change already represents 
an important causation of existing conflicts, as several 
experts conclude for the Darfur conflict, where a long-
term decline in rainfall has significantly contributed 
to the scarcity of available fresh water (Ban-Ki Moon 
2007). A recent study by the German Advisory Council 
on Global Environmental Change (WBGU) concludes 
that Africa is likely to be particularly affected by cli-
mate change-induced security risks (WBGU 2008). In 
Northern Africa, the potential for political crises and 
the pressure from migration increases due to the inter-
twining of an increased number of droughts and water 
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Theme Emerging characteristics of adaption
Social resilience
Social networks 
and social capital
Perceptions of risks by rural communities are important in configuring the problem (e.g., climate 
risk). Perceptions can shape the variety of adaptive actions taken.
Networks of community groups are also important.
Local savings schemes, many of them based on regular membership fees, are useful financial 
‘stores’ drawn down during times of stress.
Institutions Role and architecture of institutional design and function is critical for understanding and better 
informing policies/measures for enhanced resilience to climate change.
Interventions linked to governance at various levels (state, region and local levels) either enhance 
or constrain adaptive capacity.
Economic resilience
Equity Issues of equity need to be viewed on several scales
Local scale (within and between communities)
Interventions to enhance community resilience can be hampered by inaccessibility of centers for 
obtaining assistance (aid/finance)
Global scale: see IPCC 2007b
Diversification of  
livelihoods
Diversification has been shown to be a very strong and necessary economic strategy to increase 
resilience to stresses.
Agricultural intensification, for example based on increased livestock densities, the use of natural 
fertilizers, soil and water conservation, can be useful adaptation mechanisms.
Technology Seasonal forecasts, their production, dissemination, uptake and integration in model-based 
decision-making support systems have been examined in several African contexts (see examples 
given).
Enhanced resilience to future periods of drought stress may also be supported by improvements 
in present rain-fed farming systems through:  
– water-harvesting systems;  
– dam building; 
– water conservation and agricultural practices; 
– drip irrigation; 
– development of drought-resistant and early maturing crop varieties and alternative crop and 
hybrid varieties.
Infrastructure Improvements in the physical infrastructure may improve adaptive capacity.
Improved communication and road networks for better exchange of knowledge and information.
General deterioration in infrastructure threatens the supply of water during droughts and floods.
Table 25: Some examples of complex adaptations already observed in Africa in response to climate 
and other stresses
Source: Boko et al. 2007, 453
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scarcity. Along with a high population growth, this situ-
ation is weakening agricultural potentials and limiting 
political capabilities to solve the problem. The densely 
populated Nile delta is threatened by sea-level rise and 
the salination of agricultural areas. In the Sahel, climate 
change causes additional environmental stress and so-
cial crises (e.g. droughts, harvest losses, fresh water 
scarcity) in a region which is already characterized by 
weak states (e.g. Somalia, Chad), civil wars (e.g. Sudan, 
Niger) and large streams of refugees (Sudan: more than 
690,000 people; Somalia: more than 390,000 people). 
In Southern Africa, climate change could further weak-
en the agricultural potentials of countries belonging to 
the poorest societies in the world. This would worsen 
the state of human security and overstretch the govern-
ments‘ capabilities to respond adequately.
7.2 Adaptation – experiences and  
priorities
Research shows that adaptation is already taking place 
within the African agriculture system. Hellmuth et al. 
introduces 2007 examples of drought management in 
Ethiopia, flood management in Mozambique, drought 
insurance in Malawi, and agriculture in Mali. Ethiopia 
established policies and planning for drought man-
agement, in order to better cope with the recurring 
droughts. An early warning system was developed in 
order to ensure that sufficient external food aid reaches 
the country. Inter alia, it contains early warning com-
mittees on all government levels. Table 25 provides 
an overview of already observed adaptation activities 
across Africa. 
A number of African countries have developed National 
Adaptation Programs of Action (NAPAs) where they 
identified priority activities (Table 26). These now await 
implementation.
An analysis of the NAPA processes in different coun-
tries in Eastern and Southern Africa gives an outline of 
strengths and weaknesses in the development of the 
NAPAs (Osman-Elasha and Downing 2007). According 
to this analysis, the important role of the NAPA proc-
ess has been underlined by many stakeholders, which is 
largely attributed to an emphasis on participatory proc-
esses, consideration of both vulnerability and adaptation 
to climate change, investigation of climate variability as 
well as climate change, a bottom-up approach, and ca-
pacity building and awareness raising. 
Although a number of constraints are mentioned in the 
analysis – communication problems between the cen-
tral offices and states, lack of sufficient technical capaci-
ties needed at local levels to play an active role in the 
assessment process, and insufficient financial resources 
and time, especially for large countries like Sudan and 
Ethiopia – it can be concluded that the NAPAs serve as 
a good starting point to assess which adaptation needs 
African countries and their civil societies have. They 
are indeed country-driven processes, and many of them 
have contributed significantly to raising awareness and 
building adaptive capacity among national stakeholders, 
as much as it has been possible in a time span of about 
18 months which it usually takes to prepare a NAPA 
(Osman-Elasha and Downing 2007).
Although adaptation to anthropogenic climate change 
is still young in Africa (and in the rest of the world), 
different studies and workshops have tried to identify 
some early lessons. For example, one regional workshop 
to discuss early lessons from climate change adaptation 
projects in South-Eastern Africa was held in April 2007 
in Maputo, Mozambique (see IISD). It was organized by 
IISD and SouthSouthNorth. More than 60 adaptation 
experts and practitioners from the region participated 
and shared their experience. Key findings include:
Coping with extreme events:
The unpredictability of natural disasters contrasts  
with the short-term planning of local level policy.
To understand the differences between and within  
adaptation to climate change projects, we need to at-
tempt to define what is meant by ‚adaptation‘.
There needs to be an understanding of how disaster  
relief fits into adaptation. The views expressed are to-
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Table 26: Overview of NAPA priority projects as submitted by African LDCs
Country Most common climate risks Examples of priority projects Totaled costs in million 
USD (number of projects)
Congo,  
Democratic 
Republic of
Intense rainfall event
Seasonal droughts
Flooding
Coastal erosion
Dissemination of improved maize 
seeds
Dissemination of improved rice seeds
Dissemination of improved manioc 
seedlings
5.6 (3)
Djibouti Temperature and sea-level rise
Salination
Flooding
Droughts
Risk reduction for coastal production 
systems, with community participation
Promotion of adaptation measures in 
water management
6.6 (8)
Eritrea Increased climate variability
Sea-level rise
Recurring drough
Flash flooding
Introducing community based pilot 
rangeland improvement and manage-
ment in selected agro-ecological areas
Encourage afforestation and agro 
forestry through community forestry 
initiativ
Groundwater recharging for irrigation 
wells
33 (5)
Lesotho Drought
High temperature and heat 
waves
Strong winds and dust storms
Cold winters, early frost and 
heavy snowfall
Improve resilience of livestock produc-
tion systems under extreme climatic 
conditions
Promoting sustainable crop based 
livelihood systems
Capacity building and policy reform to 
integrate climate change in sectoral 
development plans
12.8 (11)
Madagascar Change in agricultural conditions
Degradation of fresh water 
resourcesSoil degradation
Saltwater intrusion
Biodiversity loss
Shoreline retreat
Rehabilitation and/or construction of 
dykes to safeguard water resources
Implementation of water manage-
ment committee
Combat erosion through soil conser-
vation measures which stabilize dunes
3.9 (15)
Malawi Floods
Recurring droughts
Improving community resilience to 
climate change through the develop-
ment of sustainable rural livelihoods
Restoring forests in the Shire River 
Basin to reduce siltation and the as-
sociated water flow problems
Improving agricultural production un-
der erratic rains and changing climatic 
conditions
22.9 (5)
Source: Harmeling, Burck and Bals 2007, 37
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wards future, long-term adaptation of the communities 
affected, as well as a need for stakeholder engagement 
in collaboration.
More funds go towards disaster relief instead of  
disaster preparedness. This fact could indicate that 
funders are not clear as to what action to take (relief 
versus adaptation). There is also a clear distinction 
between what has happened (disaster relief) and 
what can be prevented from happening (is this adapta-
tion?).
There is still debate over whether adaptation is  
separate from development. Verification of inputs (data, 
needs, etc) could be a way to discern adaptation from 
development (if this is appropriate).
Adaptation to climate change has more to do with  
social research and social institutions.
Vulnerability is created by factors other than climate  
change, yet it is increased by climate change and vari-
ability. Social processes must be included in how we 
deal with adaptation.
General aspects:
There is a clear need across South-Eastern Africa re- 
gion (and globally) to form partnerships and understand 
vulnerabilities to climate change and variability, based 
on the affected community‘s perspectives;
The sustainability of responses must be incorporated  
into planning;
For disaster response, integration into development  
strategies is needed;
Better energy policy and regulation in light of cli- 
mate change and adaptation is required to mitigate 
negative effects on this sector;
More rigorous, participatory and socially-sensitive  
project processes (including learning assessments) are 
needed;
Understanding must reach the donor sectors to have  
more projects funded and the adaptive capacity of vul-
nerable communities ensured.
Although this was only a regional workshop, it can be 
assumed that many of these lessons are valid for most 
of Africa.
7.3 Responses and capacity
7.3.1 Vulnerable communities
The most vulnerable groups include smallholder farmers 
who are reliant on rain fed agriculture, pastoralists, and 
fishing communities. For example, there may be over 
130 million poor livestock keepers in SSA – a group 
that is struggling with many challenges, even without 
climate change. Such challenges range from the harsh 
environmental conditions and distance from markets to 
inappropriate policies on natural resource management. 
In many countries, the more productive land in pasto-
ral areas is being increasingly taken over by the farm-
ing communities, thereby confining pastoral livelihood 
systems to more marginal areas (drier and water limit-
ing conditions) that can hardly support their livestock 
production system, increasing risks of livestock loss and 
low productivity as well as faster degradation of such 
areas. Extreme climatic events like drought also play a 
role in conflicts over natural resources. This sentiment 
is true of pastoralists whose competition for water and 
grazing areas often become stiff during the dry seasons, 
and can sometimes lead to violent conflict among neigh-
boring communities. All of these factors combine to in-
crease livelihood vulnerability and food insecurity of the 
affected communities.
Communities across the continent have developed ways 
of dealing with impacts of climate related events over 
time. Drought and floods are not new to many com-
munities in Africa. However, the increasing frequency 
and intensity these events are rendering some of the 
strategies that have served communities well in the past 
inadequate. For the farmers, mixed cropping served as 
insurance against total crop failure, and rotational crop-
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ping allowed for the rejuvenation of soils sustaining 
production at reasonable levels. Pastoralists migrated to 
better areas in times of drought, traded animals for cere-
als and other products from neighboring communities, 
and kept animals with friends and relatives elsewhere as 
a form of insurance. 
With the rapid changes in climate in the recent past, 
some of these strategies are no longer viable. And there 
is also evidence of erosion of coping and adaptive strate-
gies as a result of varying land-use changes and socio-
political and cultural stresses (Boko et al. 2007). As a 
result, many people have had to cope with extreme 
events as they happen. Indeed some of the strategies 
adopted of late, like sales of animals, which are produc-
tive assets among the pastoralists, have further weak-
ened their ability to survive such events in future. 
It is therefore necessary that a combination of responses 
be put in place to safeguard people from anticipated 
impacts. Such responses should combine individual/
community level strategies with national and regional/
international, or so-called political strategies. Political 
strategies may include responses geared towards limit-
ing further increase of greenhouse gas concentrations by 
raising awareness about how individual and collective 
actions contribute to the problem of climate change. 
This mitigation strategy could – as part of a worldwide 
approach – minimize the cost of adaptation in future. 
Without a worldwide mitigation strategy, limits to adap-
tation could be easily reached in parts of Africa. 
However, where response strategies are being designed, 
it is important that they address those most vulnerable 
to climate change. For example, Hellmuth et al. (2007, 
44) conclude that the early warning system in Ethiopia 
„could play a much more useful role if it could 
also reach farmers and pastoralists more direct-
ly, with timely advice on specific problems as 
well as general information. This implies tailor-
ing climate information to specific local needs, 
and would require greater involvement of agri-
cultural sector specialists than is currently the 
case.“ 
On the one hand, this shows that the direct needs of 
people tend to be neglected. On the other hand, this is 
an example of the importance of effective communica-
tion and information dissemination in coping strategies 
at the household level. Such a strategy should be suc-
cessful and bring short-term benefits. 
Another example is the use of fast-maturing hybrid 
maize. This crop is seen as necessary because of the 
unpredictable nature of rainfall, however, it has its own 
challenges. First, farmers are forced to buy new seeds 
year after year, as performance of hybrids greatly reduc-
es with replanting. Second, hybrid seeds need inputs 
like fertilizers that many poor households cannot afford, 
a problem worsening with increasing energy prices. 
This is one reason why poor farmers rarely achieve the 
optimum yields with hybrids. Thirdly, due to their uni-
form nature, the risk of total crop failure from any single 
disaster (drought, floods, and pests) is usually high. 
In a recent paper, Vermuelen et al. (2008) show exam-
ples of grassroots initiatives to build climate resilience, 
and conclude that this 
„kind of experience, gained at the grassroots, 
boosts resilience as no top-down initiative 
can.“ 
Their key messages, based on an analysis in Benin, 
Kenya, and Malawi, are that
For communities dependent on natural resources,  
adaptation involves a mix of technical solutions (such 
as different crops or planting patterns) and institutional 
solutions (such as new means of sharing information);
Local adaptations include responses to specific  
trends (such as fishing with finer-meshed nets), but also 
building of capacity and resilience – say through savings 
clubs and diversified agriculture – to cope with future 
uncertainties;
Supporting local initiatives and institutions may be  
the most effective way to support climate change adap-
tation.
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This experience underlines the fact that starting where 
the most vulnerable are is not only right for principal 
and procedural reasons, but can actually deliver ad-
aptation and climate resilience by building on local 
strengths. Niang has identified, based on an assessment 
in West and Central Africa, important proposals to im-
prove adap tation of vulnerable people (Niang 2007):
Information, awareness and education for local peo- 
ple on CC issues (causes and effects);
Improving knowledge about CC and its impacts.  
Uncertainties give the impression that there is no emer-
gency, and envisaging integrated research and devel-
opment (natural resources, agriculture, environment, 
health);
Adopting genuine bottom-up approaches with full  
involvement of the people, and encouraging the in-
volvement of NGOs that are in more contact with the 
people;
Table 27: Suggestions to improve responding to climate change
Source: compiled from Niang 2007
Improve communication 
between reaserchers, 
people and poltical  
decision makers
Reinforcing the scientific capacities of African organisations working in fields linked to 
CC and establishing functional interfaces between those structures, political decision-
makers and local communities.
It is also important to think about the best channels of communication to use; more 
data and decision-making tools are also needed to influence development strategies and 
policy.
Creating a sub regional framework for consultation involving the different actors to 
discuss and exchange on issues and gains in terms of CC in the sub region and reducing 
the dispersion of financial resources, efforts and partners.
Developing means of communication (bulletins in a simplified form accessible to 
decision-makers and the people, rural radios, brochures to disseminate information on 
technologies).
Regular seminars or information, training or capacity-building workshops for the differ-
ent actors but also for journalists.
To improve integration 
of CC by political  
decision-makers
Involving local elected representatives and developing appropriate communication tools.
Raising awareness through flyers on CC issues and involving decision-makers in national, 
continental and international events on CC; the issue of using and translating scientific 
information into a suitable language for decision-makers is crucial.
It is also necessary to prove the interest of adaptation, for instance by indicating the cost 
of doing nothing and through advocacy addressed to decision-makers so that they take 
account of CC in the design and implementation of development programs and projects;
Developing documents for decision-makers to support them in their decision-making 
and organizing a series of information and communication events to provide them with 
all of the information they need to understand the advantages and disadvantages of 
implementing CC adaptation activities.
Avoiding compartmentalization of services and promoting better visibility for institutions 
working on CC in relation to aid organisations. Passing on two messages to the decision-
makers: CC is not tomorrow, it is now; adaptation to CC is not just an environmental 
issue, it is necessary to avoid compromising development and poverty reduction efforts. 
Also communicating with the technical advisors of political decision-makers.
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Promoting the self-adaptive capacities of local peo- 
ple, supporting good adaptation practices at the local 
level;
Involving and coaching the people in seeking antici- 
pative and curative measures to adapt to CC;
Providing adequate funding for the implementation  
of projects to reduce the impact of CC;
Generally speaking, fighting against poverty contrib- 
utes to reduce the vulnerability of vulnerable popula-
tions.
7.3.2 Political and institutional capacity
Until recently, climate change adaptation has hardly 
played a role in African politics. An analysis undertaken 
in 2007 on existing Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
showed that both adaptation and climate change were 
hardly mentioned (Harmeling, Burck and Bals 2007). 
However, at that time the available PRSPs were quite 
old, and the picture is changing. Adaptation has gained 
a lot of policy profile in the last two years, as can be 
seen for example in the Addis Abeba Declaration on 
Climate Change and Development in Africa, adopted 
by the African Union in 2007 (AU 2007), or the Joint 
Africa-EU Strategy (Africa-EU 2007). 
As shown, the NAPA process has helped governments 
to understand the challenge of adaptation, although it is 
only a first step.
The institutional capacity, including that of political 
institutions, is a key issue to develop comprehensive 
adaptation strategies. Based on an assessment of the in-
stitutional framework in relation to climate change in 
West and Central Africa, a number of suggestions for 
further action to improve response capacities have been 
developed.
All the aspects mentioned here could be developed in 
a way that specifically addresses the links between cli-
mate change and food security.
7.4 Advocacy and policy 
recommendations
Food insecurity results from many causes, ranging 
from poor production to inappropriate policies that 
may hinder access to markets. For the majority of poor 
subsistence crop farmers and livestock keepers, climate 
plays an important role in determining whether they se-
cure food or not. Climate change will greatly affect their 
security status unless appropriate measures are put in 
place to facilitate their adaptation. Recognizing that the 
needs for adaptation will likely exceed their ability in 
terms of knowledge and resources, it is important that a 
combination of approaches both technical and political 
are used to ensure that the potential negative impacts 
are minimized, especially with regard to their assets and 
production systems. 
Also, it has to be recognized that 
„the causes, impacts and legacies of various 
strategies – including liberalization policies, 
decades of structural adjustment programs 
(SAP) and market conditions – cannot be ig-
nored in discussions on poverty alleviation 
and adaptation to stresses, including climate 
change“ (Boko et al 2007, 464). 
The focus should be on preventing the impacts as much 
as possible, rather than reacting to what has happened. 
Hence we suggest the following: 
1. Awareness creation at all levels as a first step in sen-
sitizing the global community on need to tackle climate 
change.
2. The need to promote mitigation activities in devel-
oping countries, and recognizing that the best way to 
adapt in the future is to minimize the impacts. 
3. For poor countries, adaptation must start, and be 
strengthened as much as possible, to avoid loss of assets 
and means of livelihood. Developed countries should 
recognize source limitations and help poor countries in 
this process.
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4. Reforming the WTO terms of engagement to ensure 
it is fair to poor developing countries as a way of pro-
moting equity and self sufficiency in food systems.
5. There is a need for coordination of efforts at the dif-
ferent levels (local, national, international) to ensure 
that limited resources are used optimally. 
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8 Research results for Asia28
Asia, the most populous continent with almost 4 billion 
people, 38.5 percent of which live within 100 km of the 
coast and house 70 percent of the world‘s poor, is fac-
ing changing climate trends, increasing variability, and 
extreme events. 
8.1 Effects of climate change on food 
production, agriculture and water  
availability 
8.1.1 Changes in climatic conditions 
An increasing trend in surface air temperature has been 
observed during recent decades ranging between less 
than 1°C to 3°C per century. Moreover, 2.0 to 4.5ºC 
net global average surface warming is expected by the 
end of the present century (2090-2099), and all of Asia 
is very likely to warm during this period (Christensen et 
al. 2007). Increases in the amount of precipitation are 
very likely in high-latitudes, while decreases are likely 
in most subtropical land regions, continuing observed 
patterns in recent trends (Christensen et al. 2007). 
Glaciers in Central Asia, Western Mongolia, North-West 
China, and the Tibetan Plateau are reportedly melting 
faster in recent years than ever before (Pu et al. 2004). 
Consequently, glacial runoff and the frequency of gla-
cial lake outbursts causing mudflows and avalanches 
have increased (Bhadra 2002; Rai 2005). Changes have 
also been observed in extreme climate events like fre-
quent occurrences of more intense rainfall, increasing 
frequency and intensity of flooding, drought, and tropi-
cal cyclones. Regions of Asia, such as South Asia, East 
Asia, and South-East Asia, will experience an increase 
in the occurrence of extreme weather events (Cruz 
et al. 2007). Based on regional HadRM2 simulations, 
Unnikrishnan et al. (2006) expect an increasing trend 
in the frequency and intensity of tropical cyclones by 
the 2050s. This development is supposed to occur as a 
result of increased greenhouse gas (GHG) forcing in the 
Bay of Bengal, which will cause heavier precipitation 
in the surrounding coastal regions of South Asia dur-
ing both the southwest and northeast monsoon seasons. 
Furthermore, a general warming of 2 to 4°C in Sea 
Surface Temperature (SST) is projected to increase tropi-
cal cyclone intensities by 10 to 20 percent in East Asia, 
South-East Asia, and South Asia (Knutson and Tuleya 
2004). Table 28 gives an overview of projected impacts 
of climate change in Asia.
8.1.2 Effects on food production, agriculture, 
water, forests, fish, and livestock
Production of rice, the staple food of most of the im-
poverished in Asia, is the key concern, as the continent 
consumes 90 percent of the world‘s rice. Warming, 
along with decreasing precipitation, have been reported 
to increase water shortages, particularly in parts of Asia 
where water resources are already under stress from 
growing water demands and inefficiencies in water use 
(Ma and Fu 2003; Manton et al. 2001). The production 
of rice, maize, and wheat has been reported to decline 
in many parts of Asia during the past few decades due to 
warming-induced water stress, increasing frequency of 
El Niño, and reduction in number of rainy days (Tao et 
al. 2004). Even an apparently water-rich country such 
as Bangladesh will face increasing risks of phenological 
drought due to increased aridity and subsequent mois-
ture stress (Ahmed and Alam 1999). 
Recent studies suggest a 2 to 5 percent decrease in yield 
potential of wheat and maize for a temperature rise of 
0.5 to 1.5°C in India (Aggarwal 2003). In Bangladesh, 
potential yield of the major pre-monsoon rice crop 
would be reduced by as much as 32 percent, assum-
ing a 4°C rise in temperature associated with a 60 per-
cent increase in moisture stress. The goods and services 
from coastal ecosystems have been substantially inter-
28 Based on a contribution by Ferdausur Rahman, Mizanur Rahman Bijoy, Nusrat Habib (all Network on Climate Change, Bangladesh) and 
Umme Kulsum (Climate Change Focal Point, Prodipan).
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rupted/declined across Asia due to major changes in 
the coastal zone from a combination of extreme climate 
and non-climate events (Li et al. 2004a). The abun-
dance of fish populations in Asian waters is threatened 
with future changes in ocean currents, sea-level, sea-
water temperature, salinity, wind speed and direction, 
strength of upwelling, the mixing layer thickness and 
predator response to climate change (Zhang and Guo 
2004). Livestock and poultry development is impor-
tant to meet the increasing demand of meat and animal 
products for Asian people. However, the expansion of 
livestock numbers has been limited in most regions of 
Asia (India, China, and Mongolia) due to constraints in 
pasture availability. 
Easterling et al. (2007) report that 
„(...) increases in frequency of climate extremes 
may lower crop yields beyond the impacts of 
mean climate change.“ 
In Bangladesh, USD 2.8 billion, or about 4 percent of 
GDP, are the estimated combined losses from two dev-
astating floods, a super cyclone ‚SIDR‘, and a tidal wave 
Sector Projected impacts
Agriculture/
Forestry
Increased risk of hunger in South Asia due to 30% decline in cereal yields (266 million Asians may 
face hunger by 2080).
Increase in agricultural water demand by 6 to 10% or more for every 1°C rise in temperatur.
Decline in net productivity of grasslands and milk yield.
Water Decline in water availability from ~1,820 m³/yr to ~1,140 m³/yr in India by 2050; may adversely af-
fect >1 billion people.
Decline in annual flow of Mekong river by 16 to 24% by 2050.
Disappearance of Tibetan Plateau glaciers of <4 km length with 3°C rise.
Shrinkage of area of glaciers by 80% over Tibetan plateau from 500,000 km² in 1995 to 100,000 km² 
by the 2030s.
Deterioration of water quality due to salt water intrusion.
Decline in fish larvae abundance in coastal waters.
Health Exacerbation of cholera in South Asia due to increase in water temperature.
Increased endemic morbidity and mortality due to diarrhea across Asia due to floods and droughts.
Increase in infectious diseases for livestock.
Coastal/Marine 
ecosystems
Loss of 2500 km² mangroves in Asia with 1 meter sea-level rise.
Flooding of Red (5,000 km²) & Mekong (15 to 20,000 km²) River deltas.
About 2.6 to 18.8 million people along the coasts of Southeast Asia may be at risk of flood by 2100.
Large scale inundation and recession of flat sandy beaches affecting tourism.
Loss of ~30% of Asia’s coral reefs in next 30 years.
Table 28: Projected impacts of climate change in Asia
Source: IGES 2008, 59 (based on IPCC)
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that hit the country all within span of few months at the 
first half of 2008. The disasters heavily disrupted agri-
culture by affecting crops, livestock, poultry, and fish 
farms (ADB 2008). 
8.1.3 Hot spots and countries at risk
WBGU (2008) identified the regions and areas as 
hotspots due to their special ecological, demographic, 
or socio-economic features; climate change will present 
particularly major challenges for these places in the 
next decades Bangladesh (3), Vietnam (4), and India (7) 
are three of the 10 most affected countries by extreme 
weather, following only countries in Africa, in the dec-
adal Climate Risk Index (CRI) for 1997-2006 (Harmeling 
2007). In the future, food scarcity projections for South 
and South-East Asia are highly vulnerable with high 
confidence, while East Asia is highly vulnerable with 
a very high degree of confidence (Cruz et al. 2007). 
The densely populated mega deltas of Asia, which are 
more apparent in megacities (e.g. Bangkok, Shanghai, 
Tianjin), are vulnerable to both climate change and sea-
level rise (Cruz et al. 2007). 2,500 km2 of mangroves 
in Asia are likely to be lost with 1 meter of sea-level 
rise. Approximately 1,000 km2 of cultivated land and 
sea product culturing area in Bangladesh is likely to 
become salt marsh (Cruz et al. 2007). In the arid and 
semi-arid regions of Asia, irrigation demand is estimated 
to increase by at least 10 percent for an increase in tem-
perature of 1°C (Fischer et al. 2002; Liu 2002). The cur-
rent melting trends of Himalayan glaciers (e.g. Gangotri 
glacier) are one of the tipping elements. It is projected 
that the Ganga, Indus, Brahmaputra, and other rivers 
that criss-cross the northern Indian plain could likely 
turn into seasonal rivers in the near future as a conse-
quence of climate change. This fact might likely affect 
economies in the region (Cruz et al. 2007).
In total, 37 countries are facing food crises and require 
external assistance; 10 of these countries are in Asia 
(FAO 2008a). Those countries lack the ability to deal 
with critical problems of food security due to exception-
al shortfalls in food production (Iraq), widespread lack 
of access (Afghanistan & Korea DPR), or severe localized 
food insecurity (Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, Nepal, 
Sri Lanka, Timore-Leste & Viet Nam). Except in conflict-
Hotspots in Asia Causes of insecurity
Central Asia Global warming and glacier melts could affect crop and water distribution issues in a region that 
is already facing civil conflicts in countries like Tajikistan and conflicts over water and energy 
resources.
China Climate change will intensify the existing environmental stress (e.g. air and water pollution, soil 
degradation) due to the increase in heat waves and droughts, which will worsen desertification 
and water scarcity in some parts of the country. Sea-level rise and tropical cyclones will threaten 
the economically significant and populous east coast. The government’s steering capacities could 
be overwhelmed by the rapid pace of modernization, environmental and social crises, and the 
impacts of climate change.
India, Pakistan 
and Bangladesh
The impacts of climate change will be especially severe in this region; glacial retreat in the 
Himalayas will cause increased floods and soil erosion, jeopardize the water supply for millions of 
people, and changes to the annual monsoon will affect agriculture for some decades. Sea-level 
rise and more intense or frequent cyclones and storms will threaten human settlements around 
the populous Bay of Bengal. These dynamics will increase the social crisis potential in a region 
which is already characterized by cross-border conflicts (India/Pakistan) and unstable govern-
ments (Bangladesh/Pakistan).
Table 29: Hotspots in Asia 
Source: WBGU 2008
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prone Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sri Lanka, natural catastro-
phes have played the most decisive role in undermining 
food security and have contributed to generating the 
recent high global cereals price, which has in turn led 
to widespread increases in domestic food prices of the 
Asian LFDC‘s (FAO 2008a).
8.2 Adaptation needs
8.2.1 Adaptation priorities
Reflecting the knowledge of projected impacts of cli-
mate change on different sectors would allow the iden-
tification of likely priority actions on adaptation from 
a top-down perspective. Initiated and supported by the 
UNFCCC process, LDCs in Asia and elsewhere have 
started to or have already finished elaborating on their 
National Adaptation Programs of Action (NAPAs). The 
guidelines agreed on under the UNFCCC specifically 
underline the objective to identify and address the most 
urgent adaptation needs and identify priority projects. In 
principle, these should be developed in a participatory 
process (UNFCCC 2001). However, the guidelines are 
much less concrete than, for example, the procedural 
elements from the FAO voluntary guidelines introduced 
above. Thus, it is not so easy to judge how far NAPA 
processes have been sufficiently participatory.
Nevertheless, these NAPAs serve as the best and most 
recent starting point when looking at adaptation priori-
ties. They also provide reference when assessing likely 
costs of adaptation, although it has to be repeated that 
they are only about the most urgent adaptation needs. 
These show that activities linked to food production and 
water supply feature prominently in this selective.
While NAPAs have been a valuable exercise for deter-
mining national priorities in adaptation, they are not 
supposed to be the tool to systematically integrate adap-
tation into all development policies and planning proc-
esses. However, it is remarkable that Bangladesh is one 
of few countries that have explicitly included capacity 
building for mainstreaming in its NAPA.
8.2.2 Barriers to adaptation
There are a number of barriers which need to be re-
moved to allow for a better and faster increase of adap-
tive capacity. 
The prevailing level of poverty can be judged as the larg-
est barrier to developing the capacity to cope and adapt. 
The poor usually have a very low adaptive capacity due 
to their limited access to information, technology, and 
other capital assets which make them highly vulnerable 
to climate change (Cruz et al. 2007). Adaptive capacity 
in countries where there is a high incidence of poverty 
will likely remain limited.
Furthermore, Cruz et al. (2007, 492) conclude that 
„insufficient information and knowledge on 
the impacts of climate change and responses 
Vulnerable Zones/ Hotspots in Bangladesh
The Government of Bangladesh has identified cli-
mate change hotspots using the vulnerability zone 
of the BCAS/RA/Approtech (1994) study in it‘s 
National Adaptation Plan of Action (NAPA) submit-
ted to UNFCCC in 2005 (GOB 2005). As the impacts 
of climate change are likely to be felt almost across 
the entire country, the whole country, except the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts, is segregated into nine vulner-
able zones depending on the agro-ecological zones 
and water planning zones defined by the BCAS/RA/
Approtech (1994) study, as shown here in Table 30. 
Several studies indicate that the coastal zone vulner-
ability would be acute due to the combined effects of 
climate change, sea-level rise, subsidence, changes 
of upstream river discharge, and cyclone and coastal 
embankments (BCAS/RA/Approtech 1994 and WB 
2000). The coastal people of Bangladesh are under se-
vere threat to become climate refugees due to extreme 
events and other climate-induced losses of production. 
Suitable areas for Aman rice would decrease signifi-
cantly due to sea-level rise along the southwestern re-
gion of Bangladesh (CEGIS 2006). 
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of natural systems to climate change will likely 
continue to hinder effective adaptation particu-
larly in Asia“.
This is also true regarding the challenge of mainstream-
ing adaptation in planning and policy processes on dif-
ferent levels. A recent consultation process undertaken 
by the Institute for Global Environment Studies (IGES, 
Japan) addressed the issue of mainstreaming adaptation. 
There seems to be common recognition that systemati-
cally integrating climate change into affected fields of de-
velopment policy and planning is becoming increasingly 
important. And although many sectoral and other entry 
points could be identified in order to integrate long-term 
climate change into, for example, food security and wa-
ter policies, progress on mainstreaming in Asia has been 
limited. Among the key barriers identified are 
„information (communication and coordina-
tion) barriers, institutional barriers, stakeholder 
participation-related barriers and the lack of 
suitable incentives and resources“ (IGES 2008, 
64). 
While some of these barriers, like the lack of clarity in 
adaptation policy guidance and the lack of incentives 
Sln Climate and related elements Critical vulnerable areas Most impacted sectors
1 Temperature rise and drought • North-West (NW) • Agriculture (crop, livestock, fisheries
• Water 
• Energy 
• Health
2 Sea-level rise and salinity  
intrusion
• Coastal area (SW, SC and SE)
• The Sundarbans (SB) and 
• Island
• Agriculture (crop, fisheries, livestock)
• Water (water logging, drinking water, 
urban)
• Human settlement
• Energy
• Health
3 Floods • Central region (CC)
• North-East region (NE)
• Charland
• Agriculture (crop, fisheries, livestock)
• Water (urban, industry)
• Infrastructure
• Human settlement
• Health
• Energy
4 Cyclone and storm surge • Coastal and 
• Marine zone
• Marine fishing
• Infrastructure
• Human settlement
• Life and property
5 Drainage congestion • Coastal area (SW, SC & SE)
• South-West (SW)
• Urban
• Water (Navigation)
• Agriculture (crop)
Table 30: Critical vulnerable areas/hotspots with most impacted sectors in Bangladesh
Source: after GoB 2005
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and adequate resources, are applicable to the entire re-
gion, yet others, like inadequate institutional structures, 
exist in specific countries or sub-regions (IGES 2008). 
The lack of awareness among sectoral policymakers 
about adverse economic impacts of climate change at 
the local level seems to be one of the key bottlenecks. 
Another point, which verifies that climate change chal-
lenges the way of conventional policy-making, is that 
both national planners and development assistance 
agencies were judged to be over-reliant on structural 
and technological options. Often, these options are in-
flexible and insensitive to the local contexts; while at 
the same time being „technologically and financially de-
manding“ (IGES 2008, 64).
Governments and their institutions have to ensure 
food security as well as advance the understanding and 
knowledge of adaptation within their national circum-
stances. Overcoming institutional barriers is very impor-
tant in achieving this goal. Also, the conclusions from 
the IGES consultation are useful in this regard (IGES 
2008, 67):
(a) Managing adaptation plans by a ministry or agency 
with a high level of leverage so that institutional link-
ages and coordination can be fostered;
(b) Encouraging the private sector to mainstream adap-
tation concerns in various operations;
(c) Ensuring a coherent approach to mainstreaming 
through regular and broader engagement of stakehold-
ers at various levels;
(d) Building „boundary institutions“ which can help to 
bring information on implications of climate change for 
sectoral planning and decision making.
Country Adaptation measure Cost (million USD)
Bangladesh Construction of flood shelter, and information and assistance centre to cope 
with enhanced recurrent floods in major floodplains
 5.00
Enhancing resilience of urban infrastructure and industries to impacts of 
climate change
 2.00
Promoting adaptation to coastal crop agriculture to combat increased salinity  6.50
Adaptation to fisheries in areas prone to enhanced flooding in North East and 
Central Region through adaptive and diversified fish culture practices
 4.50
Bhutan Landslide management and flood prevention  0.89
Weather forecasting system to serve farmers and agriculture  0.42
Flood protection of downstream industrial & agricultural area  0.45
Rainwater harvesting  0.90
Cambodia Rehabilitation of upper Mekong and provincial waterways to reduce risks 
caused by floods, improve fishery resources, supply sufficient water for irriga-
tion and domestic uses
 30.00
Vegetation planning for flood and windstorm protection  4.00
Development and improvement of community irrigation systems  45.00
Community mangrove restoration and sustainable use of resources  1.00
Table 31: Priority activities of adaptation and their costs as identified in NAPAs from selected Asian 
LDCs
Source: IGES 2008, 71
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In this particular context, suggestions for the catalytic 
role of the UNFCCC process were also made. Its prima-
ry roles in fostering mainstreaming could be to provide 
(a) guidance to development agencies to preferentially 
support mainstreaming, (b) guidance to policymakers 
on inter-agency coordination and mainstreaming at na-
tional level, and (c) capacity building on mainstreaming 
options in critical sectors.
8.3 Responses and capacity 
8.3.1 Development, poverty, and human rights 
implications
Bangladesh shows significant success in achieving some 
of the midline targets of the MDGs by the year 2005. 
The number of poor people living below the poverty 
line (USD 1 per day) was reduced from 59 percent to 
40 percent, and the proportion of people in extreme 
poverty was reduced from 28 percent to 19.5 percent. 
This is a good indication of the right path for the first 
goal of eradicating extreme poverty. But MDGs are not 
a complete human development agenda; this achieve-
ment can be hampered by climate change that is already 
impacting the lives of the poor. 
Enhanced adaptation is one necessary requirement for 
supporting progress toward the 2015 targets. In the 
world beyond 2015, climate change will act as a brake 
on human development – holding back or even revers-
ing human progress until mitigation starts to take effect 
(UNDP 2007). 
The economic and social impacts of climate change will 
result in both shortages of and increased inaccessibility 
of resources (i.e. fresh water, staple food). Above all, 
frequent and intensified storm and flood disasters have 
a positive correlation with intensification of conflict, 
violent unrest, and/or political crises. Several studies 
concluded that the severe floods and storms followed by 
severe shortages of food and insufficient aid measures in 
1970, 1974, and 1988 were some factors in the domes-
tic political crisis in Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) and 
deteriorating human security (WBGU et al. 2008).
8.3.2 Marginalization, consumption and hunger 
Poor, marginalized people, who are most vulnerable to 
the impact of climate change, will be further margin-
alized through all forms of discrimination induced by 
climate change: i.e. geographic, social, production spe-
cific, political, and gender processes. 
Children in the developing world bear the brunt of the 
health impact of climate change through the increased 
incidence of diseases such as diarrhea, malaria, and 
respiratory infections. As of International Center for 
Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh (ICDDR, B), 
climate change and sea-level rise in Bangladesh is likely 
to have important effects on the prevalence of infectious 
diseases in addition to heat stress due to rising tempera-
ture. The risk of malaria is still limited to over 10 million 
‚minority‘ populations in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and 
similar areas. It is possible that global warming would 
produce more rapid replication of the dengue virus. 
This, in turn, is expected to favor visceral leishmaniasis 
(VL) vectors, and may result in increasing cases of VL 
in Bangladesh. Cholera and other diarrheal diseases are 
an obvious risk in Bangladesh following the increased 
amount of extreme events (ICDDR,B 2007). 
These health impacts of climate change have a dis-
cernible implication on malnutrition and hunger. In 
Bangladesh, a large group of the total population con-
sumes less than 1805 kcal; the minimum requirement 
needed is 2110 kcal. The trend shifts downward nation-
ally and rurally. However, it is rising upward in urban 
areas excluding the year 2005. At the same time, we 
see rises in the number of urban poor due to rural-urban 
migration, whereas the number of the very poor remain 
huge at 27 million nationally. 
8.3.3 Most vulnerable groups 
Easterling et al. (2007) infers with high confidence 
that smallholder and subsistence farmers, pastoralists, 
and artisanal fisher folk will suffer complex, localized 
impacts from climate change. Climate change may af-
fect the poor through changes or depletion of common 
property resources, such as fisheries, rangelands, or for-
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ests on which they depend for their livelihoods (DFID 
2004). A number of studies found negative effects from 
rising temperature on rice-wheat systems across Asia; 
this area is home to the world‘s majority (87 %) of small 
farmers29 (Aggarwal et al. 2000; Lal et al. 1998). 
Increased plant disease and pest outbreaks due to cli-
mate change will likely be directly felt by the rural poor. 
They are often closely linked directly to food produc-
tion and have low capacity for food purchases (Alig et 
al. 2004 and Cruz et al. 2007). Competition for land 
and other resources, for example between food and bio-
fuel production, may coincide with the loss of farmer 
income. For instance, in the Philippines, expanded 
sugarcane production meant that tenant farmers lost ac-
cess to land for maize production (Rinot and Hill 2007). 
O‘Brien et al. (2004) also reveals that small farmers in 
India will have to face the brunt of being ‚doubly ex-
posed‘ by both climate change and globalization.
An analysis of poverty in small-scale fisheries has identi-
fied greater vulnerability to external shocks and trends 
including climate change, variation, and extreme events, 
than to asset or income poverty (Allison et al. 2005). A 
reduction of primary production in the tropical oceans is 
predicted, because of the changes in oceanic circulation 
in a warmer atmosphere (Cruz et al. 2007). 
The timing and amount of precipitation in the plains 
could also affect the migration of fish species from rivers 
to floodplains for progeny, dispersion, and growth. As a 
result, the fishing communities that depend on inland 
fisheries are likely to be particularly vulnerable to cli-
mate change (Muir and Allison 2007). The huge major-
ity of the world’s fisherfolk are found in Asia. China, 
Indonesia, India and Vietnam are the four countries with 
the largest number of fisher folk (Allison et al. 2005).
In South Asia, large declines in the natural assets of 
grasslands and savannas are likely to be a consequence 
of climate change. Reduced precipitation and a rise in 
temperature are estimated to reduce pasture productiv-
ity in the Mongolian steppe by about 10 to 30 percent 
(Tserendash et al. 2005). It is also projected that the 
vegetation zone in the Tibetan Plateau could move to 
higher altitudes, and climate change may cause a shift 
of the boundary of the farming pastoral lands (Cruz et 
al. 2007).
In recent years, the poor have been moved more quick-
ly than before to urban centers and poverty is becoming 
more urban. This urban poor are also negatively affect-
ed by an increase in food prices. One important reason 
in Bangladesh was that natural disasters have caused 
shortfalls in food production (Cruz et al. 2007). Also, 
the poor will have to endure increasing risks from floods 
and other climate-related hazards (Adger 2003). As the 
impacts of climate change are unequally distributed over 
space and time and disproportionately affect the poor it 
is likely to cause additional inequity (Stern 2006). 
Climate change also has a gender dimension. The ma-
jority of women working in the informal sectors are 
frequently worst hit by climate change-related disasters 
and other shocks. Women and children are 14 times 
more likely to die than men during disasters, and that 
makes them more vulnerable to cope with unexpected 
events and disasters or to adapt to change (Brody et al. 
2008; Araujo/Quesada-Aguilar 2007) 
Traditional food sources may become more volatile and 
meager due to climate change, and will thus consistent-
ly affect women. Women and young girls largely respon-
sible for water collection, especially among poor people, 
are more sensitive to the changes in seasons and cli-
matic conditions that affect accessibility and quantity of 
drinking water. These changes make its collection even 
more time-consuming (Brody et al. 2008). Saline water 
infiltration also could affect livelihoods from fishing, an-
other sector in which women are frequently involved. 
29 Land areas below 10 m elevation from sea-level (above mean high water). China alone occupies about 48 percent of world’s 404 million 
small farms (less than 2 hectares), while India is home to about 23 percent, Indonesia 4.2, Bangladesh 4, and Viet Nam about 2.4 percent 
( Nagayets 2005).
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Indigenous people‘s dependency on natural resources 
for their livelihoods and homes puts them on the front-
line to deal with climate change. Often, these people are 
living on the most marginal natural areas. A recent study 
(Gunter et al. 2007) suggests that the tribal people of 
Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) of Bangladesh seem to be 
highly vulnerable to a climate change-induced increase 
in drought, floods, land slides, and cyclones. The area 
is expected to suffer a number unusual drought during 
the Rabi and Pre-Kharif season (typically November to 
February) by 2030.
According to Cruz et al. (2007, 490), 
„the ability of local populations to adapt their 
production systems to cope with climate 
change will vary across Asia and will be largely 
influenced by the way government institutions 
and policies mediate the supply of, and access 
to, food and related resources. The adaptive 
capacity of poor subsistence farming/herding 
communities is commonly low in many devel-
oping countries of Asia. One of the important 
and effective measures to enhance their adap-
tive capacity is through education and the pro-
vision of easy access to climate change-related 
information.“ 
8.3.4 National/Government response  
(Bangladesh)
Responding to climate change
Since the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, climate change 
has become more recognized in policy discourse in 
Bangladesh; but a comprehensive national policy on cli-
mate change is yet to be formulated. The Government 
of Bangladesh (GoB) has participated in all the UNFCCC 
conferences and submitted the Initial National 
Communication (INC) in 2002 (Agrawala et al. 2003). 
The most significant achievement of Bangladesh in 
terms of adaptation is to prepare the National Adaptation 
Program of Action (NAPA) in 2005, which identified 
15 priority projects in different vulnerable areas (GoB 
2005). Recently, the government has prepared a Country 
Framework for climate resilient development, and it is 
currently working on the Climate Change Action Plan 
for Bangladesh (Cell 2008). This process will help the 
nation to shift their policy activities towards coherence 
and away from ad hoc decision making. 
A number of climate change-related projects (focus-
ing on mainstreaming and capacity building) are be-
ing implemented by both governmental and non-gov-
ernmental organizations with financial support from 
donor agencies. The remarkable ongoing projects are 
(a) Comprehensive Disaster Management Program 
(CDMP), (b) Poverty and Climate Change, and (c) Land 
use Change, Food Security, Water, and Biomass Energy 
in the context of Climate Change, etc. (Rahman et al. 
2007). In 2003, a Climate Change Cell was also estab-
lished as a component of CDMP in order to develop a 
connection with the Ministry of Environment & Forest 
(MoEF). The MoEF is the focal point of UNFCCC within 
government of Bangladesh (Rahman et al. 2007).
Research and studies
A number of studies have been performed throughout 
the last decade on the impacts, vulnerability, and adap-
tation assessment for Bangladesh to climate change and 
SLR. Most of the studies have assessed impacts, vulnera-
bility, and adaptation to climate change and SLR by sec-
tors and geographic areas such as water, coastal zone, 
agriculture, infrastructure, forestry, and health (Rahman 
et al. 2007). These studies can be separated into three 
parts: (1) About 20 studies have analyzed vulnerabili-
ties resulting from climate change-induced disasters, (2) 
about 10 studies have looked at the vulnerabilities re-
lated to socio-economic criteria, and (3) about 20 stud-
ies have examined a diversity of climate change-induced 
vulnerabilities (Gunter et al. 2007).
Response on food security
Constitutionally, the fundamental duty of the state is 
to secure its citizens the provision of basic necessities 
of food (article 15.a of the constitution of Bangladesh). 
But as per Government‘s Allocation of Business, it is the 
duty of the Ministry of Food and Disaster Management 
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(MoFDM) to establish a dependable food security sys-
tem for the nation. The National Food Policy (2006) 
was developed in light of the present Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Plan (PRSP)30, and with the objective‚ to en-
sure a dependable food security system for all people 
of the country at all times’, matching the broader per-
spective of food security as adopted in the World Food 
Summit of 1996. The policy also considers the GATT 
Uruguay Round Agreement (1994) and the Millennium 
Development Goals (2000) in setting a dozen of strate-
gies under three broader objectives (GoB 2006). Several 
strategies under objective one (ensure adequate and sta-
ble supply of safe and nutritious food) and objective two 
(enhance purchasing power of the people for increased 
food accessibility) could be incorporated into the climate 
change adaptation process, although the food policy has 
failed so far to find climate change as a risk for ensuring 
food security. The policy may favor private food distribu-
tion systems over public distribution systems.
At present, 27 Social Safety Net programs are being run 
by the government (GoB and SW 2007). The most im-
portant safety nets programs are broadly divided into 
two categories (provide food or cash transfer), and cover 
only about 4 to 5 million people (WB 2006). The gov-
ernment spends less than 1 percent of the GDP and 
about 4.4 percent of public expenditure in these social 
safety-net programs (GoB and SW 2007). The World 
Bank assessment (2006) shows that the budgetary sanc-
tion for Social Safety Net programs has been declining 
relative to GDP and public expenditure since the late 
1990s.
8.3.5 Civil society response
The civil society has played an active role on both the 
national and global levels in creating pressure for en-
vironment and climate concern. Despite the number 
of various studies, there was a gap on testing adapta-
tion measures for vulnerable communities. Reducing 
Vulnerability to Climate Change (RVCC) was the first 
project (2003 to 2006) of its kind on Community-Based 
Adaptation (CBA) to climate change. 
The project was implemented by CARE Bangladesh 
in association with 17 partner organizations in the 
Southwestern coastal region of Bangladesh. The project 
focused on diversification of livelihood options in vul-
nerable communities, and generated valuable local 
knowledge in how to address climate change (and ad-
aptation) at the community level (Rahman et al. 2007). 
Awareness, campaigning, and adaptation facilitation has 
continued since 2005 in coastal districts by two RVCC 
Partners, PRODIPAN and NABOLOK, through Network 
of Climate Change in Bangladesh (NCC, B).
At present, a number of projects, such as ‚Increase 
Resilience of Disaster Prone Communities in Gaibandha‘ 
by Practical Action, ‚Building Adaptation Strategy to 
Climate Change for Selected Drought and Flood Prone 
Areas of Bangladesh‘ by BCAS, ‚Livelihood Adaptation 
to Climate Change (LACC)‘ – jointly implemented by 
the FAO and the Department of Agriculture Extension 
(DAE), under Climate Change Cell, Department of 
Environment (Rahman et al. 2007) – are under way. 
Several networks and NGOs are also implement-
ing various projects on advocacy, research, and CBA. 
Four CDM projects also have been approved by the 
Designated National Authority (DNA) in 2006 (Climate 
Change Cell 2008).
8.4 Advocacy and policy 
recommendations
The mainstreaming of climate change into relevant poli-
cies for the Government of Bangladesh is an urgent thrust 
needed in all development sectors. The Bangladesh gov-
ernment can play a key role in the Least Developing 
Countries (LDCs) Group within the G77+ China and 
30 The present Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan (PRSP), ‘Unlocking the Potential: National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty Reduction’, has 
been adopted in October 2005, but recently the government decided to continue this PRSP only up to 30 June 2008 and a revised PRSP 
will take.
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in the UNFCCC negotiations. It should pursue its role 
in developing adaptation policies, mobilizing of global 
funds for LDC countries and local communities, and 
establishing better linkages between climate change 
and development. The policy makers and South Asian 
Government negotiators can be offered annual training 
on Climate Negotiations with leading Bangladeshi and 
other South Asian partners. Climate change adaptation 
is becoming the centre of the post-2012 Kyoto frame-
work, and international partnerships are recommended 
for poverty reduction. The following steps can be rec-
ommended:
In the most vulnerable countries, like Bangladesh,  
policy coherence is necessary to face, adapt to, and fight 
climate change. Therefore, linking climate change with 
all development sectors and sub-sectors (e.g. land, food, 
agriculture, trade, energy etc.) under a comprehensive 
National Climate Change Policy is necessary and recom-
mended for other vulnerable countries.
Effective global mechanisms should be developed to  
ensure funds under the UN for climate-coping initiatives 
by poor countries.
Global food production should be increased by us- 
ing suitable technology and potential agricultural lands 
in an environment friendly way. 
The vulnerable people should be empowered and  
enabled to adapt to climate change by building resil-
ience through investments in social protection, health, 
education, and other measures. 
The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) can  
be used to conduct national estimates of the costs of 
scaling-up existing programs and identifying priority ar-
eas for reducing vulnerability. 
Countries that could experience a potential food  
deficit under climate change, need effective local poli-
cies. Such polices include establishing social safety net 
and programs aiming at creation of access to food. Pro-
poor agricultural development should be given very 
high priority.
Food deficit countries should establish mechanisms,  
either individually or collectively, with neighboring 
countries. They should also create an emergency food 
reserve which may be mobilized in case food is not 
available from international sources following a shock. 
Coastal infrastructure, like dams and cyclone shel- 
ters, should be built, with support from highly-emitting 
countries, to face the onslaught of extreme events. 
The private sector and civil society should advocate 
mitigation process such as using the CDM, energy ef-
ficiency, renewable energy, and adaptation activities 
such as infrastructure developments and mainstream-
ing climate change. Common Regional Policies and 
programs for implementation should make use of the 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC). Regional modeling and response strategies in 
relation to food security and climate change can be initi-
ated early on. Existing networks of South Asian NGOs 
and research institutes can be strengthened and put to 
work on regional government initiatives and programs. 
Advocacy should be developed to ensure justice in food 
trade for the LFDCs, and that climate change is incorpo-
rated into international trade negotiations. Advocacy for 
the rights of climate refugees beyond country bounda-
ries is an emerging issue under food security constraints 
and developing nations under climate change. The 
health impact of climate change has a wide range of 
malnutrition implications, and can be another advocacy 
issue in a food-impoverished, vulnerable country like 
Bangladesh.
9 Research results for Latin  
America
The effects of climate change on food production, agri-
culture and water availability in Latin America, the re-
spective adaptation needs and policy recommendations 
are summarized in Chapter 11.7.3.
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10 Conclusion: elements of a 
rights-based strategy 
Rights-based strategies have been increasingly discussed 
in several policy areas relating to the right to adequate 
food, water, health, adequate housing etc. since the 
middle of the 1990s (summarized discussion, Windfuhr 
2001 and IISD 2004). The rights-based approach has 
gained support as a result of the frustration arising from 
the very slow improvements achieved for vulnerable 
groups, particularly in countries with non functioning 
governments. These governments often hinder the im-
plementation of policies needed to overcome depriva-
tion. The incentives provided through traditional de-
velopment policies often do not work adequately if or 
when the national policy setting is not supportive. For 
example, training farmers is a positive measure, but will 
only have a long term effect when secure access to ten-
ure rights guarantee farmers the access to productive 
resources. 
Processes of social exclusion, discrimination in access to 
productive resources, exclusion from decision-making 
bodies, and the exploitation of vulnerable women and 
men are important reasons for the persistence of pov-
erty. Inequalities are becoming institutionalized in many 
countries. These disparities are reinforced by political, 
economic, social, and cultural structures. Systematic 
discrimination on the basis of gender, class, caste, eth-
nicity, and other identities persist and lead to the struc-
tural exclusion of large groups of women and men from 
developmental processes and benefits. 
National policies often reflect the interests of sectors 
holding the most power. They are seldom oriented to-
wards the interests and needs of vulnerable and mar-
ginalized men and women. Health, education, social 
services, taxation and subsidy systems, property rights 
and their legal protection etc. often favor local elites. 
Formal and informal political decision-making struc-
tures often work against poor and marginalized women 
and men, particularly in rural areas and in poor urban 
pockets. These areas are where most of the poor and po-
litically excluded segments of societies are to be found. 
For poor women and men, access to health, education, 
productive resources, a functioning legal system, land-
registration systems, justice and appeals mechanisms 
for checking discriminatory laws or their practices etc. 
are often limited. The access to these resources would 
constitute effective remedies to react adequately, in any 
substantive way, their situations. 
In the case of adaptation policies to climate change, 
such forms of discrimination and exclusion should be 
avoided and not reinforced. A rights-based orienta-
tion for adaptation policies can help to overcome such 
problems. Adaptation policies will probably be unable 
to overcome all forms of institutionalized and historic 
marginalization, but they can avoid aggravating existing 
inequalities. Moreover, if adaptation policies are faultily 
designed, they might not achieve their intended objec-
tive – supporting those most affected. Instead, the sup-
port will again be directed towards those more power-
ful within the society with far less intense adaptation 
problems.
A rights-based approach describes, therefore, a strategy 
for increasing government accountability to its own 
citizens. It helps secure the entitlements people need in 
order to use existing chances, or it helps to widen their 
overall opportunities. A rights-based approach strength-
ens and complements other strategies in North-South 
development cooperation, such as strengthening capaci-
ties of local partners and enhancing their capabilities to 
use productive resources or other income-earning op-
Part IV
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portunities. It stimulates analysis and reflection on the 
causes of entitlement-failure and allows the more pre-
cise description of roles, obligations, and responsibilities 
of different actors in the development process. It is a 
way of reducing the accountability gap that, in many 
countries, works against the poor.
National governance issues are not the only determi-
nants of poverty and exclusion; international policies 
can also exacerbate existing local forms of social exclu-
sion and foster poverty. International trade policies can, 
and often do, directly impact the income poor produc-
ers or consumers derive from their work. 
Policies of multilateral institutions can limit states‘ ca-
pacities to act in favor of poorer segments of their so-
cieties. Losses by developing countries through trade 
protection, immigration barriers, and increasing debt 
burdens amount to many times that of the aid develop-
ing countries receive. Social exclusion is a consequence 
of many economic policies pursued by multilateral insti-
tutions. Collective frustration about processes of social 
disintegration is sometimes expressed in religious intol-
erance, spontaneous migratory movements and security 
issues. These developments can affect whole regions 
and put democratization at risk. 
This study has shown that climate change will affect 
food security and often marginalized producers and 
other vulnerable groups. Without a strong international 
mitigation policy, climate change in many parts of the 
world might easily move beyond certain thresholds and 
overwhelm the adaptive capabilities. 
The situation of marginalized and vulnerable groups 
might be aggravated, and they may need particular at-
tention because of their low coping capacities. New vul-
nerable persons or groups might develop as a result of 
climate change. Developing a rights-based strategy for 
adaptation policies in national and international policies 
can therefore be an effective tool to concentrate and 
orient such measures and policies towards the people 
most in need. This study has also shown that adaptation 
policies need to take into consideration existing forms of 
marginalization when developing adaptation policies. 
Factors that create or support vulnerability need to be 
addressed as much as possible, otherwise the adaptation 
policies designed cannot adequately help the people 
they are supposed to assist. For example, say a family 
headed by a woman is excluded from locally available 
credit schemes or agricultural extension services be-
cause of gender discrimination. This family will not gain 
much if the same services are then expanded to deliver 
credits for adaptation purposes or to deliver knowledge 
on adaptation techniques. The same household might 
still be excluded from these services because of same 
reasons as before. Adaptation policies should address or 
be sensitive to such older forms of marginalization. 
Climate change and human rights are related in situa-
tions where the impact of climate change substantially 
affects livelihood circumstances. Some potential effects 
of climate change on livelihood could be that people 
are starving or losing access to productive resources like 
land or water. Often, governments are not adequately 
supporting people to cope with these changes. In the 
context of adaptation policies, governments must guar-
antee that adaptation policies do not lead to violations 
of any human rights. Governments have to ensure that 
persons or groups affected by climate change are not 
overlooked and that they have access, without discrimi-
nation, to compensation measures offered by the gov-
ernment. 
Another dimension of interlinkages existing between 
climate change and human rights is that in some coun-
tries, where impacts are severe, the effects can exacer-
bate internal conflict. Such conflicts include struggles 
over land use or access to scarce resources between 
pastoralists and farmers, or problems between large 
farms that might overuse scarce water resources and 
the surrounding smallholder farmers. Groups that start 
demanding their rights might be politically prosecuted 
or threatened. Such conflicts might lead, therefore, to 
violations of civil and political rights. Adaptation poli-
cies need to be able to deal with conflicting situations 
and conflicts of interests. Armed conflicts might also 
become sources or contributions to substantive clashes 
over access to natural resources. The Darfur conflict is 
often seen as a conflict driven, at least partially, by the 
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overall scarcity of access to natural resources across the 
entire region. A rights-based approach to adaptation pol-
icies can be helpful in discussing potential solutions for 
groups competing for the same resource base. Such ac-
cess conflicts need to be overcome by focusing attention 
on the demands of the different groups involved. 
Elements of a rights-based strategy
This study has focused on the impact of climate change 
on the enjoyment of human rights related to food secu-
rity, particularly the right to adequate food, water, and 
health. What are the core elements of a rights-based 
strategy to adaptation policies that can be drawn from 
the results? 
1. A human rights-based approach has to cover both 
sets of human rights: civil and political (CP-rights) and 
economic, social, and cultural rights (ESC-rights). While 
the ESC-rights are important for poverty-related prob-
lems, CP-rights are relevant for the overall approach. 
For example, CP-rights guarantee that each person is 
treated in a way acceptable to human rights standards 
for participation during political trials. The right to be 
informed, freedom of expression, the right to organize, 
transparency etc. are all important civil and political 
rights. Adaptation policies need to follow these proce-
dural requirements. Every person has the right to be 
heard and to participate in the development of adapta-
tion policy measures that might be decisive for his or 
her future. 
2. Human rights create entitlements of persons vis-à-
vis their government. These entitlements can be legally 
claimed, and are a good tool to use in holding govern-
ments accountable. Complaint procedures need to be 
accessible for everyone. They can materialize in differ-
ent formats and should cover different legal qualities, 
from arbitration procedures to quasi judicial and judi-
cial procedures. Human rights institutions, ombudsman 
systems, and judicial procedures must be open to com-
plaints from everybody without discrimination. Special 
provisions for legal aid should be provided to effectively 
guarantee access to justice for extremely poor people. 
These are core conditions for the equal treatment of all 
people according to the law and for a comprehensive un-
derstanding of citizenship. These complaint procedures 
are normally accessible at the national level, but also ex-
ist at the international level. There are existing regional 
human rights instruments. For example systems are 
available in Europe, in the Inter-American Human Right 
System, and in Africa. And there are also international 
instruments for most of the core human right treaties, 
which can be used when the state is responsible for a 
violation, has ratified the specific optional protocols and 
all other criteria for adminissibility are met. 
3. A rights-based framework better describes govern-
ment obligations and develops criteria for designing 
and evaluating policy processes. A human rights-based 
framework requires governments to follow standards 
at all different levels of activities. For most of the ESC-
rights, such a framework is laid out in the General 
Comments, which the Committee on ESC-rights has de-
veloped within the course of the last years. The General 
Comments No. 12-15 require governments to develop 
a national strategy for the implementation of each of the 
respective rights. The General Comment No. 12 on the 
right to adequate food was adopted at the 20th session 
of the CESCR in 1999, No. 13 on the right to educa-
tion at the 21 session in 1999, No. 14 on the right to 
the highest attainable standard of health at the 22nd 
session in 2000. The three comment on specific rights 
of the covenant follow the same structure in describ-
ing state obligations and government action (UN 2001) 
In November 2002 the CESCR adopted additionally a 
General Comment No. 15 on the right to water that fol-
low the same structure (see Windfuhr 2003).
(A) The strategies shall start with an analysis and iden-
tification of the victims of violations together with an 
assessment of the causes of the situation. 
(B) Based on that, the governments shall check and 
improve their national legislative framework, modify 
or amend laws, and develop legislation where appropri-
ate. 
(C) Additionally, the governments should design an 
adequate policy framework for the implementation of 
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each right. The implementation should be guided by the 
following standards: The policies shall be implemented 
without discrimination towards improving equity, and 
the progressive realization of the rights shall be control-
led by set benchmarks. The benchmarks can then be 
measured by indicators which will prove if they have 
been achieved or not. Governments are required to use 
the maximum amount of their available resources. The 
policy development process should prioritize the con-
cept of vulnerable groups being addressed first. 
While setting priorities, it is important to keep in mind 
the interdependence of the different rights. The indi-
visibility and interdependence of all rights mean that 
there should be no hierarchy in the different kinds of 
rights. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that scarcity of 
resources and institutional constraints may require the 
setting of priorities. However, the implementation of the 
core obligation of all human rights must be simultane-
ously guaranteed and addressed. It is impossible to fo-
cus only on the implementation of some selected rights, 
such as the right to food, while neglecting others, like 
access to essential health care. 
(D) This will only work if constant monitoring and as-
sessment is done to guarantee that these standards are 
applied and that the rights are effectively implemented. 
Governments need to know if their policy decisions are 
effective and if they reach those groups they are sup-
posed to reach. 
 (E) Finally, people need to have the right to complain, 
if they are overlooked or negatively affected by policy 
decisions.
These five elements of national strategy can be used 
in the formulation of national adaptation policies. The 
Voluntary Guidelines on the implementation of the 
right to adequate food, adopted by the FAO Members, 
encompass 19 guidelines that describe for each policy 
field, how governments can best design policies in order 
to support the implementation of the right to adequate 
food. A similar check list for the design of adaptation 
policies to climate change should be developed at the 
national level. 
4. It is important to note that not all persons suffering 
from hunger are automatically victims of violations 
through government policies. Not all forms of hunger or 
malnutrition result from harmful government activities 
and therefore cannot be judged as violations. The im-
pact of climate change might be so monumental in one 
country or region that the government will not have the 
means to adequately help all affected persons to adapt. 
Therefore, hunger, as a result of natural disasters cannot 
automatically be judged as a violation of the right to 
adequate food. A violation can only be identified when 
hunger is caused because of the government‘s failure to 
develop a minimum response system for disaster-prepar-
edness, when the adaptation measures are not oriented 
towards the neediest, or when the government is not 
using the available resources. A rights-based approach 
requires a careful analysis of what can be considered a 
government responsibility and what cannot. 
5. A rights-based assessment and framework must 
not only look into the obligations and responsibilities 
of national governments, but it should also assess the 
potential impact of governmental policy effects on per-
sons living in another country. The Covenant on ESC-
rights specifies in Art. 2.1. that „each state party to the 
present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually 
and through international assistance and co-operation 
(...)“. The Committee has interpreted that paragraph by 
stating that states should not violate the rights of per-
sons in other countries either directly through its own 
policy measures or indirectly through policy decisions 
of intergovernmental organizations in which they have 
influence. States should also check that national pri-
vate actors working abroad do not contribute to human 
rights violations. Such extraterritorial negative impacts 
should be avoided. In the development debate, the is-
sue is normally discussed as a „coherence problem“ that 
needs to be solved in order to create a more develop-
ment friendly, international environment. 
Although the issue of extraterritorial obligations is still 
new in the human rights discourse, yet it might be pos-
sible to agree that negative impacts from foreign policy 
effects should be avoided. The question becomes more 
difficult when positive support measures are reflected. 
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How much international assistance and support can 
countries, which are unable to fully implement rights in 
their own country, expect after having shown that they 
have completely exhausted their own means? What 
can they expect from donor countries? Are there legally 
binding entitlements to help them? These questions 
need to be answered with a resounding yes. Art. 2 of 
the Covenant on ESC-Rights emphasizes the obligation 
of international cooperation. The international commu-
nity has the obligation to support those countries who 
cannot alone implement the rights of the covenant, al-
though there is no specific amount mentioned. 
Such international support is also required to poor 
countries in the implementation of national adaptation 
measures. This is a particularly important aspect of any 
adaptation regime, because poorer countries will suffer 
substantially from climate change and must cope with 
a high burden of adaptation needs. The UNFCCC con-
tains the recognition that those countries which have 
historically caused most of global warming have first the 
obligation to reduce their emissions. The Kyoto Protocol 
is formulating binding reduction targets. The UNFCCC 
also recognizes the obligation to support poorer coun-
tries affected by climate change in helping with adap-
tation. As we have seen, the amount is currently not 
prescribed and the development of the adaptation fund 
came slowly, but the obligation is recognized. It is a first 
step to support countries which are unable to cover all 
costs for implementing adequate adaptation policies. 
Much more is needed in the envisaged post-2012 agree-
ment. 
6. Human rights are individual entitlements. They set 
limits on the restrictions and deprivations that individu-
als can permissibly bear, even when promoting noble 
social goals or overall development objectives like eco-
nomic growth. Rights protect individuals, minorities, 
and other particularly marginalized groups from policies 
that may benefit society as a whole, yet place huge bur-
dens on them individually. A human right asks for zero 
tolerance for violations. In the same way that it is not 
acceptable to tolerate slavery for economic growth, it 
is hard to explain why some people die from hunger 
for the benefit of higher societal goals. A rights based 
approach does not allow certain trade-offs which are 
possible in development-oriented thinking. Adaptation 
policies should be designed so that the price affected 
persons must pay is not too high. If infrastructure invest-
ments are needed, such as the construction of dikes or 
dams to better regulate river flow and people needs to 
be resettled, adequate compensation must be ensured 
and people should have the possibility to file complaints 
in courts. A rights-based framework requires that an as-
sessment is done of how different policy choices will 
affect the prospects for the implementation of a certain 
right, and how the different choices affect different in-
dividuals and groups. This process must occur before 
choosing among different policy alternatives. It can also 
help governments set priorities in national budget deci-
sions.
7. General achievements in human development are 
not always accompanied by achievements in human 
rights fulfillment. Certain development processes may 
go hand in hand with the deterioration of livelihoods 
and the human rights fulfillment for particularly vulner-
able groups. The liberalization of agricultural markets 
may increase the economic opportunities of a society, 
while the number of hungry and malnourished among 
smallholder farmers, who do not profit from the same 
policy, may simultaneously increase. In some cases, this 
can occur on a dramatic scale. Impact studies done by 
the FAO show the divergent effects on the effect of trade 
liberalisation following start of the WTO Agreement 
on Agriculture in 1995 on agriculture in developing 
countries. Human rights create entitlements, and the 
language of claims can be of great importance to devel-
opmental processes, which often create conflicts over 
resources and social struggles. Arbitration and litigation 
can be important measures to regulate such conflicts.
8. A rights-based framework can be a helpful tool to 
complement climate change adaptation policies. It can 
help assess problems and analyze causes of the impacts 
of climate change. It can help to make decisions on 
modification of the policy design of adaptation policies 
to climate change, in order to avoid violations of the 
right to food. It allows individuals seeking remedies to 
discover whether policy measures will have negative 
Climate Change I Study
A
N
A
LY
SI
S 
02
180
outcomes for them, or if they are negatively affected by 
the results of certain adaptation policy measures. Rights 
create entitlements; and a rights-based framework can 
be seen as an important tool to effectively demand pol-
icy changes from governments through legal means. A 
rights-based framework can therefore help to mobilize 
political will against corporate and other vested interest 
and bad governance. This approach has the potential to 
improve the quality of adaptation policies. 
9. Developmental thinking helps to focus on long term 
development needs and processes, and takes into con-
sideration the broader processes of societal change. The 
two frameworks (development-oriented, rights-based) 
should not be seen as being in conflict – even though 
some potential conflicts between the two models have 
already been addressed here – but as complementary 
tools. The human rights framework is a strong device 
because it defines minimum standards for state behav-
ior. Development thinking helps to follow long term 
strategies and to take sustainability limitations into con-
sideration. 
10. In cases of failing states where a national rule of 
law no longer exists, people lose access to judicial pro-
cedures. They can no longer legally claim their rights, 
and direct accountability mechanisms will no longer 
work. These countries will have major difficulties in 
developing any kind of adaptation policy in reaction to 
experienced or expected impacts from climate change. 
Nevertheless, the basic human rights present an interna-
tionally recognized standard. Thus, a reference base can 
be constructed to check on lawless states. This structure 
can be a source of strength and orientation for people 
struggling against oppression in such conflicted coun-
tries. A universally recognized, binding framework with 
the human rights treaties already exists and can hold ne-
glecting governments accountable for their actions with 
formal legal procedures at the international level. 
11. There is an open discussion in international law about 
the following question: Can the „do no harm“ principle 
mentioned above regarding a rights based-approach to 
adaptation policies also be applied to mitigation-related 
aspects of climate change? Can the non-action of those 
countries contributing most to climate change be legally 
challenged? The arguments in favor pinpoint the fact 
that different scenarios for climate change will have 
dramatically different impacts on the right to food and 
other human rights for a huge number of people. The 
human rights accountability of polluting states needs to 
be carefully analyzed. One option for dealing with the 
situation would be to apply the Polluter Pays Principle 
(PPP). The PPP normally applies to concrete situations 
where both the pollutant and the victim are identifiable; 
yet the causal chains for climate change are much long-
er, and it is difficult to connect certain victims to certain 
polluters. However, it should be noted that the scien-
tific evidence is striking so that a revised PPP could be 
developed. Both principles, the Polluter Pays Principle 
and the „do no harm“ principal should be utilized and 
further developed in international climate negotiations.
12. In conclusion, rights-based adaptation policies are 
one good tool to ensure that money earmarked for ad-
aptation is spent reasonably. We suggest, that the Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the FAO, 
and the UNFCCC develop a guideline, which helps gov-
ernments to design adaptation policies accordingly. 
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11 Conclusion and recommen-
dations: climate change, food 
security and human rights
1. Food security as it relates to climate change is an issue 
that had not been at the forefront of the climate change 
debate for many years. Several reasons contributed to 
this fact. (1) For a long time, climate models were not 
precise enough to forecast local or regional trends in 
weather patterns, precipitation etc., so it was difficult to 
describe trends in agriculture with a sufficient solid data 
based. (2) The IPCC did not even dedicate a chapter to 
food and other agricultural products in any of its first 
three assessment reports. The FAR‘s chapter on „Food, 
Fibre and Forest Products“ was the first step in broach-
ing this topic. (3) The CO2 fertilizer effect was overesti-
mated. The FAO had hoped for several years that global 
food production would be fostered by this fertilizer ef-
fect. At the same time, the climate change risks were 
underestimated in the area of food production. All in all, 
the perception has changed from one of optimism to a 
more realistic assessment of climate change risks.
2. This study is based on the assumption that a two 
dimensional response to climate change is necessary: 
avoiding the unmanageable and managing the unavoid-
able. Managing the unavoidable means mitigating the 
impact of climate change and avoiding dangerous cli-
mate change from happening. An emerging consensus 
among scientists states that global warming must be 
limited to a temperature increase well below 2°C com-
pared to pre-industrial levels. 
In order to reach that goal, industrialized countries 
need to take the lead in drastic emissions reductions. 
Globally a 50 to 85 percent reduction of emissions 
by 2050 is necessary and actual CO2 emission should 
start to decrease, at the latest, by 2015. Managing the 
unavoidable means that sound adaptation policies are 
needed to deal with the inevitable consequences of 
climate change, some of which are already visible and 
immense. While this study focuses on the adaptation 
needs particularly related to food security and the reali-
zation of the right to adequate food, the authors never-
theless are aware that unmitigated climate change easily 
might overwhelm adaptation capacity in many parts of 
the world.
3. The impact of climate change on food security will 
be substantive. The local and regional assessments of 
impact will become better known, when more detailed 
studies are available. So far, the debate has been biased 
towards global food security concerns, i.e. the global 
balance of how much and where food can be produced. 
However, it is of utmost importance that household ef-
fects are taken into consideration when predicting the 
impacts on hunger and malnutrition. Climate change 
will impact people and groups already vulnerable to 
food insecurity, but new groups will also be affected by 
climate change. The main driver for climate change is 
increasing surface temperatures, which in turn influ-
ence most other factors contributing to changing cli-
mate conditions such as precipitation, water availability, 
and weather extremes.
4. At the same time, agriculture is one of the main 
sources of carbon emissions. The agricultural sector 
contributes to over 30 percent of current annual to-
tal emissions. Agriculture itself provides 13.5 percent, 
and deforestation supplies 17.4 percent of global total 
emissions. Adaptation and mitigation measures should 
therefore go hand in hand in the agricultural sector. 
Techniques are available to reduce emissions. Examples 
like engaging in conservation agriculture or reducing 
emissions of methane and nitrous oxide from livestock 
production and are available and summarized in chap-
ter 4.7.
5. Adaptation to the adverse impacts of climate change 
has long been neglected as a development issue by both 
governmental and nongovernmental organisations. 
Adaptation measures were not at the centre of climate 
negotiations in the first few years. They were often seen 
as a road to distract attention from the most difficult 
and politically controversial task of reducing emissions, 
particularly in countries that have contributed most to 
climate change. Since then, it has become clear that the 
additional benefits of adaptation will be monumental 
and that early action is cheaper than a post-disaster re-
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sponse, even though there are still many uncertainties 
in existing adaptation cost estimates. 
6. Adaptation requires substantive investment in infra-
structure such as dams, flood-resistant storage facilities, 
and techniques for reducing water loss in distribution 
systems etc. It requires monitoring weather extremes 
and developing disaster preparation strategies. Higher 
prices for energy, agricultural inputs, water, and food 
imports must be expected. And capacity building in 
communities particularly at risk, in national, regional, 
and local administrations etc. is of utmost importance 
and will require resources. Due to these impacts and 
the resources required to adapt to them, resources that 
would have otherwise been available to realize the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) might be di-
verted to adaptation measures. The realization of the 
MDGs might further be influenced by the direct impact 
of climate change on food, water, and health. 
„How the world deals with climate change to-
day will have a direct bearing on the human 
development prospects of a large section of hu-
manity“ (UNDP 2007, 8). 
The recent rounds of climate negotiations after Bali – 
in March/April 2008 in Bangkok and in June 2008 in 
Bonn – have shown that the costs of adaptation and 
the present under-funding by the perpetuators of cli-
mate change remain a key contentious issue. This 
is true despite the goodwill of many developing and 
some developed countries to work jointly on develop-
ing a new climate regime. Most developing countries 
hardly contribute to the emissions which cause climate 
change, and often they see domestic emissions reduc-
tions as a hindrance to development. If development 
rights are taken seriously, industrialized countries must 
invest in mitigation and reduce emissions even more 
substantially. They will also have to finance and support 
deployment mechanisms for mitigation and adaptation 
technologies and make these technologies widely avail-
able. At the same time, developing countries need to 
realize that climate change is a development issue, and 
thus this challenge has to be integrated into develop-
ment policies and planning. For example South Africa is 
the first rapidly developing country, which accepts that 
emissions have to peak also in their own country be-
tween 2020 and 2035.
7. A clear recommendation from this study is that a reli-
able financial-based mechanism must be created within 
the UN-climate negotiations if the unavoidable is to be 
managed. Substantial additional financial resources are 
needed to cope with the expected adaptation needs 
for developing countries. However, more aid does not 
necessarily mean that more funds will reach the most 
vulnerable groups. This is one reason why the UNFCCC 
negotiations must discuss which frameworks can in-
centivize adaptation. Adaptation measures need to be 
properly designed and focus on particularly vulnerable 
groups. The rights-based framework is one very prom-
ising option to help measure progress, review govern-
ment activities, and to generate resources.
11.1 Climate change, vulnerabilities, 
and groups at risk
8. The concept of „food security“ is a key concept in the 
United Nations to measure the food and nutrition situa-
tion of people and groups. The latest standard definition 
used in the FAO (2007b, 6) is: 
„food security exists when all people at all times 
have physical or economic access to sufficient, 
safe, and nutritious food to meet their dietary 
needs and food preferences for an active and 
healthy life. To achieve food security, all four of 
its components must be adequate. These are: 
availability, stability, accessibility, and utiliza-
tion.“ 
Additionally, food security depends on a variety of un-
derlying determinants; food must be nutritious and 
safe. The body must be in a condition to consume food 
without becoming ill. UNICEF and other nutritionists 
emphasize the fact that half of the children dying from 
hunger are not dying because of missing food supply, 
but rather because they cannot digest nutrients due to 
sickness, e.g. diarrhea (Eide 2004). This study utilizes 
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the differentiation of three levels of food security to de-
scribe those groups that are vulnerable to the effects of 
climate change. 
(1) Food security on a global scale: Which is the level to 
analyze overall trends and to understand which effects 
climate change might have on agricultural production, 
fishery production, and livestock production at the glo-
bal level. This is important because these trends will 
translate into agricultural prices and will influence deci-
sions of producers worldwide. 
(2) Food security on a national level: This level of analy-
sis is equally as important, because the national level is 
where most agricultural policy decisions are made. It 
will be decided here if food security concerns are cov-
ered by imports and how much financial resources are 
made available for national agricultural policies. Central 
elements of adaptation policies will be defined at the 
national level. 
(3) Food security on a household level: Without a de-
tailed look at the impacts at the household level, the 
analysis would lack an understanding of the difficulties 
and specific necessities each person faces in regard to 
food security. This knowledge is crucial in designing 
adequate adaptation policies that support those groups, 
particularly marginal producers and vulnerable consum-
ers, which are most likely to become food insecure. All 
three levels of the food security definition have been 
taken into consideration in the present study. 
9. Around 80 percent of the hungry live in rural areas; 
half of them are smallholder peasants, 22 percent are 
landless laborers, and 8 percent are hunter-gatherers, 
fishers, and pastoralists. This situation is expected to 
persist. While the urban poor are the fastest growing 
group of food insecure people, more the 50 percent of 
the hungry are still projected to live in rural areas in 
2050. The majority of these groups live on extremely 
marginal conditions. They often live in remote geo-
graphical locations, in ecological vulnerable areas, or 
on slopes or drought-prone areas/rainforest etc. They 
have difficulties accessing means of transport, such as 
roads, and thus access to markets where they can sell 
their goods. Most have limited or no adequate access to 
extension services, credits, or insurance mechanisms. 
Absence of land reform forces poor and marginal farm-
ing households to use land highly exposed to catastro-
phes like floods or droughts. Usually, they are also politi-
cally marginalized, without an important voice in local 
or national politics. 
10. In order to deal adequately with the impact of cli-
mate change on food security, work has to start with a 
good analysis of those groups which are already particu-
larly marginal today. They will often be the most affect-
ed by climate change, and they have very limited cop-
ing capacities. Given the crucial role of marginalization 
in the food security debate, it is clear that agricultural 
and food production problems cannot be tackled at the 
technical level. The situation of the rural poor has been 
aggravated by the fact that rural areas were neglected 
in regional, national, and international policy making. 
For a long time, the policy focus was on investments 
in industry and urban infrastructure, causing budget al-
locations for rural areas to be reduced substantially – of-
ten by more than 50 percent. The same happened with 
bi- and multilateral aid budgets.
11. A recent FAO/OECD study highlighted that prices 
should decline from their recent peak, yet they will re-
main above the average of the past decade (OECD/FAO 
2008). The study summarized all of the factors that are 
contributing to a long term scenario where increasing 
demand goes hand in hand with limits in food produc-
ing resources – particularly soils and water. While this 
scenario does not necessarily lead to scarcity of food in 
the coming years, it is an indication that prices for ag-
ricultural produce will not decrease to the levels that 
prevailed during the last decades. There is a continued 
rise in fertilizer prices and energy costs, which are ma-
jor input factors, for farmers. Climate change will af-
fect several factors which influence the supply side. 
Governments have to deal with this challenge when 
designing policies to adapt to climate change and imple-
menting the right to adequate food. 
12. In this study the term food security is compared 
with the concepts of the right to adequate food and food 
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sovereignty. While food security describes a goal; the 
right to adequate food obliges governments to qualita-
tively respond to the problem of hunger and malnutri-
tion. Food security therefore describes the outcome of 
the realization of the right to adequate food. The im-
plementation of the right to adequate food is guided by 
specific government obligations. A human rights-based 
monitoring system has the specific focus on analyzing 
whether governments are implementing their specific 
human rights obligations. It measures the outcomes 
regarding questions whether government policies con-
stitute an adequate answer to the human rights obliga-
tions. It is a platform to analyze whether governments 
use their respective resources adequately and most 
reasonably to fully guarantee these rights. Food secu-
rity monitoring looks at how many and to what degree 
people are malnourished. A third term gaining promi-
nence within debates of civil society organisations deal-
ing with issues such as hunger, malnutrition, and rural 
development is food sovereignty. Food sovereignty is a 
political concept primarily developed in the context of 
La Via Campesina, a global small farmers‘ movement. 
In March 2007, Via Campesina coordinated an inter-
national gathering of civil society in Mali, which was 
prepared by the umbrella organization of small farmers 
in West Africa, ROPPA, and other civil society organi-
sations. The outcome was a common statement that 
describes the ideas behind the concept of food sover-
eignty quite well (see Nyeleni-Declaration 2007). Food 
sovereignty has been developed as a concept by social 
movements and farmers organisations to protest the ne-
glect of rural areas and rural development in national 
and international policies.
13. Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries are all sensitive 
to climatic conditions. Climate change will have direct 
impacts on these three sectors, including their produc-
tivity. In turn, this will affect the income of vulnerable 
groups that depend on resources and products derived 
from these sectors. The scale of the direct adverse and 
positive effects varies with specific geographical situa-
tion. However, macro-level projections are not sufficient 
to identify the most vulnerable groups within regions or 
countries. This requires further efforts. Vulnerability as-
sessments on the national and community levels are cru-
cial for developing adequate responses to food insecurity 
in the face of climate change. The vulnerability-specific 
information, which primarily looks at the internal con-
stitution of a region or a community with regard to non-
climate stressors, is the necessary first step. It then must 
be connected to climate-related factors, for example the 
likeliness of extreme weather events, changing precipi-
tation trends etc. This will result in general assessments 
of vulnerability to climate change, but may also – and 
this would be appropriate in the context of this study – 
be translated into sector-specific climate change risk, for 
example with regard to food security. Climate change 
will therefore impact groups which have been always 
at the risk of food insecurity, but it will also affect new 
groups who become vulnerable do to changing weather 
conditions in their region. Many vulnerable groups are 
already „experts“ in risk management, but their ability 
to adapt to climate change is often restricted because of 
their extremely limited coping capacities. 
14. A person or a family is vulnerable due to their liveli-
hood situation and their factor endowment. The ques-
tion of whether a vulnerable situation translates into 
persistence of or to additional hunger or malnutrition 
is dependent on the form of the government response. 
A given (insufficient) factor endowment of families is al-
ready partially a result of government policy. This study 
therefore recommends using the right to adequate food 
in the design of adaptation policies. Increasing the ac-
countability of governments will also help to guide the 
implementation of effective adaptation policies. 
11.2 Relevant trends in climate change
15. The impacts of climate change on food security will 
be substantive and will be found in all components of 
the global, national, and local food systems. The FAR 
Working Group II summarized some major trends 
which show that many natural systems are affected by 
similar processes of climate change, particularly those 
related to temperature increase (IPCC 2007b). 
(1) There is a high confidence that natural systems are 
affected on all continents by changes in snow, ice, and 
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frozen ground, including permafrost. This conclusion 
includes the enlargement and increase of glacial lakes, 
increasing ground instability in permafrost regions, rock 
avalanches in mountain areas, as well as substantial 
changes in Arctic and Antarctic ecosystems.
(2) In regard to hydrological systems, there is high 
confidence, that many glacier- and snow-fed-rivers will 
experience increased run-off and earlier spring peak dis-
charge. A warming of lakes and rivers in many regions 
is projected.
(3) There is also high confidence that recent warming is 
strongly affecting terrestrial biological systems, with ef-
fects such as earlier timing of spring events, leaf-unfold-
ing, bird migration, and egg-laying. Earlier greening of 
vegetation in the spring is also supported by satellite ob-
servation studies which show that trend occurring since 
the early 1980s. Longer thermal growing seasons due to 
recent warming is also related to this observation. 
(4) Substantive new studies have shown that rising 
water temperatures will impact marine and freshwater 
biological systems. It will lead to range changes and ear-
lier migrations of fish in rivers, and it will contribute 
to shifts in ranges and changes in algal, plankton and 
fish abundance in high-latitude oceans and high-altitude 
lakes. 
16. This study has described the major effects climate 
change will have on food security through the increase 
of variability of weather patterns, particularly the ex-
pected increase in extreme weather events. The impact 
of climate change on food production and agriculture, 
forests, fisheries, pasture and livestock production, wa-
ter resources, and health and nutrition has been shown 
and can be summarized in the following way: Countries 
and groups of countries will be hit differently. Many 
studies indicate that 
„the impacts of climate change will fall dispro-
portionately upon developing countries and the 
poor persons within all countries, and thereby 
exacerbate inequities in health status and ac-
cess to adequate food, clean water, and other 
resources. Populations in developing countries 
are generally exposed to relatively high risks of 
adverse impacts from climate change“ (IPCC 
2001, 12).
India, for example, is projected to experience significant 
losses, with large areas of current cropland losing signifi-
cant productivity. It is anticipated that this will lead to 
higher levels of food insecurity in many vulnerable, de-
veloping countries. They will need support to cope and 
finance the necessary adaptation measures. Developed 
countries will not be immune from large effects of cli-
mate change on their agricultural sectors. 
17. The impact of climate change will be particularly 
substantial to smallholder and subsistence agriculture. 
Their livelihood systems, particularly in low latitudes, 
will be affected by major changes due to climate change. 
The farming system will be affected by the previously 
described changes in temperature, elevation of CO2, 
precipitation on yields of both food and cash crops. The 
productivity of livestock and fisheries systems will also 
be affected, as well as potential income gained from col-
lecting activities in forests. 
18. Climate zones will be forced upwards or pole-wards. 
Linear trends can go hand in hand with the quickly 
growing possibility of non-linear – and potentially cata-
strophic – changes. The relationship between global cli-
mate and the earth system is a complex one, particularly 
due to the fact that climate and non climate drivers are 
interrelated. Additionally, non-linear processes include 
several feedback loops, and these loops are very difficult 
to predict. 
The history of the earth shows that non-linear processes 
have happened quite often, particularly in the Holocene 
epoch. Ocean streams have frequently stalled abruptly, 
ice shields have suddenly melted, or monsoons have 
unexpectedly collapsed. Often small disruptions are suf-
ficient to entail fundamental changes. Simulations based 
on the knowledge of abrupt climate change in the past 
and the scientific school of analyzing highly complex 
processes that was established in the 1970s support the 
finding that our climate and the earth system might re-
Climate Change I Study
A
N
A
LY
SI
S 
02
186
act to the increasing temperature from anthropogenic 
climate change with enormous magnitude. The study 
describes some of the latest research on such tipping 
points. 
19. A recommendation from the impact analysis of this 
study concludes that specific family situations need to 
be studied, because livelihood systems are typically 
complex and include a number of interfering factors. 
For example, several crops and livestock species are in-
volved in intercropping systems, and many smallholder 
livelihoods are comprised of a variety of income sources 
such as the use of wild resources from forests, remit-
tances, and other non agricultural income strategies. 
Government support can also play a role, but so far 
many of the smallholder farmers are faced with a mar-
ginalization process in national and international agri-
cultural policies. Therefore, support is often unavailable 
or insufficient. Effective adaptation policies should start 
here and support coping and adaptation strategies of 
poorer groups in rural and urban environments. Coping 
strategies are characterized by changes in the relative 
importance between different income opportunities, 
and they will vary with the factors influencing the in-
come situation of families. Adaptation can be much bet-
ter managed if good government support and responses 
are developed and implemented.
11.3 Response capacities to climate 
change – nationally and internationally
20. The dimension of the problems linked to adaptation 
to climate change will be huge for developing countries. 
The IPCC report shows that poorer countries will be rel-
atively more affected by the impact of climate change. 
Their limited capacities to react are one important rea-
son for this particular affectedness. Adaptation policies 
cover a variety of interventions31 starting from the abil-
ity to predict changing weather conditions, particularly 
extreme weather events, to infrastructural investments 
in methods and techniques of disaster management 
such as dams or other mechanisms of flood control. 
They cover changes in the use of agricultural crops and 
varieties, irrigation, and land use techniques to support 
affected families in coping with the need to migrate or 
to cover the cost of other forms of damage to the house 
or the land of the family. It is also important to differen-
tiate adaptation policies at the different levels and define 
what can be done at the household level, locally, by 
national governments, or with international support.
21. Analytically, the IPCC further differentiates between 
two categories of adaptations: 
„autonomous adaptation, which is the ongoing 
implementation of existing knowledge and tech-
nology in response to the changes in climate 
experienced, and planned adaptation, which is 
the increase in adaptive capacity by mobilizing 
institutions and policies to establish or strength-
en conditions favorable for effective adaptation 
and investment in new technologies and infra-
structure“ (Easterling et al. 2007, 294). 
The advantage of this IPCC differentiation is that it 
looks into the coping strategies and capacities available 
locally to adjust to the changing circumstances without 
any government interference. This perspective helps to 
also identify the need for planned interventions as the 
available coping capacities might be very limited.
22. While some action needs to be implemented urgent-
ly in order to adapt to the short term consequences of cli-
mate change, adaptation must be viewed as a long term 
challenge for societies. „Mainstreaming“, or the integra-
tion of this challenge into sectoral and other policies and 
programs at different levels of decision making, will be 
necessary, and it requires a prominent role in the reduc-
tion of vulnerability from climate change. Ecosystem 
management plans that allow a multi-sectoral response 
in dealing with whole livelihood systems are needed in 
addition to sectoral responses. At the same time, adapta-
tion policies must address negative effects on the most 
31  A detailed overview about adaptation measures for key vulnerable sectors are shown in chapter 4.3 .
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vulnerable groups in order to avoid hardship for groups 
most affected by climate change. Adaptation must also 
include correcting mal-adaptations – for instance, by no 
longer providing flood insurance that encourage risky 
development in flood zones. This study summarizes the 
instruments available for response capacities at all lev-
els. It also presents adaptation measures in key vulner-
able sectors which developed countries highlighted in 
their national communications to the UNFCCC. This 
study recommends that adaptation policies must be 
closely monitored in order to guarantee that resources 
are spent meaningfully.
23. Improved response capacity needs to include better 
climate information systems. On the one hand, develop-
ing countries need assistance in generating and process-
ing relevant data. On the other hand, the available data 
needs to be distributed within the country. All groups 
potentially affected by climate change need to have ac-
cess to relevant climate information. 
This study has summarized the recent discussion about 
the scope and relevance of private or private/public in-
surance instruments for adaptation to climate change. 
Experience so far has been too limited to determine 
with certainty if internationally backed public/private 
insurance systems are viable in the long haul. But there 
are very promising examples, that show the potential 
of this instrument for effective disaster aid and for set-
ting incentives to support adaptation to climate change. 
Despite the promise of these new initiatives, insurance 
still reaches only a small fraction of vulnerable commu-
nities and governments. 
24. Weather risks destabilize households and countries 
and create food insecurity. As a case in point, floods, cy-
clones, and droughts have been a major cause of hunger 
affecting more than 30 million persons since 2000 in the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC). 
Governments and donors only react to these shocks 
rather than proactively managing the risks. These emer-
gency reactions have been criticized for being ad hoc 
and, at times, untimely. They are even credited with 
destabilizing local food markets. Similarly, many highly-
exposed developing country governments do not have 
the means to finance the recovery costs of catastrophic 
disasters. These administrations could greatly benefit 
from adequate insurance contracts, co-financed by pol-
luters. Least-developed countries can hardly afford the 
technical analyses and other start-up costs for insurance 
systems. Scaling up will prove costly, especially since 
disaster risks, unlike health or accident, affect whole 
regions simultaneously and thus require spatial diversifi-
cation, reinsurance and/or large capital reserves. Thus, 
it is very important that risk management mechanisms 
– including innovative insurance mechanisms – play a 
role in the UNFCCC negotiations. 
11.4 Response capacity at the local and 
community level
25. The literature on local and community-based ad-
aptation policies is increasing, and several studies are 
available which provide a good overview of policy op-
tions for adaptation at the local level. One example is a 
case study carried out in Bangladesh. It has developed 
a useful typology to describe different policy measures 
and policy areas that need to be involved in local ad-
aptation measures to climate change (FAO and ADPC 
2006, 66f). The authors of that study show that success-
ful local adaptation to climate variability and change is 
not an easy task. Rather, it requires multiple pathways 
with well planned and interrelated short- and long-term 
measures. The task ahead in designing meaningful adap-
tation policies at local levels is the need to find the right 
combination of these factors. This should give answers 
to the expected changes in the „geo-physical settings“ 
as well as the necessary adjustments in the „livelihood 
systems“. 
26. To sum it up, adaptation policies need to be em-
bedded appropriately in the local context and should 
be oriented towards the most vulnerable groups. One 
of the strengths of using a rights-based approach in the 
design of adaptation policies is that it helps to set up 
procedural guarantees for the affected communities and 
people for participation. This included having access 
to relevant information (transparency) and the right to 
complain. The second strength is that a rights-based ap-
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proach requests a specific outcome. Governments have 
to prove that their policy and budget decisions are fo-
cused toward the most vulnerable groups and that no 
group is overlooked. Governments must prove that 
their own adaptation policies do no harm, i.e. deprive 
people of access to food or water. Therefore, it is very 
sensitive and meaningful to target those in most need 
when approaching adaptation policies, as many studies 
demand.
11.5 Response capacity at the  
international level
27. In discussing global food security and the response 
capacity of international aid and intergovernmental or-
ganisations, this study concludes that the availability 
of food is not an indicator explaining why people are 
hungry. The overall availability of food is dependent on 
many factors, including agricultural research and pro-
ductivity. This chapter has shown that it is not only im-
portant to look into the high potential areas of produc-
tion, because their relative advantage might suffer from 
climate change (less water, flooded fertile coastal zones 
affected by salt water intrusion etc.). 
Productivity gains will be best achieved when small-
holder farmers get more support and incentives to pro-
duce. Support must be directed at them in order to en-
sure that they can use it (linked with micro-credits and 
training etc). If this support is simultaneously directed 
to help them to adapt to climate change or cope with 
the consequences, then adaptation policies are becom-
ing more oriented towards an integrated approach that 
includes poverty concerns. At the same time, smallhold-
er farmers are still the biggest single group of hungry 
persons worldwide. If their income can be raised, the 
hunger situation will become better.
28. Development cooperation can play a crucial role in 
all stages of the adaptation policies. Different aid actors 
can play different roles in development aid. Bi- and mul-
tilateral aid can help integrate adaptation into policy de-
velopment. Capacity must be built at all stages of the ad-
aptation process in developing countries, from disaster 
preparedness and early warning to insurance schemes 
and policy design issues. Other stakeholders, such the 
scientific community and NGOs, should be integrated 
into adaptation planning. Each of these institutions can 
help to best design adaptation policies. Aid organisa-
tions are often those who are more in touch with other 
institutions than most vulnerable groups. They can help 
by using their experience in project management and 
implementation and also by mobilizing internationally 
available knowledge.
11.6 Climate change and development
29. Climate change will have an impact on the econ-
omy as a whole. The cost of importing food to low in-
come, food deficit countries might increase substantial-
ly. Larger scale losses of fertile land will lead to sizable 
changes in the national economic structure. It will also 
influence the income governments receive, which will 
be one of the important sources to finance adaptation 
policies. Public budgets will not only face a potential 
decrease in income, but also potentially an increase in 
public expenditure for things like food and water sup-
ply. Public budgets could also be largely affected by the 
costs for financing infrastructure to cope with climate 
change, such as dam constructions etc. 
The spread of additional diseases might create extra 
costs. As a result, less money might be available for the 
regular implementation of the MDGs. Money for adap-
tation – both internationally and nationally – should not 
come from the overall development budget. Otherwise, 
funding might shift from long term development invest-
ments to more short term adjustment projects to climate 
change. 
30. The increasing environmental scarcity of resources 
in some regions might be one important factor trigger-
ing conflicts. The example of Darfur shows that the on-
going depletion and overuse of resources can become 
at least one of the reasons for conflict. Such situations, 
both environmentally-induced conflicts and existing 
conflicts that could be aggravated by climate change, 
will increase the number of refugees and cause migra-
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tion. Migrants and internally displaced persons (IDP) are 
becoming one of the most vulnerable groups potentially 
affected by climate change, and they are without many 
coping capacities to deal with the new situation.
31. The financing of adaptation measures will need 
adequate international support. This study discusses 
current adaptation instruments, such as the National 
Action Plans for Adaptation that already exist under the 
UNFCCC. It also shows both the benefits and weak-
nesses of the new Adaptation Fund, a new instrument 
under the Kyoto Protocol. The governance structure has 
been finally agreed on in Bali in December 2007. 
A key element under the UNFCCC to advance the un-
derstanding and practical approaches in assessing adap-
tation costs and benefits is the Nairobi Work Program 
on Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability (NWP). The 
NWP has the main objective of helping all countries 
improve their understanding of the impacts of climate 
change and to make informed decisions on practical 
adaptation actions and measures. Thus, it is a good ex-
ample of cooperative action and sharing of experiences 
among Annex-I and Non-Annex-I Parties. Many gov-
ernments have stressed the need that further work on 
the NWP should contribute to the new considerations 
under the Bali Action Plan. Improved cost assessments 
will also be important for the work of the Adaptation 
Fund Board.
32. The Adaptation Fund (AF) is one of the most innova-
tive funding instruments, and it is not fed by voluntary 
contributions but by a levy – actually the first interna-
tional envirnonmental levy – on emissions reductions 
issued under the Clean Development Mechanism. The 
present forecasts of the resources that will flow into the 
AF will probably be much larger than the voluntary con-
tributions to the Convention Funds. 
However, it will still be insufficient to cover the needs. 
After Parties agreed upon the governance structure of 
the Adaptation Fund, with a non-Annex-I – synonymic 
for the developing countries – majority in the Adaptation 
Fund Board, it now has to work cut out for it in fully 
instituting the Adaptation Fund (AF). 
It is important to note that the AF can not only finance 
projects, but also programs and activities. The Adaptation 
Fund has the potential to successfully demonstrate that 
effective international financing mechanisms with di-
rect access for developing countries and independent 
from the conventional donor-recipient structures are 
possible. The better the AF serves the goal of advancing 
adaptation in developing countries, the better it is suited 
to play a key role in future adaptation financing beyond 
2012. When developing its guidelines, it should address 
how to monitor project and program implementation to 
ensure effective disbursement of resources, and, more 
importantly, how to ensure that particularly vulnerable 
communities are prioritized target groups.
33. Once the large scale resources are generated, it re-
mains to be decided whether one operating entity will 
strategically manage these funds, or if management will 
be disbursed among different sub-entities who have par-
ticular expertise in certain fields etc. Part of this strate-
gic management must be assisting the implementation 
of frameworks based on incentives for adaptation within 
countries. The share of public investments may be high-
er in developing countries than in developed ones – and 
thus will be the share of adaptation costs. Nevertheless 
many actions relevant for adaptation are being under-
taken by private actors (OECD 2008a). But this will in 
practice only work, especially for vulnerable groups, if 
governments create enabling environments as well as 
incentive structures and support those who can not af-
ford private sector solutions. 
11.7 Regional perspectives for climate 
change and food security (Africa, Asia, 
Latin America)
34. The chapter about regional effects of climate change 
on food security gives short summaries of more detailed 
regional studies, which were written in parallel to the 
main study. The chapters on Africa and Asia start with 
an overview of the research results about the effects of 
climate change on food production, agriculture and wa-
ter availability. This is followed by an identification of 
key affected vulnerable groups and a discussion of the 
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available response capacity of governments and local ac-
tors in the regions.The Latin American study has not 
yet been available. So in chapter 12 we will give a short 
summary based on the newest IPCC results regarding 
Latin America. 
11.7.1 Africa
35. In summarizing the Africa-related conclusions of the 
FAR, it becomes obvious that climate change has the po-
tential to compromise the ability of many African socie-
ties to achieve the different Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) and to improve food security. The IPCC 
expects that the area suitable for agriculture and the 
length of growing seasons and yield potential, particu-
larly along the margins of semi-arid and arid areas, will 
decrease. The yields from rain-fed agriculture are ex-
pected to decrease by up to 50 percent in some coun-
tries already by 2020 (IPCC 2007b, 13). 
Also, the number of people under increased water stress 
will significantly increase from 75 to 250 million people 
in the next 15 years with a further increase until 2050. 
While the consequences of 2020 will be independent of 
the results of a worldwide mitigation strategy the conse-
quences for the water situation in 2050 and even more 
2100 will be largely determined by it. This will prima-
rily take place in Southern and Northern Africa. 
In addition, local food supplies are projected to be nega-
tively affected by decreasing fisheries resources in large 
lakes. This result is due to rising water temperatures, 
which may be exacerbated by continued over-fishing. 
Lake Victoria, for example, represents an important 
food source for 30 million people in danger.
36. However, Boko et al. (2007, 457) also note that 
„the contribution of climate to food insecurity 
in Africa is still not fully understood, particularly 
the role of other multiple stresses that enhance 
impacts of droughts and floods and possible fu-
ture climate change. While drought may affect 
production in some years, climate variability 
alone does not explain the limits of food pro-
duction in Africa. Better models and methods 
to improve understanding of multiple stresses, 
particularly at a range of scales, e.g., global, 
regional and local, and including the role of 
climate change and variability, are therefore re-
quired“.
37. In addition to the direct impacts of climate change 
on food security and the MDGs, recent research pays in-
creasing attention to the role water scarcity or reduced 
food availability play in the emergence of conflicts, of-
ten through increased competition for scarce resources. 
These may further aggravate the livelihoods of people. 
Climate change already represents an important cause 
for existing conflicts, as several experts have concluded 
for the Darfur conflict, where a long-term decline in rain-
fall significantly contributed to the scarcity of available 
fresh water (Ban-Ki Moon 2007). In the southern part 
of Africa, climate change is expected to further weaken 
the agricultural potentials of countries belonging to the 
poorest societies in the world. This would worsen the 
state of human security and strain the governments‘ ca-
pabilities.
38. The most vulnerable groups include smallholder 
farmers who rely on rain-fed agriculture, pastoralists, 
and the fishing communities. Communities across the 
continent have developed ways of dealing with impacts 
of climate related events over time. Drought and floods 
are not new to many communities in Africa. However, 
the increasing frequency and intensity of these events 
are rendering some of the strategies that have served 
communities well in the past inadequate. 
For farmers, mixed cropping served as insurance against 
total crop failure; rotational cropping allowed for the re-
juvenation of soils sustaining production at reasonable 
levels. Pastoralists migrated to better areas in times of 
drought, traded animals for cereals and other products 
from neighboring communities, and kept animals with 
friends and relatives elsewhere as a form of insurance. 
With the rapid changes in climate in the recent past, 
some of the strategies are no longer viable, others might 
become ineffective in a quickly further changing climate. 
And there is evidence of erosion of coping and adaptive 
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strategies as a result of varying land-use changes and 
socio-political and cultural stresses.
39. Until recently, climate change adaptation hardly 
played a role in African politics. An analysis undertaken 
in 2007 on existing Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
showed that both adaptation and climate change were 
hardly mentioned (Harmeling, Burck and Bals 2007). 
However, at that time, the available PRSPs were some 
years old, and now the picture is changing. Adaptation 
has gained a lot of policy profile in the last two years, as 
can be seen in the Addis Abeba Declaration on Climate 
Change and Development in Africa, which was adopted 
by the African Union in 2007 (AU 2007), or the Joint 
Africa-EU Strategy (Africa-EU 2007). The NAPA process 
has helped governments to understand the challenge of 
adaptation, although it is only a first step. 
40. The institutional capacity including that of politi-
cal institutions is a key issue in developing comprehen-
sive adaptation strategies. Recognizing that the needs 
for adaptation might exceed their abilities in terms of 
knowledge and resources, it is important that a combi-
nation of approaches, both technical and political, are 
used to ensure that the potential negative impacts are 
minimized. 
This is especially true with regard to their assets and 
production systems. The focus should be on prevent-
ing impacts as much as possible rather than reacting to 
what has happened. Hence, this study recommends five 
guidelines. 
(1) Awareness creation at all levels as a first step in sen-
sitizing the global community and local communities on 
need to tackle climate change.
 (2) The need to promote mitigation activities even in 
developing countries because the best way to adapt in 
future is to minimize the impacts.
(3) Everywhere, but especially for poor countries, adap-
tation must be implemented and strengthened as much 
as possible to avoid loss of assets and means of liveli-
hood. Based on the UNFCCC principles of common but 
differentiated responsibility and respective capability, 
developed countries have a moral and legal obligation 
to support poor countries in the process. 
(4) Reform the WTO and other trade regimes to ensure 
that it does not hinder vulnerable groups from being 
protected. 
(5) There is need for coordination of efforts at the differ-
ent levels (local, national, international) to ensure that 
limited resources are used optimally.
11.7.2 Asia
41. In Asia, an increasing trend towards a warmer sur-
face air temperature has been observed during recent 
decades ranging between less than 1°C to 3°C per 
century. Moreover, a 2.0 to 4.5ºC net global average 
surface warming is expected by the end of the present 
century (2090-2099). All of Asia will very likely have 
problems with this warming trend during this century 
(Christensen et al. 2007). Increases in the amount of 
precipitation are very likely in high-latitudes, while de-
creases are likely in most subtropical land regions, con-
tinuing observed patterns in recent trends (Christensen 
et al. 2007). 
Glaciers in Central Asia, Western Mongolia, North-West 
China, and the Tibetan Plateau are reportedly melting 
faster in recent years than ever before (Pu et al. 2004). 
Consequently, glacial runoff and the frequency of gla-
cial lake outbursts causing mudflows and avalanches 
have increased (Bhadra 2002; Rai 2005). Changes have 
also been observed in extreme climate events like fre-
quent occurrence of more intense rainfall, increasing 
frequency and intensity of floods, drought, and tropi-
cal cyclones. Regions of Asia such as South Asia, East 
Asia, and South-East Asia will experience an increase 
in occurrence of extreme weather events (Cruz et al. 
2007). 
Based on regional HadRM2 simulations, Unnikrishnan 
et al. (2006) expect with rising greenhouse gases an in-
creasing trend in the frequency as well as intensities of 
tropical cyclones by the 2050s in the Bay of Bengal. This 
Climate Change I Study
A
N
A
LY
SI
S 
02
192
would cause more heavy precipitation in the surround-
ing coastal regions of South Asia during both southwest 
and northeast monsoon seasons. Furthermore, a general 
warming of 2 to 4°C in Sea Surface Temperature (SST) 
is projected to increase tropical cyclone intensities by 10 
to 20 percent in East Asia, South-East Asia, and South 
Asia (Knutson and Tuleya 2004). 
42. The FAR of the IPCC projects an increased risk of 
hunger in South Asia due to a 30 percent decline in ce-
real yields. That might cause the effect that 266 million 
Asians may face the risk of hunger in 2080. A decline 
of the net productivity of grassland and milk yields is 
predicted. The agricultural water demand will increase 
between 6 and 10 percent per 1°C rise in temperature. 
The water system might be strongly affected. Overall, 
there a decline in water availability is expected. Close 
to 1 billion people will be affected by that reduction 
in India and South Asia. The melting of the Himalaya 
Glaciers will change the pattern of river runoff in the 
region. In coastal areas, the water quality might suffer 
from the intrusion of salt water, which might then also 
affect fish larvae abundance. Bangladesh (3), Vietnam 
(4) and India (7) are 10 of the most affected countries 
by extreme weather effects in the decadal Climate Risk 
Index (CRI) for 1997-2006 (Harmeling 2007). 
In the future, food scarcity projections for South and 
South-East Asia are highly vulnerable with high confi-
dence, while East Asia is highly vulnerable with a very 
high degree of confidence (Cruz et al. 2007). The dense-
ly populated mega deltas of Asia and relevant megacities 
(e.g. Bangkok, Shanghai, Tianjin), are vulnerable to both 
direct effects of climate change and sea-level rise (Cruz 
et al. 2007). 2,500 km2 of mangroves in Asia are likely 
to be lost with 1 meter of sea-level rise. Approximately 
1,000 km2 of cultivated land and sea product cultur-
ing area in Bangladesh are likely to become salt marsh 
(Cruz et al. 2007).
43. 37 countries, 10 of which are in Asia, are currently 
facing food crises and require external assistance (FAO 
2008a). Those countries lack of ability to deal with 
critical problems of food security due to an exceptional 
shortfall in food production (Iraq), widespread lack of 
access (Afghanistan and Korea DPR), or severe localized 
food insecurity (Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, Nepal, 
Sri Lanka, Timore-Leste and Vietnam). Except in conflict 
prone Afghanistan, Iraq and Sri Lanka, natural catastro-
phes have played the most decisive role in undermining 
their food security. Recent high global cereals price have 
also generated widespread increases in domestic food 
prices of the Asian LFDC‘s. (FAO 2008a).
44. Reflecting knowledge on projected impacts of cli-
mate change on different sectors would allow to the 
identification of likely priority actions on adaptation 
from a top-down perspective. Initiated and supported 
by the UNFCCC process, LDCs in Asia and elsewhere 
have started or even finished elaborating on National 
Adaptation Programs of Action (NAPAs). The guidelines 
agreed upon under the UNFCCC specifically underline 
the objective to identify and address the most urgent ad-
aptation needs and priority projects. In principle, these 
should be developed in a participatory process (UNFCCC 
2001). However, these guidelines are much less con-
crete than the procedural elements from the FAO vol-
untary guidelines on the implementation of the right to 
adequate food as introduced above. Nevertheless, these 
NAPAs serve as the best and most recent starting point 
when looking at adaptation priorities. They also provide 
reference when assessing likely costs of adaptation, al-
though it has to be repeated that they only concern the 
most urgent adaptation needs.
45. There are a number of barriers which still need to 
be removed to allow for better and faster increases in 
adaptive capacity. The prevailing level of poverty can be 
judged as the largest barrier to developing the capacity 
to cope and adapt. The poor usually have a very low 
adaptive capacity due to their limited access to informa-
tion, technology, and other capital assets which make 
them highly vulnerable to climate change (Cruz et al. 
2007). Adaptive capacity in countries where there is 
a high incidence of poverty will likely remain limited. 
Furthermore, Cruz et al. (2007, 492 conclude that 
„insufficient information and knowledge on 
the impacts of climate change and responses 
of natural systems to climate change will likely 
Climate Change I Study
A
N
A
LY
SI
S 
02
193
continue to hinder effective adaptation particu-
larly in Asia“.
46. Easterling et al. (2007) infer with high confidence 
that smallholder and subsistence farmers, pastoralists, 
and artisanal fisher folk will suffer complex, localized 
impacts of climate change. Climate change may affect 
the poor through changes or depletion in common prop-
erty resources, such as fisheries, rangelands, or forests, 
which they depend on for their livelihoods. Successful 
adaptation strategies have find strategies to support mar-
ginalized people most vulnerable to the impact of cli-
mate change. They are marginalized through all forms 
of discrimination i.e. by geographic, social, production 
specific, political, and gender processes.
47. The following recommendations for the situations 
in Asia are championed by this study. 
(1) Most vulnerable countries like Bangladesh must de-
velop policy coherence in the struggle to adapt to and 
fight against climate change. Therefore it is necessary 
to link climate change policy with all development sec-
tors and sub-sectors (e.g. land, food, agriculture, trade, 
energy etc.) under a comprehensive National Climate 
Change Policy. 
(2) Effective global mechanisms should be developed to 
ensure funds and incentive structures under the UN for 
climate-coping initiatives by poor countries. 
(3) Global food production should be increased by us-
ing suitable technology, and potential agricultural lands 
should support smallholders and help them to increase 
their productivity. 
(4) Vulnerable people should be empowered and ena-
bled to adapt to climate change by building resilience 
through investments in social protection, health, educa-
tion, insurance and other measures.
(5) In countries experiencing potential food deficits 
under climate change, local policy such as establishing 
social safety nets and associated programs aimed at the 
creation of access to food should be given priority. Pro-
poor agricultural development should be given a very 
high priority.
(6) Food deficit countries should establish mechanisms, 
either individually or collectively, with neighboring 
countries to form an emergency food bank, which may 
be mobilized in case food is not available from interna-
tional sources following a shock.
 (7) Coastal infrastructure should be built in order to face 
onslaughts of extreme events (such as dams, cyclone 
shelters) with the support from emitting countries.
11.7.3 Latin America
48. As in other continents the yields of crops can in-
crease in temperate climates, while in dryer regions it 
is expected that climate change will foster processes 
of salinisation and the available area for crop land as 
well as for grazing land will shrink (Magrin et. al 2007). 
Land use changes have occurred during the last years 
and have intensified the use of natural resources and 
exacerbate many of the processes of land degradation. 
The IPCC reports that almost three-quarter of the dry 
lands are moderately or severely affected by degradation 
processes. 
49. Climate variability and extreme events have se-
verely affected Latin America. The number of extreme 
events, be it hurricanes, flooding, or Amazonian drought 
(2005), has been high during the past few years. But the 
regular parameters are also changing. Increases in rain-
fall have been observed in South-East Brazil, Uruguay, 
the Argentinean Pampa, and some parts of Bolivia. 
While this has increased the flood frequency, it has also 
positively impacted crop yields. On the other hand, a 
declining trend in precipitation has been observed in 
southern Chile, South-West Argentina, southern Peru, 
and western Central America. As a consequence of tem-
perature increasing, the IPCC notes that the trend in 
glacial retreat is accelerating, with the exception of the 
southern Andean region. This issue is critical to Peru, 
Bolivia, Colombia, and Ecuador, where water availabil-
ity has already been compromised for both consumption 
or for hydro-power generation. It is expected (Magrin et 
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al. 2007) that the net increase of people experiencing 
water stress due to climate change is likely to increase 
from 7 to 77 million. The number of people experienc-
ing water stress will increase more in the second half to 
the century. 
50. Climate change increases the risk that major parts 
of the Amazon could change from tropical rain forest to 
savannas in coming decades. This risk is higher in the 
eastern Amazon and in the tropical forests of central 
and southern Mexico. This could go hand in hand with 
the replacement of semi-arid vegetation by arid vegeta-
tion in parts of North-East Brazil and most of central and 
northern Mexico. It would be a result of both land-use 
and climate change. 
51. Support for smallholder farmers is reduced across 
Latin America. Many of these farmers have been moved 
to agricultural areas at the fringe of difficult environ-
ments, on steep hills, or in areas that might become 
totally dry. This group is likely to be very much affected 
by climate change, particularly because they are often 
missing household coping capacity. 
Another group that will be affected are landless labor-
ers. They must buy agricultural products on local and 
regional markets and will be affected by higher prices 
for basic staple foods. Latin America is the continent 
with the highest rate of urbanization. Urban squatters 
are directly dependent on food and water prices. Almost 
13.9 percent of the Latin American population (71,5 
million) has no access to safe water supply. 63 percent 
live in rural areas (Magrin et al. 2007, 597). 
Many rural communities rely on limited freshwater re-
sources. Many others rely on rainwater or use water-
cropping methods which are vulnerable to drought. The 
number of people living in water-stressed watershed ar-
eas is going to increase by 12 to 81 million in 2020 
and 79-178 million in 2050, depending on which IPCC 
emission scenario you choose. Other groups affected by 
climate change will be those living in cost-lines with 
mangroves, such as in Ecuador. Sea level rise is ex-
pected to affect particularly low coastal areas in Central 
America and the Caribbean. 
52. The IPCC summarizes that a number of constraints 
of different natures are to be observed in this region re-
lated to the adaptation capacity. These constraints might 
dampen stakeholders’ and decision makers’ capacities 
to achieve policy efficacy and economic efficiency for 
adapting to climate change. Socio-economic and politi-
cal factors compromise the limited availability of credit 
and technical assistance as well as the low public in-
vestment in infrastructure in rural areas. This hinders 
the implementation of adaptive options in the agricul-
tural sector, particularly for small producers. In addition, 
the poor appreciation of risk, lack of technology, inad-
equate education, public health services, inappropriate 
monitoring, and incomplete information are important 
constraints to adaptation to current climate trends. The 
huge inequality in access to productive resources might 
lead to adaptation schemes that are oriented to support 
and help huge land entities and plantations adapt to 
climate change. The situation will not become easier 
for smallholder farmers and landless laborers. A rights-
based adaptation policy could help to identify the vul-
nerable groups described above and to help focus na-
tional adaptation policies on those most in need. The 
role of safety nets for consumers in order to cope with 
increasing prices for food and water will be of particular 
importance in Latin America.
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